>This argument rests on consciousness as a phenomenon only being knowable through being itself – that it cannot be inferred through other means. That if a non-sentient robot, would observe and communicate with us, be able to hold all key facts about us and our behavior in its cognitive system, it would never in principle be able to guess the existence of consciousness.

I disagree with this premise.

>That when we scream in pain there are not just observable signals that travel from A to B in our body triggering behaviors, but that we feel something when this happens

These aren't separate things. They are just different ways to describe the same thing. Pain is neural activity.

Okay, but I am not sure I follow what your argument is. That we can in principle detect consciousness without invoking consciousness? As in, Chalmers' debunking argument in his meta-problem paper?

>These aren't separate things. They are just different ways to describe the same thing. Pain is neural activity.

That doesn't have any bearing on my point, though. Neural activity doesn't inform the observer that it feels like anything at all.

One might subscribe to the notion that "you" can't "know" at all unless you're conscious.

Right, that does pose an additional issue for the non-sentient hypothetical being. However, it doesn't really break the argument. We can reduce it for example to people who are born without certain senses - for example no eyesight. These people just can't know what it is like to see (even though some scientific evidence shows the visual cortex does engage in some ways for these people) - so in general we know that without being acquainted with what-its-likeness.. you simply can't know of it.

Is this not just a super obvious tautology?

You cant know of consciousness without being conscious.... yeah you cant know anything without it.

It seems like a bit of a mistake to think understanding consciousness requires a metaphysical relation to it specifically. And while its is correct, it is akin to a correlation, causation mistake. You are arguing: you need to have X to understand and know X, so we might be missing Y because we dont have Y. While it is true that we cant know X without X, its a mistake to think there is a special relation between X and knowing X. Rather it's simply X is a requirement to understand or know anything in the first place. So obviously to understand X we need X, but there is no key relation between the two, you need X to understand. Having X has just as much of a relationship in understand X, as it does A,B,C,D,E, etc...

The statement imo is obviously true, but the whole point is wrong because the more parsimonious statement is simply: "you can't know of consciousness without being conscious."

You can get into weird useless arguments about how you prefer to define knowing or consciousness, but it's pretty all useless talking past each other and language games at that point. But even if you define knowing, in a way something unconscious like a computer can know, you can simply make the same argument for anything to say something unconscious can know consciousness. And again its simply argument of definitions. In both situations leaving out consciousness is more parsimonious.

It seems to a feature of our universe. Which is why Chalmers invokes it in his meta-problem paper as the debunking argument for illusionism. https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&url=https://philpapers.org/archive/CHATMO-32.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwj9naKTzeP7AhVRAxAIHQxnBTsQFnoECBsQAQ&usg=AOvVaw1dBPho_aISdjlJadD9LpMq

The point is simply that so far we have not been able to find what-its-likeness in the description of the universe. And I fact I think it's not there. Neural correlates - sure. Or course. But just like I would never ever infer that food tastes like something if it were tasteless to me until I actually would acquire the ability to taste..so too we would never infer phenomenal consciousness or subjective experience without actually experiencing it. That seems quite a significant point and I argue on my point why. Neither a language game nor useless.

You can of course argue that you need to have consciousness to know anything at all, but that's definitely not a given nor obvious. There could be a nonsentient entity processing things without any inner experience, and even with an exhaustive description of the universe it would still remain clueless that there is something like subjective experience. That seems rather significant.

It's why Chalmers also invented the p-zombie... to highlight this gap. However I'd prefer not to get into argumentd about that and conceivability as that's another rabbit hole.

We can’t know of consciousness even while being conscious. We know a seeming of a phenomenon we’ve labeled.

We can however compare the empirical correlations of everything we know bodily and neuronally about it with each other and similar in other organisms.

We can assume we share a reality, and we can assume all organisms have to navigate their reality with some levels of awareness. Then we can also see the rather diverse wetware options that embody this phenomenon.

It’s no more special to ask what it’s like to be me than it is to ask what it’s like to be slime mold. The same epistemic, practical limitations exist.

We can look at physical correlates, or internally analyze, thinking about it with some mental inquiry like Heidegger.

Nothing seems to ever actually produce a ‘certainty of knowing’.

Certaintity, knowing and belief are rabbit holes in themselves, but that doesn't quite have bearing on my post does it?

The central point being that without subjective experience, you can't from its description infer it even exists. That it can feel like something.

So here I mean knowing of consciosuness not fully or ideally, but simply having access to it so that we can even consider it in any shape or form.

I guess I really don’t find it that profound, just a pragmatic necessity as it is. Not to stop anyone from asking these questions, because we always will, but just accept it with a structural-functionalist interpretation. It exists for a biological function. Any further understanding of it is just bonus. I’m ok with our understanding being a little on the fuzzy side, content that a rock doesn’t have the structure because it has no need of metabolizing or replicating.

You can levy any argument against knowing without consciousness against knowing consciousness without consciousness.

Yes you can't experience the taste of food without the ability to taste food. Yes you can't experience consciousness without the ability to experience consciousness... but can you know it? Well it all comes down to how you define knowing... your argument is about knowing consciousness.

To define knowing in a way that you do to combat my more parsimonious statement requires you giving up ur argument. Example if you say: a non sentient thing processing can know things. Well than a non sentient thing processing can know consciousness and ur argument fails. You must argue knowing requires inner experience and awareness, for both your and my more parsimonious statement to stand.

As i said it would boil down to, all there is to debate is whether ur definition of knowing requires experience and/or awareness. If you say no, ur right my argument fails... but so does urs. We both must say yes, and in the end all were really saying is saying you can't experience things without the ability to experience that thing.

Which we both agree with, but just seems an obvious tautology to me.

And I think they do have a bearing on the post if one is trying to make metaphysical claims from observations. We can argue them, but I think any kind of proposition making a metaphysical statement can rightly be deflated when the justification is lacking.

Again, I would invoke Chalmers' argumentation here:

One can also make a debunking argument about beliefs about phenomenal consciousness in general, perhaps with some variety of non-reductionism operating as a background assumption. There are various ways to lay out such an argument, but perhaps the most straight forward is as follows: 1.There is a correct explanation of our beliefs about conscious-ness that is independent of consciousness 2. If there is a correct explanation of our beliefs about conscious- ness that is independent of consciousness, those beliefs are not justified 3. Our beliefs about consciousness are not justified.

Basically, I am claiming 1 and in my post list 2 as a partial knockdown argument. I personally find this a brain-breaking and fascinating idea wrt to the properties of our universe.

So we can bicker about knowing or belief, but in the end I don't see how the basic idea that whatever consciousness is bears a particular relation to us so that we can even bicker about it as an explicandum, is not compelling basis to ponder the search for other phenomena that might not be easily or at all detectable without a particular relation we'd have to bear to them.

Okay, I struggle to see how you're engaging with the actual central point. Do you know of any way subjective experience could be inferred to exist, illusion/seeming or whatever label you want to slap on it?

I seem drawn to a stance of there possibly being a form of 'being' which could 'know' things without being particularly entrenched in normative conceptions of consciousness - this could possibly sway into territories of differenced 'perceptions' of what consciousness is based around the differences of their relation to the reality substrate at large - excavations of correlation and interrelatedness borne of any emergent dynamic of complexity in /any/ variable of 'existence' may foster a connective environment-organism placement of critical thought [or a parallel of equivalence]. Ie - when will algorithms begin showing signs of purposed action , when will ai build a standard of being which may differ completely from normative human experience , what forms of being composed of events or temporal flows of reality exist which operate of their own volition? -- and what does this entail for outside observations of what is currently known as consciousness?

Im partial to the thought that any form of evolution [especially ecospheres of related sensory convergence] is withheld in a reality decryption parameterization which binds them almost entirely to the environment and sensory clearing which has fostered them. Myriad mannerisms of spectrums of intake, groundings of self volition, relativities of temporal entrenchments of processing, and realms of plausible dynamic evolution entail a detachment from the norm in the definition of what life and consciousness is .

Perhaps everything is prone to the lensing of reality distortion of the individual 'life force' and all avenues of higher forms of being cannot recognize their kindred complexities of differenced agency - the reality decryption parameterization is too different to be cognized or even comprehended

Hmm maybe I will read more into Chalmer. See if that changes my thinking

Thanks for the info and responses.

You’re only struggling to see that I’m struggling with how your central point is anything to really take note of.

As someone else already said above. That, being conscious is really the only way we are aware of the phenomenon of consciousness, just seems a tautology, a restatement of obvious practical limitation. They were also right that its our only way of being familiar with anything.

That being said, with all importance being deflated finally, trying to infer further metaphysical claims from it seems dubious.

As I said in another thread:

Again, I would invoke Chalmers' argumentation here:

One can make a debunking argument about beliefs about phenomenal consciousness in general, perhaps with some variety of non-reductionism operating as a background assumption. There are various ways to lay out such an argument, but perhaps the most straight forward is as follows: 1.There is a correct explanation of our beliefs about conscious-ness that is independent of consciousness 2. If there is a correct explanation of our beliefs about conscious- ness that is independent of consciousness, those beliefs are not justified 3. Our beliefs about consciousness are not justified.

Basically, I am claiming 1 and in my post list 2 as a partial knockdown argument. I personally find this a brain-breaking and fascinating idea wrt to the properties of our universe.

So we can bicker about knowing or belief, but in the end I don't see how the basic idea that whatever consciousness is bears a particular relation to us so that we can even bicker about it as an explicandum, is not compelling basis to ponder the search for other phenomena that might not be easily or at all detectable without a particular relation we'd have to bear to them.

> Again, I would invoke Chalmers' argumentation here:

This is not what Chalmers' argument is.

1. Is there though? That doesn’t seem self evident or settled considering there’s a whole tradition and sub-camps of empiricism, a posteriori knowledge completely dependent on the pragmatic acceptance of consciousness as the only lens we have.

2. “If there is” seems like the first would need to be settled first before this conditional can be pondered.

3. Since we can’t get past the first premise, there’s no real reason to grant this conclusion.

And no, it really doesn’t seem that profound once deflated.

It's highly speculative and one can attack many issues wrt to epistemology. For this post I opted to focus on the idea as presented. As far as I know there is no way to infer phenomenal consciousness/qualia without the actual experience. If there is, I'd love to know. Until then, it suggests something pretty fascinating about our universe.

And yes there is an if... so if 1 falls then the rest falls although not entirely as I explain in my post. Either p-consc can not be inferred without experiencing it or it's super hard to figure out how to ever infer it without the experience. Both cases - interesting wrt to our universe and may suggests other phenomena that are interesting in this manner wrt to how they manifest or their detectibility.

I don’t know if it really that is interesting though. To say that we can’t infer anything without being conscious is as deep as saying we can’t investigate anything else once we’re dead.

Why do people keep insisting consciousness has anything to do with metaphysics? It doesn't. Consciouness is simply an observance system to process input.

It's part of the brain, it's simply a sub system.

As an examples, you can have a sub system in a computer that monitors the computer. Our monitoring system just has actionable capabilities. No metaphysics required.

Can we start applying occam's razor here please? We will make more progress if we stick in reality and not try to explain stuff through unprovable means.

Have you read the post? Here is what chatGPT said based on the summary:

It is an interesting idea that there may be other significant phenomena in our universe that we are not currently aware of. This idea is based on the idea that consciousness is a unique phenomenon that is only knowable through our own subjective experience of it. If this is the case, then it is possible that there are other phenomena in the universe that are only knowable through some other unique process.

One way to explore this idea conceptually would be to consider the ways in which we currently know about the universe and the phenomena within it. We know about the universe through our senses and through scientific instruments that allow us to observe and measure it. However, our senses and instruments are limited in their ability to perceive and measure everything that exists in the universe. It is possible that there are phenomena that exist outside of the range of our senses and instruments, and therefore outside of our current knowledge.

Another way to explore this idea would be to consider the ways in which we might be able to detect these other, potentially obscured phenomena. One possibility is that we might be able to find hints of their existence in the behavior of known phenomena. For example, if there is a phenomenon that influences the behavior of particles in some way, we might be able to detect its presence by looking for patterns in the behavior of those particles that cannot be explained by known physical laws.

There are several objections to this idea that are worth considering. One objection is that our current scientific understanding of the universe is comprehensive and that there is no room for additional, unknown phenomena. However, this objection is not necessarily true. Our scientific understanding of the universe is always evolving, and there is always the possibility that we will discover new phenomena or new aspects of known phenomena that were previously unknown.

Another objection is that if there are additional, unknown phenomena in the universe, we have no way of knowing what they are or how they would behave. This is a valid concern, but it is also true of many other aspects of our scientific understanding. We do not always have a complete understanding of the phenomena we do know about, and we often have to make predictions and develop theories based on incomplete information.

Overall, the idea that there may be significant phenomena in our universe that are currently unknown is an interesting one, and it is worth considering further. Further exploration of this idea could involve looking for patterns in the behavior of known phenomena that cannot be explained by current scientific theories, and developing new theories and experiments to test those patterns. This could potentially lead to the discovery of new phenomena and a deeper understanding of the universe

Because you can't prove what you just asserted is true.

Nothing you said takes any real issue with my central point. We take your "observance system to process input" and we ask ourselves are there other cool phenomena in the universe that would require a specific process like an observsnce system to process input? Since by simply observing the universe it doesn't seem like we can infer this input feels like anything.

It has little to do with Ockham's razor also. And it also has nothing to do with the mysterianism position in philosophy of mind that you seem to imply it does.

Yes, it really not that profound. We’re liminally bound. There are obviously the possibilities and even likelihoods of phenomena present in the universe we are not aware of or only aware in part of, even our instruments just being a way to extend our senses.

The solutions you’re speaking of aren’t really any different from the pattern detection we seek in the universe through our empiricism to begin with. If we can’t find direct effects, sometimes we settle for looking at downstream or indirect effects.

The blind speculation though I can do without. There may or may not be other phenomena we’re familiar with. I’ll worry about it when they have an interaction with reality that is within our ability to study.

I find it brain-tickling and profound based on how profound and significant cosciousness is. But to each their own. :)

That is an incorrect statement. My assertion is testable and can be prove true or false through examination. Metaphysical claims have no current mechanism for such a test.

We have an observance system because it has demonstrated an evolutionary advantage.

Applying such a concept out of context requires justification to do so. We do not see the universe alive in the same context as we are. What is the justification to apply such a concept to vast empty space, gasses, solids, liquids, and metals out in space?

I don't follow what you're getting at or asking. Yes, consciousness evolved. What do you mean by applying it out of context? The point is simply that significant phenomena may exist like that which in principle we couldn't detect any less than we can infer what taste, eyesight or hearing is like without experiencing them. These significant phenomena may just as well evolve or be constructed, they needn't be states of matter...

That’s the thing though. I don’t find consciousness to be profound or significant, just the navigation system we’re stuck with.

That assertion is false. Why can't we infer taste, eyesight or hearing without experiencing then?

We know eagles have better sight than us without needing their eyes.

We know bats hear better than us, and use it for sight without that capability ourselves.

We know migrating birds have mechanisms for navigating that we do not posses. Even though we have not pinned down exactly what, we know it exists and we don't need metaphysics for it.

The more we know about how each thing works the less we need to be able to experience it ourselves to understand it

The p zombie argument is bogus because the p zombie doesn't know it's a zombie. It believes it's a person just like you do. As an observer you also don't know whether or not the subject you are talking to is a zombie. They act as if they are not, and if you ask them they say they are not.

It's a weird and invalid exercise.

> here is a correct explanation of our beliefs about conscious-ness that is independent of consciousness

How can that possibly be? How can you have a belief without consciousness?

>Neural activity doesn't inform the observer that it feels like anything at all.

Why not? They know you feel pain because you are screaming right?

An observer who doesn't know pain or subjective experience can just note you are making a lot of noise. You can tell them you're in pain - how could they ever understand what thst is?

Explanation about our beliefs about consciousness rhat is independent if it...that's something else.

And it's conceivable an entity has intelligence but no subjective experience. So you can explain what strawberry tastes like till you're blue in the face. It doesn't grasp the concept of taste.

There are variations on the zombie that are a bit more clever. The point is that it's unclear why the processes in our bodies have to feel like anything since descriptively they perform their function.

Cojoined twins exist. See Krista and Tatiana Hogan. So not knowing is an interfacing issue.

>The point is that it's unclear why the processes in our bodies have to feel like anything since descriptively they perform their function.

Why is that a point worthy of consideration?

I also don't see what the conjoined twins has anything to do with this.

>The point is that it's unclear why the processes in our bodies have to feel like anything since descriptively they perform their function.

Again, what does this even mean?

>And it's conceivable an entity has intelligence but no subjective experience.

I am not sure if that's possible. I don't think you can gain or enhance intelligence without input of any sort and input is experience.

>So you can explain what strawberry tastes like till you're blue in the face. It doesn't grasp the concept of taste.

I think it could. Blind people have concepts of seeing, deaf people have concepts of hearing.

My post and a whole body of work covers why it's worthy of consideration. Because consiousness is a crucial phenomenon and apparently you can't know of it unless you get to experience it. That's pretty interesting. I suggest you read the meta-problem by Chalmers. If it doesn't interest you, then I guess it doesn't.

You said as an observer you don't know... so I mentioned cojoined twins as an example that in principle we can know.

>An observer who doesn't know pain or subjective experience can just note you are making a lot of noise.

In response to particular stimuli. Also other physiological reactions.

>You can tell them you're in pain - how could they ever understand what thst is?

Same way that you do. Your perception of pain is merely electrochemical reactions happening inside of your body. That being could measure these and conclude you are in pain.

>Because consiousness is a crucial phenomenon and apparently you can't know of it unless you get to experience it.

Why did you put the word "apparently" in there. Is this really apparent? It's not apparent to me at all.

>I suggest you read the meta-problem by Chalmers. If it doesn't interest you, then I guess it doesn'

Chalmers bores me to tears. His arguments are all just attempts to justify his already held beliefs no different than any christian who is making arguments for god.

>You said as an observer you don't know... so I mentioned cojoined twins as an example that in principle we can know.

I don't get it. How is this applicable?

People born deaf have some compensatory mechanisms like better detection of vibrations... but you're stretching at this point.

Yes, the relation between intelligence and consciousness is an open problem. Input sure. Input is not experience. That is nonsense. I can build a simple raspberry Pi robot with accentuators and its simple processing doesn't mean it necessarily has subjective experience unless you subscrive to some form of panpsychism. I don't that flies.

Chalmers's arguments are systematic and explorative. Sorry, can't help you further since he bores you and your convinxed of some caricarure of him.

And if it's not apparent to you, then make an argument how subjective experience can be inferred without having it. I don't think there is one. That would be beyond Nobel-level stuff.

>Chalmers's arguments are systematic and explorative

I disagree. They are contrived and designed carefully to try and provide some sort of a backing for his already held conclusions.

>And if it's not apparent to you, then make an argument how subjective experience can be inferred without having it.

I have multiple times.

Your experiences are merely electrochemical activity taking place in your body. They can be measured and then mechanically stimulated to make you feel things.

>That would be beyond Nobel-level stuff.

It's banal and has been done thousands of times. You can literally make people believe in god and then disbelieve by stimulating their brains.

>People born deaf have some compensatory mechanisms like better detection of vibrations... but you're stretching at this point.

They have input into their brains. They can understand input they don't have using input they do have.

>Input is not experience.

Of course it is. There can be no experience without input.

>I can build a simple raspberry Pi robot with accentuators and its simple processing doesn't mean it necessarily has subjective experience unless you subscrive to some form of panpsychism.

It has input and that input is in fact experience for the processor. It detects the electricity which then results in other electrochemical reactions.

This is no different than your brain.

Mentioning elechtrochemical activity and the God helmet has nothint to do with the point. You are projecting magical views onto people and tilting at windmills. So we're talking past each other.

!RemindMe 6 hours

This is awesome! Thanks for sharing!

It's is of course arcbitecturally completely different than my brain.....

From "input isn ot experience" it doesn't follow that there can't be any experience without input. I am simply saying not all forms of input result in subjective experience.

Thank you!

I think it would.

I guess soo, in respect to how Chalmers defines the hard problem I’m an illusionist.

Okay, the onus is on you how. Sounds like magic. If I had no taste at all, all my life. And you would tell me the stuff we put in your mouth "tastes liie something".. I wouldn't even be able to comprehend what this taste sense is you speak of.

So how you'd conclude from looking at a physical process "Oh, gee that must feel like someting from the inside" without knowing about what it's like sounds like magic to me.

There'd be a lot of interesting things to conclude if a non-sentient intelligent entity would observe biological life. Complex self-dissipating systems, negentropy...etc., but subjective experience? How? On what basis?

Ever read Bisson's "They're Made out of Meat"? That, only waaaay weirder it'd be for that entity to listen to this "inner feel" we have.

You are the one making the claims. You can’t lay the foundation of your argument on this point and then turn around asking me to be rove it wrong.

Anyway if I were, then I’d use a reductio ad absurdum style argument. If you do assume what is true then it leads you to the absurdities of the hard problem. You’ll end up with phenomenal experience being an epiphenomena, which is impossible. Or you end up claiming the brain doesn’t obey the laws of physics.

Okay. I find illusionism a useless position with zero explanatory value. It tries to claim phenomenal consciousness is an illusion and leaves us with the same stuff to explain, only now they're called illusions.

I am not making any claims. We don't know of any way, in principle, how to infer subjective experience. Don't think there are absurdities there either.

There is just the easy problem to solve. Now the easy problem is going to be really hard to solve, but is solvable.

I like this question. This is something I think about a lot in fact.

>It's is of course arcbitecturally completely different than my brain.....

It's really not that different though.

>From "input isn ot experience" it doesn't follow that there can't be any experience without input.

Sure it does. Experience is the result of electrochemical activity in the brain. That doesn't happen without input.

>I am simply saying not all forms of input result in subjective experience.

And I am saying they do.

>Mentioning elechtrochemical activity and the God helmet has nothint to do with the point.

It has everything to do with the point. It proves that experience is the result of electrochemical activity in the brain and causing electrochemical activity in the brain causes experience.

Okay, wow. Bold claim. Evolution seemed to work hsrd to develop a CNS and such if all "input" is subjective experience.

It doesn't prove anything and again hss no bearing on my point. You seem to think this is about some ghost in the machine. It's not.

But its not only "consciousness"!

The relevant truth must be:

We cant know without a function of knowing.

So i think you have to redefine the art of knowing.

Many dont understand the comoplexity and the dependency that is involved here.

Knowing is an (inter)action itself.

But its more then one action.

But first, of course, we must set the existentialism.

So lets say, if nothing interacts, nothing can register other beings. There must be movement and there must be interactions.

This does not include knowing so far. As knowing is a special way of interacting.

So what do we need to know, wether consciouss or not?

We need senses, that retrieve information out of the classic interaction. Its not clear if you need a conscious here or only a subconscious. Anyway, we can argue, that without senses, there is no consciousness. But stil we need to proof that!

Next, we need the memory system, which can save the information.

Then we need the rational system, which values the information.

And then we need the realization model, which brings the thought into the rest of the world.

So you need a lot to have a conscioussness and a unconscioussness. And there is more body function you need ...

Still its not clear how all these things work together, how they become one. But we can see the dependnecys much more clearly now ... after science walked on the last 200 years ... and now we see and know a lot more!

So, its not a hard probem of metyphysics anymore, its a normal problem of understanding the function of knowing and life at all and to realize the importance of empiricism and the whole informational/rational system we have. It all works together.

So, it brings us not very far to say, we need a conscious to register conscioussness. Its quite obvious - NOW.

So the hard problem of the past and classic metaphysic is and was, that they think, we can know something without a basic process of empiricism and knowing at all. and we cant know without a basic empiricism.

we dont need empiricisms actually to make deductions about unsensed objects, but we can only deduct if we have basic senses and all structures of knowing to recombine it to a new structure we havent sensed at all.

so i would say metaphysics is just a very old and incomplete system.

determinism, physics, systemtheory and all its dependencys, must be included into the philosophy, otherwise, we wont sense the whole thing and will make infinite and incomplete assumptions - called metaphysics!

>It doesn't prove anything and again hss no bearing on my point.

You can't be serious. We can cause specific experiences by providing specific input.

>Okay, wow. Bold claim. Evolution seemed to work hsrd to develop a CNS and such if all "input" is subjective experience.

CNS can't work without input. It requires a steady stream of oxygenated blood and hydrocarbons all of which require input.

You're talking about correlates of consciousness and associated physical processes. I don't disagree any of tbat, but the processes don't "prove" anything in themselves.

And your calculator also takes input. It doesn't automatically have experience.

> The central point being that without subjective experience, you can't from its description infer it even exists. That it can feel like something.

A philosopher writes lengthy text about consciousness. Why does he do that? Answer that question and you have an understanding of consciousness. There is no reason to assume that this question would be unanswerable, since it's observable.

Who says you cant "know" of consciousness without being conscious? What does it even mean to know something anyway?

Is just being able to regurgitate a definition enough? In that case a dictionary website is intelligent enough.

I think that a lot of the problems with many metaphysical arguments is that they are rooted in definitions of consciousness which are based on junk science or no science at all. Its a hard pass for me when I see arguments about consciousness that don't come from any kind of understanding of how the brain works, because thats where it all begins.

I agree with the premise. Consciousness, when you try to describe it without actually referencing one's experience of it, is hard to fully understand. It's Iike describing color to a blind person, or sound to a deaf person, there is an innate sensory experience that qualifies the description, without which, it is hard to truly understand.

What is cool is that consciousness is the product of unconsciousness - over time inanimate molecules combined differently, and given the right circumstances we somehow get cellular life, and finally conscious organisms, all built from stardust.

>And your calculator also takes input. It doesn't automatically have experience.

Are you sure? Why do you think it doesn't? Clearly it reacts to input. Your brain also reacts to input.

A thermometer "knows" something is warm without needing to have consciousness to perceive temperature.

A computer that could read the pain signals in your brain would "know" you were in pain without needing consciousness.

Since consciousness is simply brain signals, yes we can detect consciousness without being conscious. That is what medical brain scanners do.

The issue is that we don't yet know how to translate the language.

>It's is of course arcbitecturally completely different than my brain.....

An old circular CRT TV is architecturally completely different than a modern smart TV. Yet there's a commonality of function (convert input to two-dimensional visual display) that makes comparison not only possible, but obvious.

I both understand and agree

It's not about us detected neural correlates about consciousness.

I can't be a 100% sure, but we have our own experience and evidence from convergence in evolution in our cases, verbak reports and the whole rest. In the case of simple calculators that did not evoove to think and feel like us, we don't. And it's a rather specious suggestion. The positive feedback loops in the CNS, receptors and signalling, etc., are a whooe different machine than simple electronic devices or even any Von Neumann architecture. Our brain is an analog piece wetware.

It's not in any description of it or science we know where you can point to subjective experience. I am well aware of the science. It's simply saying that if I didn't have taste for example, I wouldn't be able to even guess others do until they tood me and then I wouldn't be able to imagine it either. That goes for all of subjective experience.

without subjective experience...

The first rule of conscious club, you only know you're in conscious club if you're conscious.

Perhaps this definition helps round off consciousness. Defying atrophy in a beneficial way as to cause you to replicate and amass things that assist your own survival

Or think about it like the Emma’s room thingy (?) Where a scientist (that only sees/knows black and white) knows everything there can be known about the color red, but has never seen it. Does she lack something?

OP would say she lacks the experience of red, what would you say?

> its more then one

Did you mean to say "more than"?
Explanation: No explanation available.
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Psychedelic trips can often pierce the veil, though we don't really have a very sophisticated means of dealing with what's discovered - heck, even proponents are often not very helpful.

> how could they ever understand what that is

Try thinking of "understand" not as a True/False binary but as a multi-dimensional spectrum.

Try thinking of illusion not as a True/False binary but as a multidimensional spectrum.

This simple approach (consciously overriding subconscious heuristics) has great utility with many ideas.

> It's part of the brain, it's simply a sub system.

This is metaphysics.

> My assertion is testable and can be prove true or false through examination.

Using Occam's Razor?

I do. What makes you think I don't? I was talking about the philosophical position illusionism. I have no issues with the idea that some of the thinks we believe introspectively are mistaken. But we don't need an -ism for that.

> Does she lack something?

Does she lack everything?

>OP would say she lacks the experience of red, what would you say?

I don't dispute this. The question is can she detect or understand the experience of red in any way.

as I said before a deaf person can understand that another person can hear and can detect when another person hears.

>n the case of simple calculators that did not evoove to think and feel like us, we don't.

I said nothing about thinking or evolving. I am merely talking about experience.

>Our brain is an analog piece wetware.

Irrelevant to the discussion.

Maybe I don't understand the problem then, because to me if one fully and "properly" accepts that illusionism is in effect (which includes representing heuristics predictions as truths), I'd think a workflow could be worked out such that people would be better able to realize that the core proposition is simply unknown at this point in time, which perhaps could get more people on the same page for a change.

> But we don't need an -ism for that.

Memes can be an effective popular way to get knowledge into otherwise resistant minds, just look at how well "We have no free will!" has worked, despite the truth of the matter being unknown.

Quantum Metaphysics, a friend argued.

How something is built and what sort of input it receives, how it's processed is of course relevant to the discussion. Making random claims that anything that receives input has subj. experience is silly.

Illusionism as held by Dennett, Graziano, Frankish.. has akl the issues Chalmers lists in his meta-problem. It's barely coherent, doesn't provide explanatory value.. and if beliefs about consciousness can be debunked, that without experience we can't theorize about it (you need "access") then maybebthere is more to it.

You lost me a bit with the first paragraph. Illusionism wants to negate phenomenal consciousness. Don't think many people can get on that page.

> and if beliefs about consciousness can be debunked, that without experience we can't theorize about it (you need "access") then maybebthere is more to it.

This sounds like its right in the wheelhouse of what I'm interested in, but I can't tell what you're getting at exactly.

> You lost me a bit with the first paragraph. Illusionism wants to negate phenomenal consciousness. Don't think many people can get on that page.

I'm getting at how on specific topics, it seems as if the human mind is unable to distinguish between reality and perception, fact and opinion. Whether we have free will is simply not known, not is it known whether the entirety of the universe is deterministic. If it was otherwise someone could point to a proof (or something approaching it), but all anyone has is stories, most of which have obvious flaws in them. On this topic it's perhaps not such a big deal, but I find the phenomenon annoying and it seems rather dangerous.

I have worked on free will quite a bit and we have it, only in degrees. Kevin Mitchell is working on a great (goingnby his tweets andnpeevious work) book on it right now. Check also George Ellis out wrt top-down causation.

Only in degrees, sure, but degrees go from zero to infinity, where it is within that range that we sit is the tricky part!

The lore of psychedelia is saturated with information pertaining to this - though i feel a certain amount of salt taken with this is essential due to the mind maintaining a capacity for crafting sub-autonomies which intermingle and provoke self contained feedback states [schizophrenia, tulpas, Dissociative Identity disorder, etc]

/and/ the fact that it could be archetypes of the mind - noetic excavations of the extents of the atunement of the mind when faced with differing cognitive placements incited by chemical intake

However, religious stances of psychedelics, tesla's viewpoint on the mind [it being a receiver for information created elsewhere], native american beliefs that mental illness is an individuals predisposition towards differing dimensions, and the fact of the matter that high fidelity rated sensory organs of bioware when overclocked and refined through the usage of chemical compounds ['crystalline piezo-electric experience amplifiers' - the dead] may depict valid referentials of aspects of reality [Penrose and Hameroff have this whole theory of quantum computation within scopically sub neuronal architectures of microtubules - with delvings into psychedelia and how it may refine brain wave patterns to ellucidate deeper levels of space time geometry]

Either way, they entail a wealth of knowledge and profundity - and until we get "real" "time" readouts of the experiences themselves or anomalous spikes in future variables with meta-tech sensors - it's entirely within the realm of plausible deniability when faced with the [quasi-rightful] tryant that is modern science .

I'm exceedingly interested in detachments from the illicit though - and postulations dealing strictly with the extents of thought in sobriety . Ie - our consciousness defined by the spatial axis' x, y, z is somehow interacted with by a "consciousness" defined by the spatial axis' x, z, z² , what forms of "consciousness" might exist when emergently related to a reality substrate dictated by differing mathematical constants, what forms of "consciousness" exist within the span of a second [their relative experience of existence feels like 80 years], what variables of sustenance exist in the ebbs of post temporal/spatial transcendence - and what avenues of "life" base their "existence" around such things?

//and how do all of these hypothetical instances relate to the perception of us from an outsider perspective ? - especially when taking into account quantum implications of an observer's relation to it's environment/superposition breakdown - !!does the typoidal "consciousness" dictate , quantumly, it's residence within the nth+ hyperobject which encapsulates our reality - and what occurs when differing strains of "consciousness" enroach upon another's domain? [Strictly by means of observation]

So many questions, so much socioeconomic stiflement, so little time

> The lore of psychedelia is saturated with information pertaining to this - though i feel a certain amount of salt taken with this is essential due to the mind maintaining a capacity for crafting sub-autonomies which intermingle and provoke self contained feedback states [schizophrenia, tulpas, Dissociative Identity disorder, etc]

Agree, though what so many people overlook when applying salt is that the mind makes things up during normal consciousness as well - the subreddit I linked above is full of not-actually-scientific scientific thinking. You seem less prone to falling for these tricks which is a nice change of pace!

> Either way, they entail a wealth of knowledge and profundity - and until we get "real" "time" readouts of the experiences themselves or anomalous spikes in future variables with meta-tech sensors - it's entirely within the realm of plausible deniability when faced with the [quasi-rightful] tryant that is modern science .

Scientific thinkers do love epistemology, when it works in their favour at least!

> I'm exceedingly interested in detachments from the illicit though - and postulations dealing strictly with the extents of thought in sobriety . Ie - our consciousness defined by the spatial axis' x, y, z is somehow interacted with by a "consciousness" defined by the spatial axis' x, z, z² , what forms of "consciousness" might exist when emergently related to a reality substrate dictated by differing mathematical constants, what forms of "consciousness" exist within the span of a second [their relative experience of existence feels like 80 years], what variables of sustenance exist in the ebbs of post temporal/spatial transcendence - and what avenues of "life" base their "existence" around such things?

I think our (default) consciousness is kind of hardwired to 3D reality and our (human-longevity-distorted) sense of time, and as a consequence we continue to make bad decisions as a species.....what's your take on this theory?

> and how do all of these hypothetical instances relate to the perception of us from an outsider perspective ?

Exactly...which is why I think people often find psychedelic trips "more real than reality" at the time, and are certain of it, but can't recall why afterwards.

> So many questions, so much socioeconomic stiflement, so little time

Ha! Too true, too true.

I think that we have been bred selectively for optimum fulfillment of lower tiers of maslow's heirarchy of needs , and so we are very much entirely predisposed towards only interacting with that which is pertinant to the base aspects of reality . In time , perhaps our evolution could be trajected towards us leaving the waters of leadened reality and shaking , subtly, the droplets of physicality from our repurposed vestigialities of form - perhaps this is a heaven or hell . Society has much promise yet seemingly is pushing for nonthinking drones, purposefully subjected to the lower rungs - which is antithetical to advancements of capacity for fulfilling higher tiers of the heirarchy. I think we do purposefully make bad decisions and that it is an affliction of purpose and intent by select members of the species for gain - by will of power inherited and by will of pushing for bad decisions to be made so as to retain the status quo and prevent ascension of the power structure we currently find ourselves in .

We're also like preteens in term of geo-political amoebic poly-autonomous societal entities so it's like - ahhh when's the fermi paradox scythe gonna bring out the dead in nuclear hollocaust

I've heard tell of there being definitive gain from only being privy to base levels of reality - perhaps our trivial life and death - the whole tragedy of the human experience , in terms of species , is a blessing - hubris is a concept of biblical folly

[Tldr:] maybe we should continue to make bad decisions so we can remain gratefully dead , our waking minds asleep to the horrors of what could be - waiting blissfully in our own negligence of comprehension for that slumber , somnium eternal

Also whoa its so cool to actually like talk to somebody ab this i've been ruminating in intellectual isolation for like years now

>How something is built and what sort of input it receives, how it's processed is of course relevant to the discussion

No it's not. The mere fact that processing happens is the only thing that matters.

>Making random claims that anything that receives input has subj. experience is silly.

Why is it silly?

Very succinct and thought provoking - thank you

Handwaving with a word like processing is meaningless. I personally am looking to engineer not just AI but synthetic minds. Properties of the materials and the physics matter.

It's silly because it assumes subjective experience as some sort of magic that happens regardless of the design.

I believe that there is a standing of inference/conformity to rationally acceptable modes of being when comprehending the environment which we tread . We subsist within a stark difference to the notion of inner being and our own perceptions of what we are as an individual - we only perceive ourselves as homeogenous with our species in depictions which the external form shows , not in any regard with our inner atunements . We apply our own logic and applicable overlay as a processing basis and interaction veil atop a plausibly differenced state of the truth of reality . Every human , from the viewport of themselves, exists as a uniquety of form in and of their own conceptions/perceptions of the entirety of existence . This is rationally negligable but rationality in and of itself is a machination which is taught to us predominantly by the external world . The only true primary evidence of consciousness is withheld within the individual and can never be ported as a shared relation of definable standards.

Beyond this, and taking speciative congruency into account, a suspension of disbelief is required to ever believe with certainty that consciousness exists beyond the realm of the michrochosm that is the specific slice of the anima mundi which you have been blessed with. It is an interesting thing to note

>Handwaving with a word like processing is meaningless.

Is it though? How is it worse than handwaving with a word like consciousness or experience or qualia?

>I personally am looking to engineer not just AI but synthetic minds.

Good luck with that. Let me know when you know what a mind is and how you would recognize one.

>It's silly because it assumes subjective experience as some sort of magic that happens regardless of the design.

It's not magic at all. It's just chemical reactions.

“Seems a tautology, a restatement…” ironic isn’t it hahah. I mean no harm, just made me smile

Through direct examination.

Incorrect.

Definition: abstract theory with no basis in reality

Or

Definition: an idea, doctrine, or posited reality outside of human sense perception

Both suggest we cannot ascertain the reality, however, as I suggest with bats we can indeed do so.

> Incorrect.

Also metaphysics.

> > > > Definition: abstract theory with no basis in reality

> > > > Or > > > > Definition: an idea, doctrine, or posited reality outside of human sense perception > > >

Are these the only two, consensus (non-controversial) definitions of metaphysics?

> Both suggest we cannot ascertain the reality, however, as I suggest with bats we can indeed do so.

Can we ascertain the entirety of it, with zero chance of error?

What if two people make conflicting claims about a portion of reality?

Can you provide ~proofs for these two assertions of fact (not opinion)?

• Why do people keep insisting consciousness has anything to do with metaphysics? It doesn't.

• We will make more progress if we stick in reality and not try to explain stuff through unprovable means.

Proof, not yet that's why we still deal with philosophy around this point.

However, we know humans are rooted in reality. That is testable in many ways. As our knowledge and capabilities have expanded we have been able to remove an increasing amout of things from the realm of philosophy. Just because we have not done it yet, doesn't mean that that it will not fall squarely into the realm of the physical

On the second point. We have no indication that it is required to use metaphysics to explain it. Therefore, investing in examining the brains capabilities and examining for a process.

That is where Occam's razor comes into play. Let's invest our efforts in what so know instead of positing ideas the dont exist without universal by definition.

If claimed on reality, then metaphysics need not apply.

Those definitions came from Webster and dictionary.com. if those are controversial then I think the field needs to properly define it.

> Those definitions came from Webster and dictionary.com

Can you please link to both (I want to check if those are the sole definitions for each)?

Which reminds me - you didn't answer this (or my other questions):

>> Are these the only two, consensus (non-controversial) definitions of metaphysics?

> Those definitions came from Webster and dictionary.com. if those are controversial then I think the field needs to properly define it.

Well, this also happens to exist:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphysics/

> Proof, not yet that's why we still deal with philosophy around this point. > > > > However, we know humans are rooted in reality.

What about this reality right here: "That is an incorrect statement. My assertion is testable and can be prove true or false through examination."?

Are you "rooted in" that one (which disagrees with this one the one in the comment I'm replying to) also? Is it simultaneously, or do they/you switch back and forth?

> That is testable in many ways.

You can test that there is some shared reality. Beyond that, you're speculating.

> Just because we have not done it yet, doesn't mean that that it will not fall squarely into the realm of the physical

Great marketing, bad argument.

> On the second point. We have no indication that it is required to use metaphysics to explain it.

How do you see the future with physics? Maybe I'm out of the loop, but have there even been any experiments on this?

> That is where Occam's razor comes into play. Let's invest our efforts in what so know instead of positing ideas the dont exist without universal by definition.

I will not invest in anything backed by this style of thinking - worse, I will oppose it.

assuming anything 'discovered' via psychedelics is actually anything in the first place.

apart from self-reflection there isnt anything there, as someone who has done a pretty large amount of a variety of hallucinogens ive never had an ego-death, met entities of any variety, felt any connection to nature or the universe or any of the other typical experiences (and ive done 1300ug doses of LSD).

personally i havent seen anything of any objective quality to psychedelics, they are interesting as hell but they cant tell you anything part of you didnt already know.

Edit: i am autistic, maybe thats why i have never had any of those experiences?

and? no one can prove any of their theories, at least emergent behavior makes rational sense (the rest basically require magic, souls or other non-materiel assumptions).

'you' are literally the sum of your genes, neurons, memories, experiences, society (as such you also make all your own choices, the entire free will debate hinges on human consciousness being 'special' when it isnt)

You will not invest in approaches based on reality? Sounds like we done here.

It's not really the future of physics that is important here. It's the ability for us to inspect claims that were previously impossible to investigate. We have the ability, and increasingly so, to inspect how the brain functions. This path is likely to give us better answers then the last three millenia of speculation with deferrement to untestable metaphysical concepts - such as the soul.

I am sorry, had major surgery this morning and am recovering. Not on top of my game. Your link does support that this is poorly defined still.

I donl apologize, I won't be able to continue thus dialog, but it will reference your point.

Thank you, and get well soon!

> You will not invest in approaches based on reality?

One problem is with your demonstration here today of "what we know". Another is "backed by this style of thinking" - that you equate your thinking with reality itself is a big problem for me.

Also, dodging of questions is a black mark in my books.

> assuming anything 'discovered' via psychedelics is actually anything in the first place.

How might the two of us simultaneously be talking about something that has no existence? Us talking about it requires a kind of existence, and us coming to talk about it presumably requires a force of some kind (especially since it has happened simultaneously).

> apart from self-reflection there isnt anything there, as someone who has done a pretty large amount of a variety of hallucinogens ive never had an ego-death, met entities of any variety, felt any connection to nature or the universe or any of the other typical experiences (and ive done 1300ug doses of LSD).

Do you honestly think that the entirety of reality is what you have experienced (or, that you have experienced the entirety of reality)?

> personally i havent seen anything of any objective quality to psychedelics, they are interesting as hell but they cant tell you anything part of you didnt already know.

How did you determine that it is a fact that what you experienced was not objective? I will go way out on a limb and take a wild guess: was consciousness involved in the acquisition (and possibly manufacture) of that fact(?) in any way?

> > > > Edit: i am autistic, maybe thats why i have never had any of those experiences?

I dunno man, you seem quite neurotypical to me.

I agreeof course, but does the subjectivity really have anything to do with consciousness? You could taste something and have a totally different experience than i would because your taste buds are different.

Likewise, a non conscious agent like a software bot or simple organism can have a different subjective experience than an identical agent because of similar environmental differences.

If i just ate a giant meal and you didnt, and we both experience a day without food, then my subjective experience would be very different than yours for example. Regardless of whether we are conscious or not.

I dont think consciousness = subjective experience. I think consciousness is a thought process that happens in our brains, and subjective experience is a very abstract concept that can be influenced by many, many things but exists independently of consciousness.

>Neural activity doesn't inform the observer that it feels like anything at all.

Why would it? Language only conveys what speakers can understand. If a neurosurgeon was colorblind, they could still understand how color vision works without knowing how colors look in the first person, but that doesn't mean there should be a way to convey what those experiences are like even to certain speakers who can't experience them. Having a certain kind of nervous system is a necessary condition for apprehending certain experiences.

>I think it would.

If you were the observer you would, but if you had a nervous system incapable of pain you wouldn't understand what pain felt like. That doesn't mean there is anything verbal to know about pain though, it just means that knowing what pain feels like requires having a nervous system capable of experiencing it.

Yes, it wouldn't. There's the rub and the basis for my post and issue in our universe. And in your reply "conveying what they are like" is doing a lot of heavy lifting. If someone never had the sense of taste, you can ralk to them till your blue in the face, but they wouldn't know what it's like. And that's the way you know what it even is. To experience it.

So in total what-its-likeness cannot be inferred in principle from any description from the universe. If it can, I'd love to hear how.

Already in your first paragraph you make a strsnge point. Varistions in sensations don't somehow support subjectigity doesn't have anything to do with consciousness. The same goes for a lot of other examples.

Weirdly, you mention outliers when there is worldeide consensus on a massive majority of experiences...i.e. sugsr being sweet... mint tasting "cold"... variation in subjectivity doesnt detach it from consciousness.

Finally.. phenomenal consciousness or subjective experience is simply a huge part of what consciousnes is. I don't even know how to begin understanding what you are trying to argue by mentioning variations in experience to then ask whether it has anything to do with with conscious experience.

Write your own posts arguing that and get feedback. But in all the literature this is one of the main conundrums Koch et all with integrated information theory tried to quantify it to mention an example. Unity, awareness and experience.

We know how to examine the brain to some extent and we have improved on that significantly, we also know that all who we are is contained within our bodies.

We require no metaphysical concept to understand that. My argument is simple here. We are fundamentally real within our context of understanding. We do not require claims that suspend the reality to explain anything about ourselves.

My thinking is that we have no demonstrated need for anything beyond our experiences within our reality to explain these concepts.

> We know how to examine the brain to some extent and we have improved on that significantly

On a percentage basis, how close are we to having perfect understanding of the entire system (including when brains are networked)?

> ...we also know that all who we are is contained within our bodies.

We don't actually, but there is certainly no shortage of belief who have faith that that is true.

> We require no metaphysical concept to understand that.

To understand what is really going on here, I believe it inevitably gets deep into metaphysics, depending on one's definition - for me, I use this one:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics

> My argument is simple here. We are fundamentally real within our context of understanding. We do not require claims that suspend the reality to explain anything about ourselves.

Oh, I didn't realize your statements were an argument.

If it isn't too much trouble, would you be willing to continue this conversation in a form of only objectively true statements? (And if not: why not?)

> My thinking is that we have no demonstrated need for anything beyond our experiences within our reality to explain these concepts.

Your thinking may be correct, but it may also be incorrect.

Consider: what are the odds that your cognition and the "knowledge" that it rests on has zero substantial flaws?

>And that's the way you know what it even is. To experience it.

No, perception is one way you can know things, but it is prone to biases, faulty information, illusion, hallucination, etc.. That's why having objective means of measurement or studying things generally is necessary in science, and how e.g. neurology can describe how vision works. Just having vision might lead to false explanations of how vision works. Obviously before microscopes, X-ray imaging, etc., much less was known in biology. [Actually in this instance you probably mean "know what an experience is like", but my point is any knowledge based on that wouldn't be something you could learn verbally, so it's just an aspect of communication. It wouldn't mean someone couldn't know "coffee tastes chocolatey" if they don't know what chocolate tastes like. Facts like that could be known without first person apprehension just based on how the sense work, etc.. ]

Experience gives first person apprehension of some sensory system, but my point was that the inability to convey in language what some experiences are like to speakers who can't have the experience is not a problem of knowledge, at least not something solvable by philosophers like how certain problems are solved in physics to determine experimental results. It's just a brute fact that certain organisms like humans are limited in their senses, and can't perceive beyond them, at least not without some future biotechnology, like to allow humans to sense infrared like snakes or hear higher frequencies like dogs or so on.

No, I meant what isubjective experience even is. If you have zero first person access to any experience, then it's impossible to comprehend what it even is based on any description thereof. This is not a linguistic issue.

The whole conundrum is that concluding processing goes on doesn't give you an inkling of an idea subjective experience even exists or understand anything even if one were to tell you.

Without access to subjective experience all you have left is dry processes you can have a fully exhaustive account of without ever knowing what subjective experience even is.

>How might the two of us simultaneously be talking about something that has no existence? Us talking about it requires a kind of existence,

The conception of an idea does not necessarily mean that it exists in any real capacity. Take magic for example: Shooting a fireball by saying a few words and willing the thing into existence or lifting a rock with nothing but the power of your mind can't be done in real life, but we can conceive of a reality where it might be possible.

>and us coming to talk about it presumably requires a force of some kind (especially since it has happened simultaneously).

Coincidence. No outside force necessary.

> The conception of an idea does not necessarily mean that it exists in any real capacity.

What meaning do you ascribe to the word "real"?

Is this claim (...an idea does not necessarily mean that it exists...) "real"? Is it true?

> Take magic for example: Shooting a fireball by saying a few words and willing the thing into existence or lifting a rock with nothing but the power of your mind can't be done in real life, but we can conceive of a reality where it might be possible.

Seems reasonable, but examples in the physical realm is playing on easy - how about metaphysical questions like is there a God(s)?

>What meaning do you ascribe to the word "real"?

"actually existing as a thing or occurring in fact; not imagined or supposed" (from Google)

Tangible, touchable, interact-able, experience-able. Perhaps more specifically "as pertains to reality"

For the specific use "...any real capacity." it means that just because you can think of it and make it "real" in a sense (real within a story, lore for a game, etc.), doesn't mean that it is something you can find in reality and interact with.

>Is this claim (...an idea does not necessarily mean that it exists...) "real"? Is it true?

Yes, just because you can conceive of something doesn't automatically make it a reality somewhere in the universe. You have to find it and prove that it exists first. You can postulate ways that it might exist (done often in science before the actual discovery of something) but to say that it for sure exists before you have actual evidence is folly. You can only say that it might exist or even very much probably exists. Which leads to your next question...

>Seems reasonable, but examples in the physical realm is playing on easy - how about metaphysical questions like is there a God(s)?

Personally, I believe there are no gods, nothing supernatural. Everything is natural and anything that seems supernatural is simply something we don't yet understand well enough to explain via natural laws. Therefore, it is reasonable to be skeptical of any claim about a god or gods. I can take the believer at their word when they describe aspects of their god, since that is what they believe about it and doesn't really affect me but when they start saying that I must believe in their god or such and such thing will happen I need proof. As far as I'm concerned they are just believers in a fantasy, until they can provide proper evidence. I myself tried to provide proper evidence for a believe in the christian god and that simply wasn't possible.

Well, I would think one should conclude that the inability of human language to directly evoke some previously never sensed sensory experience is a linguistic issue, and isn't a problem to be solved with language, it's just a fact about how human language works.

Getting back to the blog post this was about, it says,

>I argue that if consciousness is only knowable through the unique metaphysical relation we bear to it, then it necessarily follows that other significant phenomena may exist in our universe we don’t know about without the necessary metaphysical relation(s).

Having consciousness is a necessary condition for all knowledge, but it is not a sufficient condition for knowing about a particular thing, even for knowing about consciousness. Before any understanding of how brains work people had consciousness but didn't know what it actually was, that the experience of tasting pistachios was the brain activity resulting from eating pistachios. Having an experience is not the same as knowing what it is. People experience plenty of things without knowing what the experience is.

With language, we can describe what some experiences are like in terms of experiences that a speaker would understand, like people describe various tastes as nutty, or chocolatey, and so on. That way people can sometimes imagine what experiences are like without ever having had them, by their similarity to whatever they have experienced. Hence having had some experience of X isn't always a necessary condition for knowing what X is like, because it could be understood by relation to Y or Z. Or it could be imagined in relation to objective facts. Some things could not be conveyed like that, like the experience of a bat at least largely could not without some kind of mutation scenario or highly advanced implantation or surgical goings on.

> "actually existing as a thing or occurring in fact; not imagined or supposed" (from Google) > > > > Tangible, touchable, interact-able, experience-able. Perhaps more specifically "as pertains to reality" > > > > For the specific use "...any real capacity." it means that just because you can think of it and make it "real" in a sense (real within a story, lore for a game, etc.), doesn't mean that it is something you can find in reality and interact with.

Are thoughts real?

>>> The conception of an idea does not necessarily mean that it exists in any real capacity.

>> Is this claim (...an idea does not necessarily mean that it exists...) "real"? Is it true?

> Yes, just because you can conceive of something doesn't automatically make it a reality somewhere in the universe.

"The conception of an idea does not necessarily mean that it exists in any real capacity" is real, exist, and is true though?

> Personally, I believe there are no gods, nothing supernatural. Everything is natural and anything that seems supernatural is simply something we don't yet understand well enough to explain via natural laws. Therefore, it is reasonable to be skeptical of any claim about a god or gods. I can take the believer at their word when they describe aspects of their god, since that is what they believe about it and doesn't really affect me but when they start saying that I must believe in their god or such and such thing will happen I need proof. As far as I'm concerned they are just believers in a fantasy, until they can provide proper evidence. I myself tried to provide proper evidence for a believe in the christian god and that simply wasn't possible.

What's your take on abortion rights?

I thought I asked some good questions, would you be willing to reply?

The p-zombie thought experiment isn't about whether a p-zombie could actually be identified in reality, it's about whether the concept is simply coherent; could a human that doesn't experience qualia exist and act functionally identically to a human that does experience qualia? It's just an attempt to clarify what the term 'qualia' refers to and, based on whether one finds the p-zombie idea to be coherent or not, establish whether qualia are an ontologically real, non-physical property of the universe.

To borrow from Wikipedia (Consciousness is being used here in the sense of 'experiencing qualia'):

> 1. According to physicalism, all that exists in our world (including consciousness) is physical. > 2. Thus, if physicalism is true, a metaphysically possible world in which all physical facts are the same as those of the actual world must contain everything that exists in our actual world. In particular, conscious experience must exist in such a possible world. > 3. Chalmers argues that we can conceive being outside of a world physically indistinguishable from our world but in which there is no consciousness (a zombie world). From this (so Chalmers argues) it follows that such a world is metaphysically possible. > 4. Therefore, physicalism is false. (The conclusion follows from 2. and 3. by modus tollens.)

This article is pondering whether we'd ever be able to 'know' a metaphysical property that we bear no relation to. I'll give some examples to clarify the problem. For physicalists: imagine dark matter didn't have the property of mass and thus had no gravitational effects. We would never know dark matter exists because we'd have no other way to interact with it or recognize its existence; in fact, there very well could be a form of physical 'matter' like this out there already, but we have no way of knowing it. We couldn't even really speculate on the nature of such matter beyond whether it exists.

For idealists: look at a color wheel and memorize all the colors. Imagine that the spectrum of visible light we can see is expanded by 50 nm in one direction. That new light we'll be able to detect will have colors that are not a part of the current color wheel, but are an addition to it. What do those new colors look like? I personally can't envision any colors existing that aren't ROYGBIV or pink. Perhaps such a color is metaphysically impossible?

For dualists: the universe consists entirely of mental and physical properties. Invent a new fantasy property that doesn't exist and explain it to me in a way I can understand. I'd bet this is also impossible, but perhaps I'm just not very creative!

I would personally consider it impossible for anyone to comprehend or effectively discuss an ontological property that we have no way of recognizing or being impacted by. Because a p-zombie does not have the metaphysical capacity to experience qualia it would not be able to comprehend or discuss it; as you said, a p-zombie would not know it's a p-zombie, because it wouldn't know what it was lacking. The other side of this is that, to put it very crudely, if we are able to comprehend and discuss an ontological property then it can reasonably be said to exist, even if its relation to other properties is uncertain. We possess qualia and are able to discuss it, hence why the p-zombie idea and the term 'qualia' exists in the first place. This is probably what OP means when he says "you can't know of consciousness without being conscious." In this case it really does take one to know one.

>As an observer you also don't know whether or not the subject you are talking to is a zombie. They act as if they are not, and if you ask them they say they are not.

I'd say that if I asked a p-zombie if they experience qualia they'd say "what's that?" They would not be able to understand my explanation because they don't have the metaphysical capacity to understand the ontological properties that I experience and talk about. I wouldn't be able to prove it but I'd have a reasonable suspicion that they were philosophical zombies (provided my explanation was any good). Other than discussing qualia itself though, they'd otherwise be indistinguishable from a normal human, provided that qualia aren't strictly necessary for engaging in usual human behaviors.

I hope at least some of this made sense.

But those sub-systems operate on the same logic as the rest of the computer. It's all computer code. Taking 'conciousness' to essentially mean 'qualia' as in the Chalmers tradition, consciousness is fundamentally ontologically different from the brain itself, despite their correlation.

To keep with the computer analogy, the brain is like the CPU and consciousness is like the light coming from the monitor. Totally separate things. The light has nothing to do with how the CPU operates, and the CPU is actually responsible for the light in first place via instructions given to the monitor. But you can, in a way, make the CPU acknowledge the light that it's creating by hooking up a webcam and pointing it at the monitor. Sort of a computer self-awareness, the same way I'm aware of my own qualia/conscious experience.

The point is the neither the observer or the zombie itself can know whether or not they are a zombie. So this makes the whole thought experiment moot.

You can't tell, the zombie can't tell.

It's just the problem with solipsism restated.

>Chalmers argues that we can conceive being outside of a world physically indistinguishable from our world but in which there is no consciousness (a zombie world). From this (so Chalmers argues) it follows that such a world is metaphysically possible.

Can we though? This is the whole problem You can't conceive of such a world because that world would be exactly like this one.

>For idealists: look at a color wheel and memorize all the colors. Imagine that the spectrum of visible light we can see is expanded by 50 nm in one direction. That new light we'll be able to detect will have colors that are not a part of the current color wheel, but are an addition to it. What do those new colors look like? I personally can't envision any colors existing that aren't ROYGBIV or pink. Perhaps such a color is metaphysically impossible?

Do you see how you are begging the question. Your question is saying there is a physical eye seeing physical wavelengths of photons and a brain is undergoing physical processes. So if you are perceiving anything it's due to physicalism. There is nothing metaphysical about perceiving colors.

>The other side of this is that, to put it very crudely, if we are able to comprehend and discuss an ontological property then it can reasonably be said to exist, even if its relation to other properties is uncertain.

Again I pointed out that you can't conceive of it but let's presume you can. This argument boils down to "anything anybody can conceive of is real and exists using the words real and exist in the ways we are familiar with".

Surely you can see the flaw in this premise.

>I'd say that if I asked a p-zombie if they experience qualia they'd say "what's that?"

Most likely this is true because the word itself carries no defined meaning and was created purposefully to be vague and malleable so as to prove a point".

>They would not be able to understand my explanation because they don't have the metaphysical capacity to understand the ontological properties that I experience and talk about.

But they would. The experiment says they could talk about it.

>I hope at least some of this made sense.

I understand what you are saying, your arguments don't make sense to me and I don't accept your premises or conclusions.

>The point is the neither the observer or the zombie itself can know whether or not they are a zombie.

Someone who isn't a zombie would know they themselves aren't a zombie though. Someone who possesses qualia would be able to recognize that fact. The point of the thought experiment is for those qualia-having people to imagine the existence of physically-functional humans who have no qualia and to consider the philosophical/metaphysical/epistemological implications. It makes perfect sense to me.

>Can we though? This is the whole problem You can't conceive of such a world because that world would be exactly like this one.

It would be almost entirely physically identical. Qualia are non-physical by definition. They're the result of physical processes, yes, but qualia are not physical themselves. And I can easily conceive of such a world existing. I know that if I were a p-zombie I'd probably talk about qualia a lot less!

>Your question is saying there is a physical eye seeing physical wavelengths of photons and a brain is undergoing physical processes. So if you are perceiving anything it's due to physicalism. There is nothing metaphysical about perceiving colors.

You got me here. I know there are no idealists on reddit so I still made that example for physicalists really, haha. But I still think it works - subjective color experience itself is a quale, and that's what the whole example is about.

>This argument boils down to "anything anybody can conceive of is real and exists using the words real and exist in the ways we are familiar with".

Hence why I put 'crude'. The argument doesn't work for everything that can be conceived of, only fundamental ontological properties. If humans were all blind we wouldn't discuss sight experience, but most of us can see and thus we can discuss sight experience. The discussion of sight experience itself is one thing that tells me that others can see, and when I apply this logic to qualia this is how I overcome solipsism.

On the other hand, we know bats echolocate and we know the physics and the biology behind it, but most of us can't personally echolocate - and thus we don't talk about the quale of echolocation. We don't even know what it's like, so how would we talk about it? I don't have a nice fancy polished argument for this line of thought but I'm sure you can at least see what I'm aiming at here.

>Most likely this is true because the word itself carries no defined meaning and was created purposefully to be vague and malleable so as to prove a point".

I'm not sure about that. Every definition I've seen of qualia strikes at a very particular feature of human existence - subjective conscious experience. It's always seemed like a pretty straightforward concept to me.

>But they would. The experiment says they could talk about it.

Er, can you clarify?

>I understand what you are saying, your arguments don't make sense to me and I don't accept your premises or conclusions.

That's fine. These kinds of metaphysical debates usually don't result in any form of mutual understanding lol. But figured I'd try anyway.

>Someone who isn't a zombie would know they themselves aren't a zombie though.

How?

>Someone who possesses qualia would be able to recognize that fact.

The zombie thinks they have qualia.

> The point of the thought experiment is for those qualia-having people to imagine the existence of physically-functional humans who have no qualia and to consider the philosophical/metaphysical/epistemological implications. It makes perfect sense to me.

Honestly it makes no sense to me.

>It would be almost entirely physically identical. Qualia are non-physical by definition.

But they are physical. Your perceptions are physical. Your feelings about your perceptions are also physical.

> I know that if I were a p-zombie I'd probably talk about qualia a lot less!

No you wouldn't. You'd talk about it just as much because you would think you have qualia.

> subjective color experience itself is a quale, and that's what the whole example is about.

But it's physical. Your subjective experience can be measured in a machine by examining your brain activity.

>The argument doesn't work for everything that can be conceived of, only fundamental ontological properties.

Why? Why is this definition of creation only limited to fundamental ontological properties (whatever that means).

>If humans were all blind we wouldn't discuss sight experience, but most of us can see and thus we can discuss sight experience.

Yes because photons are hitting our physical eyes and creating physical electrical signals which travel on physical nerves and get processed in your physical brain.

>On the other hand, we know bats echolocate and we know the physics and the biology behind it, but most of us can't personally echolocate - and thus we don't talk about the quale of echolocation.

Some people do. Come to think of it it's no different than talking about qualia of hearing.

>We don't even know what it's like, so how would we talk about it?

We can guess. We can theorize. We can simulate. We can mathematically model. We can build machines to mimic it. That's what humans do to understand things beyond our perception.

>Every definition I've seen of qualia strikes at a very particular feature of human existence - subjective conscious experience. It's always seemed like a pretty straightforward concept to me.

No you forgot to add "non physical" or "non material" or "supernatural" into that definition. Subjective experience is physical and there is no need for a special word to talk about it.

> These kinds of metaphysical debates usually don't result in any form of mutual understanding lol. But figured I'd try anyway.

Do you know why? It's because nobody can define the word metaphysical consistently.

>How?

Because a zombie has no qualia and I know I do have qualia because I'm currently and constantly directly experiencing qualia.

>The zombie thinks they have qualia.

>No you wouldn't. You'd talk about it just as much because you would think you have qualia.

According to whom? That's not part of the thought experiment and I see no logical reason to assume that. I've spent this entire discussion establishing exactly why that wouldn't be the case. The zombie would only think it has qualia (assuming it understands the correct definition of qualia and hasn't been lied to) if it actually does have qualia and thus it wouldn't be a zombie.

>Honestly it makes no sense to me.

Then I'm afraid I must conclude you yourself are a p-zombie :)

>But they are physical. Your perceptions are physical. Your feelings about your perceptions are also physical.

>But it's physical. Your subjective experience can be measured in a machine by examining your brain activity.

>Subjective experience is physical and there is no need for a special word to talk about it.

Neural correlates of consciousness are physical and can be measured but consciousness (qualia) itself is not and cannot. But this is a whole argument by itself. I'd recommend reading Chalmer's The Conscious Mind for a better understanding.

>Why? Why is this definition of creation only limited to fundamental ontological properties (whatever that means).

The article in the post we're arguing in the comments section of should answer this question.

>We can guess. We can theorize. We can simulate. We can mathematically model. We can build machines to mimic it. That's what humans do to understand things beyond our perception.

What these things do is convert that information into a form we can access. But we can never experience the quale of bat echolocation, or bird magnetoreception, or shark electroreception, et cetera. At this point we've just arrived at the Mary the color scientist thought experiment.

>Do you know why? It's because nobody can define the word metaphysical consistently.

'Philosophy' has never been properly defined either, but here we are.

>Because a zombie has no qualia and I know I do have qualia because I'm currently and constantly directly experiencing qualia.

The zombie believes he has qualia.

>According to whom?

According to the premise of the experiment.

>? That's not part of the thought experiment and I see no logical reason to assume that.

The logical reason is that there is another universe exactly like this one which means the zombies are exactly like humans but lack qualia. This means they believe they have qualia and say that they have qualia when you ask them.

>Then I'm afraid I must conclude you yourself are a p-zombie :)

Go right ahead. I am sure it fits in your worldview already.

>Neural correlates of consciousness are physical and can be measured but consciousness (qualia) itself is not and cannot.

Of course it can. We can literally record you experiencing the redness of red.

>But this is a whole argument by itself. I'd recommend reading Chalmer's The Conscious Mind for a better understanding.

I have. He makes no sense. Like you he keeps making insane and completely unsubstantiated claims like "qualia can't be detected" when we can clearly detect you experiencing qualia.

>The article in the post we're arguing in the comments section of should answer this question.

It doesn't. An answer isn't just something somebody says. There has to be some sort of evidence.

>What these things do is convert that information into a form we can access.

Exactly.

>But we can never experience the quale of bat echolocation, or bird magnetoreception, or shark electroreception, et cetera.

why are you so sure of that. According to you qualia is unmeasurable, undetectable, completely subjective, and is not material. Given all of that how can you be sure I am not experiencing the qualia of echolocation?

>'Philosophy' has never been properly defined either, but here we are.

Arguing about the definition of words nobody can agree with. That's philosophy in a nutshell.

>The logical reason is that there is another universe exactly like this one which means the zombies are exactly like humans but lack qualia. This means they believe they have qualia and say that they have qualia when you ask them.

I suppose that's fair enough, but personally I'd say there's a tacit assumption in any thought experiment that causality is 'reset' and the hypothetical world plays out according to whatever has been changed in the thought experiment to begin with. In which case these p-zombies wouldn't believe they have qualia.

>Of course it can. We can literally record you experiencing the redness of red.

>I have. He makes no sense. Like you he keeps making insane and completely unsubstantiated claims like "qualia can't be detected" when we can clearly detect you experiencing qualia.

What magical machine is this that records my qualia? You can measure my brain activity all you want but that's not the same thing. Neural correlates of consciousness are not consciousness.

The insanity here is the inability to understand what I'm talking about when I refer to the most fundamental aspect of human existence. My only options are to believe that physicalism has resulted in some sort of collective self-denying delusion (a la Daniel Dennett) or that philosophical zombies actually exist, are among us, and are debating philosophy of mind with us. I can't tell which one I prefer.

>Given all of that how can you be sure I am not experiencing the qualia of echolocation?

Because I'm sure you would've told me by now if you were lmao

>Arguing about the definition of words nobody can agree with. That's philosophy in a nutshell.

Truer words have never been spoken. Anyway it's far past my bedtime, gotta call it a night/morning. Have a good one 🤙

>I suppose that's fair enough, but personally I'd say there's a tacit assumption in any thought experiment that causality is 'reset' and the hypothetical world plays out according to whatever has been changed in the thought experiment to begin with. In which case these p-zombies wouldn't believe they have qualia.

But that makes no sense. That premise begs the question and can't possibly lead to any kind of rational conclusion.

>What magical machine is this that records my qualia?

There are several variety of brain scanning devices. Surely you know this.

> You can measure my brain activity all you want but that's not the same thing.

Why not? They are exactly the same thing. You can even watch it and say to yourself "so that's what me experiencing the redness of red looks like".

> Neural correlates of consciousness are not consciousness.

That seems like an outrageous claim and will need to be backed up by some evidence.

>The insanity here is the inability to understand what I'm talking about when I refer to the most fundamental aspect of human existence.

I suspect this is because you yourself don't really know and can't put it into precise terms. You are holding on to a vague notion so it's no possible for you to explain it to anybody with clarity.

> My only options are to believe that physicalism has resulted in some sort of collective self-denying delusion (a la Daniel Dennett) or that philosophical zombies actually exist, are among us, and are debating philosophy of mind with us. I can't tell which one I prefer.

I think if you tried hard enough you'd be able to come up other options.

>Because I'm sure you would've told me by now if you were lmao

What makes you so sure of that?

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