Submitted by Gmroo t3_zdfsu4 in philosophy
Reply to comment by Gmroo in The hard problem of metaphysics: figuring out if other phenomena exist in our universe that like consciousness require we bear a specific metaphysical relation to them - i.e. you can't know of consciousness without being conscious. by Gmroo
You can levy any argument against knowing without consciousness against knowing consciousness without consciousness.
Yes you can't experience the taste of food without the ability to taste food. Yes you can't experience consciousness without the ability to experience consciousness... but can you know it? Well it all comes down to how you define knowing... your argument is about knowing consciousness.
To define knowing in a way that you do to combat my more parsimonious statement requires you giving up ur argument. Example if you say: a non sentient thing processing can know things. Well than a non sentient thing processing can know consciousness and ur argument fails. You must argue knowing requires inner experience and awareness, for both your and my more parsimonious statement to stand.
As i said it would boil down to, all there is to debate is whether ur definition of knowing requires experience and/or awareness. If you say no, ur right my argument fails... but so does urs. We both must say yes, and in the end all were really saying is saying you can't experience things without the ability to experience that thing.
Which we both agree with, but just seems an obvious tautology to me.
Again, I would invoke Chalmers' argumentation here:
One can also make a debunking argument about beliefs about phenomenal consciousness in general, perhaps with some variety of non-reductionism operating as a background assumption. There are various ways to lay out such an argument, but perhaps the most straight forward is as follows: 1.There is a correct explanation of our beliefs about conscious-ness that is independent of consciousness 2. If there is a correct explanation of our beliefs about conscious- ness that is independent of consciousness, those beliefs are not justified 3. Our beliefs about consciousness are not justified.
Basically, I am claiming 1 and in my post list 2 as a partial knockdown argument. I personally find this a brain-breaking and fascinating idea wrt to the properties of our universe.
So we can bicker about knowing or belief, but in the end I don't see how the basic idea that whatever consciousness is bears a particular relation to us so that we can even bicker about it as an explicandum, is not compelling basis to ponder the search for other phenomena that might not be easily or at all detectable without a particular relation we'd have to bear to them.
> here is a correct explanation of our beliefs about conscious-ness that is independent of consciousness
How can that possibly be? How can you have a belief without consciousness?
Explanation about our beliefs about consciousness rhat is independent if it...that's something else.
And it's conceivable an entity has intelligence but no subjective experience. So you can explain what strawberry tastes like till you're blue in the face. It doesn't grasp the concept of taste.
>The point is that it's unclear why the processes in our bodies have to feel like anything since descriptively they perform their function.
Again, what does this even mean?
>And it's conceivable an entity has intelligence but no subjective experience.
I am not sure if that's possible. I don't think you can gain or enhance intelligence without input of any sort and input is experience.
>So you can explain what strawberry tastes like till you're blue in the face. It doesn't grasp the concept of taste.
I think it could. Blind people have concepts of seeing, deaf people have concepts of hearing.
People born deaf have some compensatory mechanisms like better detection of vibrations... but you're stretching at this point.
Yes, the relation between intelligence and consciousness is an open problem. Input sure. Input is not experience. That is nonsense. I can build a simple raspberry Pi robot with accentuators and its simple processing doesn't mean it necessarily has subjective experience unless you subscrive to some form of panpsychism. I don't that flies.
>People born deaf have some compensatory mechanisms like better detection of vibrations... but you're stretching at this point.
They have input into their brains. They can understand input they don't have using input they do have.
>Input is not experience.
Of course it is. There can be no experience without input.
>I can build a simple raspberry Pi robot with accentuators and its simple processing doesn't mean it necessarily has subjective experience unless you subscrive to some form of panpsychism.
It has input and that input is in fact experience for the processor. It detects the electricity which then results in other electrochemical reactions.
This is no different than your brain.
It's is of course arcbitecturally completely different than my brain.....
From "input isn ot experience" it doesn't follow that there can't be any experience without input. I am simply saying not all forms of input result in subjective experience.
>It's is of course arcbitecturally completely different than my brain.....
It's really not that different though.
>From "input isn ot experience" it doesn't follow that there can't be any experience without input.
Sure it does. Experience is the result of electrochemical activity in the brain. That doesn't happen without input.
>I am simply saying not all forms of input result in subjective experience.
And I am saying they do.
Okay, wow. Bold claim. Evolution seemed to work hsrd to develop a CNS and such if all "input" is subjective experience.
>Okay, wow. Bold claim. Evolution seemed to work hsrd to develop a CNS and such if all "input" is subjective experience.
CNS can't work without input. It requires a steady stream of oxygenated blood and hydrocarbons all of which require input.
>It's is of course arcbitecturally completely different than my brain.....
An old circular CRT TV is architecturally completely different than a modern smart TV. Yet there's a commonality of function (convert input to two-dimensional visual display) that makes comparison not only possible, but obvious.
Hmm maybe I will read more into Chalmer. See if that changes my thinking
Thanks for the info and responses.
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