Russian History 101:

"Things were bad, but then it got worse!"

By becoming a Chinese vassal, you mean?

Xi axis?

I think they're already tilted

>A mistake many of us have made is to see Russia as a rational actor and think they will do what they should do. Meanwhile they insist on doing these irrationnal blunders.

I addressed this in another response, but I'll paraphrase here.

I think it's a mistake to see Putin as irrational. His power is derived from positioning himself as Russia's protector and savior.

The Propaganda:

He saved Russia from the "Chechen terrorists" (which was likely a false flag operation, and which brought him to national attention).

He saved Russia from the chaos and grotesque freedoms of post-Soviet Russia (circa 2004, when he took over media, and restructured voting - during the 1990s, free expression flourished in Russia, and it disturbed many people who felt their reality was already crumbling).

He saved Russia from the oligarchs (he made a public display of going after disloyal oligarchs, and then installed loyalists).

He saved Russia from starvation and capitalists (life in 1990s Russia was the hardest it had been in decades, and for many, especially outside of Moscow, food insecurity was a really problem, caused by global capitalists trying to hobble Russia).

He's currently saving Russia from apostate Russians who have gotten into their heads that Ukraine is an actually identity, while embracing Nazism.

He has been playing on repeat for over 20 years that the Baltic states are ungrateful backstabbers who want to see Russians suffer, and only he can keep them at bay.

Any pain that Russia suffers is because it's enemies are relentless, and the only thing standing between those enemies and utter, complete annihilation is Putin himself. He can't stop all the pain, but he can hold of oblivion.

Because of how he's positioned himself, each pain suffered by Russia is turned into a reminder of the death that awaits each Russian should he lose power.

His power is at its zenith when Russia suffers.

As I said elsewhere, there's a limit to the suffering Russians will take, but we don't know where that limit is, and that's dangerous for us all.

> A mistake many of us have made is to see Russia as a rational actor and think they will do what they should do. Meanwhile they insist on doing these irrational blunders.

In truth, there were plenty of things operating in support of Putin's judgement that you would describe as rational, which people seemed blind to. I'm not sure that the 'mad-man' thing really works to the extent that Reddit says. You didn't need to be privy to 'top secret' information to see how it built up either. You would be perfectly capable of looking at the chronology of events and concluding that the invasion was inevitable and the logical extension of what he'd be doing for a decade

1: Putin was known to have been furious about how NATO corrupted a peace-keeping no-fly zone in Libya and turned it into an offensive action, that picked a side. Never again, was his thinking. I feel this was a really important touchstone moment, the significance of which is often overlooked and gets absolutely zero media comment. Don't forget that Obama was persuaded to join this action at the prompting of Hillary Clinton and Susan Rice. Vice President Joe Biden was known to have favoured non-intervention. Putin might be looking at Biden's lack of enthusiasm and mistaking good judgement for weakness. It needn't be the thinking of a mad man therefore, but rather someone who thinks he's got a read on Biden, and he's betting that this is Biden's default reaction

2: In 2014 Putin annexed Crimea with no serious consequences

3: America failed to involve themselves in Syria. Again it was Clinton who was more enthusiastic for action against Assad. It was first David Cameron (whose non-participation owed more to parliamentary mismanagement than any intent) and later VP Biden who persuaded Obama (during their famous 'rose garden walk') not to commit to Syria. Only the French formally adopted a proposal to engage, and they were left on their own

4: Russia by contrast did decide to intervene in Syria and enjoyed a modicum of success in doing so, even to the point where they attacked and helped destroy some western proxies (notably the FSA). This has to have served to embolden Putin, encouraging him to conclude he was more effective than he was

5: A new President (Trump) then handed over American bases in Syria to the Russians and allowed them to get on with it. Again, this has to signal to the Russian's that the American's will stand aside in the face of Russian aggression

6: Having co-opted the Kurds into the fight against ISIS, American foreign policy changed again when President Trump abandoned them and allowed the Turks and Syrians a free run on his erstwhile ally. You could easily be forgiven for thinking that when the chips were down, America would abandon another loose ally who is neither part of the NATO alliance nor particularly woven into the fabric of the west

7: Russia poisoned the Skripals and faced little more sanction than a few diplomats being sent back. Indeed, there's a been a whole host suspicious deaths occurring all over Europe and North American with no one making much effort to sanction Russia

8: During all this time of course, Trump is also working to undermine the western alliance, questioning the value of NATO and starting to open up fault lines

9: Throughout this period Russia is launching a series of global disruptions from political interference campaigns, cyber/ ransomware attacks against western infrastructure, cutting internet cables in Norway, or destroying satellites in space. None of this draws any retaliation from the west, indeed, it seems to generate approval in some quarters!

10: Putin then watches the chaos of another American withdrawal (Afghanistan this time). Crucially this is another Biden decision where Joe has signalled a preference to disengage, and having failed to train another army to add to the Syrian opposition and Iraqi's, Russia might be forgiven for thinking there is a structural problem here and America can't train a resistance

11: Although I doubt he ever regarded the EU as military threat to Russia, he has to have been further encouraged by the appetite in western Europe for his gas and oil. Was the EU (an organisation that tends to stay within its borders and has never engaged in any military activity of consequence) likely to face off under the threat of the loss of their gas supply in support of a peripheral state that wasn't even an official candidate member? It was Germany and France after all who led the western resistance against the Iraq war, Italy is of little consequence, and the most belligerent member state in the bloc is no longer a member

12: Finally he meets Xi at the Beijing Olympics to agree their 'no limits' pact

When you take all these incidents together over the 10 year + timeframe, I'm not sure you'd call it mad? There is plenty of evidence there to make you conclude its a calculated gamble, and plenty of fair winds blowing to indicate that Putin would get away with it. You can certainly say it was an error of judgement, but an error you can perhaps begin to understand the path that led him to make it. Making a mistake in judgement however needn't be the same as being mad

Let's be honest, had a handful of American states voted Republican, America's position today would be to denounce Ukraine and support Russia. That's how precarious this was (and still is to a degree).

This article is about Lithuania taking steps to ready it's defensive posture against Russian invasion.

You seem to be implying that this is unnecessary because there is a zero chance of Russia invading Lithuania.

You say the zero chance stems from Russia looking at NATO's response.

This is Lithuania both readying that response, and advertising it.

If Lithuania treated it like a zero chance, it wouldn't be a zero chance.

They are treating it like a likelihood, and therefore, the chance decreases.

As the article correctly points out, Lithuania is Russia's gateway to Kaliningrad. That provides political cover (however vellus) for Russia to try something.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, and especially since 2004, Russian media has been running a constant narrative about how two faced the Baltic states are - how Russia saved them from Hitler, rebuilt them after WWII, poured in tons of wealth that could've been used in the Russian Soviet Republic, only to have them say "thank you" by turning their backs on them.

There has been an intensive propaganda campaign,spanning decades, against the Baltic states. Even Russians who might question a "special operation" in Ukraine would "understand" the necessity for escalation in the Baltics.

Also, Putin tends to be stronger when Russia is losing, because he plays off Russian fears of the the outside world to position himself as Russia's savior. Contrary to popular belief, he is a rational actor, and every defeat Russia experiences on the battlefield is a personal victory for his hold on power. Of course there's a limit to that, but no one knows exactly where that limit is, and that makes this whole situation incredibly dangerous, and we need to take all potential threats very seriously.