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shockingdevelopment t1_iuf415r wrote

Reply to comment by contractualist in Freedom vs. Utility (the modern Euthyphro dilemma) by contractualist

> If the skeptic says his X is valuable, then according to reason, X is valuable among others.

Right but the equality here wouldn't tell us killing the monk is wrong. It seems like it could be morally neutral by your account.

This is a problem in not describing the kind of freedom you have in mind. It doesn't tell us how much weight to give positive versus negative rights.

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contractualist OP t1_iuf5lqe wrote

I will get into rights in a future article, however, so long as someone has freedom, they are a member of the moral universe. Other members cannot deny their freedom.

Reason requires valuing anothers freedom. Since there is no reason from which to deny the monk's freedom, killing him would be morally wrong.

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shockingdevelopment t1_iuf6v9m wrote

You're arbitrarily giving preference to one freedom. You could just as well say since they both have equal right to freedom, the monk cannot deny his killers will to do what he wants.

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contractualist OP t1_iufu7bq wrote

if freedom is the basis of morality, then the interactions between the monk and others would be governed by the principles developed in a social contract (this is because the contract is reason-based and is approved by free parties, as discussed here).

Principles against murder would be included, so valuing freedom would forbid killing the monk.

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shockingdevelopment t1_iufyn7b wrote

With social contract theory you're conceding that your argument for freedom being the foundation of morality relies on restrictions on freedom to get off the ground at all...

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contractualist OP t1_iufzb9s wrote

Step 1) freedom, step 2) reason, step 3) social contract. The article is arguing that freedom, not utility, is step 1.

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shockingdevelopment t1_iug36v8 wrote

But you only mean "freedom" in that humans are smart enough to make choices. In your sense It's just a prerequisite for anything we do. Not something especially related to ethics at all.

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zhibr t1_iuhe400 wrote

So what makes one social contract better than another? A bunch of slave-keeping Southerners have a social contract where their freedom is important, but the slaves' freedom isn't. And if you say a contract that includes more people who have freedom is better, then does that directly make factory farming wrong, because the billions of cows, pigs, etc. should have freedom too? Or is there a reason to exclude animals?

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contractualist OP t1_iuk5se5 wrote

All free humans would be included in the social contract, and would never agree to the slave owners terms, making their laws unjust. The actual social contract would exclude slavery.

Whether animals are included in our moral universe depends on whether they have a conscious (free) experience.

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TrueBeluga t1_iufs43p wrote

Are you arguing for positive or negative liberty? The right to do versus the right to not be done upon? Or a mixture of the two?

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contractualist OP t1_iufudrc wrote

I'll be discussing that (rights) in future posts, what I mean by liberty is here which is just consciousness/the experience of freedom

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TrueBeluga t1_iufwtcx wrote

So your definition of freedom (or liberty) is: "the power to reflect on our desires and change them based on abstract principles—including morals"

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I think the issue here is the definition for freedom is strange. It's not at all what the term means in ordinary language. So I'm not sure it's the best word to use if you're trying to communicate what you're saying to any audience.

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As you say, someone can't be held morally accountable for not doing something that is impossible (e.g. going back in time and killing Hitler). However, let me present a hypothetical: imagine you are in the wreckage of a destroyed building. Underneath a metal beam there is a man suffocating (from the weight of the beam). You are unable to lift it as you are not strong enough. So, given what you have said the person would not be held morally accountable.

But, if you had stayed more physically active throughout your life, you would have been able to lift the beam. So though in the moment it was impossible, if you had been stronger (a real possibility) you would have been able to save the man's life. Would you say under your normative theory that people have an obligation to maximize (or at least increase) their own ability (by ability I mean your power to exert your will upon the world, e.g. by increasing physical strength)? If not, people could simply be lazy or reduce their abilities in order to reduce their moral obligation.

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contractualist OP t1_iug088u wrote

There wouldn't be a moral duty to be in top physical health. Nor is there a moral duty to become a doctor to save the man. Nor a moral duty to also become an architect to prevent buildings from being destroyed. And so on. You can create infinite duties from this scenario. And no such duty would be created in the social contract. Therefore, those duties are not moral duties.

I've even questioned the duty to rescue (when rescuing harms others) here. An unlimited duty to rescue wouldn't be accepted in the social contract, since the responsibilities of free parties create acceptable stopping points of duties.

If you have a certain definition of freedom in mind, I'd be happy to hear and use it in future posts.

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TrueBeluga t1_iug8z00 wrote

Any person, regardless of profession or walk of life, can be physically fit (except in cases of certain disability, in which it would be impossible to be physically fit). Additionally, maximizing your own ability can just mean maximizing your ability in your walk of life (similar to Kant, advancing one's own skills and abilities).

In a world without this duty, people would be fine to do nothing at all. We would not want to live in a world where people don't maximize their ability. We want competent doctors and architects, and we want physically strong healthy people in general. Society without these would collapse.

I think a key issue with Scanlon's dilemmas is they ignore what the people losing TV actually want. Go, survey them if possible. Would they want the man to die so they can watch a bit more TV? I think you'll find a resounding no, as very few people would be that selfish. Why, in any case, would we be morally obligated to do something that no one wants, kills a person, and barely benefits anyone else? A utilitarian would not want this, as a utilitarian understands that a greater benefit and well-being would come from a society in which people aren't routinely sacrificed for minor pleasures.

I find the idea that principles often conflict within your theory a failure of the theory itself. All theories being subjective, I would much rather follow a theory that gives consistent advice on all topics rather than one that in a simple situation like the trolley problem says, "do whatever you want". I do not want to live in a world with such a vacuous ethical system. A normative theory tells you what you ought to do. If it can't do that, it's not exactly normative theory. Especially in situations of life or death. I mean no offence, but if an ethical theory cannot tell me whether to save a life, or take one, then I am not interested.

Of course ethics are subjective. There are not ethical objects to be found in the world, they're just rules or ideals that humans create founded upon arbitrary points. I find the glorification of "freedom" to be as arbitrary as the glorification of "utility" or "virtue". It doesn't matter what any of these things are, as what is has no affect on moral theories. It is the is-ought problem. You can't derive ought from is, and so it doesn't matter how "fact-based" or anything else freedom is, it's no more valid than utility or virtue.

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I think you should just use a separate word for freedom, as freedom already has a definition in ordinary language. Giving it a new one is, plainly speaking, just confusing.

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contractualist OP t1_iuhbhp8 wrote

I argue that there are objective duties and beyond that, there is subjective meaning (post coming, and I'd like your thoughts on it). I'll be making one on freedom as well, where I believe that there are two relevant definitions that need some explaining.

I don't mean to glorify freedom, but to find a proper foundation for ethics. Freedom, I argue, happens to fit the bill. (wait till I write my stuff on reason for glorification of concepts, which has the authority to restrict freedom).

I agree that the is-ought divide cannot be bridged, and I'll try to clarify this view further.

Philosophers have been using words like autonomy, agency, etc. However, I think freedom gets the point across better, despite its baggage.

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TrueBeluga t1_iuilse1 wrote

By objective duties do you mean actually objective (as in, within the fabric of the universe or reality, something totally independent of the observer) as that is what I find objective to mean. Anything else is subjective. If you don't think the is-ought problem can be bridged, I'm confused how you argue the existence of objective duties (and thus an objective morality, if I understand you correctly).

I do agree freedom is a decent word for the concept your describing, but is there nothing else that can be used (e.g. mental freedom, desire freedom/freedom of desires, moral freedom)? I think these would help distinguish it from the regular use of freedom, because you may get a lot of flack from ordinary language philosophers for this usage. I don't think it makes your actual argument weaker, but I do think it weakens your ability to communicate it effectively.

I agree that there is subjective meaning, if what you mean by that is something like this: purpose, or meaning within the world is an arbitrary/human concept, and thus can be nothing else than subjective.

I apologize for using the term glorification, as I don't think you're glorifying freedom any more than utilitarian's glorify utility or virtue ethicists glorify virtues. Maybe "moralize" is a better word, but the "moralization" of some concept is integral to any normative theory. In any case, it isn't an issue, but I was just trying to show that freedom is no more special than utility or virtue in regards to the creation of an ethical theory.

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contractualist OP t1_iuk1ja7 wrote

What I mean by objective duties is that there are moral rules that could not be reasonably rejected and would therefore be a part of the social contract (restrictions on murder, slavery, discrimination etc.). This is in some sense metaphysical and some sense dependent on human nature.

The is-ought problem can't be bridged, however the mere pursuit of normativity is enough for reason to bind an agent's freedom and place them under the moral law. And this moral law is objective. Yet this is the whole mission of my substack, so I'll have much more to say about this.

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