Philip Kitcher argues that morality is a social technology designed to solve problems emerging from the fragility of human altruism. Morality can be evaluated objectively, but without assuming moral truths. The view makes sense against a Darwinian view of life, but it is not social Darwinism.
on-humans.podcastpage.ioSubmitted by Ma3Ke4Li3 t3_y5iu41 in philosophy
Bookswinters t1_isjxtba wrote
I think I generally agree. I would emphasize the genetic predisposition to morality likely predates homo sapiens as a species.
Behaviours like a preference for harm reduction, preference for fairness, preference for autonomy, preference for established hierarchies, and a preference for loyalty can be seen in the non human animal kingdom. Furthermore, every human culture I'm aware of assigns a moral weight to sacred objects or actions. I would argue this is largely genetic and forms a basis of an "intrinsic" morality. Humans are born "primed" to accept hierarchy and sacredness as concepts, but it's up to the society to define the specifics. These moral concepts are fairly universal, and it's easy to imagine why such traits would be selected for in a social species.
As we have become more sophisticated we can describe an "aspirational" morality somewhat more seperated from genetics and intrinsic human nature. Usually these place lesser emphasis on sacredness and hierarchy and more emphasis on fairness and harm reduction. Most secular humanist morality models such as Sam Harris' moral landscape fit this "aspirational" morality category, but the ideal person described by various religious teachers could be placed here as well.
Edit: spelling