And that 30% run was triggered by techbros who want to kill banks...

Banks usually have a concentration cap on deposits to prevent any small group from becoming able to kill the bank. But Thiel and them were left unchecked.... prolly cause SVB had no Chief Risk Officer (apparently), and instead focused on having things like a Chief Diversity, Equity and Inclusion Officer.

A 30% run would kill most FIs. Interestingly, some jurisdictions/FI ecosystems have/had ways to deal with it -- though regulators have dismantled those mechanisms. For example: Canada's BC Credit Union system used a pooled liquidity system for decades. Liquidity reqs between CUs and Banks in Canada vary, but generally CUs need 11% banks need like 6%. What CUs used to do with their liquidity pooling, is they'd all store their liquidity with a central trade association (Central1). There's around 50 or so CUs in the province still, though that number shrinks all the time. By pooling their liquidity, all peers of a like size/smaller size, would generally be 'fine' if there was a run on any one institution -- a run on a $200 million CU doesn't mean anything, if the pool has $1b from 50 like-sized participating CUs. They also paid into CUDIC, which is/was another fund specifically for providing deposit insurance if any CU did go under.

The regulators basically destroyed most of that, and they had the ability to do so in part because BC offers 100% deposit guarantees -- which means the government calls all the shots. The regulators demanded that CUs stop pooling liquidity, and instead assign it to individual institutions. They also strongly encouraged/pushed CUs into entering the bond market... which as we've seen, worked out well for SVB. The regulators basically demand that the CU system, which was setup to offer an alternative to banks/bank structures, behave like banks...