Just the thought they are "made of" some other thing is really the issue, in a very ultimate sort of way. Some people truly believe they are 'made of' thought, perception, even consciousness itself. Most people want a more rigorous, scientific kind of approach, but are stymied by the fact they seem to be 'made of' nothing more than probability (or perhaps "strings vibrating in 11 dimensions"). Is energy 'made of' wave functions or are wave functions 'made of 'energy? I propose they (energy and wave functions) are 'made of' and 'make up' the ineffability of being, and it's "turtles all the way down", as if that makes any sense. 😉

By the way, I started a subreddit for discussing things like this outside of r/philosophy and r/consciousness, feel free to visit or post there if you are interested.

Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.

That really doesn't help, no. The question is what part of this discussion about the article (which all pertains to that part of the article) your quandary relates to. You are not required to answer, but this response isn't useful.

Perhaps I could help by noting a few problems with your quandary itself, because it seems malformed. As far as I can tell, "Particle B" is irrelevant, because whether A and B are entangled or not, the location of one isn't dependent on the location of the other. Indeed, this is related to the nature of entanglement itself, that the location of either is unimportant; questions about entanglement iconically query spin although that is not the only property which shows entanglement. The location of a particle is a circumstance rather than a property, in this context.

So perhaps you meant your quandary to actually involve both particles. In that case, entanglement must be assumed or they have no necessary correlation at all. So the question becomes whether Particle B has any spin between the time the spin of A is measured and the time the spin of B is measured in order to evaluate the system according to Bell's theorem. Whether this is logically (though not physically) the same as saying a particle has spin before it is measured, or location for that matter, seems to be the root of your quandary, but there is a subtle difference in the reasoning of the argument, I suppose. Regardless, in terms of science the spin of B becomes "well-defined", though probabilistic rather than deterministic, as soon as the spin of A is measured.

Returning to the question of location, though, this has been my point all along. In the decades since Bohr and Einstein debated the matter, it has become clear that a particle actually doesn't have a location until it is 'observed', whether by a scientific measurement or a 'natural' interaction with any other particle. What I have been saying all along is that this metaphysical uncertainty is indeed no different than whether, according to Einstein's analogy (not to be taken literally but logically valid nevertheless) the moon exists before we observe it. This has proven a more contentious claim than I expected (perhaps because it means both Einstein and Bohr were "right") resulting in one redditor accusing me of insulting Bohr, another declaring I am ignorant about science, and now you insisting some other thing I cannot be certain about.

The metaphysical uncertainty involved in the question of whether there is "objective truth" independent of 'subjective knowledge' of that truth isn't special to quantum physics, it just becomes undeniable in that context. But it really is the same "normal" metaphysical uncertainty in particle location, the presence of the moon (or a clock on a classroom wall, another example presented in this discussion) or, and this is the really important part, the existence of the entire physical universe outside of one's mind. Because scientificists (neopostmodernists) and scientists are used to dismissing metaphysical uncertainty entirely as a philosophical illusion rather than an undeniable truth, they generally believe that the quantum effect referred to as "spooky action at a distance" is somehow a special case, but it really isn't.

My philosophy approaches the matter (pun intended) a bit differently than most. In standard (postmodern physicalist) philosophies, resolving (not really avoiding but hoping to explain) 'spooky action' by assuming that the world is not made of "made of well-defined, independent pieces of ‘stuff’" focuses on whether the stuff is "well-defined", but this, as suggested by the article, would not be consolation to Einstein. Instead, I focus on whether the stuff is "independent" in the way both science and naive observations by consciousness dictate. This is problematic only it that it does not directly distinguish my philosophy, which is fundamentally and entirely physicalist but not naively so, from idealist philosophies that propose 'mind is fundamental' or some such. My philosophy (POR) does address the issue and distinguish itself from idealism, just not directly with this particular principle. Consciousness ("mind") is an emergent property of human brains, it is no less physical than space or time or heat or entropy or information, but like these things is not composed of particles or matter or substance. I can't truly explain "spooky action at a distance" any better than QM does, but I don't need to because QM does it quite well already, if it does so at all. What my philosophy does, and yours (apparently) doesn't do is explain why people are confused by 'spooky action', or local realism, or consciousness, why they are justified in being confused, but also why they don't really need to be.

Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.

>I was hoping to show you how implausible it would be for a curious amateur to understand physics better than the experts.

This discussion has never been about understanding physics, it is about understanding philosophy. I understand physics just fine, despite your uncertainty on that point.

>So you should probably stop saying that physicists are wrong about the weirdness

So long as they "shut up and calculate", I have nothing to say. When they begin philosophizing about the implications of their calculations, I will address any mistakes I believe they have made. Likewise, I am not a certified expert on philosophy, but when philosophers make errors on scientific matters, it is still possible for me to notice that.

>really QM works just like regular mechanics if only people would listen to you.

Your interpretation of my position is inaccurate. Metaphysical uncertainty in QM works just like metaphysical uncertainty in regular mechanics, despite your contention to the contrary. It is just that QM forces some people, who believe (incorrectly) that metaphysical uncertainty can be ignored, to confront the fact that they are mistaken.

Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.