simonperry955 OP t1_ix858o9 wrote on November 21, 2022 at 2:13 PM

Reply to comment by Skinonframe in The structure of moral normativity by simonperry955

>You exclude by definition a personal morality,

But morality surely consists of my behaviour that affects others. If we both want to thrive, then our joint goal is thriving. If I aim to give the maximum benefit and minimum harm available to myself and all those affected by my actions, then it's a cooperative win-win and everyone is thriving to the maximum available extent. This is a "personal morality". See: ps. 33 & 42 of my e-book, "Perfect Compassion".

Tomasello posits four moral concerns: me-concerns (selfishness/self-interest); you-concerns (compassion/empathic concern); equality concerns (fairness); and we-concerns (following and enforcing group norms). These exist in any cultural group, and the first three don't vary much from group to group. Only group norms vary significantly from group to group - and the strictness and punitiveness/humaneness with which they are enforced. The individual is free to follow their own version of morality, which nonetheless is likely to be influenced by their in-group.

Kropotkin was I believe the first to write about the ideas of mutual aid and interdependence.

Skinonframe t1_ixa9qwz wrote on November 21, 2022 at 10:58 PM

I find your normative system interesting and useful. But, as I have said, I also find it incomplete, inadequate and/or internally too static ("descriptive") to express agency, a vital aspect of morality. As I see it, to adequately describe moraluty we need to allow for individual moral agency potent enough by chance or choice to escape and even to re-define the normativity of the group/of groups. This seems especially so if we are to root morality in the underlying evolution of sentient, conscious and ultimately intelligent being, evolution itself being necessarily dynamically open ended. I will stop here. Thank you for the exchange.