Well, I would think one should conclude that the inability of human language to directly evoke some previously never sensed sensory experience is a linguistic issue, and isn't a problem to be solved with language, it's just a fact about how human language works.

Getting back to the blog post this was about, it says,

>I argue that if consciousness is only knowable through the unique metaphysical relation we bear to it, then it necessarily follows that other significant phenomena may exist in our universe we don’t know about without the necessary metaphysical relation(s).

Having consciousness is a necessary condition for all knowledge, but it is not a sufficient condition for knowing about a particular thing, even for knowing about consciousness. Before any understanding of how brains work people had consciousness but didn't know what it actually was, that the experience of tasting pistachios was the brain activity resulting from eating pistachios. Having an experience is not the same as knowing what it is. People experience plenty of things without knowing what the experience is.

With language, we can describe what some experiences are like in terms of experiences that a speaker would understand, like people describe various tastes as nutty, or chocolatey, and so on. That way people can sometimes imagine what experiences are like without ever having had them, by their similarity to whatever they have experienced. Hence having had some experience of X isn't always a necessary condition for knowing what X is like, because it could be understood by relation to Y or Z. Or it could be imagined in relation to objective facts. Some things could not be conveyed like that, like the experience of a bat at least largely could not without some kind of mutation scenario or highly advanced implantation or surgical goings on.