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r0ndy t1_irrsrj1 wrote

I believe it's both, like many things it's not a simple one size answer. Nature vs nurture is a good example. Both play a part in the end result.

Having no empathy for a small baby is seen as harmful for care. But that lack of empathy might make it easier to hunt and kill animals that provide sustenance. While too much empathy could inhibit this process.

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Ma3Ke4Li3 OP t1_irrudq5 wrote

Yes, and as said, her argument was that empathy etc. is a certain "platform for morality" on top of which we also learn social norms. But what I would like to hear people's perspectives on whether there is any value in rooting morality in biological impulses. Or does this undermine morality? I don't think so - but I think many would disagree.

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r0ndy t1_irrv59h wrote

Adding biological impulses, does not define morality. Is the idea that these biological imperatives/impulses become the morality? Procreative impulses come to mind, and morality currently holds heavily in this area. Morality by this, cannot safely be defined by biological impulses. Though, at a root level, everything can be accepted once normalized. Add in outliers for everything.

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Ma3Ke4Li3 OP t1_irryv3w wrote

I don't think the argument would be quite that biological impulses "become" or "are" morality. Rather, certain biological impulses must be in place for there to be a "platform" for morality.

So the question is, why is it that there is a corner of the animal kingdom where anything vaguely resembling morality could have taken off? And Churchland argues that it is not a coincidence that it is this warm-blooded ape, instead of, say, salamanders, that does moral philosophy.

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r0ndy t1_irrzt7k wrote

I'm going to back out. I think I could misspeak to easily. Or throw too many questions my ADHD brain wouldn't process first... lol. Hopefully I can keep up with comments though

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Ma3Ke4Li3 OP t1_irs703d wrote

Haha sure :D but do shoot some ideas back if you feel like it.

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Krasmaniandevil t1_irx9ki0 wrote

Do dogs have moral intuitions? I'd say yes based on how they respond to failing to reward tricks, giving more treats to dog2, dogs' capacity for self sacrifice, etc.

Do chimps/bonobos have moral intuitions? In addition to the example provided in the podcast, the two primates have very different strategies for conflict resolution despite their genetic proximity, and I have a hard time identifying the point in human evolution that triggered some sort of deontological obligation.

Should we punish lions for eating cubs sired by other lions? Although they are warm-blooded like us, this is normal behavior for the lion. We might say lions don't have the capacity for morality, but that requires distinguishing them from primates, whales, dolphins, rats, etc.

But lets put aside the premise that humans are categorically distinct as moral angents. If we discovered an alien species (perhaps descended from ravens or parrots rather than chimps), could we reasonably judge them by our own standards? What if the conditions were so much harsher than earth that morally appalling behavior was necessarily required for that species to survive? (Relatedly, do we judge other humans who bend/break moral norms in the name of survival, as many survivors of genocide or war have done?).

IMO, moral codes are path dependent, adaptive, and emergent. We see this biologically with the examples provided in the podcast, but also in human history and political philosophy.

We can even take this principle one further into the realm of political philosophy. Suppose a sovereign has a (deontologicsl) moral code that prohibits taking violent action against a rebellious faction that is ready and willing to commit violence. Should the sovereign adhere to their code even where the rebels will impose a moral order that would be horrifying to the sovereign? I don't find this example much different than an animal with poor self-preservation instincts, but some of my comments below go into more details about my premises and corrolary arguments etc.

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Ma3Ke4Li3 OP t1_irxwj85 wrote

I will reply later with more thoughts, but I think two folks who are best at making this distinction (why humans can be moral agents, but lions cannot) are Michael Tomasello and Stephen Darwall. If you are interested.

And thanks for actually listening to the content, most people just read the abstract!

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