Natanael_L

Natanael_L t1_iu0m81m wrote

https://www.reddit.com/r/IAmA/comments/yd7qp6/i_am_the_coauthor_behind_acms_techbrief_on/ittyuja/

https://www.infona.pl/resource/bwmeta1.element.springer-147a2312-2fe6-3a08-9954-a904e950f9bb

> Instead of adding additional circuitry to the target design, we insert our hardware Trojans by changing the dopant polarity of existing transistors. Since the modified circuit appears legitimate on all wiring layers (including all metal and polysilicon), our family of Trojans is resistant to most detection techniques, including fine-grain optical inspection and checking against “golden chips”.

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Natanael_L t1_ittz85o wrote

The mules film was debunked in full before it was published.

Why does the name matter?

The wifi thing is a process issue. Local staff messed up. And in other countries they don't even need to mess with machines. If you control the whole thing with no insight and no audits you can just lie about the result regardless how the vote happens.

With paper backups AND independent audits none of that is a problem because the real count can be verified by hand, it would be obvious if it differs from what the machine reports. In western countries there's enough insight into how the voting is run to detect attempts at manipulation.

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Natanael_L t1_ittyuja wrote

The issue remains proving the hardware runs that software and that software only. No extra chips, no modified chips, not even tweaking semiconductor doping, and no exploits against the secure boot mechanism.

Even game consoles and the iPhone and sometimes HSM's fail at this.

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Natanael_L t1_itspfz7 wrote

It's really the audit part that's important. Statistics and such topics. On the CS side maybe cryptography, if you want to learn about that part of electronic voting. There's /r/crypto (I'm a mod there) and /r/cryptography where you can ask questions.

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Natanael_L t1_itsim44 wrote

As a cryptography nerd, I think electronic remote voting for national elections is terrifying. Even the best possible technical solutions can be attacked with trivial workarounds if the users' devices can be compromised, or even substituted. Supply chain security for the hardware involved, handling issuing/registering keypairs and handling lost keypairs, etc. Coercion, targeted denial of service, etc.

Even without the actual election system being hacked, the processes around it can still be compromised. State of the art cryptography doesn't help when the keys are stolen and the inputs were replaced.

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