>A mistake many of us have made is to see Russia as a rational actor and think they will do what they should do. Meanwhile they insist on doing these irrationnal blunders.

I addressed this in another response, but I'll paraphrase here.

I think it's a mistake to see Putin as irrational. His power is derived from positioning himself as Russia's protector and savior.

The Propaganda:

He saved Russia from the "Chechen terrorists" (which was likely a false flag operation, and which brought him to national attention).

He saved Russia from the chaos and grotesque freedoms of post-Soviet Russia (circa 2004, when he took over media, and restructured voting - during the 1990s, free expression flourished in Russia, and it disturbed many people who felt their reality was already crumbling).

He saved Russia from the oligarchs (he made a public display of going after disloyal oligarchs, and then installed loyalists).

He saved Russia from starvation and capitalists (life in 1990s Russia was the hardest it had been in decades, and for many, especially outside of Moscow, food insecurity was a really problem, caused by global capitalists trying to hobble Russia).

He's currently saving Russia from apostate Russians who have gotten into their heads that Ukraine is an actually identity, while embracing Nazism.

He has been playing on repeat for over 20 years that the Baltic states are ungrateful backstabbers who want to see Russians suffer, and only he can keep them at bay.

Any pain that Russia suffers is because it's enemies are relentless, and the only thing standing between those enemies and utter, complete annihilation is Putin himself. He can't stop all the pain, but he can hold of oblivion.

Because of how he's positioned himself, each pain suffered by Russia is turned into a reminder of the death that awaits each Russian should he lose power.

His power is at its zenith when Russia suffers.

As I said elsewhere, there's a limit to the suffering Russians will take, but we don't know where that limit is, and that's dangerous for us all.

This article is about Lithuania taking steps to ready it's defensive posture against Russian invasion.

You seem to be implying that this is unnecessary because there is a zero chance of Russia invading Lithuania.

You say the zero chance stems from Russia looking at NATO's response.

This is Lithuania both readying that response, and advertising it.

If Lithuania treated it like a zero chance, it wouldn't be a zero chance.

They are treating it like a likelihood, and therefore, the chance decreases.

As the article correctly points out, Lithuania is Russia's gateway to Kaliningrad. That provides political cover (however vellus) for Russia to try something.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, and especially since 2004, Russian media has been running a constant narrative about how two faced the Baltic states are - how Russia saved them from Hitler, rebuilt them after WWII, poured in tons of wealth that could've been used in the Russian Soviet Republic, only to have them say "thank you" by turning their backs on them.

There has been an intensive propaganda campaign,spanning decades, against the Baltic states. Even Russians who might question a "special operation" in Ukraine would "understand" the necessity for escalation in the Baltics.

Also, Putin tends to be stronger when Russia is losing, because he plays off Russian fears of the the outside world to position himself as Russia's savior. Contrary to popular belief, he is a rational actor, and every defeat Russia experiences on the battlefield is a personal victory for his hold on power. Of course there's a limit to that, but no one knows exactly where that limit is, and that makes this whole situation incredibly dangerous, and we need to take all potential threats very seriously.

>Zero chance Russia tries to invade a NATO state.

I heard this a lot during the Maidan in 2014, with a lot of people denying Russia's invasion while it was actively invading Crimea.

For the last 8 years, the received wisdom was that there was a zero chance Putin would invade Ukraine, because [insert any number of reasons, ranging from Slavic brotherhood and lovd to the suicidal consequences for Putin and Russia].

Of course, the "zero chance" crowd I personally argued with since the beginning of the Maidan were dead wrong.

The "zero chance" scenarios, like the invasion, like the Russian draft, like the targeting of civilians, seem to be proven wrong at again and again.

Something might be low chance, without being zero chance. The difference is that we take low chance threats seriously instead of dismissing them.