contractualist OP t1_iw99mhy wrote
Reply to comment by Ok_Meat_8322 in The "Reasonable Certainty" Standard for Belief (On the problem of other minds, our duties to future people, and believing in the unknown) by contractualist
>The idea that we can only justifiably believe a proposition if it is the conclusion of a deductively sound argument is essentially epistemological infallibilism
I deal with the issue of inductive knowledge.
And under epistemic justification, philosophers argue for different standards for what would constitute a justified belief. Skeptics may argue that no beliefs are justified, since beliefs require an infinite regress of knowledge. Some philosophers accept the regress, while others deal with it in some way. I argue that its not worth dealing with if we have reasonable certainty.
Ok_Meat_8322 t1_iwdlk6x wrote
Sure, but once again, the point is that the case of a belief supported by sufficient evidence but for which conclusive logical proof is impossible is not an interesting or controversial case, since being supported by sufficient evidence means that the belief is epistemically justified )on any evidentialist account of justification at any rate).
What is (purportedly) tricky about, say, the problem of other minds, is that it is in dispute whether we are in possession, or could ever be in possession, of sufficient evidence nevermind conclusive proof.
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