Xeiexian0

Xeiexian0 t1_j5w4xb0 wrote

>One of the main arguments for moral anti-realism is that there is no way
to objectively verify or falsify moral claims. For example, it is not
possible to conduct a scientific experiment to prove that murder is
wrong or to measure the “goodness” of honesty. This contrasts with
scientific claims, which can be tested and verified through
experimentation and observation.

This is technically an argument from incredulity. Even if we may not currently know how to objectively derive moral facts (although I would posit the method I have posted in this thread as a possible candidate for such), this does not imply that no such method can be found in the future.

​

>Another argument for moral anti-realism is that moral beliefs and values are culturally relative and vary widely across different societies and
historical periods. This suggests that moral beliefs are not based on
any objective moral facts, but rather on the cultural and historical
context in which they are held.

The fact that there are various different models of an alleged phenomenon each contradicting themselves does not preclude the existence of such phenomenon. Otherwise we would have to discard the spherical earth theory because there were so many different models of the earth in the ancient past. We would also have to discard the theory of evolution because of all the creation myths that people held even to this day. It is possible that only one person's/culture's morality is correct and all the others are wrong, or at least there might be a variation in the merit of moral claims.

The set containing all moral codes one can devise is at least limited by sustainability. Those moral beliefs that wipe out any holder of such beliefs tend not to last long. Furthermore the more parochial a moral system is, the less likely a group of its adherents can expand beyond a limited time and space without discarding such beliefs.

There is also the fact that, just like descriptive fact systems, prescriptive systems can be corrupted by agents bending such system to their personal benefit. The variation in moral beliefs from a possible true one may be due to corruption of people's moral understanding.

​

>Another version of moral anti-realism is called relativism, which holds that
moral statements are true or false relative to a particular culture or
society. According to relativism, there are no objective moral facts or
values that hold true across all cultures or societies.

What if one culture clashes with another? For instance, what if a group of people believes that they are morally obligated to have sex with another group who themselves believe that they are morally obligated to maintain celibacy? Both culture's morals cannot both be practiced. At a bare minimum, freedom from association will be required in order to avoid conflict and for moral relativism to work which would make freedom from association an objective standard. The same can be said of moral subjectivism where a particular society/culture is a culture of one individual.

I am unsure about expressivism. Moral beliefs not extending beyond opinion doesn't seem that different from moral nihilism.

>Moral anti-realism has been criticized by moral realists, who argue that
it fails to provide a coherent account of moral language and ethical
reasoning. They argue that moral anti-realism is unable to explain how
moral statements can be meaningful or have any practical implications if
they do not correspond to any objective moral facts or values.

I'll have to side against the moral realists in this case. Although moral statements do have to be objective in order to work (the sex mandate group and the celibates can't both be right), this does not imply that they exist/are_real. Also the existence of language used to describe a given phenomenon does not prove the reality of that phenomenon, other wise the language of faster than light travel found in many sci-fi genres proves that you can travel faster than the speed of light.

That being said, people have desires, wishes, and other preferences. Such preferences take the form of prescriptive type phenomenon. Although these preferences can contradict one another, they can possibly be used to derive a consistent objective meta-preference given the right framework.

2

Xeiexian0 t1_j5qe5pr wrote

All sentient beings have a moral right to holistic social/behavioral information entropy.

First of all, let me apologize for posting this rather lengthy ocean of confusion wisdom.

Second, here are some definitions:

Sentient being: a system capable of organically modeling its environment, its location within such environment, and has preferences with regard to such environment. Many animals may qualify as such.

Person (sapient being): a sentient being with sufficient mental capacity to form a holistic worldview and distinguish right from wrong. Humans may qualify as such, although they may not be the only ones.

Morality: A model of the ideal behavior of persons or groups of persons.

Ethics: The study of morality. The logic applied to prescriptive modeling.

Moral Right: Something a sentient being or group of sentient beings would be-able-to-do/possess in a moral ideal scenario regardless of the desires/demands of other sentient beings or groups. A moral right held by a sentient being usually implies a moral obligation imposed on persons to respect/support such right. As such, a rights model is a type of moral/legal model.

Information Entropy (H): a measure of the “spread” of possible states a system can be in, or the open-endedness of a system [0]. In simple form, the entropy (in nats) of a system is given by H = ln(Z), where Z is the number of possible states the system can be in, and “ln()” represents the natural logarithm function.

[0] https://brilliant.org/wiki/entropy-information-theory/

Information Negentropy (D): a measure of the “collapse” of possible states a system can be in, or close-endedness of a system. In simple form, the negentropy (in nats) of a system is given by D = ln(Z0) - ln(Z) = ln(Z0/Z), where Z0 is the maximum number of possible states the system can be in.

Socio-Behavioral Information Entropy (SBIE): Information entropy applied to sentient beings and their social interactions.

Social-Behavioral Information Negentropy (SBIN): Information negentropy applied to sentient beings and their social interactions.

With that out of the way...

In most moral models, prescriptive terms tend to either remain undefined, or are defined in an ad hoc “just because” manner. This has led to countless mutually exclusive moral codes being proposed, even under the same ethical framework. Up to this point, there has been no success in deriving a foolproof, non-arbitrary, moral model.

This post will attempt to remedy this problem, deriving a rights based moral model, here called social entropian rights (SER). This will (ostensibly) be accomplished by introducing a new tool to general epistemology, namely, the principle of maximum entropy (PME). The PME states that the model most likely to be valid is the model with the highest information entropy given our background knowledge [1][2][3].

[1] https://www.statisticshowto.com/maximum-entropy-principle/

[2] https://deepai.org/machine-learning-glossary-and-terms/principle-of-maximum-entropy

[3] https://pillowlab.princeton.edu/teaching/statneuro2018/slides/notes08_infotheory.pdf

If a system is known to be in one of Z0 states, then the probability that the system will be confined to Z states within the Z0 states is given by

P(Z) = Z/Z0 = exp(ln(Z/Z0)) = exp(-ln(Z0/Z)) = exp(-D)

, where “exp()” represents the exponential function. Note: As Z approaches the maximum number of states, Z0,

P(Z) --> P(Z0) = Z0/Z0 = 1

, which is the maximum possible probability. The corresponding entropy is H = ln(Z0) which also happens to be the maximum possible entropy. This is a highly simplified “proof” of the PME.

An example of the use of the PME would be a scenario where a marble is contained in one of eight boxes with equal probability of being in each box. We do not know which box the marble is in. Suppose there are 3 models that try to describe the location of the marble.

  1. A model that insists that the marble is in box 1.
  2. A model that insists that the marble is in either box 2, 4, or 7.
  3. A model that insists that the marble is in one of the 8 boxes.

The corresponding entropies, negentropies, and probabilities are

  1. H = ln(1) = 0 _________ D = ln(8) - 0 = ln(8) ____________ P = exp(-ln(8)) = 1/8
  2. H = ln(3) _____________ D = ln(8) - ln(3) = ln(8/3) ______ P = exp(-ln(8/3)) = 3/8
  3. H = ln(8) _____________ D = ln(8) - ln(8) = 0 ____________ P = exp(-0) = 1

The probability increases with increasing entropy. This should give you a general idea of how the PME functions.

Using the PME, social entropian rights can be derived in the following steps:

​

  1. By parsimony of general epistemology (avoiding epistemological double standards), the same logical rules that apply to descriptive notions would reasonably apply to prescriptive notions. The laws of logic/probability and the PME are thus imported into ethics.
  2. The preferences/motivations of sentient beings, being prescription type entities, can be used as ingredients to generate moral facts. To avoid bias, the preferences/mental-motivations of persons are black-boxed as the moral framework is derived.
  3. In order to be meaningful, a moral model is not constructed in such a way that it implies its own violation due to the physical impossibility of following it, otherwise it contradicts itself and violates the laws of logic provided by Premise 1. The boundaries of the physical universe are thus imported into the boundaries of ideal behavior.
  4. There is little to go on with regards to what persons ought to do other than the physical limitations people as a whole have (Premise 3) given that their wills are black-boxed (Premise 2).
  5. By the PME, provided by Premise 1, the moral model representing the maximum information entropy given our background information is the most probable moral model.
  6. The moral model with the maximum information entropy is the one with maximum SBIE for everyone as a whole (holistic SBIE) given the background information of what is physically possible (Premise 3).
  7. If the preferences of sentient beings conflict, the preferred conditions closest to maximum holistic SBIE would therefore best qualify as the objectively ideal conditions (Premises 5 and 6), and should thus take precedence. This forms a basis for moral entropic rights.
  8. Therefore the SBIE of sentient beings should not be suppressed without said sentient beings’ agreement.

A rational person agrees to any SBIE suppression they intentionally inflict upon themselves. Any controversy about said person’s intentional behavior must therefore involve the suppression of SBIE in others. Applying the PME, the probability that a person has a right to c is given by the social entropian rights equation (SERE).

R(c) = exp(-D0(c))

,where D0(c) is the imposed SBIN (suppressed SBIE) on other persons as a result of c. A more detailed description of social entropian rights and SBIE can be found in the following text [4](mine):

[4] https://www.mediafire.com/file/al4xn6fhb14oeea/S-B-I-E.pdf/file

In summary, the principle of maximum entropy can, through the simplification of general epistemology, be imported into ethics leading to the derivation of social entropian morality. From social entropian morality, a system of moral entropic rights, SER, can be derived from the core moral right to holistic SBIE.

Thank you for your consideration. I look forward to your feedback.

1