Submitted by Gmroo t3_zdfsu4 in philosophy
Reply to comment by ConsciousLiterature in The hard problem of metaphysics: figuring out if other phenomena exist in our universe that like consciousness require we bear a specific metaphysical relation to them - i.e. you can't know of consciousness without being conscious. by Gmroo
My post and a whole body of work covers why it's worthy of consideration. Because consiousness is a crucial phenomenon and apparently you can't know of it unless you get to experience it. That's pretty interesting. I suggest you read the meta-problem by Chalmers. If it doesn't interest you, then I guess it doesn't.
You said as an observer you don't know... so I mentioned cojoined twins as an example that in principle we can know.
>Because consiousness is a crucial phenomenon and apparently you can't know of it unless you get to experience it.
Why did you put the word "apparently" in there. Is this really apparent? It's not apparent to me at all.
>I suggest you read the meta-problem by Chalmers. If it doesn't interest you, then I guess it doesn'
Chalmers bores me to tears. His arguments are all just attempts to justify his already held beliefs no different than any christian who is making arguments for god.
>You said as an observer you don't know... so I mentioned cojoined twins as an example that in principle we can know.
I don't get it. How is this applicable?
Chalmers's arguments are systematic and explorative. Sorry, can't help you further since he bores you and your convinxed of some caricarure of him.
And if it's not apparent to you, then make an argument how subjective experience can be inferred without having it. I don't think there is one. That would be beyond Nobel-level stuff.
>Chalmers's arguments are systematic and explorative
I disagree. They are contrived and designed carefully to try and provide some sort of a backing for his already held conclusions.
>And if it's not apparent to you, then make an argument how subjective experience can be inferred without having it.
I have multiple times.
Your experiences are merely electrochemical activity taking place in your body. They can be measured and then mechanically stimulated to make you feel things.
>That would be beyond Nobel-level stuff.
It's banal and has been done thousands of times. You can literally make people believe in god and then disbelieve by stimulating their brains.
Mentioning elechtrochemical activity and the God helmet has nothint to do with the point. You are projecting magical views onto people and tilting at windmills. So we're talking past each other.
>Mentioning elechtrochemical activity and the God helmet has nothint to do with the point.
It has everything to do with the point. It proves that experience is the result of electrochemical activity in the brain and causing electrochemical activity in the brain causes experience.
It doesn't prove anything and again hss no bearing on my point. You seem to think this is about some ghost in the machine. It's not.
>It doesn't prove anything and again hss no bearing on my point.
You can't be serious. We can cause specific experiences by providing specific input.
You're talking about correlates of consciousness and associated physical processes. I don't disagree any of tbat, but the processes don't "prove" anything in themselves.
And your calculator also takes input. It doesn't automatically have experience.
>And your calculator also takes input. It doesn't automatically have experience.
Are you sure? Why do you think it doesn't? Clearly it reacts to input. Your brain also reacts to input.
I can't be a 100% sure, but we have our own experience and evidence from convergence in evolution in our cases, verbak reports and the whole rest. In the case of simple calculators that did not evoove to think and feel like us, we don't. And it's a rather specious suggestion. The positive feedback loops in the CNS, receptors and signalling, etc., are a whooe different machine than simple electronic devices or even any Von Neumann architecture. Our brain is an analog piece wetware.
>n the case of simple calculators that did not evoove to think and feel like us, we don't.
I said nothing about thinking or evolving. I am merely talking about experience.
>Our brain is an analog piece wetware.
Irrelevant to the discussion.
How something is built and what sort of input it receives, how it's processed is of course relevant to the discussion. Making random claims that anything that receives input has subj. experience is silly.
>How something is built and what sort of input it receives, how it's processed is of course relevant to the discussion
No it's not. The mere fact that processing happens is the only thing that matters.
>Making random claims that anything that receives input has subj. experience is silly.
Why is it silly?
Handwaving with a word like processing is meaningless. I personally am looking to engineer not just AI but synthetic minds. Properties of the materials and the physics matter.
It's silly because it assumes subjective experience as some sort of magic that happens regardless of the design.
>Handwaving with a word like processing is meaningless.
Is it though? How is it worse than handwaving with a word like consciousness or experience or qualia?
>I personally am looking to engineer not just AI but synthetic minds.
Good luck with that. Let me know when you know what a mind is and how you would recognize one.
>It's silly because it assumes subjective experience as some sort of magic that happens regardless of the design.
It's not magic at all. It's just chemical reactions.
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