> Does it? You give no reason why.

>Doesn't sound very like the quote you're referencing to me. Do you think Zizek would agree with you here?

I was assuming that you read the article under discussion.

Here, I'll bold the relevant parts for you.

>Compatibilists such as Daniel Dennett have an elegant solution to the incompatibilists’ complaints about determinism: when incompatibilists complain that our freedom cannot be combined with the fact that all our acts are part of the great chain of natural determinism, they secretly make an unwarranted ontological assumption: first, they assume that we (the Self, the free agent) somehow stand outside reality, then they go on to complain about how they feel oppressed by the notion that reality in its determinism controls them totally. This is what is wrong with the notion of us being “imprisoned” by the chains of natural determinism: we thereby obfuscate the fact that we are part of reality, that the (possible, local) conflict between our “free” striving and the external reality that resists it is a conflict inherent in reality itself. That is to say, there is nothing “oppressive” or “constraining” about the fact that our innermost strivings are (pre)determined: when we feel thwarted in our freedom by the pressure of external reality, there must be something in us, some desire or striving, which is thus thwarted, but where do such strivings come from if not this same reality? Our “free will” does not in some mysterious way “disturb the natural course of things,” it is part and parcel of this course.... When a determinist claims that our free choice is “determined,” this does not mean that our free will is somehow constrained, that we are forced to act against our will—what is “determined” is the very thing that we want to do “freely,” that is, without being thwarted by external obstacles.

Do you see the bit about "the fact that all our acts are part of the great chain of natural determinism"? Do you see the bit about Zizek explicitly tying our actions to the inescapable bounds of a deterministic - i.e. "(pre)detetrmined" - universe? How he denies that our Self can be a "free agent" outside of those bounds? How he explicitly links our "strivings" and the reality which - in his proposition - has spawned them? And how about the bit on our free choice being "determined" - by that very same reality?

It's the compatibilists themselves that are happy to claim that determinism removes free choice. They just attempt to decouple choice and "free will" - and do so clumsily and incoherently.

In particular, Zizek's proposition is that a pre-deterimined choice is still consistent with "free will" - because "what is “determined” is the very thing that we want to do “freely,” that is, without being thwarted by external obstacles."

This falls apart in several places - perhaps most obviously in that in Zizek's own framing, there is no possibility of any "external obstacles" - because there is no possibility in his mind of anything "external" to the reality that both governs our "strivings" and determines their success or failure.

>"...that the (possible, local) conflict between our “free” striving and the external reality that resists it is a conflict inherent in reality itself."

In Zizek's proposition (and Burgis' far less able framing) we are simultaneously totally governed by the unshakeable, constant and accidental whims of reality - and also free to choose whatever path we like, provided it aligns exactly with the predetermined path laid out by that same reality.

The ultimate meaninglessness of Zizek's interpretation of determinism is almost breathtaking.

>These are just more assertions lacking any given justification. You aren't bothering to try justify your position at all.

>Also, it's very unclear what idea of free will is sitting in your head.

Why yes, if you neatly clip around the specific parts of my post where I point out that determinism conflicts with the very definition of free will brought up in the article, then yes, you're right.

Here, let me quote the full thing for you:

>A pre-determined choice is not a choice. A deterministic universe neatly wipes out any such concerns as "reason responsiveness" or whatever other definition of free will you care to align on. Zizek's treasured quote that the author presents with such reverence boils down to accepting the lack of choice, and finding "freedom" in that unity with the universe, by recognizing that the "choice" you are making was in fact made by the very universe you are trying to affect, and only has meaning because of that commonality of source.

> Asserting that determinism removes choice from the equation is question begging. The compatibilists don't think it does and you didn't give even one reason why it would.

Compatibalists can try to play whatever semantic games they like - a deterministic universe is incompatible with the idea of choice. By definition.

The entire premise of compatibilism is trying to square peg that round hole.

A pre-determined choice is not a choice. A deterministic universe neatly wipes out any such concerns as "reason responsiveness" or whatever other definition of free will you care to align on. Zizek's treasured quote that the author presents with such reverence boils down to accepting the lack of choice, and finding "freedom" in that unity with the universe, by recognizing that the "choice" you are making was in fact made by the very universe you are trying to affect, and only has meaning because of that commonality of source.

Which is all fine and good and ultimately meaningless. It gets truly non-sensical however, if you follow the author's proposed approach of accepting this fluff and then pretending that the "common sense" approach to assigning moral responsibility still applies, even though no one is really in control of their actions.

> We don't put moralistic judgements on things we think don't have choice, but if determinism is true than this is sort of trivially untrue: we have in fact been making moral judgements on humans who don't have control over their choices

>Basically, a choice is an empirical fact one could argue. I'm not talking about "a thing determined by nothing other than a person's agency" when I say a choice, but I am talking about whatever we have been pointing to for over a thousand years and calling a choice, an emergent phenomenon of the brain.

>The reason I wouldn't call a volcano free is that I can't enter into a relationship with a volcano as if it were free, and it does not have any (deterministic) process of determination.

All of this boils down to "determinism destroys choice, but as long as we pretend it doesn't and just continue doing the same thing as we did before, then it's all OK."

Which makes determinism worthless and compatibalism so much hot air.

>Have you actually never heard the term “free will is an illusion”? I feel like it perfectly describes compatibilism.

Whether this does or does not perfectly define compatibilism, I do not know.

I do know that this description is in fairly direct opposition to the relationship between free will and compatibilism as presented in the article.

>The author has redefined it to make it a negligible epiphenomenon.

The author has attempted to redefine it, and at the same time attempted to leverage the "common sense" perception of moral responsibility that is most certainly not based on his new definition.

The author is playing a semantic shell game, all while desperately attempting to convince you that he gets to go to dinners with more interesting people, and that those who disagree with him and his cool friends are just "Philosophy 101 students."

> I'd like to be convinced, for a long time I thought I was missing something, but I'm now begining to believe I'm not missing anything.

You're not missing anything.

The whole thing is built on incredibly shaky suppositions and wordplay and constant allusions to the "fact" that if you don't "get it" then you're just not savvy enough, you're just not seeing things the right way.

EDIT:

>I don’t think you would accept [determinism] at as a blame-removing (or even blame-reducing) excuse. And I don’t think you’d accept it even if you fully and deeply accepted your friend’s empirical premise.

>The reason I don’t think you’d accept it—no matter how good a job you’d done in convincing yourself that determinism was 100% for sure definitely true—is that determinism vs. indeterminism has all of nothing to do with anything we commonsensically regard as relevant to the kind of control that’s required for moral responsibility.

This argument that "determinism is not an excuse" is both foundational to Brugis's point, and is completely unsupported. Literally no supporting evidence for this other than Burgis "doesn't think so."

Meanwhile, the argument that "determinism is, in fact, an excuse" is much more straightforward - determinism removes choice from the equation, and we don't tend to place moralistic judgement on things that don't have a choice. We don't put volcanoes on trial, regardless of how much damage they cause, we don't think that COVID is a bad moral example for our children, regardless of how many lives it has taken.

Apologies for being a kill-joy - but please consider that article to be only a bit of fanciful pseudo-science.

Fact check source