The structure of moral normativity

Submitted by simonperry955 t3_yuv3c5 in philosophy

We may define morality as the normative structure that is generated when we collaborate with [necessarily] imperfect, fallible others to achieve normative goals jointly or collectively.  The ultimate normative goals are thriving, surviving and/or reproducing.  Thriving or flourishing may, in humans, be biological, psychological, social, or/and moral.  There is a basic existential pressure within every organism to do the things that will lead to an increased chance of thriving, surviving and/or reproducing.  This pressure is a result of evolution and natural selection.  

Hence, we may say that raw instrumental normativity, the pressure to achieve goals, is synonymous with the pressure to do the things that will allow me to thrive, survive and/or reproduce.  

If we define morality as the normativity of collaborating to achieve joint goals, then at least the following features are generated; in any one morality, there may be extra features.  Each core feature in the list is a source of, or contains, normativity.  

The kind of morality generated (e.g., cooperative, patriarchal, pair-bonded, parental, familial, etc.) depends on the particular kind of goal and the way to achieve it.  

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Features of morality (sources of normativity)

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  • Instrumental normativity = pressure to achieve goals
  • Achieving normative goals jointly
  • That for which we may be held accountable by others
  • Interdependence shapes normativity
  • Mutual risk and strategic trust
  • Joint commitment to achieving normative standards and goals
  • Promoting, enforcing good behaviour according to norms
  • Discouraging, preventing bad behaviour according to norms
  • Partners
  • Partner choice by reputation and cooperative identity
  • Partner control
  • Roles and their ideal normative standards
  • Duty: sense of responsibility to (respected and valued) other partners to uphold ideal normative standards
  • A set of moral norms (general role ideals)
  • A set of moral values (general behavioral sub-goals of the overall goal)
  • A set of moral virtues (ideal performance of norms)
  • A set of moral vices (sub-standard performance of norms: to be avoided)
  • Intrapersonal, interpersonal and cultural levels

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Types of morality (with goals; way of achieving them)

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  • Cooperative (to thrive and survive; cooperation)
  • Parental (reproducing; parental care)
  • Familial (reproducing; cooperation with respect to inclusive fitness)
  • Pair-bonded (reproducing; pair-bonding)
  • Patriarchal (reproducing (men's); control and coercion of women)
  • Professional (any goal; professional standards)
  • Medical (health goals; medical ethics and standards)
  • Financial regulation bodies (goal of selling financial products fairly; regulation of parties involved)
  • Religious (serving God; religious practice)  

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If I hold you accountable for your actions, it means that I make claims upon you to behave according the ideals of your role.  I compel you to do this through partner control: I am a source of normativity for you.  

Why I feel a responsibility to my cooperative partners to uphold role ideals, and why I feel guilty if I fail in this regard, is a good question.  When we make a commitment to collaborate, we form a joint agent "we" and I identify with "us" and our goals.  Therefore I relinquish some personal control in favour of self-governance on behalf of "us" towards our joint goal, which translates as responsibility towards my other partners.

Partner choice is a source of normativity because I need to have a good moral track record (reputation) in order to be chosen as a partner.  The best way to achieve this is actually to behave well, and be a genuinely good prospective partner.  So, there is pressure to behave well, as a result of partner choice through reputation.  My moral identity is my publicly known reputation.  My cooperative identity is my status as a good or bad cooperator with each of my partners.  

Roles have normative standards associated with them.  There is pressure to fulfil these normative standards, because each is a sub-goal of the overall goal.  A moral normative standard is an ideal that applies to any collaboration, pair-bond, parenthood, family, hospital, church, etc., alike.  They are general role ideals according to the joint goal that is pursued and the way it is pursued.  

Moral normativity is intrapersonal: it can come from within, and the conscience; it can be interpersonal, in that it may be passed between individual persons; and it can be cultural: group- or society-wide.  

Normativity

It is not surprising that every standard feature of morality either consists of, or is a source of, normativity. Morality is that which we do in pursuit of a joint goal, by definition.  

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eliyah23rd t1_iwgthlb wrote

I enjoyed your post. It motivated me to look at your previous posts and I found your e-book, which I hope to find more time for soon.

I would like to ask a basic question about your methodology.

You seem to make little distinction between the population of humans through time and an individual human being situated at specific moment such that the history of even that individual is secondary to an analysis of the specific subject.

For example, in this post you say:

>There is a basic existential pressure within every organism to do the
things that will lead to an increased chance of thriving, surviving
and/or reproducing.

Certainly an individual at a specific instant may experience a drive to survive, but this is just one among multiple motivations competing for salience among many others. For much of the time, today, it is quite dormant due to lack of threats. Similarly, many spend most of their time uninterested in reproducing because what was once an instrumental goal has now been disconnected from its origin by the availability of contraceptives. The fact that the goal can be analyzed as instrumental matters less than that it figures so centrally in the programming of the human machine as it exists now.

Survival is a selection-oriented statistical drift within a population rather than in individuals.

I see that from your starting point you seek to explain the broader picture, but that serves as a genealogy of morality. Would it not be better to start with the individual as they are at a specific moment and proceed to their goals, limitations and frustrations?

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simonperry955 OP t1_iwh80cp wrote

>You seem to make little distinction between the population of humans through time and an individual human being situated at specific moment such that the history of even that individual is secondary to an analysis of the specific subject.

I'm glad you enjoyed the post. As for this point: on the contrary, I follow the premise that for a trait to evolve, it has to benefit the individual in some way (increase its fitness, ready for natural selection); and I believe that the individual is at the centre of morality, as the ultimate decision-maker. However, it's true that morality operates on intrapersonal, interpersonal, and cultural / collective levels.

To thrive is to increase one's viability, or ability to survive. There is pressure to survive because our ultimate genetic purpose is to reproduce, and we need to live long enough to do so. As such, we have a sexual instinct that orients us in the direction of reproduction, even if we never reproduce or even intend to. We just love sex because it's the way we can fulfil our ultimate purpose (that love being instilled by evolution, to make it attractive to do). This is Freud's Eros or the erotic insinct. Likewise, the Pleasure Principle exists because thriving makes us feel good, and there is a pressure to thrive, and therefore a pressure to feel good. See: p. 16, "Pleasure", and p. 243, "Emotions". Because of motivational autonomy, each pressure takes on a life of its own: e.g., we want to thrive, as an end in itself.

>Survival is a selection-oriented statistical drift within a population rather than in individuals.

Again, on the contrary: try asking any individual whether or not they want to survive, and fear death.

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eliyah23rd t1_iwmaq10 wrote

Thank you so much for your reply.

I can't really accept either point, but I don't think we actually disagree all that much. Let's say that we are looking at the same scene but from two different angles. Let me try and explain in a different way why, to me, while your answer addresses many great questions, it doesn't address mine.

Suppose I do just want to make other people happy. I just want to help end suffering for other people. As you say on page 20, "a primary value is an arbitrary choice". I understand that a researcher like you is interested in how that came to be. However, that genealogy is not "my" reason for my motivation. It is a cause not a reason. A value is considered by me as the ultimate goal. I don't look for justifications for the value; for other facts that, by virtue of being true, make my goal become valid. I don't care.

I understand what you're doing. For the last 160-odd years people have been given the message that their essence is to survive and out-compete. You are following others who explain that their thinking is an incorrect understanding of evolution. Of course, an "is" does not follow from an "ought". The fact that their understanding might lead to a destruction of our civilization, does not make their thinking wrong. You just show that, in fact, the more desirable interpretation is the correct one.

It's good that you're countering the "be-selfish" brainwashing (if you will), but is it necessary? You are what you are. You will always do what you want to do. The question is only how should we structure our society around that, so that we are all most likely to succeed at our own goals. How do we not step on each other toes? Not because it is bad to step on the toes of other people but (a) many of us don't want to and (b) it will get all our toes burned up if we do.

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simonperry955 OP t1_iwn1cq3 wrote

>Suppose I do just want to make other people happy. I just want to help end suffering for other people.

That's being prosocial. You wish well for others. I have formalised this propensity in terms of evolutionary ethics, in "Perfect Compassion", p. 33. The opposite is to thrive at the expense of others, whether knowingly, or unknowingly, and whether or not it is enjoyable to do so, sought out, etc. That is called D, the Dark factor of personality ("Dark and light traits", p. 182).

The two extremes are joined by a continuum of how generous one is, or its opposite: how exploitative and harmful. See a diagram of sorts: "Unconditional love", p. 178.

I don't actually evaluate either one from any kind of viewpoint - I only describe them. Most people are prosocial (p. 193), and that's the way I personally like it.

>You are what you are. You will always do what you want to do. The question is only how should we structure our society around that, so that we are all most likely to succeed at our own goals.

I am sadly pessimistic that the corrupt and wicked will not end up killing the world. Narcissists rule the day and cause the most destruction and chaos.

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eliyah23rd t1_iwqi07r wrote

I think the best way to describe our difference is that your project is descriptive and mine is prescriptive. You want the to discover the cause and I am looking for solutions.

However, that simplifies our position a little. In order to propose solutions, I look to build the descriptive case correctly. I am very minimalist about descriptive assumptions, but I cannot avoid them all.

You, on the other hand, seem to propose a sort of “Inference to Best Explanation” argument for motivating the genealogy that you propose. This is a classic descriptive project strategy. However, your last comment highlights that there is a prescriptive wish behind your project, an agenda, if you will. While you present your evidence irrespective of moral outcome, you seem to be motivated by a belief that should your view be accepted, the world would be a better place.

One last point, if I may. You use the word “ought” a number of times. On page 20 you even use it with reference to Hume. However, like de Waal, your use of “ought” seems to be the hypothetical (IF you want X you ought to Y) meaning of “ought” and not the categorical (You ought to Y). To me it seems clear that Hume is very clear that he is referring to the categorical “ought”. I’d be interested to know whether you agree that (a) you are using the hypothetical and (b) Hume is using the categorical.

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simonperry955 OP t1_iwqzevl wrote

You're right, I take a descriptive approach. My personal view is that the world would be a better place (all concerned would thrive more) if everyone was prosocial and moral (i.e., enforced norms).

The descriptive case to be made depends on surely what you want to achieve. If it's mutual benefit, then prosociality is the way to go.

My understanding of the is-ought problem has moved on since I wrote the entry in the ebook. I provide a descriptive ought, not an imperative ought. I describe the fact that people feel they ought to X, and give natural reasons why they feel this way. To move to an imperative ought, one possible goal or imperative is the thriving or flourishing of the self and others, optimally. After all, each organism experiences a pressure or imperative to thrive or flourish.

Each entry in this list of features of morality, is a source of moral oughtness, including instrumental oughtness, which provides the original pressure to achieve goals. Moral oughtness is derived from the pressure to achieve goals jointly. So, moral oughtness comes from others towards me (partner control) as well as from me to others (responsibility).

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eliyah23rd t1_ix48b3j wrote

I know that I'm responding to your post from three days ago but I've been thinking a lot about our discussion.

In the light of your response, I think the categorical-hypothetical distinction is not sufficient. The pressure that one person exerts on the other (partner) is to accept a categorical. Since this pressure may be a direct appeal to a non-linguistic "irrational" motivator, it may not be saying explicitly "IF you want to partner THEN you must seek X". For example the parent just encourages "seek X" even though the unwritten motivator is that the child desires to align with the parent.

However, this still leaves the analysis in the realm of the descriptive. The researcher identifies these pressures between partners.

But when I switch out of the role of observer to the rational subjective, I am not considering the observed objects. I ask only whether my partner has any hypothetical suggestions for me given the goals I already have. I reject any attempt to request the categorical (without a justifying hypothetical) as manipulation. As a rational actor I still have no reason I "should" accept a new categorical or modify the goals I already have.

The idea that I should accept any categorical because it has in the past been the cause of the current state of affairs, holds no appeal for me. That is the naturalistic fallacy.

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simonperry955 OP t1_ix9kcxg wrote

I think the categorical / hypothetical imperative distinction is a good one. If I want to thrive and survive, then I need to do it *this* way (which may be instrumental or moral, depending on whether I need to do it with others).

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eliyah23rd t1_ixdgl80 wrote

Oh, I wasn't retracting on the value of the distinction. However, you had made me realize that the descriptive project can record the fact of one partner pressuring the other to accept a categorical and not just a hypothetical value.

I think I need to retreat to a usage that involves logic/reason. My position is that this pressure cannot succeed at a logical argument for accepting a categorical but only a hypothetical. It can try, but it must fail. However, limbic, non-lingustic pressure to accept a categorical is found everywhere.

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simonperry955 OP t1_ixe8xks wrote

That's probably because the limbic system accepts thriving and surviving as an unquestioned goal. Anything that promotes these, to the limbic system, is a categorical imperative.

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simonperry955 OP t1_iwym6ry wrote

>Would it not be better to start with the individual as they are at a specific moment and proceed to their goals, limitations and frustrations?

Do you mean, how does an individual make moral choices, within a certain environment? I choose what I think will bring me long term thriving: physical, psychological, social, moral. But think about the people who live in Iran. If they do the right thing, they end up in jail. To bring about the best long term thriving for me, is a prudential instrumental matter. To go against one's culture to stand up for what I believe in (e.g., human rights, women's rights) can lead to my thriving being curtailed, yet I still do it. I think that for certain people, some values are sacred: of infinite value. They see these values as more important than anything else, including popularity, or personal thriving.

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eliyah23rd t1_ix4aeqh wrote

Not quite clear what specific issue you are getting at here. It might come to me with more reflection, but I'll give my best answer for now.

I am not arguing that my current values are necessarily selfish. They might not even be for the purpose of "thriving". They are what they are regardless of how these values came to be. These values may be sacred to me and I would lay down my life for them. Yes, a researcher might identify a causal pathway that included the search for meaning or the pressure of my parental context. I might even be aware and accept the findings of the research. However, regardless of cause, the sacred remains sacred and may take precedence over any thriving.

So what would be the agenda of my prescriptive research?

  1. To identify the structure of the values I do have. For example, to highlight the fact that there is usually a multiplicity of values that could easily conflict in practice. Or to highlight that consistency and universalism are some of my goals.
  2. To figure out ways multiple people, each with their own and differing goals can work together.

For both these goals the prescriptive and descriptive researchers must collaborate. Or, at least, the descriptive researcher has much to teach the prescriptive practitioner.

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simonperry955 OP t1_ix9ld2u wrote

If you want me to be prescriptive, then I prescribe: if you want to be prosocial, then cultivate cognitive empathy (p. 163) and sympathetic joy (ps. 164, 165) and Perfect Compassion (ps. 33 and 42). These are based on the virtues of truth and compassion, or wisdom.

I think to figure out how multiple people can achieve their differing goals together, respect for the fact they want to thrive and flourish is a good place to start.

I don't prescribe being anti-social ("dark"). If you want to try it, see how far you get ...

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eliyah23rd t1_ixdhhc7 wrote

So as we have agreed I think, the prescription is hypothetical.

I think the prescription you offer uses both 1 and 2. 1. You may think you only have value X, but you also have unspoken values Y and Z. 2. The best way for both you and I to achieve Y and Z is to cultivate empathy and sympathetic joy

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simonperry955 OP t1_ixe9d1d wrote

That way, everybody wins (in theory). Perfect Compassion treats the well being of individuals as the highest good. People who hold other values sacred, may violate Perfect Compassion.

I think cognitive empathy can be cultivated.

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Skinonframe t1_iwfht7v wrote

Thank you for this nomenclature and for the perspective it gives us on morality. I find it useful but incomplete. It seems to me that there is more to the "we" of moral interaction than informed by the pragmatics of collaboration. "Sacrifice" of self-interest and even of self can be willful or instinctive, and in either case not required by the normative goals of thriving, surviving or reproducing.

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simonperry955 OP t1_iwfqz4l wrote

That's a good point. I think loyalty and self-sacrifice can arise in cooperative morality (and other kinds) because I have respect and gratitude for the value that partners bring to me in helping me to thrive and survive.

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Skinonframe t1_iwj4fjj wrote

I agree that loyalty and self-sacrifice can arise in "cooperative morality," but I feel loyalty and self-sacrifice occur, and are considered "the right thing to do," in situations where no cooperation has been negotiated or even previous contact has been engaged.

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simonperry955 OP t1_iwn2tu0 wrote

But then, cooperation can be implicit, collective, and cultural as well as organised and/or interpersonal. We thrive and survive together with all those in our group - which can be as large as a country, at least.

So, there are a number of, say, moral psychological consequences of being part of a group. Group solidarity and loyalty is one of them, because I depend on everyone else in the group, and: 1) I am committed to helping the other group members; 2) I am sure they would do the same for me. You could say, the limits of my group mark the limits of my inclusive fitness - because all my fellow group members, together, are helping me to thrive and survive.

There may come a time where someone may try to save a drowning person. Who would he or she sacrifice him or herself for? Most probably, a child, or a loved one. I think this is the caring instinct rather than the group loyalty instinct. The caring instinct evolved as parental care in birds and mammals, and became available for use in humans for interdependent social living situations.

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Skinonframe t1_iwpxd5c wrote

You define morality as "the normative of collaborating to achieve joint goals." It is that "which we do in pursuit of a joint goal, by definition." My first concern is that this system denies agency, the existential decision to act or not act -- perhaps out of empathy for anything from a cat in a tree to the ecosphere, perhaps out of commitment to an internalized rationale of worth or value, perhaps out of some other impulse -- but still within a lonely philosophical and psychological framework of "rightness" that does not have its source in "collaborating to achieve joint goals" – as Camus, or perhaps a Theravada monk, Daoist poet or alienated "lying flat" (tang ping) Chinese intellectual, might propose.

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simonperry955 OP t1_iwqmncq wrote

But arguably, "rightness" (upholding moral principles) evolved in the context of obligate collaborative hunting and gathering. From there, it's free to be used in any context. The morality of helping a cat in a tree is more basic: empathic concern or compassion evolved in the context of child care, but became available for strangers too in humans.

Michael Tomasello, in "A Natural History of Morality", holds that a moral principle is a general standard of behaviour that applies to any collaboration [and, as I propose: pair bond, or family, or doctor's practice] alike.

One is free not to uphold moral principles or to do a good job, but if other people are relying on me, then I owe them to do so, because we are a "we", and I identify with "us".

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Skinonframe t1_iwsueg4 wrote

I don't contest how morality may have "evolved" nor that it in human society it may be mostly rooted in the pragmatics of social collaboration, rather your assertion that moral behavior is necessarily that "which we do in pursuit of a joint goal" -- that is, that a wilful act of "rightness" is always, necessarily rooted in the "we" of our existence in society.

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simonperry955 OP t1_iwtpg3r wrote

I propose that it's "rooted" - evolved - in the context of a "we". But there are two classes of motivations: ultimate (evolutionary) and proximate (present-day). We can carry our ultimate instincts into the present day, where they do not have to be rooted in a "we". For example, we may help out-group members compassionately, using the same instinct we use to help in-group members.

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Skinonframe t1_iwtyc4t wrote

  1. I think you should state this "ultimate"/"proximate" distinction more clearly.
  2. I still have problems with predicating an individual's morality on the pragmatics of his/her membership in an "in-group." Examples:
  • Camus feels himself a "Stranger" in an absurd world. He predicates his morality not on being a member of an in-group or otherwise on being subject to an in-group's system of values, but on being a sentient being who makes choices about how he is going to get through life. (And he does so with extreme courage.)
  • A monk's morality may be guided by the goal of achieving his own enlightenment, achieved through the self-non-preoccupied elimination of ego. He may immolate himself, not to encourage others to do so, but to protest this incarnation of his existence.
  • The morality of a Tang poet may be guided by the engagement of his senses in pursuit of the non-rational "wu," (nothingness), a state that implicitly involves disregard for imperial society's prevailing order of value, which prioritized correct behavior in keeping with Heaven's mandate. A young Chinese intellectual, perhaps influenced by this recurring phenomenon in Chinese social history, may make a similar ethically inspired but lonely and contrarian choice to stop striving for the wealth, social status and (less likely) political power dangled by the hegemonic materialist value system of the Communist Party of China.
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simonperry955 OP t1_ix2yj0n wrote

  1. I think you should state this "ultimate"/"proximate" distinction more clearly.

According to the theory or hypothesis of Michael Tomasello and others: there were evolutionary pressures on our ancient ancestors (beginning with Homo erectus, 2 million years ago) that caused them to behave strategically in ways that were encoded over later time as moral emotions and instincts. These evolutionary pressures were obligate collaborative foraging: "I must collaborate with others in order to survive". In turn, this leads to a situation of enforced interdependence , and this is what made morality evolve in humans (but not chimpanzees, bonobos, or arguably, any other species). Morality is defined here as that for which we are held accountable by others, when we work together towards joint goals. If we are not interdependent, then there is no need to hold others accountable. For example, interdependence requires that I help my partners to survive (empathic concern / compassion) and that I willingly share with others (proto-fairness).

I think your other questions are best decided in terms of modern-day moral psychology, which has its ultimate roots in evolution, rather than in terms of evolutionary pressures per se.

>2. Camus feels himself a "Stranger" in an absurd world. ...

I've read some Camus. He may consider himself a free agent, as do I, but there are times when he comes head to head with the cultural mores of the day.

>A monk's morality may be guided by the goal of achieving his own enlightenment, ...

Arguably, so is most people's, in their way. We all strive to grow and refine ourselves morally, if we are "light" enough (prosocial). See my ebook https://orangebud.co.uk/Understanding%20morality%20and%20ethics.pdf p. 194, "A quiet ego". I studied Buddhism when I was writing the book. Again, if a monk wants to immolate himself, that's up to him. Most people wouldn't do that.

>The morality of a Tang poet ...

Again, there's always going to be a tension between interpersonal and intrapersonal morality (the conscience and how we treat others, and behave) and cultural morality, which may dictate just the opposite of compassion and justice.

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Skinonframe t1_ix3nsmn wrote

>Morality is defined here as that for which we are held accountable by others, when we work together towards joint goals.

You exclude by definition a personal morality, even though you say, finally, that,

>Again, there's always going to be a tension between interpersonal and intrapersonal morality (the conscience and how we treat others, and behave) and cultural morality, which may dictate just the opposite of compassion and justice.

I agree that we live within a historical moment influenced if not hegemonically constrained by value systems, and that this context brings us "head to head" with "cultural mores of the day."

But it is a bit of a stretch to then say our notions of right and wrong are necessarily those of an "in-group." (I am reminded of Wittgenstein's rejection of private language – with which I disagree.) Being cognizant of the rules of others does not rule out one's own; in particular, it does not rule out mutancy – e.g., that of Nietzsche "Most people would not do that" does not deny the exception to the rule, including the exception that may become the rule.

I am not qualified to comment on Michael Tomasello's, or your, evolutionary theories of morality. That said, they don't cause me particular concern. Indeed, without expertise on the matter, I observe behavior in species more distant to us than Homo erectus that I could accept as "moral."

At an even more rudimentary level, I am sympathetic to the observations of Kropotkin and others: inter-species co-operation, or at least constructive co-existence, is commonplace in nature, and, at least possibly, a foundation for morality. In short, we share the evolutionary experience of the ecosphere. Arguably, ecosystemic existence encourages notions of right and wrong that presage the pragmatic needs of our species, moreover the inherent sentience, consciousness, intelligence of such existence has not only a past but a present and a future, and thus a potential for agency.

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simonperry955 OP t1_ix858o9 wrote

>You exclude by definition a personal morality,

But morality surely consists of my behaviour that affects others. If we both want to thrive, then our joint goal is thriving. If I aim to give the maximum benefit and minimum harm available to myself and all those affected by my actions, then it's a cooperative win-win and everyone is thriving to the maximum available extent. This is a "personal morality". See: ps. 33 & 42 of my e-book, "Perfect Compassion".

Tomasello posits four moral concerns: me-concerns (selfishness/self-interest); you-concerns (compassion/empathic concern); equality concerns (fairness); and we-concerns (following and enforcing group norms). These exist in any cultural group, and the first three don't vary much from group to group. Only group norms vary significantly from group to group - and the strictness and punitiveness/humaneness with which they are enforced. The individual is free to follow their own version of morality, which nonetheless is likely to be influenced by their in-group.

Kropotkin was I believe the first to write about the ideas of mutual aid and interdependence.

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Skinonframe t1_ixa9qwz wrote

I find your normative system interesting and useful. But, as I have said, I also find it incomplete, inadequate and/or internally too static ("descriptive") to express agency, a vital aspect of morality. As I see it, to adequately describe moraluty we need to allow for individual moral agency potent enough by chance or choice to escape and even to re-define the normativity of the group/of groups. This seems especially so if we are to root morality in the underlying evolution of sentient, conscious and ultimately intelligent being, evolution itself being necessarily dynamically open ended. I will stop here. Thank you for the exchange.

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Skinonframe t1_iwj50kd wrote

I agree that loyalty and self-sacrifice can arise in "cooperative morality," but I feel loyalty and self-sacrifice occur, and are considered "the right thing to do," in situations where no cooperation has been negotiated or even previous contact has been engaged.

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