>I don't see how the economical situation in Ukraine is sustainable. Right now they depend on the support of its allies both to sustain the working of the government as well as the supply of weapons.

Er... yes, and that is fully sustainable. Both the EU and the US have guaranteed stable revenue supports of around $3bn per month for all of next year.

>I honestly don't think that Ukrainians are able to reconstruct as fast as you think, mainly due to the austerity brought up by the conflict itself.

The power outages are in general lasting hours or a couple of days at maximum. Roads and rail are literally being repaired the next day.

Major infrastructure like buildings, etc. take a lot longer, obviously, but they're still in the process of being repaired already.

>Your assumption is that the Russian army can't keep up with this effort

That is not my assumption, it's the analysis of the military experts who have good estimates of how many missiles Russia had before the war, and how many they've been seen to fire off. They are running incredibly low on missiles.

>and that Ukraine air defenses have been brought up to a level where they now can handle it.

We've seen the Ukrainian success rate climb steadily in the last few weeks, and there is currently only a single active Iris-T system in the country. That will be joined by 3 more Iris-T and 4 more NASAMS in the next few weeks.

>I do think casualties in the Ukrainian army are huge.

You have repeatedly mentioned this, but have given no supporting evidence.

>Training tens of thousands won't be enough to go on the offensive to reclaim all the lost territory.

They are already on the offensive with the force levels they have now, and successfully reclaiming territory, while training up additional forces and integrating additional modern weaponry. Which is back to my first point : what do you think is going to change to make this stop happening? You didn't have an answer for that.

>Specially now that the mobilized Russian conscripts start joining the ranks of the occupation.

The Russian conscripts are a joke. Seriously. They're untrained, they're barely armed, they have no winter clothes and they're going to die by the tens of thousands. They actively interfere with the military efficiency of units to which they're attached.

>At the start of the war, the Ukraine army was even better equipped then now I believe.

Horseshit. At the start of the war Ukraine was very poorly armed. They were running on older Soviet kit and had much fewer forces. Since then they have steadily shifted to modern NATO weapons as they burn down the last of their Soviet-era ammunition, and they have increased the number of troops in active use. They have limited the speed of recruitment only to the number that they can train and arm, but that's an ongoing process. They had little antitank and antiair capability, and only the same inaccurate artillery and rockets as Russia does.

>Even with all of that the Russian army was able to occupy a big chunk of the country.

They took that territory with a massive attack from four directions, assisted by traitors within Ukraine. Since that time they have steadily been losing territory, and the pace at which they're losing territory is increasing. They have not successfully taken any territory in 3-4 months now, so what they did in February is not relevant.

>So yes, I don't know how in the mid or long term Ukraine can go on an offensive to reclaim the lost territories.

You don't know how Ukraine can do exactly what they're currently doing?

It fits with you being wrong on almost every single point of fact above, however, so I'm not surprised.