Natanael_L
Natanael_L t1_iu2a0dm wrote
Reply to comment by PaulSnow in I am the co-author behind ACM’s TechBrief on Election Security: Risk-limiting Audits. Ask me anything about election security! by TheOfficialACM
https://spectrum.ieee.org/chip-x-ray
And optical inspection is common - and less capable in detecting attacks like manipulated silicon doping
Natanael_L t1_iu0m81m wrote
Reply to comment by PaulSnow in I am the co-author behind ACM’s TechBrief on Election Security: Risk-limiting Audits. Ask me anything about election security! by TheOfficialACM
https://www.reddit.com/r/IAmA/comments/yd7qp6/i_am_the_coauthor_behind_acms_techbrief_on/ittyuja/
https://www.infona.pl/resource/bwmeta1.element.springer-147a2312-2fe6-3a08-9954-a904e950f9bb
> Instead of adding additional circuitry to the target design, we insert our hardware Trojans by changing the dopant polarity of existing transistors. Since the modified circuit appears legitimate on all wiring layers (including all metal and polysilicon), our family of Trojans is resistant to most detection techniques, including fine-grain optical inspection and checking against “golden chips”.
Natanael_L t1_itzm4n5 wrote
Reply to comment by PaulSnow in I am the co-author behind ACM’s TechBrief on Election Security: Risk-limiting Audits. Ask me anything about election security! by TheOfficialACM
Did you not look at the link I provided above?
Natanael_L t1_ityfenv wrote
Reply to comment by PaulSnow in I am the co-author behind ACM’s TechBrief on Election Security: Risk-limiting Audits. Ask me anything about election security! by TheOfficialACM
How to you think hardware tampering is discovered?
Natanael_L t1_itx703j wrote
Reply to comment by bornonthetide in I am the co-author behind ACM’s TechBrief on Election Security: Risk-limiting Audits. Ask me anything about election security! by TheOfficialACM
Didn't I already tell you I'm all for prosecuting the rest too?
Natanael_L t1_itx3j26 wrote
Reply to comment by bornonthetide in I am the co-author behind ACM’s TechBrief on Election Security: Risk-limiting Audits. Ask me anything about election security! by TheOfficialACM
If you think it's weaponized in every single instance where a criminal in the republican party gets caught then you need to reevaluate your life choices. Do you really think Republicans are overrepresented in prosecutions? They aren't.
Natanael_L t1_itwf6fr wrote
Reply to comment by bornonthetide in I am the co-author behind ACM’s TechBrief on Election Security: Risk-limiting Audits. Ask me anything about election security! by TheOfficialACM
You're really far down the rabbit hole. I told you everybody who breaks the law should face consequences and you falsely take it as proof that I somehow am the tribalistic hypocrite and not you yourself.
Natanael_L t1_itwew4c wrote
Reply to comment by PaulSnow in I am the co-author behind ACM’s TechBrief on Election Security: Risk-limiting Audits. Ask me anything about election security! by TheOfficialACM
Do you think every voting machine in Florida can be xrayed?
Natanael_L t1_itw7xsk wrote
Reply to comment by bornonthetide in I am the co-author behind ACM’s TechBrief on Election Security: Risk-limiting Audits. Ask me anything about election security! by TheOfficialACM
Most people don't leave evidence but he did.
Nobody accidentally goes over the limit by that much.
Natanael_L t1_itvdk7h wrote
Reply to comment by bornonthetide in I am the co-author behind ACM’s TechBrief on Election Security: Risk-limiting Audits. Ask me anything about election security! by TheOfficialACM
My response is to go ahead and prosecute more people over it. Don't let people get away with crime. The people who's prosecutions you're upset over all broke the law.
Natanael_L t1_itv9owu wrote
Reply to comment by bornonthetide in I am the co-author behind ACM’s TechBrief on Election Security: Risk-limiting Audits. Ask me anything about election security! by TheOfficialACM
The dude has fraud convictions. That's absolutely laughable.
Natanael_L t1_itufvgn wrote
Reply to comment by PaulSnow in I am the co-author behind ACM’s TechBrief on Election Security: Risk-limiting Audits. Ask me anything about election security! by TheOfficialACM
In practice it's the paper copies that's the best security measure. It really isn't feasible to audit the hardware in full at scale.
Natanael_L t1_ittz85o wrote
Reply to comment by bornonthetide in I am the co-author behind ACM’s TechBrief on Election Security: Risk-limiting Audits. Ask me anything about election security! by TheOfficialACM
The mules film was debunked in full before it was published.
Why does the name matter?
The wifi thing is a process issue. Local staff messed up. And in other countries they don't even need to mess with machines. If you control the whole thing with no insight and no audits you can just lie about the result regardless how the vote happens.
With paper backups AND independent audits none of that is a problem because the real count can be verified by hand, it would be obvious if it differs from what the machine reports. In western countries there's enough insight into how the voting is run to detect attempts at manipulation.
Natanael_L t1_ittyuja wrote
Reply to comment by PaulSnow in I am the co-author behind ACM’s TechBrief on Election Security: Risk-limiting Audits. Ask me anything about election security! by TheOfficialACM
The issue remains proving the hardware runs that software and that software only. No extra chips, no modified chips, not even tweaking semiconductor doping, and no exploits against the secure boot mechanism.
Even game consoles and the iPhone and sometimes HSM's fail at this.
Natanael_L t1_itspu8p wrote
Reply to comment by danegerously in I am the co-author behind ACM’s TechBrief on Election Security: Risk-limiting Audits. Ask me anything about election security! by TheOfficialACM
You don't know what gerrymandering is? Go look it up.
Natanael_L t1_itspouk wrote
Reply to comment by Star_Tropic in I am the co-author behind ACM’s TechBrief on Election Security: Risk-limiting Audits. Ask me anything about election security! by TheOfficialACM
It's not a good idea to leave them exposed, but ideally shouldn't bea huge risk. And with paper backups and audits that risk can be minimized.
Natanael_L t1_itspfz7 wrote
Reply to comment by SScattered in I am the co-author behind ACM’s TechBrief on Election Security: Risk-limiting Audits. Ask me anything about election security! by TheOfficialACM
It's really the audit part that's important. Statistics and such topics. On the CS side maybe cryptography, if you want to learn about that part of electronic voting. There's /r/crypto (I'm a mod there) and /r/cryptography where you can ask questions.
Natanael_L t1_itsp1rh wrote
Reply to comment by danegerously in I am the co-author behind ACM’s TechBrief on Election Security: Risk-limiting Audits. Ask me anything about election security! by TheOfficialACM
It's not a sports team. More people voted against former guy than for him because they wanted him out. End of story.
Natanael_L t1_itskm06 wrote
Reply to comment by Brancher in I am the co-author behind ACM’s TechBrief on Election Security: Risk-limiting Audits. Ask me anything about election security! by TheOfficialACM
What they did was faff around and mess with numbers they didn't understand.
Natanael_L t1_itskik8 wrote
Reply to comment by claymaker in I am the co-author behind ACM’s TechBrief on Election Security: Risk-limiting Audits. Ask me anything about election security! by TheOfficialACM
It's not a good match for national elections. It may work for participants within an organization which understand the tech and issues at hand, but there's too many problems for national voting.
Natanael_L t1_itsjdq4 wrote
Natanael_L t1_itsiy5o wrote
Reply to comment by aleph32 in I am the co-author behind ACM’s TechBrief on Election Security: Risk-limiting Audits. Ask me anything about election security! by TheOfficialACM
With paper ballots as a backup and protected from tampering, it's pretty hard to mess with a competent audit and not get caught.
Natanael_L t1_itsim44 wrote
Reply to comment by TheOfficialACM in I am the co-author behind ACM’s TechBrief on Election Security: Risk-limiting Audits. Ask me anything about election security! by TheOfficialACM
As a cryptography nerd, I think electronic remote voting for national elections is terrifying. Even the best possible technical solutions can be attacked with trivial workarounds if the users' devices can be compromised, or even substituted. Supply chain security for the hardware involved, handling issuing/registering keypairs and handling lost keypairs, etc. Coercion, targeted denial of service, etc.
Even without the actual election system being hacked, the processes around it can still be compromised. State of the art cryptography doesn't help when the keys are stolen and the inputs were replaced.
Natanael_L t1_itshtck wrote
Reply to comment by GalironRunner in I am the co-author behind ACM’s TechBrief on Election Security: Risk-limiting Audits. Ask me anything about election security! by TheOfficialACM
Also where they ask, they need to get a representative sample to make an accurate prediction
Natanael_L t1_jacr8yj wrote
Reply to comment by knd775 in Hand me down name tag trail on this child’s jacket by Mofomania
Abandoned bikes plus recovered bikes with no identified owner.