Ok_Meat_8322 t1_iw8wzhz wrote
Reply to comment by contractualist in The "Reasonable Certainty" Standard for Belief (On the problem of other minds, our duties to future people, and believing in the unknown) by contractualist
>Moreover, the standard isn't whether there is "sufficient evidence" for a belief the standard isn't whether there is "sufficient evidence" for a belief but whether we can validly conclude a belief, which in philosophy, for inductive knowledge, we cannot.
Sure it is, at least on the dominant philosophical account of epistemic justification (which I've just been assuming for the sake of discussion).
The idea that we can only justifiably believe a proposition if it is the conclusion of a deductively sound argument is essentially epistemological infallibilism, which is highly problematic (and not widely held or respected by professional philosophers, from what I can tell) since it entails that we can never be justified in believing any matter of fact, since matters of fact can never be established as logically necessary, and would mean we are only justified in believing the tautologies of mathematics and logic and that we cannot reasonably believe any substantive propositions about the physical universe.
Which is... not a great result, especially since this constitutes precisely the sort of radical skepticism you keep mentioning that you are arguing against.
contractualist OP t1_iw99mhy wrote
>The idea that we can only justifiably believe a proposition if it is the conclusion of a deductively sound argument is essentially epistemological infallibilism
I deal with the issue of inductive knowledge.
And under epistemic justification, philosophers argue for different standards for what would constitute a justified belief. Skeptics may argue that no beliefs are justified, since beliefs require an infinite regress of knowledge. Some philosophers accept the regress, while others deal with it in some way. I argue that its not worth dealing with if we have reasonable certainty.
Ok_Meat_8322 t1_iwdlk6x wrote
Sure, but once again, the point is that the case of a belief supported by sufficient evidence but for which conclusive logical proof is impossible is not an interesting or controversial case, since being supported by sufficient evidence means that the belief is epistemically justified )on any evidentialist account of justification at any rate).
What is (purportedly) tricky about, say, the problem of other minds, is that it is in dispute whether we are in possession, or could ever be in possession, of sufficient evidence nevermind conclusive proof.
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