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SlowJoeCrow44 t1_ivazjid wrote

Reply to comment by eliyah23rd in Michael Shermer argues that science can determine many of our moral values. Morality is aimed at protecting certain human desires, like avoidance of harm (e.g. torture, slavery). Science helps us determine what these desires are and how to best achieve them. by Ma3Ke4Li3

"Science cannot provide justification for the value clause". Why is this necessary? Isn't the justification simply that we want a better world as opposed from a worse one? And if you don't happen to agree then you're not really getting the whole concept of morality that we are all trying to understand. It's not deflationary of morality, it is what we mean when we say morality.

'Science can't justify Science, that doesn't make it unscientific.' Health can't justify we why want to feel better, but once we admit that we all want to feel better than we can have a Science of medicine. ' if someone comes along and says well I want to continually vomit and live in pain, he isn't offering an argument against the Science of medicine?

I fail to see that problem. To say that Science can't bolster our moral claims is absurd. What else could?

Science is simply our attempt to understand the world. If you want to base your morality off of something else such a religious dogma or whim go for it but you will be inviting suffering, I garuntee it.

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theo_radical t1_ivbjrx1 wrote

> Science cannot provide justification for the value clause". Why is this necessary? Isn't the justification simply that we want a better world as opposed from a worse one?

No. That is not the justification. That introduces the concept of "better" before it has been agreed upon.

The justification needs to explain how science, which provides a descriptive explanation of how morality evolved in human beings, entails a prescriptive statement of how humans ought to be. Morality is not simple stating truths, it's imperative. Something must appeal to action.

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ConsciousLiterature t1_ivbruej wrote

>No. That is not the justification. That introduces the concept of "better" before it has been agreed upon.

How would you agree on this outside of science?

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SlowJoeCrow44 t1_ivbn8xu wrote

Does pain not appeal to action? How is stating an imperative not stating a truth? We can't get ought statements without is statements. We can derive our ought statements inductively from our is statements and that'd all we need to act.

No one else is so confused about morality than a moral philosopher.

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NonsenseRider t1_ivbot4p wrote

If you think it's that black and white you live in a oversimplified world

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SlowJoeCrow44 t1_ivbqj0b wrote

How can one 'live in a oversimplified world' ? What would an undersimplified world look like?

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theo_radical t1_ivboyte wrote

Your (descriptive) pain does nothing to spur action in me. Of course, my own pain spurs my own action, but I can find no prescriptive reason it should. In fact, the compelling reason to act on my own pain is involuntary. Morality is a question of who we are/how we act precisely when we are given a choice.

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SlowJoeCrow44 t1_ivbs1u6 wrote

If pain in others doesn't spur action in you then we are not talking about the same thing. That is simply what I mean be morality.

You can't find a prescriptive reason why your own pain should spur action? How about because your a living organism and that's what living organisms happen to do.. and so far as I can see that that other person over there is as I am, viola we have morality.

To think that there is a distinction between what we choose, what happens to us is a fundamental flaw in western philosophy. We can move past it and loose nothing from morality.

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theo_radical t1_ivcpccm wrote

I didn't say pain in others does not compel me to act. I said the mere description of pain in others does not compel me to act. I am only compelled to act when I decide that I should. Whether that is to placate the uncomfortable feeling of watching someone suffer or simply because I believe it is right, nothing intrinsic to the description itself prescribes a course of action.

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SlowJoeCrow44 t1_ivcu3xk wrote

But the 'should' act, is in relationship to the 'description' of pain is it not? What is your decision based on if not the description?

That's what I mean by saying all our ought statements can only derive from is statements. And to the degree that science and knowledge generally can tell us about is statements, it can tell us about ought statements.

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theo_radical t1_ivcuj1z wrote

I'm willing to accept that descriptive statements may be necessary in deciding moral action if you're willing to admit that descriptive statements are not sufficient for deciding moral action. I'm not even sure they are necessary but it's also secondary to the primary point of contention.

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SlowJoeCrow44 t1_ivdhjz1 wrote

I could take that compromise. I want to agree that they are not sufficient, but I can't seem to think of any knowledge that isn't merely a description of reality. Even prescriptive statements are descriptive.

Neat line of inquiry tho.

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cowlinator t1_ivc7tel wrote

>Your (descriptive) pain does nothing to spur action in me.

Then you would be a rarity among humans.

Most humans who observe outward obvious indications of suffering are often innately compelled to action. We call this "sympathy", and it even comes with rational justifications.

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