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theo_radical t1_ivcpccm wrote

I didn't say pain in others does not compel me to act. I said the mere description of pain in others does not compel me to act. I am only compelled to act when I decide that I should. Whether that is to placate the uncomfortable feeling of watching someone suffer or simply because I believe it is right, nothing intrinsic to the description itself prescribes a course of action.

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SlowJoeCrow44 t1_ivcu3xk wrote

But the 'should' act, is in relationship to the 'description' of pain is it not? What is your decision based on if not the description?

That's what I mean by saying all our ought statements can only derive from is statements. And to the degree that science and knowledge generally can tell us about is statements, it can tell us about ought statements.

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theo_radical t1_ivcuj1z wrote

I'm willing to accept that descriptive statements may be necessary in deciding moral action if you're willing to admit that descriptive statements are not sufficient for deciding moral action. I'm not even sure they are necessary but it's also secondary to the primary point of contention.

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SlowJoeCrow44 t1_ivdhjz1 wrote

I could take that compromise. I want to agree that they are not sufficient, but I can't seem to think of any knowledge that isn't merely a description of reality. Even prescriptive statements are descriptive.

Neat line of inquiry tho.

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