Sanskrit is not the mother language of all other languages. There are many languages that predate it and had already branched off before it existed.

Let me attempt to explain something.

Morality is a word, yes? Words have meaning. I don't mean to get into the philosophy of language, but lets saying the meaning of words is based on common language use and the definitions within dictionaries, as is commonly accepted (if you disagree, read into theories of meanings and the philosophy of language to develop your own theory of meaning). For example, the meaning of literally used to mean "not figuratively", but because of common language use, it cannot be argued that it does not mean "figuratively" as well. The meaning of words is a complex, dynamic thing. This dynamic complexity is shared with the meaning of morality, as morality is a word like any other.

I would concede to you that some concept akin to morality, that I will call from now on as EB-morality (for EducatorBig), could be something that is not imaginary and exists irrespective of the mind. However, the issue is, EB-morality is not synonymous with morality as used in English. That's my main problem with your point. You can argue that morality is malevolence and benevolence all you want, but to do so you would be logically required (and by logically required I mean that if you were not to, you would be being illogical) establish a new philosophy of language and meaning.

I'm not sure how to explain this in clearer terms. The concept you are professing could fit under the definition of morality and common language understanding of morality, but it is not the definition or common language understanding of morality. Because your definition concerns moral right and moral wrong, evil or good, it does fit as a "theory of morality", or an ethical theory. However, it cannot somehow usurp its definition. Just like how no amount of logical argument could change the definition of "being", or really any other word, because the meaning of words has never been tied to these types of logical arguments. You can say the current definition of morality is incorrect, but on what basis? The basis that it is illogical is irrelevant (which I don't even agree with), because meanings of words do not have to follow logic.

To attempt to drive this point home, let me examine this quote by you:

>Something used to be written in dictionaries about the Sun and the stars was "They orbit the Earth."

This may be true, however the issue is not that the definition is wrong. The definition was never wrong, not even then, because when people said "the sun", what they were referring to was an object that orbited the Earth (footnote below). The issue isn't that the definition was wrong, but that the defined object simply did not exist. Definitions (in a language sense) can never really be "wrong", so to speak. It's simply the word as defined may not exist. Just like the definition of unicorn, as defined as "a horse-like animal with a single horn", is not incorrect, but the defined object does not factually exist in the real (real as defined in realism, as mind-independent) world.

I'm not going to continue to argue this further, because sadly I have a lot of university work to complete, but good talking to you.

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Footnote: They would have been wrong if they were to point at the sun in the sky and say, "that glowing object orbits the earth", but not if they were to say, "the sun orbits the earth" if the sun were defined as "the glowing sphere which orbits the earth" as these are definitionally and logically consistent statements. If they defined the sun as, "the glowing sphere in the sky" but said nothing about its orbit, then in this case it would be incorrect to say "the sun orbits the earth" as this is no longer definitionally consistent and also refers to an object that can be said to exist. I know this is sort of dense philosophy of language, but sadly I cannot explain a few hundred years of modern philosophy in a reddit thread lol.

>Except for the problem with the second premise.

For someone who complains about me talking about semantics, you sure do like to complain about semantics a whole lot. I can rephrase that easily to fix it. Here is the fixed second premise, ""Should", "moral right," and "moral wrong" are imaginary (premise)" (moral right and moral wrong, in this case, are defined as the usage of right and wrong associated not with accuracy or direction, but the definitions used in moral philosophy).

>You're just going to willfully ignore what I've said about definitions, huh?

Because what you've said about definitions is incoherent and unsupported. I literally had no idea how to respond to it because when you talked about definitions, you didn't make an actual logical argument. I cannot critique an argument that has not been made.

>No, I am simply having a conversation

Yes, and in this specific conversation we are having an arguments. Arguments have reasons. When I say I have no reason, I mean you have provided no reasons, and thus your argument is logically unsound. That is what that means. Stop with this silly "should is a myth" semantics. I'm not talking about that right now, so stop arguing with me about random stuff I haven't even brought up.

Ok, I'll just point out my issues with the premises and the conclusions you provided:

>Benevolently protecting others is good (opposite of evil) (premise)

Leap of logic. You need to prove that "benevolence is good" or, "benevolently protecting others is good". Benevolence's definition does not equal good's definition, and so to prove that benevolent action is good (in this case, benevolent protection), you need to provide other premises to prove that. Because you are implementing a logic chain (as is common in arguments), the fact that this premise is logically unsound means that your entire argument (after this premise) is unsound. So, if you want to correct your argument, you need to fix this issue first, but even though this damns your argument already I will provide some more criticisms below.

>Malevolently harming of others is evil (premise)

Same issue with above. This is unsupported. Just because harming exists, and malevolence exists, does not mean malevolent harm is evil. This needs to be proven with further evidence, reasons, or premises or else it also causes your argument to be unsound and illogical.

>A person can recognize good (premise)

A person can recognize evil (premise)

A person can recognize the distinction between good and evil (premise)

I do not accept these premises. Different cultures all around the world recognize the existence of evil and good. However, what they call evil, and what they call good, is drastically different. In many cases, say some ancient pagan cultures (lets just say the Asatru norse, in this case) would say that malevolent harm can be good (and not evil) if its done in the service of a God, or in an act of revenge. Even Christian witch hunts, which are malevolent cause of harm, would not be recognized as evil, and this witch hunts have continued in Africa into modern times. If we are using your definitions of good and evil, then it is actually completely incorrect to say that people can recognize good and evil. Some can, but if you were to pick a random person in history or present, it would be quite likely that they couldn't "recognize good/evil" in many, many cases. Thus, these premises are false.

>Even if no people exist in the past or present, people will exist in the future (premise)

Not necessarily. The science is still evolving, but if heat death were to happen ( a real possibility), then at some point nothing would be able to live as entropy would have reached a maximal state of continuous and equal energy levels throughout the entire universe and thus reactions (chemical, physical, biological) could not occur. You have to add the assumption: "assuming heat death, or any other end-of-universe scenario will not occur, and that the universe will remain persistent and hospital for some kind of life for all time", which an assumption which is ungrounded in current science and thus I do not accept.

Each one of these criticisms of your argument are, so to speak, damning. That means that if you want your argument to be logical or sound, you must address and fix each one.

>You mean you see no reason why you "should" or "must"?

No, I don't. When I say no reason, I mean no reason. Why are you assuming something that I didn't even say? Having a reason to believe something does not mean you should believe it, all it does is provide proof in favour of its reality or its factualness or accurateness. So, no, I'm not talking about should or must as you have decided to randomly assume.

>There is no such thing as "necessarily" since "necessity" is a myth

Yeah, that's why it isn't necessarily. I didn't say it was necessarily, I said it wasn't. What are you even talking about? Your whole response there wasn't even contrary to anything I had said.

>morality to actually factually be

How have you logically proven this at all? Morality is a word with a definition. You're just using your own definition, which is fine, but don't act like you have at all proven what morality is factually. This whole section, as I understand it, was meant to prove that morality is as you say it is:

"If you're malevolently doing harm (evil) without some benevolent prevention/undoing harm (good) to "cancel it" you're not being a moral person, you're being an immoral person"

The issue with this, however, is it isn't even an argument. It's just a conclusion. I think you misunderstand how deductive logic works. You have to provide premises that show what you're saying is right. I'm not sure how to put this more clearly, but you simply have not done that.

>The answer to the last two questions are: No one and nothing does. This is how morality and immorality have nothing to do with right and wrong or good and bad.

No, that doesn't actually logically follow. Just because "should", "right", and "wrong" do not actually exist does not mean that morality necessarily has to ascribe to something real. That's not a logically sound argument, because the conclusion does not follow from the premises. All that would prove is that morality may not be talking about something real in the first place. In fact, one of the viable, actually logical conclusion from these premises is that morality is imaginary, as I have been arguing. Let me demonstrate this with deductive logic:

1. Morality is generally considered by definition (in available dictionaries), by the general populace, and by philosophers to be about "should", "right", and "wrong" (premise)
2. "Should", "right", and "wrong" are imaginary (premise)
3. Therefore, morality as it is defined and understood (by the general populace) is about imaginary things (conclusion)

This is logically sound. If you disagree, please respond in a similar manner, using a deductive argument that is organized in a similar manner (with numbered points, and labelling your premises and your conclusion) or else I'm just not going to respond. I sadly just don't have the time in the day or the patience to sift through looking for any actual deductive arguments.

>But causing harm and being malevolent are not the same thing

My bad, I typed i.e. instead of e.g., I was just making an example.

>Arguably doing evil would be malevolence + causing (or actively trying to cause) harm

I don't agree, and I see no reason to agree with you. You can define evil in that way, but I see no reason why I would define evil in that way. On top of that, morality isn't even necessarily about good and evil. You can just as easily say it's about right and wrong, or good and bad. My main point is that you have failed to provide any conclusive proof to define morality in the way you want. This isn't semantic, because most philosophers and even just the general populace don't agree with your definition. Especially in philosophy, I haven't heard anyone advocate for a theory that says "morality is good and evil, which is benevolence and malevolence", and yet again, I see no reason to all of sudden agree with your definition of morality when you've provided no good reason for me to.

>Nothing is ever "required"

I wasn't using required in the manner you think. When someone says "logically required" they're talking about deductive logic, consider these premises: all frogs can jump, the animal in question is a frog, therefore the animal in question can jump. This is deductive logic (as opposed to inductive logic). Assuming the first two premises are true and accurate (I'm not saying they actually are, but lets say they are for the sake of the argument), then it is logically required that the animal in question can jump. That's what logically required means, it means that the conclusion put forth is consistent with deductive logic.

>No, because "should" is a myth.

Sure, I agree. But saying it's a myth is a bit of a weird way of saying it, its just subjective. What any one person should do, based on deductive or inductive logic, is based on an incomprehensible number of variables, and based on their own goals conscious and unconscious. But you are wrong, morality in philosophy is a normative study, aka the study of what you should do. If you disagree with that, then it'd be wise to find another word instead of morality as you are using it in such a way that most people educated in philosophy won't understand what you're trying to say.

>i.e. me being evil and immoral.

This is just a contingent or definitional truth (i.e. a truth that is only true because you define a word in such a way, aka it is definitionally true that causing harm is immoral if I define immorality as doing harm). I disagree that evil or immorality has anything to do with malevolence. If you think it does, that's fine, but you're definition of immorality is in no way logically required or objective.

>benevolence and malevolence exist objectively

Do they? What's your definition of benevolence and malevolence? In addition to that, your conclusion that because benevolence and malevolence exist objectively (which I have yet to see evidence for), that therefore morality exists objectively is logically unsound. Morality is normativity by definition, or in other words, morality is what you should do rather than what is. The existence of benevolence or malevolence has no effect on this. If you were to create a moral theory, you could say that being benevolent is good and being malevolent is bad, but this is in no way logically required, it is just subjective.

In what way does it exist outside of the mind? Morality, good, and evil are concepts created by humans. If all minds were removed from the universe, where would morality exist?

In what way is value non-imaginary? Value exists only in the mind, it is something imagined. Same with morality, or moral evil/good. Or are you using a different definition of imaginary?

While it is true that people are capable of understanding different languages, that does not mean it is not subjective. People have greatly different understandings of different words. This has been evidenced in your discussions with various people, I am sure, as many people have different conceptions of the words you use (freedom, objectivity etc.). To say words are presented to everyone equally and with equal comprehension is false. They are comprehended differently, based on everyone's own experiences with the words in the past. This makes them subjective. They may hold similar meaning to what others believe the words mean, but to say they hold they exact same meaning (which is what would be required to call them objective) is false.

By objective duties do you mean actually objective (as in, within the fabric of the universe or reality, something totally independent of the observer) as that is what I find objective to mean. Anything else is subjective. If you don't think the is-ought problem can be bridged, I'm confused how you argue the existence of objective duties (and thus an objective morality, if I understand you correctly).

I do agree freedom is a decent word for the concept your describing, but is there nothing else that can be used (e.g. mental freedom, desire freedom/freedom of desires, moral freedom)? I think these would help distinguish it from the regular use of freedom, because you may get a lot of flack from ordinary language philosophers for this usage. I don't think it makes your actual argument weaker, but I do think it weakens your ability to communicate it effectively.

I agree that there is subjective meaning, if what you mean by that is something like this: purpose, or meaning within the world is an arbitrary/human concept, and thus can be nothing else than subjective.

I apologize for using the term glorification, as I don't think you're glorifying freedom any more than utilitarian's glorify utility or virtue ethicists glorify virtues. Maybe "moralize" is a better word, but the "moralization" of some concept is integral to any normative theory. In any case, it isn't an issue, but I was just trying to show that freedom is no more special than utility or virtue in regards to the creation of an ethical theory.

Any person, regardless of profession or walk of life, can be physically fit (except in cases of certain disability, in which it would be impossible to be physically fit). Additionally, maximizing your own ability can just mean maximizing your ability in your walk of life (similar to Kant, advancing one's own skills and abilities).

In a world without this duty, people would be fine to do nothing at all. We would not want to live in a world where people don't maximize their ability. We want competent doctors and architects, and we want physically strong healthy people in general. Society without these would collapse.

I think a key issue with Scanlon's dilemmas is they ignore what the people losing TV actually want. Go, survey them if possible. Would they want the man to die so they can watch a bit more TV? I think you'll find a resounding no, as very few people would be that selfish. Why, in any case, would we be morally obligated to do something that no one wants, kills a person, and barely benefits anyone else? A utilitarian would not want this, as a utilitarian understands that a greater benefit and well-being would come from a society in which people aren't routinely sacrificed for minor pleasures.

I find the idea that principles often conflict within your theory a failure of the theory itself. All theories being subjective, I would much rather follow a theory that gives consistent advice on all topics rather than one that in a simple situation like the trolley problem says, "do whatever you want". I do not want to live in a world with such a vacuous ethical system. A normative theory tells you what you ought to do. If it can't do that, it's not exactly normative theory. Especially in situations of life or death. I mean no offence, but if an ethical theory cannot tell me whether to save a life, or take one, then I am not interested.

Of course ethics are subjective. There are not ethical objects to be found in the world, they're just rules or ideals that humans create founded upon arbitrary points. I find the glorification of "freedom" to be as arbitrary as the glorification of "utility" or "virtue". It doesn't matter what any of these things are, as what is has no affect on moral theories. It is the is-ought problem. You can't derive ought from is, and so it doesn't matter how "fact-based" or anything else freedom is, it's no more valid than utility or virtue.

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I think you should just use a separate word for freedom, as freedom already has a definition in ordinary language. Giving it a new one is, plainly speaking, just confusing.

So your definition of freedom (or liberty) is: "the power to reflect on our desires and change them based on abstract principles—including morals"

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I think the issue here is the definition for freedom is strange. It's not at all what the term means in ordinary language. So I'm not sure it's the best word to use if you're trying to communicate what you're saying to any audience.

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As you say, someone can't be held morally accountable for not doing something that is impossible (e.g. going back in time and killing Hitler). However, let me present a hypothetical: imagine you are in the wreckage of a destroyed building. Underneath a metal beam there is a man suffocating (from the weight of the beam). You are unable to lift it as you are not strong enough. So, given what you have said the person would not be held morally accountable.

But, if you had stayed more physically active throughout your life, you would have been able to lift the beam. So though in the moment it was impossible, if you had been stronger (a real possibility) you would have been able to save the man's life. Would you say under your normative theory that people have an obligation to maximize (or at least increase) their own ability (by ability I mean your power to exert your will upon the world, e.g. by increasing physical strength)? If not, people could simply be lazy or reduce their abilities in order to reduce their moral obligation.

Are you arguing for positive or negative liberty? The right to do versus the right to not be done upon? Or a mixture of the two?

That’s because oxygen is a gas. Gases are more soluble in cold water, solids more soluble in hot water.