Anna Alexandrova, a philosopher of science at Cambridge, argues that a “science of happiness” is possible but requires a new approach. Measures such as “life satisfaction” or “positive emotions” can be studied rigorously. An underlying variable of “happiness” cannot.
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Abstract:
Many social scientists have become interested in the possibility of studying happiness (i.e. subjective well-being) scientifically. This has motivated many individual studies but also the large and much-reported World Happiness Report. This movement has been criticised by two strands of philosophers. On the one hand, there are those who criticise underlying welfarism. On the other hand, others have criticised the field for studying a topic (“happiness”) that is impossible to study rigorously.
Anna Alexandrova argues that the latter concern is justifiable, but only partially so. There is no clear reason why the kinds of measures used by “happiness scientists” could not be used rigorously (e.g. asking people about their life satisfaction). However, happiness and well-being have many meanings in different contexts, and it is problematic to collapse all these pluralistic measures under one overarching “happiness” variable. Therefore, one can support the general project of the “science of happiness” but remain sceptical about single-variable such as “world’s happiest country” or the WELBY metrics adopted by the UK government.
However, most “science of happiness” reports make the questionable assumption that all of these metrics can be used to gauge a single underlying “happiness” (e.g. “what is the happiest country in the world?”) Instead, we need a pluralistic approach, where scientists tackle more specific questions around topics that fall under the concepts of happiness and wellbeing.