Summary: When is it unreasonable to be skeptical? When available evidence shows that a conclusion is intuitively certain and any doubt is only resolvable with evidence that is impossible to obtain.

Since all available evidence shows that other humans have minds like our own, we can be reasonably certain of other minds. Doubting other minds is, therefore, unreasonable if it requires impossible evidence to alleviate. The same principle of reasonable certainly also creates moral concern for future people as well, who we can be reasonably certain to exist in our future. Not being able to see into the future isn’t a valid basis for denying the moral standing of these future people. And reasonable certainty can also let us reject other ideas, like the existence of god and aliens.

Since Epstein raped kids on an island where proofs were for the most of us impossible to attain, this is bullshit.

It seems to me that if the evidence required to properly justify belief in a given proposition is impossible to obtain, then the only epistemically justified position wrt that proposition is suspension of judgment, not belief (or disbelief either, assuming there isn't sufficient counter-evidence against the proposition to warrant disbelief/rejection).

On the other hand, belief in the existence of other minds strikes me as a pretty good candidate for foundationalist or hinge epistemologies, so it may well be that certain propositions (such as the existence of other minds) which cannot themselves be epistemically justified are nevertheless necessary for rational/epistemic activity in general (either as foundational beliefs at the bottom or origin of a sequence of inference/justification, or as something like Witt's hinge propositions).

If there is sufficient existing evidence for a certain belief, so much so that one can act intuitively as if it is true, then demanding impossible evidence is unreasonable skepticism. Only without this intuitively satisfying evidence can we reasonably warrant suspending disbelief.

>If there is sufficient existing evidence for a certain belief, so much so that one can act intuitively as if it is true, then demanding impossible evidence is unreasonable skepticism.

Well, sure. But this is basically just a tautology; if there is sufficient evidence to warrant a certain belief, then that belief is justified, period. This isn't interesting or controversial.

The more interesting case is a belief for which sufficient evidence (evidence to sufficiently justify/warrant belief) is impossible to obtain- for instance, arguably, the existence of other minds.

But if sufficient evidence is impossible to obtain, then it is impossible for that belief to be epistemically justified/warranted- and if sufficient counter-evidence is also absent/impossible, then it seems only suspension of judgment is justified.

>if there is sufficient evidence to warrant a certain belief, then that belief is justified, period. This isn't interesting or controversial.

Yet this goes at the problem of induction and skepticism in general, which argues that we should be mindful of our lack of certainty outside of a priori knowledge. It's also the view of many philosophers that we can never know things as their appearance, but who nevertheless fall back on only practicality as their reason for acting like everyone else.

The article argues that this level of skepticism is unreasonable and shouldn't even be kept in mind.

Although the main purpose of the piece is to show that the problem of other minds isn't a morality loophole, that we have certain duties to people in the future (rather than hypothetical people), and as an aside, a justification for athiesm.

Moreover, the standard isn't whether there is "sufficient evidence" for a belief but whether we can validly conclude a belief, which in philosophy, for inductive knowledge, we cannot. Yet we can be reasonably certain, where exercising skepticism would be unreasonable.

[removed]

It's rational to be skeptical.

Well, God and aliens are very different. I certainly think aliens could exist mostly because I believe God the grand creator.

Let's get to this idea of evidence, it's really opinion isn't it? Empirical philosophy would say so.

yet what I argue is there is reasonable and unreasonable skepticism, particularly where evidence is impossible to obtain and one's skepticism isn't subject to falsification. That level of doubt couldn't be justified to others.

And I wouldn't say all evidence is mere opinion, particularly when we act intuitively on where the evidence takes us.

> there is reasonable and unreasonable skepticism

Unfortunately: opinions vary on what is valid skepticism, because reasoning varies and opinion often appears as fact.

>> If there is sufficient existing evidence for a certain belief, so much so that one can act intuitively as if it is true, then demanding impossible evidence is unreasonable skepticism. Only without this intuitively satisfying evidence can we reasonably warrant suspending disbelief.

> Well, sure. But this is basically just a tautology

tautology: a statement that is true by necessity or by virtue of its logical form

The proposition is subjective - subjective matters can be framed in a tautological manner, but this does not seem to be an example of that.

> if there is sufficient evidence to warrant a certain belief, then that belief is justified, period. This isn't interesting or controversial.

I disagree with it, because of the subjectivity.

I agree with your other points though.

>tautology: a statement that is true by necessity or by virtue of its logical form
>
>The proposition is subjective - subjective matters can be framed in a tautological manner, but this does not seem to be an example of that.

There's nothing subjective about it; epistemic justification for a given belief just is having sufficient evidence for it (at least, on the prevailing theory of epistemic justification, evidentialism, which I'm assuming for the purposes of this discussion). So if you say that "there is sufficient existing evidence for a certain belief" this is to say that this belief is epistemically justified, since having sufficient evidence =/= the belief being justified/warranted.

What may be "subjective" (or, at least, open to disagreement) is what one considers to constitute "sufficient" evidence for a given belief... but we don't need to adjudicate the proper criteria for sufficiency for our purposes here; if we say that "there is sufficient existing evidence for a belief" then we are by the same token saying that the belief is epistemically justified, regardless of what particular criteria of sufficiency we happen to be using.

>Yet this goes at the problem of induction and skepticism in general, which argues that we should be mindful of our lack of certainty outside of a priori knowledge.

I don't really see how; the proposition in question ("if there is sufficient evidence to warrant a certain belief, then that belief is justified") is tautological, or at most definitional- it merely sets out what we mean by "justification"- and so doesn't contradict any particular view or proposition.

But perhaps I'm misunderstanding what you have in mind, if you'd like to clarify.

>There's nothing subjective about it; epistemic justification for a given belief just is having sufficient evidence for it

For all propositions that exist, is there unanimous agreement on the necessary level of evidence required to meet epistemic justification?

If so, please link to your data source so I can check to see if my name is in the list.

>So if you say that "there is sufficient existing evidence for a certain belief" this is to say that this belief is epistemically justified, since having sufficient evidence =/= the belief being justified/warranted.

Seeing something is true does not cause it to be true though, it only causes it to appear to be true.

>What may be "subjective" (or, at least, open to disagreement) is what one considers to constitute "sufficient" evidence for a given belief... but we don't need to adjudicate the proper criteria for sufficiency for our purposes here

It is a crucially important component of your claim, so yes you do if you want your claim to be epistemically sound.

>if we say that "there is sufficient existing evidence for a belief" then we are by the same token saying that the belief is epistemically justified, regardless of what particular criteria of sufficiency we happen to be using.

Do "we" say that though, or might you have only imagined that?

Also, this runs up against the issue I noted above.

>Moreover, the standard isn't whether there is "sufficient evidence" for a belief the standard isn't whether there is "sufficient evidence" for a belief but whether we can validly conclude a belief, which in philosophy, for inductive knowledge, we cannot.

Sure it is, at least on the dominant philosophical account of epistemic justification (which I've just been assuming for the sake of discussion).

The idea that we can only justifiably believe a proposition if it is the conclusion of a deductively sound argument is essentially epistemological infallibilism, which is highly problematic (and not widely held or respected by professional philosophers, from what I can tell) since it entails that we can never be justified in believing any matter of fact, since matters of fact can never be established as logically necessary, and would mean we are only justified in believing the tautologies of mathematics and logic and that we cannot reasonably believe any substantive propositions about the physical universe.

Which is... not a great result, especially since this constitutes precisely the sort of radical skepticism you keep mentioning that you are arguing against.

>For all propositions that exist, is there unanimous agreement on the necessary level of evidence required to meet epistemic justification?

Almost certainly not, but as I pointed out already, it doesn't matter whether there is or not.

>It is a crucially important component of your claim, so yes you do if you want your claim to be epistemically sound.

It isn't. The proposition in question is the conditional statement, "IF there is sufficient evidence for a belief, THEN that belief is justified", which doesn't require us to take any position on what constitutes sufficiency.

Since justification just is having sufficient evidence, then whatever sufficiency might be, IF you have it, THEN belief is justified, regardless of what constitutes sufficiency. Assume sufficiency to be whatever you like; no matter what you pick, it will always remain the case that if you have sufficient evidence (whatever "sufficient" might be) then belief is justified. Its just straightforwardly tautological, no subjectivity involved whatsoever.

> Almost certainly not, but as I pointed out already, it doesn't matter whether there is or not.

In terms of belief, perhaps, but in terms of knowledge there is.

If you were to simply acknowledge that you are expressing your opinion, I think we'd have less disagreement.

> It isn't. The proposition in question is the conditional statement, "IF there is sufficient evidence for a belief, THEN that belief is justified", which doesn't require us to take any position on what constitutes sufficiency.

Vague tautologies are true by definition. They are also an excellent source of delusion (as if consciousness and our piss poor education system wasn't enough!!!).

> Since justification just is having sufficient evidence, then whatever sufficiency might be, IF you have it, THEN belief is justified, regardless of what constitutes sufficiency.

At the object level, how do you determine that you have it though? Belief is powerful, but it has limited ability to transform reality itself, it only changes perception of reality.

> Assume sufficiency to be whatever you like

I cannot, it is against my religion.

Philosophical skeptics may argue that there are no inductive beliefs (knowledge outside deductions or our direct sensations) that can be justified. For example, we don't know that we aren't brains in vats, so we can't say we are justified in believing that we are not.

I argue that this level of skepticism is unwarranted if we have reasonable certainty.

In philosophy, sound conclusions require 100% certainty (pretty much impossible for inductive knowledge). I argue that having something like 95% certainty and if its impossible to get any higher, is justification enough for a belief.

>The idea that we can only justifiably believe a proposition if it is the conclusion of a deductively sound argument is essentially epistemological infallibilism

I deal with the issue of inductive knowledge.

And under epistemic justification, philosophers argue for different standards for what would constitute a justified belief. Skeptics may argue that no beliefs are justified, since beliefs require an infinite regress of knowledge. Some philosophers accept the regress, while others deal with it in some way. I argue that its not worth dealing with if we have reasonable certainty.

>Philosophical skeptics may argue that there are no inductive beliefs (knowledge outside deductions or our direct sensations) that can be justified. For example, we don't know that we aren't brains in vats, so we can't say we are justified in believing that we are not.
>
>I argue that this level of skepticism is unwarranted if we have reasonable certainty.

Right but once again, the point of contention isn't so much whether belief is justified provided one has reasonable certainty, its what constitutes reasonable certainty in the first place (especially since "reasonable" or "rational" are often synonymous with "epistemically justified/warranted" in epistemology)- the skeptic agrees that a belief is justified if one is reasonably certain, but claims that inductive or empirical/factual beliefs can never be reasonably certain (since, for instance, we could just be brains in vats or in an ancestor simulation or whatever).

And just as an aside, epistemology seems to have mostly moved on from its obsession with answering the radical skeptic; this was the preoccupation of English-speaking philosophers in the early 20th century- so, Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein, etc- who were responding the idealists and neo-Hegelians who had immediately preceded them. But I think most people consider the radical skeptic to have been well answered, by arguments like Witt's in On Certainty for instance, and so have tended to move on to other problems.

That's not to say there's any harm in rehashing this issue, but it does seem to me that the problem you're attempting to solve has already been adequately dispensed with.

Sure, but once again, the point is that the case of a belief supported by sufficient evidence but for which conclusive logical proof is impossible is not an interesting or controversial case, since being supported by sufficient evidence means that the belief is epistemically justified )on any evidentialist account of justification at any rate).

What is (purportedly) tricky about, say, the problem of other minds, is that it is in dispute whether we are in possession, or could ever be in possession, of sufficient evidence nevermind conclusive proof.

>If you were to simply acknowledge that you are expressing your opinion, I think we'd have less disagreement.

I'm trying to find anything in my previous comments in this thread that constitute mere opinion, and drawing a blank, so I'm afraid I can't do that.

And I'm suspicious whether we have any substantive disagreement, it mostly looks like you're trying to argue for the sake of arguing (especially since my point was straightforwardly tautological).

>At the object level, how do you determine that you have it though? Belief is powerful, but it has limited ability to transform reality itself, it only changes perception of reality.

An interesting and productive question, certainly... but one entirely outside of the scope of my comments or the point I was making in this particular thread (which was pretty straightforward)

What a weird tangent this took.

Agreed, I began by merely pointing out something that I assumed was a typo or unintentional mistake, didn't really expect it to go any further than that

I like a big show.

So I gather..

And as luck would have it: it is rarely difficult to get one's counterpart enthusiastically involved in the manufacture of a big show.