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simonperry955 OP t1_iwqmncq wrote

Reply to comment by Skinonframe in The structure of moral normativity by simonperry955

But arguably, "rightness" (upholding moral principles) evolved in the context of obligate collaborative hunting and gathering. From there, it's free to be used in any context. The morality of helping a cat in a tree is more basic: empathic concern or compassion evolved in the context of child care, but became available for strangers too in humans.

Michael Tomasello, in "A Natural History of Morality", holds that a moral principle is a general standard of behaviour that applies to any collaboration [and, as I propose: pair bond, or family, or doctor's practice] alike.

One is free not to uphold moral principles or to do a good job, but if other people are relying on me, then I owe them to do so, because we are a "we", and I identify with "us".

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Skinonframe t1_iwsueg4 wrote

I don't contest how morality may have "evolved" nor that it in human society it may be mostly rooted in the pragmatics of social collaboration, rather your assertion that moral behavior is necessarily that "which we do in pursuit of a joint goal" -- that is, that a wilful act of "rightness" is always, necessarily rooted in the "we" of our existence in society.

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simonperry955 OP t1_iwtpg3r wrote

I propose that it's "rooted" - evolved - in the context of a "we". But there are two classes of motivations: ultimate (evolutionary) and proximate (present-day). We can carry our ultimate instincts into the present day, where they do not have to be rooted in a "we". For example, we may help out-group members compassionately, using the same instinct we use to help in-group members.

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Skinonframe t1_iwtyc4t wrote

  1. I think you should state this "ultimate"/"proximate" distinction more clearly.
  2. I still have problems with predicating an individual's morality on the pragmatics of his/her membership in an "in-group." Examples:
  • Camus feels himself a "Stranger" in an absurd world. He predicates his morality not on being a member of an in-group or otherwise on being subject to an in-group's system of values, but on being a sentient being who makes choices about how he is going to get through life. (And he does so with extreme courage.)
  • A monk's morality may be guided by the goal of achieving his own enlightenment, achieved through the self-non-preoccupied elimination of ego. He may immolate himself, not to encourage others to do so, but to protest this incarnation of his existence.
  • The morality of a Tang poet may be guided by the engagement of his senses in pursuit of the non-rational "wu," (nothingness), a state that implicitly involves disregard for imperial society's prevailing order of value, which prioritized correct behavior in keeping with Heaven's mandate. A young Chinese intellectual, perhaps influenced by this recurring phenomenon in Chinese social history, may make a similar ethically inspired but lonely and contrarian choice to stop striving for the wealth, social status and (less likely) political power dangled by the hegemonic materialist value system of the Communist Party of China.
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simonperry955 OP t1_ix2yj0n wrote

  1. I think you should state this "ultimate"/"proximate" distinction more clearly.

According to the theory or hypothesis of Michael Tomasello and others: there were evolutionary pressures on our ancient ancestors (beginning with Homo erectus, 2 million years ago) that caused them to behave strategically in ways that were encoded over later time as moral emotions and instincts. These evolutionary pressures were obligate collaborative foraging: "I must collaborate with others in order to survive". In turn, this leads to a situation of enforced interdependence , and this is what made morality evolve in humans (but not chimpanzees, bonobos, or arguably, any other species). Morality is defined here as that for which we are held accountable by others, when we work together towards joint goals. If we are not interdependent, then there is no need to hold others accountable. For example, interdependence requires that I help my partners to survive (empathic concern / compassion) and that I willingly share with others (proto-fairness).

I think your other questions are best decided in terms of modern-day moral psychology, which has its ultimate roots in evolution, rather than in terms of evolutionary pressures per se.

>2. Camus feels himself a "Stranger" in an absurd world. ...

I've read some Camus. He may consider himself a free agent, as do I, but there are times when he comes head to head with the cultural mores of the day.

>A monk's morality may be guided by the goal of achieving his own enlightenment, ...

Arguably, so is most people's, in their way. We all strive to grow and refine ourselves morally, if we are "light" enough (prosocial). See my ebook https://orangebud.co.uk/Understanding%20morality%20and%20ethics.pdf p. 194, "A quiet ego". I studied Buddhism when I was writing the book. Again, if a monk wants to immolate himself, that's up to him. Most people wouldn't do that.

>The morality of a Tang poet ...

Again, there's always going to be a tension between interpersonal and intrapersonal morality (the conscience and how we treat others, and behave) and cultural morality, which may dictate just the opposite of compassion and justice.

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Skinonframe t1_ix3nsmn wrote

>Morality is defined here as that for which we are held accountable by others, when we work together towards joint goals.

You exclude by definition a personal morality, even though you say, finally, that,

>Again, there's always going to be a tension between interpersonal and intrapersonal morality (the conscience and how we treat others, and behave) and cultural morality, which may dictate just the opposite of compassion and justice.

I agree that we live within a historical moment influenced if not hegemonically constrained by value systems, and that this context brings us "head to head" with "cultural mores of the day."

But it is a bit of a stretch to then say our notions of right and wrong are necessarily those of an "in-group." (I am reminded of Wittgenstein's rejection of private language – with which I disagree.) Being cognizant of the rules of others does not rule out one's own; in particular, it does not rule out mutancy – e.g., that of Nietzsche "Most people would not do that" does not deny the exception to the rule, including the exception that may become the rule.

I am not qualified to comment on Michael Tomasello's, or your, evolutionary theories of morality. That said, they don't cause me particular concern. Indeed, without expertise on the matter, I observe behavior in species more distant to us than Homo erectus that I could accept as "moral."

At an even more rudimentary level, I am sympathetic to the observations of Kropotkin and others: inter-species co-operation, or at least constructive co-existence, is commonplace in nature, and, at least possibly, a foundation for morality. In short, we share the evolutionary experience of the ecosphere. Arguably, ecosystemic existence encourages notions of right and wrong that presage the pragmatic needs of our species, moreover the inherent sentience, consciousness, intelligence of such existence has not only a past but a present and a future, and thus a potential for agency.

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simonperry955 OP t1_ix858o9 wrote

>You exclude by definition a personal morality,

But morality surely consists of my behaviour that affects others. If we both want to thrive, then our joint goal is thriving. If I aim to give the maximum benefit and minimum harm available to myself and all those affected by my actions, then it's a cooperative win-win and everyone is thriving to the maximum available extent. This is a "personal morality". See: ps. 33 & 42 of my e-book, "Perfect Compassion".

Tomasello posits four moral concerns: me-concerns (selfishness/self-interest); you-concerns (compassion/empathic concern); equality concerns (fairness); and we-concerns (following and enforcing group norms). These exist in any cultural group, and the first three don't vary much from group to group. Only group norms vary significantly from group to group - and the strictness and punitiveness/humaneness with which they are enforced. The individual is free to follow their own version of morality, which nonetheless is likely to be influenced by their in-group.

Kropotkin was I believe the first to write about the ideas of mutual aid and interdependence.

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Skinonframe t1_ixa9qwz wrote

I find your normative system interesting and useful. But, as I have said, I also find it incomplete, inadequate and/or internally too static ("descriptive") to express agency, a vital aspect of morality. As I see it, to adequately describe moraluty we need to allow for individual moral agency potent enough by chance or choice to escape and even to re-define the normativity of the group/of groups. This seems especially so if we are to root morality in the underlying evolution of sentient, conscious and ultimately intelligent being, evolution itself being necessarily dynamically open ended. I will stop here. Thank you for the exchange.

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