Submitted by Gmroo t3_zdfsu4 in philosophy
Reply to comment by Mustelafan in The hard problem of metaphysics: figuring out if other phenomena exist in our universe that like consciousness require we bear a specific metaphysical relation to them - i.e. you can't know of consciousness without being conscious. by Gmroo
The point is the neither the observer or the zombie itself can know whether or not they are a zombie. So this makes the whole thought experiment moot.
You can't tell, the zombie can't tell.
It's just the problem with solipsism restated.
>Chalmers argues that we can conceive being outside of a world physically indistinguishable from our world but in which there is no consciousness (a zombie world). From this (so Chalmers argues) it follows that such a world is metaphysically possible.
Can we though? This is the whole problem You can't conceive of such a world because that world would be exactly like this one.
>For idealists: look at a color wheel and memorize all the colors. Imagine that the spectrum of visible light we can see is expanded by 50 nm in one direction. That new light we'll be able to detect will have colors that are not a part of the current color wheel, but are an addition to it. What do those new colors look like? I personally can't envision any colors existing that aren't ROYGBIV or pink. Perhaps such a color is metaphysically impossible?
Do you see how you are begging the question. Your question is saying there is a physical eye seeing physical wavelengths of photons and a brain is undergoing physical processes. So if you are perceiving anything it's due to physicalism. There is nothing metaphysical about perceiving colors.
>The other side of this is that, to put it very crudely, if we are able to comprehend and discuss an ontological property then it can reasonably be said to exist, even if its relation to other properties is uncertain.
Again I pointed out that you can't conceive of it but let's presume you can. This argument boils down to "anything anybody can conceive of is real and exists using the words real and exist in the ways we are familiar with".
Surely you can see the flaw in this premise.
>I'd say that if I asked a p-zombie if they experience qualia they'd say "what's that?"
Most likely this is true because the word itself carries no defined meaning and was created purposefully to be vague and malleable so as to prove a point".
>They would not be able to understand my explanation because they don't have the metaphysical capacity to understand the ontological properties that I experience and talk about.
But they would. The experiment says they could talk about it.
>I hope at least some of this made sense.
I understand what you are saying, your arguments don't make sense to me and I don't accept your premises or conclusions.
>The point is the neither the observer or the zombie itself can know whether or not they are a zombie.
Someone who isn't a zombie would know they themselves aren't a zombie though. Someone who possesses qualia would be able to recognize that fact. The point of the thought experiment is for those qualia-having people to imagine the existence of physically-functional humans who have no qualia and to consider the philosophical/metaphysical/epistemological implications. It makes perfect sense to me.
>Can we though? This is the whole problem You can't conceive of such a world because that world would be exactly like this one.
It would be almost entirely physically identical. Qualia are non-physical by definition. They're the result of physical processes, yes, but qualia are not physical themselves. And I can easily conceive of such a world existing. I know that if I were a p-zombie I'd probably talk about qualia a lot less!
>Your question is saying there is a physical eye seeing physical wavelengths of photons and a brain is undergoing physical processes. So if you are perceiving anything it's due to physicalism. There is nothing metaphysical about perceiving colors.
You got me here. I know there are no idealists on reddit so I still made that example for physicalists really, haha. But I still think it works - subjective color experience itself is a quale, and that's what the whole example is about.
>This argument boils down to "anything anybody can conceive of is real and exists using the words real and exist in the ways we are familiar with".
Hence why I put 'crude'. The argument doesn't work for everything that can be conceived of, only fundamental ontological properties. If humans were all blind we wouldn't discuss sight experience, but most of us can see and thus we can discuss sight experience. The discussion of sight experience itself is one thing that tells me that others can see, and when I apply this logic to qualia this is how I overcome solipsism.
On the other hand, we know bats echolocate and we know the physics and the biology behind it, but most of us can't personally echolocate - and thus we don't talk about the quale of echolocation. We don't even know what it's like, so how would we talk about it? I don't have a nice fancy polished argument for this line of thought but I'm sure you can at least see what I'm aiming at here.
>Most likely this is true because the word itself carries no defined meaning and was created purposefully to be vague and malleable so as to prove a point".
I'm not sure about that. Every definition I've seen of qualia strikes at a very particular feature of human existence - subjective conscious experience. It's always seemed like a pretty straightforward concept to me.
>But they would. The experiment says they could talk about it.
Er, can you clarify?
>I understand what you are saying, your arguments don't make sense to me and I don't accept your premises or conclusions.
That's fine. These kinds of metaphysical debates usually don't result in any form of mutual understanding lol. But figured I'd try anyway.
>Someone who isn't a zombie would know they themselves aren't a zombie though.
How?
>Someone who possesses qualia would be able to recognize that fact.
The zombie thinks they have qualia.
> The point of the thought experiment is for those qualia-having people to imagine the existence of physically-functional humans who have no qualia and to consider the philosophical/metaphysical/epistemological implications. It makes perfect sense to me.
Honestly it makes no sense to me.
>It would be almost entirely physically identical. Qualia are non-physical by definition.
But they are physical. Your perceptions are physical. Your feelings about your perceptions are also physical.
> I know that if I were a p-zombie I'd probably talk about qualia a lot less!
No you wouldn't. You'd talk about it just as much because you would think you have qualia.
> subjective color experience itself is a quale, and that's what the whole example is about.
But it's physical. Your subjective experience can be measured in a machine by examining your brain activity.
>The argument doesn't work for everything that can be conceived of, only fundamental ontological properties.
Why? Why is this definition of creation only limited to fundamental ontological properties (whatever that means).
>If humans were all blind we wouldn't discuss sight experience, but most of us can see and thus we can discuss sight experience.
Yes because photons are hitting our physical eyes and creating physical electrical signals which travel on physical nerves and get processed in your physical brain.
>On the other hand, we know bats echolocate and we know the physics and the biology behind it, but most of us can't personally echolocate - and thus we don't talk about the quale of echolocation.
Some people do. Come to think of it it's no different than talking about qualia of hearing.
>We don't even know what it's like, so how would we talk about it?
We can guess. We can theorize. We can simulate. We can mathematically model. We can build machines to mimic it. That's what humans do to understand things beyond our perception.
>Every definition I've seen of qualia strikes at a very particular feature of human existence - subjective conscious experience. It's always seemed like a pretty straightforward concept to me.
No you forgot to add "non physical" or "non material" or "supernatural" into that definition. Subjective experience is physical and there is no need for a special word to talk about it.
> These kinds of metaphysical debates usually don't result in any form of mutual understanding lol. But figured I'd try anyway.
Do you know why? It's because nobody can define the word metaphysical consistently.
>How?
Because a zombie has no qualia and I know I do have qualia because I'm currently and constantly directly experiencing qualia.
>The zombie thinks they have qualia.
>No you wouldn't. You'd talk about it just as much because you would think you have qualia.
According to whom? That's not part of the thought experiment and I see no logical reason to assume that. I've spent this entire discussion establishing exactly why that wouldn't be the case. The zombie would only think it has qualia (assuming it understands the correct definition of qualia and hasn't been lied to) if it actually does have qualia and thus it wouldn't be a zombie.
>Honestly it makes no sense to me.
Then I'm afraid I must conclude you yourself are a p-zombie :)
>But they are physical. Your perceptions are physical. Your feelings about your perceptions are also physical.
>But it's physical. Your subjective experience can be measured in a machine by examining your brain activity.
>Subjective experience is physical and there is no need for a special word to talk about it.
Neural correlates of consciousness are physical and can be measured but consciousness (qualia) itself is not and cannot. But this is a whole argument by itself. I'd recommend reading Chalmer's The Conscious Mind for a better understanding.
>Why? Why is this definition of creation only limited to fundamental ontological properties (whatever that means).
The article in the post we're arguing in the comments section of should answer this question.
>We can guess. We can theorize. We can simulate. We can mathematically model. We can build machines to mimic it. That's what humans do to understand things beyond our perception.
What these things do is convert that information into a form we can access. But we can never experience the quale of bat echolocation, or bird magnetoreception, or shark electroreception, et cetera. At this point we've just arrived at the Mary the color scientist thought experiment.
>Do you know why? It's because nobody can define the word metaphysical consistently.
'Philosophy' has never been properly defined either, but here we are.
>Because a zombie has no qualia and I know I do have qualia because I'm currently and constantly directly experiencing qualia.
The zombie believes he has qualia.
>According to whom?
According to the premise of the experiment.
>? That's not part of the thought experiment and I see no logical reason to assume that.
The logical reason is that there is another universe exactly like this one which means the zombies are exactly like humans but lack qualia. This means they believe they have qualia and say that they have qualia when you ask them.
>Then I'm afraid I must conclude you yourself are a p-zombie :)
Go right ahead. I am sure it fits in your worldview already.
>Neural correlates of consciousness are physical and can be measured but consciousness (qualia) itself is not and cannot.
Of course it can. We can literally record you experiencing the redness of red.
>But this is a whole argument by itself. I'd recommend reading Chalmer's The Conscious Mind for a better understanding.
I have. He makes no sense. Like you he keeps making insane and completely unsubstantiated claims like "qualia can't be detected" when we can clearly detect you experiencing qualia.
>The article in the post we're arguing in the comments section of should answer this question.
It doesn't. An answer isn't just something somebody says. There has to be some sort of evidence.
>What these things do is convert that information into a form we can access.
Exactly.
>But we can never experience the quale of bat echolocation, or bird magnetoreception, or shark electroreception, et cetera.
why are you so sure of that. According to you qualia is unmeasurable, undetectable, completely subjective, and is not material. Given all of that how can you be sure I am not experiencing the qualia of echolocation?
>'Philosophy' has never been properly defined either, but here we are.
Arguing about the definition of words nobody can agree with. That's philosophy in a nutshell.
>The logical reason is that there is another universe exactly like this one which means the zombies are exactly like humans but lack qualia. This means they believe they have qualia and say that they have qualia when you ask them.
I suppose that's fair enough, but personally I'd say there's a tacit assumption in any thought experiment that causality is 'reset' and the hypothetical world plays out according to whatever has been changed in the thought experiment to begin with. In which case these p-zombies wouldn't believe they have qualia.
>Of course it can. We can literally record you experiencing the redness of red.
>I have. He makes no sense. Like you he keeps making insane and completely unsubstantiated claims like "qualia can't be detected" when we can clearly detect you experiencing qualia.
What magical machine is this that records my qualia? You can measure my brain activity all you want but that's not the same thing. Neural correlates of consciousness are not consciousness.
The insanity here is the inability to understand what I'm talking about when I refer to the most fundamental aspect of human existence. My only options are to believe that physicalism has resulted in some sort of collective self-denying delusion (a la Daniel Dennett) or that philosophical zombies actually exist, are among us, and are debating philosophy of mind with us. I can't tell which one I prefer.
>Given all of that how can you be sure I am not experiencing the qualia of echolocation?
Because I'm sure you would've told me by now if you were lmao
>Arguing about the definition of words nobody can agree with. That's philosophy in a nutshell.
Truer words have never been spoken. Anyway it's far past my bedtime, gotta call it a night/morning. Have a good one 🤙
>I suppose that's fair enough, but personally I'd say there's a tacit assumption in any thought experiment that causality is 'reset' and the hypothetical world plays out according to whatever has been changed in the thought experiment to begin with. In which case these p-zombies wouldn't believe they have qualia.
But that makes no sense. That premise begs the question and can't possibly lead to any kind of rational conclusion.
>What magical machine is this that records my qualia?
There are several variety of brain scanning devices. Surely you know this.
> You can measure my brain activity all you want but that's not the same thing.
Why not? They are exactly the same thing. You can even watch it and say to yourself "so that's what me experiencing the redness of red looks like".
> Neural correlates of consciousness are not consciousness.
That seems like an outrageous claim and will need to be backed up by some evidence.
>The insanity here is the inability to understand what I'm talking about when I refer to the most fundamental aspect of human existence.
I suspect this is because you yourself don't really know and can't put it into precise terms. You are holding on to a vague notion so it's no possible for you to explain it to anybody with clarity.
> My only options are to believe that physicalism has resulted in some sort of collective self-denying delusion (a la Daniel Dennett) or that philosophical zombies actually exist, are among us, and are debating philosophy of mind with us. I can't tell which one I prefer.
I think if you tried hard enough you'd be able to come up other options.
>Because I'm sure you would've told me by now if you were lmao
What makes you so sure of that?
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