Submitted by ActivePersona t3_11b6wx9 in technology
uwu2420 t1_j9xyhri wrote
Reply to comment by drawkbox in Signal CEO: We “1,000% won’t participate” in UK law to weaken encryption by ActivePersona
> I mean pretty much anything in a cloud should be considered secure from everything but law enforcement
Again, nope. If a cloud service is truly end to end encrypted, and designed well, nobody but the end user should be able to access the data. Yes, even if there is a subpoena.
> The point is your still need the user context
Or if you have access to the files on Apple’s server, then no user auth is required.
> These files only work with the OS to access them
Again, no. There are many commercial and open source tools that are able to read the backup file for you. Elcomsoft, iMazing and the Citizen Lab Mobile Verification Toolkit are some examples.
> Most people are worried about hackers
It wouldn’t be the first time someone’s iCloud account was hacked into.
> there is a “ghost” user ability
Show me where in the Signal code there is this functionality. Again, it’s open source, so a honeypot would be quickly found. Also, if you’re worried about state level honeypots, note that retrieving an unencrypted iCloud backup is a lot easier.
> It is only plaintext in the context of the user…
…and anyone with access to the files on Apple’s servers, which aren’t only subpoenas but also hackers, governments that don’t respect human rights, etc. which is the whole point of having end to end encryption, even the service provider themselves should not have the ability to access the data on your account.
Do you not understand the point of end to end encryption? The whole point is that nobody, not even the service provider hosting the cloud service can access your data.
drawkbox t1_j9xzevz wrote
> If a cloud service is truly end to end encrypted, and designed well, nobody but the end user should be able to access the data.
I agree this is just not the case with so many holes and side channels out there. The cloud is good for securing content from others, oversight will always find a way. Anyone that thinks otherwise is a suka.
> Or if you have access to the files on Apple’s server, then no user auth is required.
User auth still required but yeah you could hack Apple I supposed and get it. Good luck though.
> There are many commercial and open source tools that are able to read the backup file for you. Elcomsoft, iMazing and the Citizen Lab Mobile Verification Toolkit are some examples.
If those apps are getting the user context then sure. If not then no.
Take Elcomsoft for instance with LastPass vs Password managers. That is why you don't install clients or extensions, like LastPass.
Read this closely:
>> Windows Data Protection API Not Used
>> One may argue that extracting passwords stored by the Google Chrome browser is similarly a one-click affair with third-party tools (e.g. Elcomsoft Internet Password Breaker). The difference between Chrome and LastPass password storage is that Chrome makes use of Microsoft’s Data Protection API, while LastPass does not.
>> Google Chrome does, indeed, store user’s passwords. Similar to third-party password managers, the Windows edition of the Chrome browser encrypts passwords when stored. By default, the encrypted database is not protected with a master password; instead, Chrome employs the Data Protection API (DPAPI) introduced way back in Windows 2000. DPAPI uses AES-256 to encrypt the password data. In order to access passwords, one must sign in with the user’s Windows credentials (authenticating with a login and password, PIN code, or Windows Hello). As a result, Google Chrome password storage has the same level of protection as the user’s Windows login.
>> This, effectively, enables someone who knows the user’s login and password or hijacks the current session to access the stored passwords. This is exactly what we implemented in Elcomsoft Internet Password Breaker.
>> However, in order to extract passwords from Web browsers such as Chrome or Microsoft Edge, one must possess the user’s Windows login and password or hijack an authenticated session. Analyzing a ‘cold’ disk image without knowing the user’s password will not provide access to Chrome or Edge cached passwords.
>> This is not the case for the LastPass Chrome extension (the desktop app is seemingly not affected). For the LastPass database, the attacker will not need the user’s Windows login credentials of macOS account password. All that’s actually required is the file containing the encrypted password database, which can be easily obtained from the forensic disk image. Neither Windows credentials nor master password are required.
>> macOS has a built-in secure storage, the so-called keychain. The Mac version of Chrome does not use the native keychain to store the user’s passwords; neither does the iOS version. However, Chrome does store the master password in the corresponding macOS or iOS keychain, effectively providing the same level of protection as the system keychain. Elcomsoft Password Digger can decrypt the macOS keychain provided that the user’s logon credentials (or the separate keychain password) are known.
Elcomsoft mentions the OS level protections on these.
> It wouldn’t be the first time someone’s iCloud account was hacked into.
If someone gets into iCloud they are most likely getting into the device and again, the point of a "secure" messenger or cloud falls apart because they have access to their user. Yes, people should be careful with their user, it opens up everything.
> not even the service provider hosting the cloud service can access your data.
If you believe this then you believe in magic. Even if a provider tried to do this, software has holes... See OpenSSL/Log4j/Log4Shell/on and on and on and on... The fact that you trusted it because they said they don't look, it was probably a lie, but even if it wasn't they can get in.
uwu2420 t1_j9y02jf wrote
Yeah I agree there are always vulnerabilities in software, but the thing is, as far as I know, there aren’t any known bugs that would leak data from Signal so far despite all the security research attention it gets, and plenty of evidence that it’s safe.
Meanwhile, I’ve already explained how it’s trivial to get around the end to end nature of iMessage for a large majority of users.
If you don’t care about your conversation being end to end encrypted, then yes, by all means, use iMessage or even just plain SMS. Much easier. But if you do care, I’m not sure why you’d shoot yourself in the foot with the option known to have a major workaround.
drawkbox t1_j9y2ig6 wrote
Signal definitely seems the best out of them if you are into using a third party messenger, for now.
I would still trust the OS level messaging on mobile over third parties because of the scale, future funding, incentives and trust. The OS already has access to your info. Other people getting access to your data is probably always easier on third party systems, even if the third party is trustable, not ever person or dependency is.
iMessage is secure, if you are going straight SMS yes that is more open. I also know what Apple wants and their goals fully, that is a secure platform that isn't just messaging.
The fact is though, every system has holes and security issues, so the best opsec is less third parties, big or small or open or closed...
Just ask Jeff Bezos after he got hacked via WhatsApp temp hole by something sent to him by freaking MBS.
uwu2420 t1_j9y3ix1 wrote
The thing you’re missing is, if you’re using Signal you specifically want an end to end encrypted chat service.
The OS doesn’t upload that data in unencrypted form. You can analyze for yourself with a MITM proxy.
iMessage is secure, as long as you don’t care for your messages remaining end to end encrypted, and you trust Apple to have a copy of your messages. Is that reasonable to you? Maybe, maybe not.
With Signal, the whole idea is you shouldn’t have to trust Signal with your messages, because they don’t have the ability to read them, even if they wanted to. Yes, it could have holes like any software, so this can really be simplified to: use the tool with a known issue for sure, vs use the tool that might have an issue in the future but for now is known to be safe.
drawkbox t1_j9y44d1 wrote
> end to end encrypted chat service
End to end means nothing though when a client isn't in your control and may have another user attached. Again, common in many messaging apps.
iMessage is end to end encryption to iMessage, just like Signal to Signal. If you use SMS it is not.
> We designed iMessage to use end-to-end encryption, so there's no way for Apple to decrypt the content of your conversations when they are in transit between devices. Attachments you send over iMessage (such as photos or videos) are encrypted so that no one but the sender and receiver(s) can access them
Apple can't magically make SMS secure, it is not secure by default as it was really from telephone diagnostics and repurposed for messaging. So when you message Android it goes SMS. SMS was from SS7 and really only for diagnostic or messages to customers for testing. MMS is better but still not that great. Apple should bring iMessage to Android and do better on messengers, it is leading many people to third parties that open up opsec issues.
> With Signal, the whole idea is you shouldn’t have to trust Signal with your messages, because they don’t have the ability to read them, even if they wanted to.
That is a bold statement. Yes, on the surface. Again, ghost users, compromised clients, endpoints can have problems. Also Signal does have a proprietary shim for monitoring, spam checking and other things, could easily be used to surveil or sift. There are probably a dozen ways or more to get around it currently at the dependency level or breaking their encryption as it is custom.
The best opsec is always less third parties.
uwu2420 t1_j9y4q7s wrote
We can assume the majority of people go with the default settings. iMessage conversations, by default, end up in a backup file on iCloud that is not end to end encrypted. Signal conversations, by default, do not.
> We designed iMessage to use end-to-end encryption
Which again is worthless when a plaintext version is also being uploaded in the form of iCloud backups, which are on by default. The same isn’t true for Signal.
You’ll have to provide a source for your claims about Signal’s ghost users. As far as a compromised client, that’s not something any messaging client can defend against, and if a service is end to end encrypted, it shouldn’t matter if the endpoint server is entirely compromised.
> breaking their encryption as it is custom
That’s the cool part, it’s not. It’s based on the same old algorithms that have been around for years. ECDSA, ECDH, AES, etc. if I remember correctly
It depends on your definition of opsec but just a reminder that we’re in a thread about Signal and end to end encryption specifically.
drawkbox t1_j9y5gri wrote
You dismiss user level auth/encryption like it is nothing. If anyone had access to user level auth why go to the backup file, just go to the device, load up Signal and scrape their messages.
All other messaging apps have the "ghost user" problem confirmed.
Signal has a shim for spam that is very unclear, I'll just say that. There are other things around Signal that make is sus in my opinion.
> The source code for spam detection is not public.
So there is a plausible deniability reason to hide some code... you have to trussssst. Here's the kicker, you can't check for spam if you aren't seeing the message.
Even on the self installed versions...
> Signal's servers are partially open source, but the server software's anti-spam component is proprietary and closed source due to security concerns
Signal does handle users being added better, but this could just be theater as well.
> The real problem with the GCHQ proposal is that it targets a weakness in messaging/calling systems that’s already well-known to providers, and moreover, a weakness that providers have been working to close — perhaps because they’re worried that someone just like GCHQ (or probably, much worse) will try to exploit it. By making this proposal, the folks at GCHQ have virtually guaranteed that those providers will move much, much faster on this.
> And they have quite a few options at their disposal. Over the past several years researchers have proposed several designs that offer transparency to users regarding which keys they’re obtaining from a provider’s identity service. These systems operate by having the identity service commit to the keys that are associated with individual users, such that it’s very hard for the provider to change a user’s keys (or to add a device) without everyone in the world noticing.
> As mentioned above, advanced messengers like Signal have “submerged” the group chat management into the encrypted communications flow, so that the server cannot add new users without the digitally authenticated approval of one of the existing participants. This design, if ported to in more popular services like WhatsApp, would seem to kill the GCHQ proposal dead.
I personally don't trust Signal for a few reasons beyond these items, but if you trust them then rock on.
uwu2420 t1_j9y65ub wrote
> You dismiss user level auth
To scrape my Signal messages, you need access to my physical device, and you need my passcode. To get access to iMessage messages, all you need to do is get my latest backup, or the backup of the person I talked to, off of Apple’s servers, for example, with a legal request, which completely bypasses the need for any user level auth/encryption.
Agree to disagree
drawkbox t1_j9y8ajk wrote
> To scrape my Signal messages, you need access to my physical device, and you need my passcode.
Same with getting access to your iCloud/Apple account.
> To get access to iMessage messages, all you need to do is get my latest backup, or the backup of the person I talked to, off of Apple’s servers, for example, with a legal request, which completely bypasses the need for any user level auth/encryption.
As I said, anything stored in a cloud will have some oversight. Anyone that thinks storing something in a cloud is secure from oversight is dim.
If you think anyone from enforcement can just get your iCloud/Apple account, that would also mean they are able to access your device and everything on it including your "encrypted end to end" Signal messages that are plaintext on your client.
Messaging apps also get cam/mic/location/contacts permissions, Signal is no different, one more entity with your face/voice/place/friends.
You can trust Signal, a third party, rock on. Acton is involved in both, from WhatsApp, went to Facebook, and then when people stopped trusting Facebook he made Signal to catch those leaving. The story is he didn't trust Facebook, no one should, but can you trust Signal/Acton or is it a front. You decide. Problem is you trust them so much they got ya. I mean Elon Musk and Edward Snowden recommend it... is must be safe /s. Signal is maybe safe, maybe safe from some five eyes, but not all eyes not in the five. Even then, there are always ways to get in via dependencies and devs (mainly devops) are the weak link today sadly.
Agree to disagree, good discussion though.
uwu2420 t1_j9y8y3c wrote
> Same with getting access to your iCloud/Apple account
No you don’t, because it is stored unencrypted on Apple servers and Apple themselves will give it to you (for example, with a legal request). If you go this route, you don’t need the physical device or any of the user’s passwords. The user won’t even know it’s happened until they are told.
The difference is in one case, my password and my physical device is needed. If you want that, you’ll have to physically get my device from me, and then get me to tell you my passcode. The other is just stored on Apple’s servers. If you don’t see how one is much harder than the other, I dunno what to tell you lol
Edit: no need to believe me, believe American law enforcement instead and refer to the leaked slide I posted earlier.
drawkbox t1_j9y9geb wrote
Unencrypted behind being encrypted by the user context... so yes, not double encrypted. You can encrypt it though.
Messaging apps also get cam/mic/location/contacts permissions, Signal is no different, one more entity with your face/voice/place/friends.
We definitely agreed to disagree.
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