Submitted by ADefiniteDescription t3_xyumwc in philosophy
TMax01 t1_irjqc3a wrote
>In Bohr’s view, the world doesn’t have definite properties unless we’re looking at it.
The fundamental issue here (the relationship between philosophy and physics, quantum or otherwise) comes down to an over-generalized notion of "unless we are looking at it". Bohr was speaking from a predisposition of metaphysics, and this confuses many people. Every particle "looks at" every other particle it interacts with; the conscious effort of measurement is irrelevant. The moon does not cease to exist when we are not seeing it, but we cannot "know" that with absolute certainty, because any effort to determine if it is true would involve seeing whether the moon exists. This is a fundamental property of metaphysics (indeed, the only fundamental property of metaphysics, and the sum total of metaphysics) called metaphysical uncertainty. Nevertheless, to adopt the idea that the moon only exists because we see it is insane.
Physics doesn't challenge reality, it merely illuminates it; if your reality is challenged by quantum mechanics, it is because your beliefs about reality were inaccurate. The only thing challenged by the results of quantum physics is how we explain things; things were, are, and will be just as they always have been (objects emerge from some quantum interactions, life emerges from some objects, and consciousness emerges from some life) regardless of how we explain them.
newyne t1_irjt8sz wrote
"Observation" doesn't even mean "looking at," it means making a measurement with equipment that intra-acts with the particle.
Also you don't need quantum physics to challenge that kind of physicalism: that comes down to a logical absurdity.
TMax01 t1_irjv6jv wrote
I can't tell what your point is, or even whether you mean to agree with or dispute my comment.
newyne t1_irjw3qg wrote
Agreeing. It seems strange to me that the author of the article got that wrong; that's a common misconception among laypeople, but if you're writing an article about it??? Seems like at least a terrible choice of words.
As for physicalism... Lol, I will never pass up an opportunity to critique that!
TMax01 t1_irk05t3 wrote
>that's a common misconception among laypeople
Unfortunately, it is also a common misperception among both physicists and philosophers, as well. In fact, there may well be good reason to believe that Bohr himself was willfully, perhaps even intentionally, confusing the issue to begin with. After all, we should not presume that, at the dawn of our exploration of quantum weirdness, even the most profoundly brilliant physicists knew just how weird things were going to get. The article seems more than slightly sensationalist, as almost any article on the subject of quantum mechanics is going to be, so it seems more of an inevitable rather than terrible choice for an essay which uses the phrase "quantum philosophy" in its title.
>As for physicalism... Lol, I will never pass up an opportunity to critique that!
The dialectic between a naive physicalism and a comprehensive one makes both critique and criticism unavoidable, I think.
sticklebat t1_irkcljv wrote
> Unfortunately, it is also a common misperception among both physicists and philosophers, as well.
Among philosophers, yes. Among people who studied physics in college? Sometimes. Among actual practicing physicists? No. Not often enough to matter.
> In fact, there may well be good reason to believe that Bohr himself was willfully, perhaps even intentionally, confusing the issue to begin with.
No, we have plenty of Bohr’s research, correspondence, and seminars to know that Bohr did indeed understand the distinction, and did not deliberately try to confuse the issue. There is zero reason whatsoever to believe what you’re suggesting. The article isn’t quoting Bohr, it’s poor use of words doesn’t reflect Bohr’s meaning. This misconception arises so often because physicists appropriated colloquial words for technical meaning, so people without training or expertise read/hear things and don’t realize that they’ve misunderstood, because they don’t realize the words don’t mean what they think they mean.
I do agree that the article is sensationalist, though, since its attempts to describe the concept of local realism to an inexpert audience are ignorant or incompetent, depending on whether the author actually understands it themself.
TMax01 t1_irkfy25 wrote
> Among actual practicing physicists? No. Not often enough to matter.
In the context of their actual professional physics, that is beyond doubt. Unfortunately, outside of that restricted activity, physicists are as apt as any other person to expound upon what they believe are the implications of their physics. And what is worse, they are both more likely to believe their actual knowledge of physics provides them a privileged perspective of those philosophical implications, and to be referenced by people without that practical and professional knowledge of physics go suggest their skill in physics lends weight to their philosophical beliefs. Hence the need for the whole "shut up and calculate" perspective, as honored in the breach as the observance.
>Bohr did indeed understand the distinction, and did not deliberately try to confuse the issue
I understand your point, but I was not impugning his integrity. It was a poor choice of words on my part. The truth is the distinction itself is not so simple a matter, nor something physicists are qualified to assess to begin with. Bohr had a rational and scientific perspective on physics, as all good physicists must. But unfortunately, that is, in a real way, assuming a conclusion, from a philosophical perspective. Bohr assumed there is a [meta]physical truth that his work explored, as did Einstein; they were simply discussing what that truth was, which of their conflicting explanations was more accurate. Which means they were both failing to "shut up and calculate", but were instead using discourse and thought experiments (valid practices for physicists, I realize, but not physics) to attempt to ascertain which worldview to embrace based on their beliefs about the implications of their calculations rather than the calculations themselves.
>This misconception arises so often because physicists appropriated colloquial words for technical meaning,
I don't believe that is the case. The misconception arises often because of the nature of consciousness and quantum weirdness, and the potential for killing two birds with one stone, which most people find very tempting. The fact that scientists borrow words for use as symbols in logical expressions is an entirely separate issue, although I do agree it confounds things even further.
sticklebat t1_irkzann wrote
> Unfortunately, outside of that restricted activity, physicists are as apt as any other person to expound upon what they believe are the implications of their physics.
As someone who has spent decades in physics academia, I’ve never met someone at or past the graduate school level who would make the mistake of thinking that “observation” in quantum mechanics implies observation by a conscious observer, unless explictly talking about some sort of consciousness-causes-collapse interpretation. I’m not arguing that physicists can’t make mistakes or harbor some misconceptions, but negligibly few will make the mistake you’re claiming.
> It was a poor choice of words on my part.
What was a poor choice of words? Which words, exactly, are you referring to? The article doesn’t use any of his words. It summarizes what he says. If you want to read his actual words, here’s an example from a discussion he has with Heisenberg about objectivity and subjectivity. Here’s a particularly relevant excerpt:
> And what predictions we base on such findings depend on the way we pose our experimental question, and here the observer has freedom of choice. Naturally, it still makes no difference whether the observer is a man, an animal, or a piece of apparatus, but it is no longer possible to make predictions without reference to the observer or the means of observation.
I’m not sure how that could be confused, unless you cherry pick bits and pieces of his words so as to make them misleading.
> The truth is the distinction itself is not so simple a matter, nor something physicists are qualified to assess to begin with.
The details of the distinction aren’t simple, but the distinction between conscious observer and not is fairly straightforward, and the topic of conversation here. Also the claim that this is something that physicists aren’t qualified to assess, let alone discuss, is absurd. It certainly requires some philosophical chops, but it also requires a detailed technical understanding of fundamental physics, which very, very few philosophers have.
> Bohr assumed there is a [meta]physical truth that his work explored, as did Einstein; they were simply discussing what that truth was, which of their conflicting explanations was more accurate. Which means they were both failing to "shut up and calculate",
They were physicists exploring the implications and consequences of a new physical model. They were doing science, and their thought experiments and arguments led to further understanding that eventually underpinned physical, metaphysical and philosophical analysis of the matter. If they had those discussions 40 years later they’d have been pissing into the wind. But they didn’t, and their discussions led to the EPR paradox, the idea of hidden variables, Bell’s theorem, etc. This year’s Nobel prize has its roots in the very conversations you’re claiming these physicists — the foremost experts of the subject at the time — weren’t qualified to have. Talk about pretentious…
> I don't believe that is the case. The misconception arises often because of the nature of consciousness and quantum weirdness, and the potential for killing two birds with one stone, which most people find very tempting.
As someone who teaches this, I can assure you you’re wrong. It is difficult to talk about superposition and complementarity in a clear and concise way, because the technical language is confusing because it uses words that people have preconceptions about. You can either be clear, or you can be concise, but very rarely both. And worse, once a misconception always a misconception: it propagates. You can see it here on Reddit all the time. Someone who doesn’t understand states it with confidence, or someone who understands tries to explain it concisely and people misunderstand, and then they spread it to others.
This misconception is very easy to dispel simply by having a careful talk about the meaning of words, and that tells me it’s the words that are the main problem.
TMax01 t1_irl8cnl wrote
>I’m not arguing that physicists can’t make mistakes or harbor some misconceptions, but negligibly few will make the mistake you’re claiming.
You're building a strawman here. The nature of the issue is broader than just that one word. The metaphysical perspective that results in non-physicists over-interpreting that word does in fact infest the thinking of physicists, as well, in their interpretation if not their scientific efforts.
>Which words, exactly, are you referring to?
The ones I used, which is why I said that. I'll leave it for you to obsess over which ones exactly.
>This year’s Nobel prize has its roots in the very conversations you’re claiming these physicists — the foremost experts of the subject at the time — weren’t qualified to have.
Nah. The prize related to the "shut up and calculate" parts of the science, not their interpretations and conversations.
>This misconception is very easy to dispel simply by having a careful talk about the meaning of words, and that tells me it’s the words that are the main problem.
LOL. Yes, you misunderstand the problem. You are what I refer to as a neopostmodernist. By that I mean that you don't realize that compared to the meaning of words, quantum mechanics is downright trivial. If only something as simple as Bell's Theorem could be used to sort out language, consciousness, and existential truth.
sticklebat t1_irmw0ed wrote
> You're building a strawman here. The nature of the issue is broader than just that one word.
No, I’m not. You keep saying that the misconception that observation requires a conscious observer is a common misconception among physicists. It is not. I don’t know where you’re getting this idea but it’s entirely false.
> The ones I used, which is why I said that. I'll leave it for you to obsess over which ones exactly.
So you’re blaming Bohr for your choice of words? Good on ya, that makes so much sense! /s
> Nah. The prize related to the "shut up and calculate" parts of the science, not their interpretations and conversations.
Then you frankly don’t understand it. I was beginning to gather as much by your other comments, but this is the nail in the coffin. The argument Einstein and Bohr were having was about whether the universe can be locally real (another example of scientific/philosophical terminology being easy to confuse). The argument they participated in led to the creation of different possible interpretations of quantum mechanics and culminated in John Bell realizing that any locally real interpretation must predict different correlations than an interpretation that isn’t locally real. He was hoping and expecting that this would allow physicists to show that the universe is in fact locally real, making quantum mechanics a bit easier for many to swallow. This Nobel Prize was awarded to the primary experimenters who tested those correlations, and who found the opposite of what Bell hoped. Bell’s theorem and tests of it are absolutely central to any discussion about interpretations of quantum mechanics, and they’ve ruled out all interpretations consistent with Einstein’s argument. The notion that Bell tests are unrelated to interpretations of quantum mechanics is laughably wrong.
> LOL. Yes, you misunderstand the problem. You are what I refer to as a neopostmodernist. If only something as simple as Bell's Theorem could be used to sort out language, consciousness, and existential truth.
You are what I would refer to as obtuse. You’re just changing what we’re arguing about halfway through to make yourself sound smarter. I am not arguing about the details of language, consciousness, and existential truth. I am merely pointing out that the language used to describe quantum mechanics is easily misunderstood, and that the specific misconception that quantum mechanics places conscious observation on a pedestal is easily dispelled by clarifying what the words used to talk about quantum mechanics means. But go ahead and call me a “neopostmodernist” if using big made up words makes you feel better, and accusing me of misunderstanding grandiose problems that were never under discussion in the first place.
TMax01 t1_irn3ag5 wrote
>You keep saying that the misconception that observation requires a conscious observer is a common misconception among physicists. I
As a strawman, it is not an entirely inadequate proxy for what I actually said, but it is not what I actually said.
>You are what I would refer to as obtuse.
And you are what I refer to as cantankerous. You're in the wrong subreddit. This is r/philosophy, not r/physics.
>. I am not arguing about the details of language, consciousness, and existential truth. I am merely pointing out that the language [...]
Oops.
>used to describe quantum mechanics is easily misunderstood, and that the specific misconception that quantum mechanics places conscious observation on a pedestal is easily dispelled by clarifying what the words used to talk about quantum mechanics means.
Quantum mechanics is easily misunderstood. Perhaps owing to the fact it cannot be easily (or actually) understood. "If you think you understand quantum mechanics, you don't understand quantum mechanics." The meaning of words is also (supposedly independently) not easily understood, despite the faith one might have in any particular definition or dictionary. So despite the devastation you have wreaked on the strawman argument that I have besmirched the good name of Niels Bohr, the actual issue I am discussing remains, unperturbed.
I don't identify you as a neopostmodernist to "make myself feel better", I do it to accurately describe your position and practices, or at least the intellectual milieu and time period of your reasoning.
The problem is that "clarifying [...] the words used to talk about" any subject, let alone the supremely difficult subjects of QM or consciousness, doesn't actually work as well as you insist it should. Whether 'observation' or 'measurement' or 'interaction' or any other word is used, and no matter how rigorously one attempts to nail down what any of them "mean", the difficulty of understanding or discussing these things does not evaporate, or even lessen, and the effort itself simply compounds the difficulty. Scientists can shut up and calculate, but when they don't, and for everyone else who simply accepts what (current) science provides without further consideration, the nature of meaning, in both words and more generally, makes the difficulty of dealing with the possible correlation, or at least parallel, between the ineffably quantum and the ineffably conscious all the more enticing.
Personally, I don't suffer from this problem, because my philosophy resolves the nature of consciousness more completely than neopostmodern philosophies do. I can understand the parallels between quantum uncertainty and existential uncertainty, and recognize the meaning of those parallels without conflating the subjects. But the problem remains, even for me, when I attempt to discuss these issues with other people, and the more neopostmodernist they are, the more cantankerous they get. You have demonstrated that well, I believe, and I apologize for engaging on this topic with you as an object lesson on principle, since I don't disagree with you at all about how much that strawman deserved the thorough thrashing you've given it.
Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.
sticklebat t1_irn84qa wrote
> As a strawman, it is not an entirely inadequate proxy for what I actually said, but it is not what I actually said.
It is exactly what you said. That is the exact misconception that was being discussed when you replied, quoting another person, and said “it’s a common misconception among physicists.” I’m always amazed by people on Reddit who pretend they didn’t say the things they said, that are still there for all to see.
> This is r/philosophy, not r/physics.
Yes, in an article about philosophical ideas related to a model of physics. You cannot meaningfully consider the philosophy of physics if you don’t first understand the physics.
> Oops.
Did you fall, or something?
> Quantum mechanics is easily misunderstood. Perhaps owing to the fact it cannot be easily (or actually) understood.
But we aren’t talking about the entirety of quantum mechanics. We are talking about one specific and common misconception of it. And that particular misconception arises primarily because the words “observation” and “measurement” mean something different to a physicist than they do to a lay person.
> So despite the devastation you have wreaked on the strawman argument that I have besmirched the good name of Niels Bohr, the actual issue I am discussing remains, unperturbed.
No, I responded to two specific things you claimed. One, your claim that physicists commonly suffer from the misconception that conscious observation plays a special role in quantum mechanics. Two, that Niels Bohr deliberately confused the two. The first claim is laughably wrong and makes it very clear you have no experience with the actual physics community; and the latter is demonstrably false and demonstrates your propensity to make shit up for some reason that I can’t comprehend.
You keep defending your claims, but whenever I make any reference to those claims you call it a strawman. That just makes you dishonest.
> I don't identify you as a neopostmodernist to "make myself feel better", I do it to accurately describe your position and practices, or at least the intellectual milieu and time period of your reasoning.
You don’t know enough about my positions and practices to call me anything, since the only things I’ve addressed are whether physicists possess a particular misconception, the origin of that misconception, and what words Bohr used. This would be like watching someone walk down the street and diagnosing them with heart disease.
> The problem is that "clarifying [...] the words used to talk about" any subject, let alone the supremely difficult subjects of QM or consciousness, doesn't actually work as well as you insist it should.
But it does. I actually teach these things, I deal with this all the time. In this particular instance, about the very specific and precise thing we’re discussing, it works quite well. In fact, you can see it working in this very Reddit post, among others on the subject. Your imagination — or perhaps your own confusion — notwithstanding.
> Personally, I don't suffer from this problem, because my philosophy resolves the nature of consciousness more completely than neopostmodern philosophies do.
How pretentious of you. This attitude is certainly consistent with your previous assertion that Einstein and Bohr weren’t qualified to talk about quantum mechanics.
> I can understand the parallels between quantum uncertainty and existential uncertainty, and recognize the meaning of those parallels without conflating the subjects.
And yet you’ve demonstrated that you clearly don’t understand the physics (see your claim that this year’s Nobel prize has nothing to do with interpretations of quantum mechanics). So sorry if I doubt your ability to see parallels so crystally clear when you don’t even understand one of them in the first place.
> But the problem remains, even for me, when I attempt to discuss these issues with other people, and the more neopostmodernist they are, the more cantankerous they get.
It’s more likely that people who actually understand the physics get frustrated when you, who clearly don’t, make baseless and false claims about something you don’t understand, and then accuse them of inventing strawmen when they correct your errors. You aren’t arguing honestly. Hell, you’re still defending your claim about Bohr instead of admitting that you took this shitty article’s awful summary of his argument as a stand in for his actual words, and you’re too proud to admit you made a mistake.
NarroNow t1_irmjm7m wrote
So, a bunch of quantum particles get together, build a machine, and decide if quantum particles are there or not. Sounds to me like the universe has issues.
SunnyNickname t1_irn0n5v wrote
Our understanding of the universe has issues.
We still debate how to interpret quantum mechanics. It works, it’s one of the best tested theories out there, we just have no idea how to interpret the math.
Check measurement problem if you’re interested in going down the rabbit hole.
NarroNow t1_irnjk7n wrote
Apologies up front for a wall of text.
Yup. Love the rabbit hole.
So many good sources of info.
Sabine H. explained observation so my brain could grasp it... fascinating stuff.
We humans somehow distinguish ourselves from the universe... but we're all the same stuff.
I wrote this a while back. Help me refine it, if you want. Poke holes as you see fit. All good.
So, to be fair to Dr. Harry V. Cliff, here is the full quote: "Based on the laws of physics, I don't see how there can be free will. To be clear, the universe doesn't appear to be deterministic - quantum mechanics tells us that the future is unknowable - we can only ascribe probabilities to outcomes. But that doesn't mean there's any room for free will. There is no way to decide the outcome of a quantum event, it just happens according to probabilities, so how could you ever make a genuine choice?"
Other thoughts re: free will which are rolling in my head (my glib guesstimations) on the topic, with quantum mechanics floating around in the back of my mind...
I think it is fair to view having free will as a 1 or a 0. You have it, or you don't. There's no in-between. Even if you have only a tiny bit of free will, the switch is flipped and the free will light turns on, albeit possibly burning very dimly. 1 or a 0.
Can we assume that with free will, that there arrives a point where your brain makes a choice?
For example. two cups are placed in front of you, under a veil. One is a color you like (red), and one is a color you hate (yellow). You get to make a choice and pick up the one you prefer when the veil is lifted. So, when the veil is lifted, you see the cups, process which one you like, and reach for the red cup. Free will, right?
But, barring about a thousand other logical reasons/discussions discussed on the web related to free will's why/why not, I like to focus more on a quantum aspect.
Think you and I agree that we, with our free will, have zero control over the probablistic outcomes of subatomic particles. Nothing we can do about it.
Earlier, /u/DoodDoes stated: Quantum particles are the silt, Subatomic particles are the sand, atoms are the pebbles, molecules are the stones, you are the riverbed in which they lie. Quantum mechanics dictate everything about you, because you are made of quantum particles. If something like quantum tunneling or entanglement does impact our consciousness, the impact is either unnoticeable or is incorporated into the intended function of us. Atoms having charges and being effected by waves of all sorts in the electromagnetic spectrum are both things that impact our ability to think and also our proclivity to age. but atoms only do things because subatomic particles do things, and subatomic particles only do things because quantum particles do things. (love it).
We've got roughly 7,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 (7 octillion) atoms in a human body, all doing what they do as a result of quantum interactions, and the interactions can result in ungodly energy state changes (the typical vibrational frequencies range from less than 1013 Hz to approximately 1014 Hz), per second. All of which we have zero control.
The sheer amount of subatomic interactions, atomic vibrations, etc is so fast that if we were to view human activity from a subatomic perspective of time, humans would appear frozen for years.
So, while you may see your snap decision to pick the red cup as free will, changing that 0 to a 1, in that fraction of a second (to you), an incalculable amount of matter interactions has occurred over which you possess zero control.
You are never in control of these interactions. Never.
"you" aren't even you.
the amalgamation of gray matter you call a brain is telling you that you are "you", and it is just a part of everything, doing what it does. quantum particles doing things.
DoodDoes t1_irnvo2h wrote
I’m not sure if there are holes to poke so much as this is currently a field where unfalsifiable hypotheses are easy (for theoretical physicists) to come up with. I don’t think the probabilistic nature of quantum particles excludes the possibility of either free will existing or not existing. For example: either you placed your chips on the wrong bet in roulette or the ball landed in the wrong slot on the board. Both are based in probability and it’s really impossible to tell if the ball was always going to land there, or if you were always going to put your chips there, or both, or neither. That however is where I would disagree with the “‘you’ aren’t even you” sentiment, because at the very least you were there to observe it. It doesn’t matter that in actuality it’s just a bunch of oxygen and nitrogen atoms moving along a temperature gradient, it’s still the wind. And it doesn’t matter if on a quantum scale you are just a flow of quantum particles that are bottlenecked at what you call a mouth only to be temporarily stored and expelled, you are still you.
I like to think of it like sailing: you can’t control the direction of the wind, but you can move the sails. On a certain level that is not an entirely random event because you are making decisions that will benefit yourself, but on another level even with free will you only reacted to the wind because you knew what to do based on what the wind was doing. Even still I would consider self preservation and altruism to be “proofs” of free will, because in a situation where the two choices are to fight for life or blindly accept death nearly everyone chooses to fight. And if serving yourself was just a probabilistic likelihood then that would be a cascade of factors leading to apparent decision making. Maybe you didn’t have any options other than fight the wind or be swept out to sea, but either way you can still choose to do the Macarena while reciting Shakespeare. And if that’s not free will then it doesn’t matter much, because the universe just so happened to make it likely which is good enough for me
Also I didn’t state the silt, sand, pebbles thing just today, just to say. This must have been copy and pasted from a while back. Iirc the original post was about how quantum particles change what we think
NarroNow t1_iroh1kx wrote
Thanks for this. Your insight very much appreciated!
Sorry, the "just today" was from an earlier post I made (correct the time time).
I'll fix it.
fineburgundy t1_irkhjxb wrote
I am not a physicist. But I have encountered this issue and spent a lot of time on it. Any actual physicist out there is invited to review this and correct it.
Here’s the subtle, insane thing that physicists (and philosophers) have grappled with: what you gave was a perfectly normal description that should apply to both QM and classical physics. “We don’t know where something is until we measure it, but it is somewhere, waiting for us to spot it.” QM is not that normal. It is not just telling us how much information we have, it tells us something weird is going on.
There are competing ways to describe the problem, but a Copenhagen interpretation would say that the wave function of a quantum system evolves smoothly (like ripples on he surface of a pond) then collapses when measured. It’s as if Nature waits to decide where a particle is until we ask.
What difference does that make? Well, I want to emphasize the following point: it took decades for someone to come up with an answer to that. We now know how to conduct an experiment that would give a different outcome if QM’s weird math is right. What I think you said is almost true, almost; quantum measurement almost gives us the same results as if our measurement just tells us where the particle was all along. And for decades many physicists assumed we never would spot any difference, that this apparent weirdness was “just philosophy.”
But Bell showed that we can check if that “almost” is true. Einstein didn’t figure out how to, he didn’t live long enough for anyone to figure this out. Many of the people who first discussed this had passed away. I can’t emphasize enough that it wasn’t obvious we would ever find that QM’s weird methodology made a detectable difference. But Bell came up with his Inequalities, experimenters could finally test for them, and it turned QM’s math was right. Entangled particles measured in a clever way were correlated “too well.”
One of the reasons this gets confusing is that there are many very different descriptions of the weirdness, because if physics says the world works in an impossible way you can “fix the problem” if you are willing to break a different rule instead. I say two entangled particles can’t know how to correlate in advance. But maybe the information travels backwards in time. Or maybe particles actually follow every possible path, but follow each one in a parallel universe. We end up with a lot of very smart people arguing about which unreasonable option is more reasonable. But nobody has found what most other physicists would consider a solution. Something weird really is going on.
I think Nobel Prize was awarded to three people who made a series of cleverer and more conclusive experiments testing Bell’s Inequalities. I think at least two have said that they thought if they were careful enough they could show that QM isn’t really weird in this way. But they kept coming up with the results QM predicted all along.
TMax01 t1_irl4kc4 wrote
>“We don’t know where something is until we measure it, but it is somewhere, waiting for us to spot it.”
>QM is not that normal.
Well, I hope you won't mind if I try to interpret what you're trying to say. Before I do that, though, I feel that I should point out that isn't a quotation from me, nor does it adequately characterize what I did say. But I understand why you presumed that you were actually paraphrasing my position, when you weren't.
Accepting the 'location' metaphor you have set up, I don't think "we don't know where something is" but it is "waiting for us to spot it". Quite the opposite; there is either a location, amd we simply look at what is there, or we only measure whatever we spotted, and then try to figure out from that what and where it is. In that way, QM is perfectly normal: it is simply physics. The fact that it provides results that are startlingly unexpected and seem to be more contrary to our intuitions doesn't make that any less true. In fact, it makes it more true, just in a surprising way because we've become so used to believing (falsely) that we understand why physical objects behave the way they do. But let's not forget that all science is, to some degree or other, contrary to our expectations. Intuition led us to believe that heavier objects fall faster than lighter ones. Intuition led us to believe that aether must exist, that the Sun orbited the Earth, and that mice arose from dirty rags. QM is more exceptional because it defies the expectations of conventional physics, not because it is unintuitive. Heck, most people don't quite understand how the speed of light could limit the propagation of gravity, so the fact that entanglement could (theoretically!) allow instantaneous information transfer is only notable because scientists previously (but only recently) insisted that instantaneous information transfer was impossible, not because it is "unintuitive".
>It’s as if Nature waits to decide where a particle is until we ask.
You just repeated the very error the article did. In spades. I understand, your intention was to point out that quantum indeterminacy is distinct and more profound than more mundane ignorance-based indeterminacy. But you've done it by invoking a problematic metaphor of agency and recycling the notion of location to resuscitate determinism; as if the particle is just 'elsewhere' until "Nature" wishes to reward us for looking for it. The "asking" is indeed what 'causes' the particle to have a discrete location. That only seems confusing if you try to imagine the particle as an object, like the moon. So DDTT.
>quantum measurement almost gives us the same results as if our measurement just tells us where the particle was all along.
Your interpretation of my description is mistaken, again. I believe what I actually said (and none of your points actually disputes, although I understand why you find my perspective to lack the requisite mystified exacerbation of quantum weirdness you're used to) is that "quantum measurement" isn't a special thing, it is just measurement. And no matter how spooky, uncanny, weird, mystifying, and confusing the mechanisms of quantum systems get, somehow or other they do result in the behavior of the material objects our intuitions are informed by. Quantum particles aren't objects, they never have been, they don't have locations, they simply have localization determined by the necessity of their local effect, regardless of whether that is a measurement by a physicist or any other quantum particle interacting with it. People are rightfully confused and bemused by "spooky action at a distance". Why is that? Because it isn't an effect that is analogous to how larger objects (which are all entirely composed of quantum particles) behave.
>But they kept coming up with the results QM predicted all along.
That has been the case since the discovery of QM. Many of the greatest advancements in quantum physics have been the result of someone trying to disprove quantum physics, and successfully failing to achieve that goal.
gae12345 t1_irmefwg wrote
>(which are all
>
>entirely composed
>
>of quantum particles) behave.
What are quantum particles composed of then? sorry don't know if the question makes sense
TMax01 t1_irmj1fq wrote
It doesn't really, but only because I don't know why you are asking it, and the answer doesn't make any difference to what I said. Quantum particles aren't really "composed" of anything, because that term suggests component parts, which is the opposite of what "quanta" means. Quantum particles are just energy, aka the localized affect of decoherent wave functions.
gae12345 t1_irmr44d wrote
oh it wasn't meant as something which would challenge something else you said or anything like that I just asked because how crazy and interesting all this is thanks for having answered
so quatnum particles are made of energy no wait they 're made of wave functions?
TMax01 t1_irmy8rh wrote
Just the thought they are "made of" some other thing is really the issue, in a very ultimate sort of way. Some people truly believe they are 'made of' thought, perception, even consciousness itself. Most people want a more rigorous, scientific kind of approach, but are stymied by the fact they seem to be 'made of' nothing more than probability (or perhaps "strings vibrating in 11 dimensions"). Is energy 'made of' wave functions or are wave functions 'made of 'energy? I propose they (energy and wave functions) are 'made of' and 'make up' the ineffability of being, and it's "turtles all the way down", as if that makes any sense. 😉
By the way, I started a subreddit for discussing things like this outside of r/philosophy and r/consciousness, feel free to visit or post there if you are interested.
Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.
gae12345 t1_irn40m2 wrote
>hey are 'made of' thought, perception, even consciousness
well one could ask what those things are made of as well
TMax01 t1_iroydv4 wrote
Indeed. But whatever the answer might be, one could ask what that is "made of". It's turtles all the way down.
gae12345 t1_irn43mq wrote
>propose they (energy and wave functions) are 'made of' and 'make up' the
>
>ineffability of being
>
>, and it's "turtles all the way down"
sort of like a feedback loop? I will definitely check out that sub
TMax01 t1_iroxz5j wrote
Not a feedback loop, like a dynamic equilibrium; an identity (not a personality trait, but being the same thing) without teleology (cause or purpose): being. As in the word is.
Smooth_Notice8504 t1_irmqpn5 wrote
Particle-like behaviour is one aspect of the manifestation of energy in quantum fields.
fineburgundy t1_irtj421 wrote
Hmmm, I see a relatively simple disagreement, and a more serious one.
Simple one: the interpretation are weird in their own ways. It’s possible that “my” interpretation happens not to work for you. But let me test that:
When we measure the location of particle A, we get a particular result. Do you believe in counterfactuals? That if we measure particle B instead, particle A is in that same location it would have we measured it? Feel to answer for either entangled particles or unentangled particles, whichever seems clearest to you.
I think I can guess your answer, but I would rather just ask you yourself!
TMax01 t1_irtyjpe wrote
The entire "disagreement" is simple: you think your question relates to the topic of conversation, and I know it does not. More importantly, I know why it does not. Feel free to review the thread to try to determine why the details of QM which you are asking about are irrelevant to the issue we were previously discussing. If you cannot, or choose not to, then there is nothing I could say, in response to your quandary or otherwise, that would force you to recognize your error in this regard.
fineburgundy t1_iru0rzn wrote
I was responding to this part of the article:
““What if the world isn’t made of well-defined, independent pieces of ‘stuff’?” I hear you say. “Then can we avoid this spooky action?”
Yes, we can. And many in the quantum physics community think this way, too. But this would be no consolation to Einstein.
Einstein had a long-running debate with his friend Niels Bohr, a Danish physicist, about this very question. Bohr argued we should indeed give up the idea of the stuff of the world being well defined, so we can avoid spooky action-at-a-distance. In Bohr’s view, the world doesn’t have definite properties unless we’re looking at it. When we’re not looking, Bohr thought, the world as we know it isn’t really there.”
You are not required to discuss that at all.
TMax01 t1_irw67zi wrote
That really doesn't help, no. The question is what part of this discussion about the article (which all pertains to that part of the article) your quandary relates to. You are not required to answer, but this response isn't useful.
Perhaps I could help by noting a few problems with your quandary itself, because it seems malformed. As far as I can tell, "Particle B" is irrelevant, because whether A and B are entangled or not, the location of one isn't dependent on the location of the other. Indeed, this is related to the nature of entanglement itself, that the location of either is unimportant; questions about entanglement iconically query spin although that is not the only property which shows entanglement. The location of a particle is a circumstance rather than a property, in this context.
So perhaps you meant your quandary to actually involve both particles. In that case, entanglement must be assumed or they have no necessary correlation at all. So the question becomes whether Particle B has any spin between the time the spin of A is measured and the time the spin of B is measured in order to evaluate the system according to Bell's theorem. Whether this is logically (though not physically) the same as saying a particle has spin before it is measured, or location for that matter, seems to be the root of your quandary, but there is a subtle difference in the reasoning of the argument, I suppose. Regardless, in terms of science the spin of B becomes "well-defined", though probabilistic rather than deterministic, as soon as the spin of A is measured.
Returning to the question of location, though, this has been my point all along. In the decades since Bohr and Einstein debated the matter, it has become clear that a particle actually doesn't have a location until it is 'observed', whether by a scientific measurement or a 'natural' interaction with any other particle. What I have been saying all along is that this metaphysical uncertainty is indeed no different than whether, according to Einstein's analogy (not to be taken literally but logically valid nevertheless) the moon exists before we observe it. This has proven a more contentious claim than I expected (perhaps because it means both Einstein and Bohr were "right") resulting in one redditor accusing me of insulting Bohr, another declaring I am ignorant about science, and now you insisting some other thing I cannot be certain about.
The metaphysical uncertainty involved in the question of whether there is "objective truth" independent of 'subjective knowledge' of that truth isn't special to quantum physics, it just becomes undeniable in that context. But it really is the same "normal" metaphysical uncertainty in particle location, the presence of the moon (or a clock on a classroom wall, another example presented in this discussion) or, and this is the really important part, the existence of the entire physical universe outside of one's mind. Because scientificists (neopostmodernists) and scientists are used to dismissing metaphysical uncertainty entirely as a philosophical illusion rather than an undeniable truth, they generally believe that the quantum effect referred to as "spooky action at a distance" is somehow a special case, but it really isn't.
My philosophy approaches the matter (pun intended) a bit differently than most. In standard (postmodern physicalist) philosophies, resolving (not really avoiding but hoping to explain) 'spooky action' by assuming that the world is not made of "made of well-defined, independent pieces of ‘stuff’" focuses on whether the stuff is "well-defined", but this, as suggested by the article, would not be consolation to Einstein. Instead, I focus on whether the stuff is "independent" in the way both science and naive observations by consciousness dictate. This is problematic only it that it does not directly distinguish my philosophy, which is fundamentally and entirely physicalist but not naively so, from idealist philosophies that propose 'mind is fundamental' or some such. My philosophy (POR) does address the issue and distinguish itself from idealism, just not directly with this particular principle. Consciousness ("mind") is an emergent property of human brains, it is no less physical than space or time or heat or entropy or information, but like these things is not composed of particles or matter or substance. I can't truly explain "spooky action at a distance" any better than QM does, but I don't need to because QM does it quite well already, if it does so at all. What my philosophy does, and yours (apparently) doesn't do is explain why people are confused by 'spooky action', or local realism, or consciousness, why they are justified in being confused, but also why they don't really need to be.
Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.
fineburgundy t1_is9bhhb wrote
How can you not know that a particle’s location is also used in these thought experiments? Have you never even considered the two slit experiment? It’s like telling me “it’s always cows we make perfectly spherical, you can’t give an example with sheep!”
It’s weird how more words indicate less to say.
TMax01 t1_isamro8 wrote
Unless and until you can more clearly and comprehensively explain the results of the two slit experiment, rather than merely that the results occur, there is no reason to believe your thought experiments have any validity. Knowing there is such a thing as wave/particle duality is not the same as resolving that conundrum. If you actually understood why cows can be considered spherical but are not, you would understand why it makes no difference if you use sheep instead. So a better analogy would be that you are saying "Because we assume spherical cows, there is no reason not to assume spherical cubes."
Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.
fineburgundy t1_irtkb6v wrote
I have a separate unrelated question, which I should probably put off but I need help:
I happen to know a way physicists could measure momentum of a certain kind of particle much more accurately. I just want to get it out there, I know I won’t make any money, but I’m getting frustrated as hell. Do you have any ideas? Do you know who to ask for ideas?
TMax01 t1_irtzs4h wrote
I can't help you with that, sorry. But I will point out that physicists are already able to make such measurements with a great deal of precision. "Accuracy" isn't really the issue; why do you think physicists cannot measure the momentum of any particle accurately to begin with?
fineburgundy t1_iru1azf wrote
I was hoping to show you how implausible it would be for a curious amateur to understand physics better than the experts. Obviously I don’t. Neither do you. So you should probably stop saying that physicists are wrong about the weirdness, really QM works just like regular mechanics if only people would listen to you.
TMax01 t1_irw753z wrote
>I was hoping to show you how implausible it would be for a curious amateur to understand physics better than the experts.
This discussion has never been about understanding physics, it is about understanding philosophy. I understand physics just fine, despite your uncertainty on that point.
>So you should probably stop saying that physicists are wrong about the weirdness
So long as they "shut up and calculate", I have nothing to say. When they begin philosophizing about the implications of their calculations, I will address any mistakes I believe they have made. Likewise, I am not a certified expert on philosophy, but when philosophers make errors on scientific matters, it is still possible for me to notice that.
>really QM works just like regular mechanics if only people would listen to you.
Your interpretation of my position is inaccurate. Metaphysical uncertainty in QM works just like metaphysical uncertainty in regular mechanics, despite your contention to the contrary. It is just that QM forces some people, who believe (incorrectly) that metaphysical uncertainty can be ignored, to confront the fact that they are mistaken.
Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.
fineburgundy t1_is9bxd9 wrote
Again, then: you would be advised to approach subjects where you are not an expert with curiosity and a smidge of humility when you think they are doing something wrong. Your reflex should be to assume that you are missing something, not that they are.
TMax01 t1_isan22w wrote
I have. But humility does not require undo reverence for the less humble, and the possibility remains that you are making a mistake rather than that I am.
Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.
fineburgundy t1_isdezkk wrote
Not humility with respect to me.
With respect to professional physicists (and philosophers).
TMax01 t1_isdg5wr wrote
fineburgundy t1_isgqm3t wrote
Where you also made it about me.
But I have given the advice, taking it is up to you.
TMax01 t1_ish7nrx wrote
That wasn't advice, it was an admonishment, and it was out of place. My advice is you learn how to avoid such situations, and I've offered you good advice for how to do that, which you keep ignoring and yet trying to make it seem like a bad thing I offered it.
Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.
fineburgundy t1_islsjyb wrote
It’s advice: if you wish to be engaged, you can’t say “I’m not a physicist but I figured out what they all get wrong about this whole ‘QM is weird’ thing. It’s really quite simple…”
Nobody will take that claim seriously, or at least nobody who knows enough to carry on a conversation about any of this.
Anyway, you get my point or you don’t. I’ll leave the poor equine corpse alone.
TMax01 t1_ism14ss wrote
You still don't get it: this is not a discussion about quantum physics, and nothing I have said either denies that QM is weird or contradicts the scientific findings in quantum physics.
Metaphysical uncertainty is still just metaphysical uncertainty, you're just used to being able to dismiss it in classic physics. People love to go on and on about how the human brain is incapable of comprehending "reality" and metaphysical uncertainty is just a psychological limitation of our minds, and then the mathematical undeniability of wave/particle duality or Heisenberg Uncertainty or spooky action at a distance comes along to make it clear that metaphysical uncertainty can't be ignored as easily as you'd like. Scientificism has made you arrogant, and now you're being humbled by science itself, and because you don't like that or the emotional uncertainty of real life, you're transferring your cognitive dissonance onto me.
Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.
juicyfizz t1_irkshnn wrote
Is this related to Descartes’ work in philosophy? The only thing I remember from philosophy 100 in college 20 years ago is the lecture we all had on how do we know the clock on the wall doesn’t disappear and reappear when we come back in the room?
I was an asshole back then and didn’t give a shit so I’m like, “so long as the clock is there when I need it to be, I don’t fucking care if it comes or goes”. Nowadays this shit is fascinating to me and will send me into an existential crisis if I think about it too much.
TMax01 t1_irl6bis wrote
>Is the related to Descartes’ work in philosophy?
That's the trillion dollar question.
Yes, your philosophy professor was trying to explain metaphysical uncertainty. My point was that it isn't actually limited to quantum mechanics. QM just makes it more obvious that it is fascinating and will send you into an existential crisis if you think about it too much. Physicists have the luxury to "shut up and calculate", but philosophers deal with the hard problems.
juicyfizz t1_irl7bue wrote
Totally agree. That line between philosophy and mathematics/physics fascinates the fuck outta me.
TMax01 t1_irl94el wrote
Yeah. "Are numbers real?" is the most intriguing question ever, and if you are satisfied with any answer for it, you don't actually understand it, as far as I'm concerned.
arkticturtle t1_irmxabr wrote
What would make them unreal? Is there a distinction between realness and existence?
TMax01 t1_irnaler wrote
>Is there a distinction between realness and existence?
Depends. 😉
The question isn't really what makes numbers unreal, but what makes them real. To ask whether numbers "exist" simply explores the issue further rather than indicates a resolution. Are numbers simply functional illusions, or do they (not the numerals we use to identify them, which is a separate order of "exist", but the numbers apart from the quantities we abstract them from) exist 'in and of themselves', and if so, are they more or less real than the quantities, or the minds perceiving them?
Most people are satisfied with ignoring it all as esoteric navel-gazing or psychobabble, and say it is something only incompetent philosophers do to earn a paycheck. They assume that when it comes to non-material (?) things like numbers, being real or existing only reduces to utility, anyway, so why bother caring. Nobody has respect for philosophers, unless they're just mathematicians in disguise, until their pet or their relative dies, and then suddenly everything becomes starkly existential and they want solace from their angst and uncertainty, and even then they don't want philosophers, they just want secular priests.
Sorry for the rant. Thanks for your time. Hope it helps. 🤓
arkticturtle t1_irnc6wz wrote
I wonder... Does this idea apply to other descriptors like "redness"
I'm not well versed or educated by any means but I think I've heard this issue before with colors. Does redness exist in and of itself or is it always applied to something
TMax01 t1_irnqpu6 wrote
You are doing an admirable job of recreating the course of philosophical development. I wish I could call it "progress", but this is, I believe, an iconic example which illustrates it is not. Thousands of years before humans discovered the real nature of colors (both as frequencies of electromagnetic radiation differentially effecting the cells in our eyeballs, and as comparative/relative signals processed by our neurological visual systems) Aristotle and other ancient philosophers contemplated the idea or ideal of the conscious experience of color (what today philosophers identify as qualia). But the question of whether "redness" exists 'in and of itself' is more a matter of convention than ascertainable fact. I believe (I'm not rigorously academic so I could be mistaken, and I'm sure I'm not using the "proper" terminology) that the current convention is to say that redness is always applied to something, similar to the idea of size; it is comparative rather than fundamental.
The truth, at least as I see it, is that this epistemic uncertainty is the same in terms of qualia like "redness" and also numbers, but also every other word in every real language. It just becomes most obvious in these two examples, so much so that not even the most neopostmodern of postmodernists can deny that metaphysical uncertainty (whether "red" exists or whether "math" transcends physics or results from it) and epistemic uncertainty (whether "redness" exists or whether "numbers are real") themselves exist (distinct from simple ignorance), and will argue whether they can really be distinguished.
Erin4287 t1_iru61ld wrote
Can you further explain why this question is so intriguing, and why confidence in an answer implies not understanding the depth of the conversation around it? I always have felt that numbers and math are imagined concepts and if they are “real”, they are only so in the sense that any concept is real. Are you suggesting that numbers and math exist in the physical universe, and if so what’s your argument and evidence for this belief?
TMax01 t1_irwbdsr wrote
Unfortunately, you've ruined any hope I have for such a conversation simply by using the word "concept". As I am already discussing in a different thread, using that term assumes a conclusion, and untangling the premise would be necessary for an adequate consideration of the original question. You seem to have covered both sides of the argument, by suggesting that math both does and does not "exist in the physical universe". How could anyone possibly argue against such a position?
Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.
Erin4287 t1_irwzct0 wrote
It seems that you’re not willing to answer, and claim that’s the case because of a word I used, which is disappointing. I don’t believe math exists in nature, though I also don’t think such existence determines whether numbers are real.
I’d be interested to understand your point of view there, but I don’t really care to ”argue” about it. I’d just like an explanation. I’ll defer to you as being far more knowledgeable than I am on this topic.
What I really care about is why you find this to be the most intriguing question ever. I don’t find it particularly interesting at all, and I’d like to understand why you do, even if it’s a one sentence response.
TMax01 t1_iry83l9 wrote
> don’t believe math exists in nature
I gathered that. So how do you explain why it works so well, and how is it not "in nature" by doing so? Do you think thoughts exist in nature? Do people exist in nature? Do words? This notion of "in nature", like the reality of numbers, is really not as simple as you appear to believe it does.
>I’d just like an explanation
You should just Google "why numbers are real" and dive down the rabbit hole, then. There isn't an easy explanation, on either side of the issue, which is exactly what makes it intriguing. (Note; such a quest will be made difficult because the technical term "real numbers" exists. You might find it easier to google "why numbers are not real", and paying attention to, rather than facilely dismissing, the counter-arguments.)
>I don’t find it particularly interesting at all, and I’d like to understand why you do, even if it’s a one sentence response.
Because I've thought about it (and learned about it) a lot more than people who respond the way you have and don't find it intriguing. As I said, anyone who believes it is a simple issue doesn't actually understand the issue. It explores epistemic and metaphysical uncertainty (and certainty) more completely than any other single question I have come across, and yet does not simply reduce to epistemic or metaphysical uncertainty.
Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.
Erin4287 t1_irylvta wrote
I don’t feel the need to have an “argument” because I don’t at this point care about this issue. Whether numbers are “real” or not, whatever that means, they’re very useful and fundamental in helping us understand the world and make decisions. You deny the possibility of a simple answer being a valid response at least in part because the discussion is supposedly so complex, a premise I reject, and in fact you deny that it’s even possible for me to have thoughts of value on the issue, so there’s no point in my enabling your fervor and apparent anger at me.
What I was hoping is to understand why you believe this to be the most intriguing question there is. Many questions don’t have answers or ”easy” explanations! so this doesn’t explain to me why you assert that this is objectively the most intriguing question. You may find “exploration of epistemic and metaphysical certainty and uncertainty“ to be fascinating, but I don’t find those topics particularly interesting or relevant. Rather than this being objectively one of the most interesting questions possible, I feel like this is a matter of personal preference. I believe you totally when you say that the discussion is very complex and explores these subjects in amazing depth, but like many other scientists, I don’t find those particular subjects particularly stimulating, and in fact they feel sort of irrelevant to me, especially when the focus is on questions which apparently can’t ever be answered with empirical data or logical proof.
I’m glad that exploration of this question has enriched your life, just as questions like “why do we experience having a sense of self”, a question which is primary in Cognitive Science and appears simple on the surface, have captured the minds of people involved in neuroscience, psychology, philosophy, and other fields. Of course that question may have a simple answer, in part because it’s actually solvable, and finding this answer may help us understand numerous things about ourselves and other life. Different people find different questions interesting, including academics and free thinkers in all fields.
TMax01 t1_is0sr5s wrote
>You deny the possibility of a simple answer being a valid response at least in part because the discussion is supposedly so complex, a premise I reject,
That's your argument, and you're going to stick to it no matter what. 🤣
>in fact you deny that it’s even possible for me to have thoughts of value on the issue,
I only deny that you do, and you have ratified my perspective with your arguments. I'm quite certain it is possible, that you could learn enough about the issue to have thoughts which have value to people who already understand the issue more thoroughly, in theory. Whether you will is a different question, and seems a dubious possibility. Now, what makes all this intriguing (to those of us who are actually interested in philosophy, including but not limited to the question of whether numbers are real, for whatever definition of "real" you'd care to settle on long enough to have a philosophically valid opinion of the issue) is that it is ultimately impossible to identify whether you aren't learning that much because you will not, or because you can not, and whether there is any meaningful difference between those two propositions. The reason I use the term "intriguing" in this regard is because there is a lot of affinity, if not an identity, between that question and the other one, of whether numbers are real.
Most people have no interest in or patience for plumbing the depths of epistemic and metaphysical uncertainty. It seems a human characteristic to prefer certainty as much as possible, but it is also a human characteristic to be curious.
>I’m glad that exploration of this question has enriched your life,
I'm sorry that consideration of this question has failed to enrich yours. The endemic existential angst underlying our society, accounting (in my view, quite directly) for so much anxiety, depressions, contentiousness and even violence we suffer from, is not as far removed from this philosophical issue as you may believe.
>Of course that question may have a simple answer,
It does not. The matter of the hard problem of consciousness is not simply a 'difficult scientific challenge', it is an unresolvable metaphysical issue which is coincident with consciousness itself. Accepting the reality of that is the only way to "understand numerous things about ourselves", for those specific things which are the purpose and context of philosophy. This being a subreddit dedicated to philosophy, I find it interesting, but not really unusual, that you are here while also denying you are interested in such matters.
Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.
TiredPanda69 t1_irn4fpf wrote
Im tired of the "quantum physics" posts on this sub
Its all just idealists or non materialists trying to force their world view
TMax01 t1_irn8iaa wrote
You think this is bad, you should check out r/consciousness. Even disregarding the admitted panpsychists, every discussion highlights and then centers around the "quantum eraser experiment", it seems. But it isn't surprising, since QM and the hard problem are the most vexing issues related to philosophy these days, so it (they, and their potential alignment/conflict) is what people want to talk about. Philosophy is all about explaining and professing world views. And I do believe I prefer the quantum physics posts to the more mundane but equally pointless rehashing of utilitarian ethics posts. And all that's left is esoteric and arcane plumbing of the depths of analytic logical positivism. 😉
sjwebb2207 t1_irst2aw wrote
Specifically idealists, I feel like there’s a whole cult of them on reddit lol
thebeautifulseason t1_irk31d0 wrote
This is something I struggle with, and I hope you can help me understand. In very basic lay terms, my question is if anything exists outside of myself. If I cannot perceive a thing, how can I know with certainty it exists? However, that I can even imagine that scenario must mean that other things do exist outside of myself, otherwise how would I develop the concept of comparison/separation of my perception and stuff that I cannot perceive? But…is that verifiable? Does something have to be verifiable to be true? Not sure if these questions make sense…
TMax01 t1_irkc22a wrote
This is an issue everyone struggles with. If they do not, then clearly they are not trying hard enough.
>If I cannot perceive a thing, how can I know with certainty it exists?
Can you recognize how this relates to Einstein's comment about the moon? Are you saying that something does not exist unless you percieve it? More importantly how can you know with certainty that a thing exists even if you do perceive it?
My initial comment referenced metaphysical uncertainty (the perpetual inability to know if something exists independent of our observation), but the issue you have brought up regards epistemic uncertainty, whether our descriptions of a thing are accurate. This resolves, in classical philosophy, to the study of what it means to know. In my philosophy, we go further, and recognize epistemology as the study of meaning, with the meaning of the word "know" being merely a special and essential instance. Long story short, your question hinges on whether you (we) can know anything "with certainty".
To be direct, the answer is this: there is only one thing you (we) can know with certainty. How that one thing is expressed can vary. The Socratic approach is to say the only thing you can be certain of is that you cannot be certain of anything. The Cartesian approach, which I prefer, is cogito ergo sum: you can be certain you exist (without any additional characterization of that existence being implied), but everything after that is supposition and conjecture. In practical terms, we must ignore this necessary uncertainty (both metaphysic and epistemic) and make due with reasonable degrees of certainty, but the nature of philosophy is that it cannot be restricted to practical value.
Nevertheless, all we really need to do, all we can do, either philosophically or practically, is recognize that, although everything beyond that one thing is uncertain, that does not mean everything else is equally uncertain. So rather than spend all of our time "navel-gazing" and wondering what is certain, we instead consider how certain we are about specific and particular things, rather than the abstract general category "something".
As long as we do not confabulate metaphysical (existential) uncertainty and epistemic (intellectual) uncertainty, we can, in truth, leverage the absolute nature of our certainty about that one thing in order to examine and explore the various degrees of certainty which we need in order to understand the world and determine our conjectures with productive accuracy. When epistemic uncertainty prevents us from proceeding, because what we believe about a thing relates to how we experience it, we can rely on metaphysical certainty (something exists, and existence must mean objective physical existence) to ascertain what aspects of it are not related to our experience of it. When metaphysical uncertainty prevents us from proceeding, because we can only be aware of even the most objective things through our 'subjective' perceptions, we can rely on epistemic certainty by defining things quantitatively rather than experentially. By using this "latching bootstrap" mechanism, we can elevate our knowledge from the deeply profound uncertainty (brain in a jar, butterfly dream, insane absurdity) to the scientific certainty and emotional sincerity that enables us to be conscious, self-determining human beings. It has always been so, this methodology is not a recent development; it is simply the process of reasoning which humans have relied on since the moment we stopped being merely apes. It is just that recently, thanks to the double whammy of metaphysical knowledge of consciousness (as derived from the physical existence of our brains rather than supernatural entities) from Darwin's discovery of natural selection which opened the postmodern age and the epistemic knowledge of quantum mechanics (and the fact that even the most deterministic aspects of physical existence derive from probabilistic causation) which this conversation is focused on, conscious and conscientous examination of the process of knowing and reasoning and being have become common, and fodder for existential angst, rather than just what our brains and minds do innately without thinking about the thinking we think we're doing.
>Does something have to be verifiable to be true? Not sure if these questions make sense…
I understood them and consider them deep and profound. Whether that means they make sense is a whole other thing. 😉
No, something does not have to be verifiable to be true. But, if you are reasonable and intelligent and wish to be well-informed, a thing has to be verifiable for you to be certain it is true. This relates to your epistemic knowledge of its truth, not the metaphysical fact of its truth. This leaves open the question of just what sort of verification you are looking for and hoping to find. Just because epistemic and metaphysical uncertainty are unavoidable does not mean they should not both be minimized. But (if I can be forgiven for bringing the conversation back full circle to the matter of quantum uncertainty) it seems likely that they cannot both be minimalized simultaneously. In a very real way, being both metaphysically and epistemically certain of whether something is true is like measuring both the location and momentum of a quantum particle to an arbitrary level of accuracy. The principle of uncertainty in physics cannot be ignored simply because it is inconvenient or difficult to grasp, and the analogy to philosophical certainty seems almost too on-the-nose, but I don't believe it should be lightly dismissed based on that circumstance.
Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.
liquiddandruff t1_irm61j9 wrote
The analogy of metaphysical vs epistemic certainty to the Heisenberg uncertainty principle is a woah dude moment. I'll be chewing on this for a while.
Thanks for your contributions to this thread, they were all so illuminating!
thebeautifulseason t1_irnrfdw wrote
Yes! Thank you! And I’m glad you touched on what I sorta naively think of as “so what” or “what would knowing the answer change for you?” And moving beyond or setting that aside that has its own value. The book I’m listening to brought this home in a roundabout way, and makes me wonder about “genius,” about how it is not some magical quality but a combination of being able to hold onto the thread while moving around the “so what” questions with, hmm, how to put it…intuition within reason? Reason expanded with intuition? Anyway, I’m incredibly appreciative of the time you put into your response, and you can be sure I’ll be coming back to it later when my poor brain has cooled down.
TMax01 t1_irnw30y wrote
>sorta naively think of as “so what” or “what would knowing the answer change for you?”
I can appreciate the "hot take", but it is, indeed, naive. My questions certainly had a similar dispositive character to what you could naturally presume to be dismissive argumentation, but they were sincere and exploratory, not merely rhetorical.
>Reason expanded with intuition?
In my view, which is thoroughly unconventional, intuition and reason are much more closely related than reason and logic, the conventional view that I believe you and that book said about 'genius' are both starting from.
Happy to help, hope to hear more from you.
sticklebat t1_irkdp2b wrote
You’re talking about solipsism. It cannot be disproved, even in principle. However, it is typically presumed implicitly false in any conversation about reality, because otherwise there’s no point in the discussion.
TMax01 t1_irmnnpe wrote
The idea thebeatifulseason identified generalizes to solipsism, but not all metaphysical uncertainty goes that far. Ultimately, solipsism itself is merely an instance of a broader category of unfalsifiable theories concerning consciousness. Other examples include simulation theory/brain in a jar, theism, panpsychism, and Last Thursdayism. They are not presumed implicitly false epistemically, although they are typically not worth discussing ontologically. However, this leaves the area of theology, which is to say morality or ethics, not merely theism, the existence and characteristics of God.
In science, an unfalsifiable theory is one that is logically incoherent or unnecessary, to the point it cannot be falsified empirically; it is "not even wrong". (A phrase which means "not even true enough to be incorrect", supposedly a remark made by Richard Feynman when presented with a naive and unfalsifiable hypothesis.) But philosophy is not science, and must confront rather than dismiss theories that cannot be disproven even in principle. In a very important respect science is a part of philosophy: science is all the easy parts of philosophy, the questions that can, in principle, be answered empirically, physics, while philosophy is everything left over, metaphysics.
Nenor t1_irlvgwa wrote
They do, and a lot of great philosophers have thought about it. Descartes famously said "I think, therefore I am" and his work is dedicated on constructing a rational explanation of how reality works by abandoning even the most basic assumptions that philosophers before him took for granted. That quote basically says that the only thing we can be certain of is that since we are thinking, then we must exist, as we are doing that thinking.
Another weird philosophy branch in that area is called solipsism, which makes the unprovable (but also undisprovable) claim that everything we perceive is just our imagination, our brains playing illusions on us. Clearly the brain interprets the world by electrochemical stimulation coming from our senses. So if it were possible to send a brain in a jar the same signals your brain is currently receiving, then the brain in a jar would basically be perceiving the same "reality" you currently are, rather than its own (sitting in that jar).
If you really want to go down that hole, you should also check out the concept of Boltzmann brains.
thebeautifulseason t1_irnsav9 wrote
Someone else mentioned solipsism above, so thank you for giving me another avenue to research. Gotta say, I am so grateful that this sub responded to my questions with patience and respect <3
Devout--Atheist t1_irko850 wrote
You can't. Everyone has to accept certain axioms to discuss reality, if you accept that reality exists.
DBeumont t1_irk3hbs wrote
Another giant, glaring issue is that: quantum physics describes the behavior of particles on an atomic and sub-atomic scale. It has nothing to do with the complex macro structures we know as "reality."
sticklebat t1_irke98l wrote
That’s not true at all. Quantum mechanics describes macro structures through its descriptions of the things that make up those macro structures. It’s just impractical to use quantum mechanics to describe the macroscopic world, because classical physics is easier and in the vast majority of circumstances more than good enough.
In fact, we have constructed macroscopic quantum systems (like the mirrors used in LIGO, for example). There are also many macroscopic phenomena that we only understand through quantum mechanics, like why metals tend to be reflective or lustrous.
DBeumont t1_irkek2m wrote
It is still only a behavior of the quantum particles. The point is that it has nothing to do with all the metaphysical stuff ascribed to it.
sticklebat t1_irktrbx wrote
I’m not sure what you mean by that. What is “it”?
DBeumont t1_irkz6n7 wrote
"It" being quantum physics.
sticklebat t1_irl0aca wrote
Then that doesn’t make any sense… Macroscopic phenomena are explained and underpinned by quantum mechanics. Whatever metaphysics surrounds quantum mechanics also necessarily applies to macroscopic phenomena. That it’s not usually noticeable is another matter.
DBeumont t1_irl0x7u wrote
No. A person, a rock, a chunk of dirt, etc. do not hold superpositions, do not entangle states, or any other quantum phenomenon. Quantum physics only describes the behavior of atomic and sub-atomic particles at an atomic and sub-atomic scale.
>Quantum mechanics is a fundamental theory in physics that provides a description of the physical properties of nature at the scale of atoms and subatomic particles.[2]: 1.1 It is the foundation of all quantum physics including quantum chemistry, quantum field theory, quantum technology, and quantum information science.
sticklebat t1_irl3do1 wrote
Please point to the part of that article that you think supports your claim. Yes, it provides a description of the physical properties of nature at the scale of atoms and subatomic particles, and those things make up macroscopic systems. You can recover all of Newtonian mechanics from quantum mechanics.
The properties of a rock are determined by the properties of the things that makes up the rock, and how they interact with each other, and all of those are quantum mechanical. Macroscopic systems can absolutely demonstrate quantum mechanical behavior. I even gave you an explicit example already. A macroscopic system would be represented in quantum mechanics by a very high dimensional density matrix, but a density matrix nonetheless, no different in principle from the density matrix representing a pair of entangled electrons.
Smooth_Notice8504 t1_irms24e wrote
I think the misunderstanding on DBeumont's part here is that he's taking the idea of decoherence in macroscopic objects to mean that they aren't governed fundamentally by QM when it just means we don't tend to see that kind of behaviour on our scale.
There have been experiments done with high numbers of coherent particles showing that it is a matter of maintaining the conditions to allow for coherence rather then some inherent exclusivity in macroscopic objects or that they are somehow exempt from the predictions of the theory, as you say, you can derive classical physics from QM.
TMax01 t1_irmqptv wrote
>You can recover all of Newtonian mechanics from quantum mechanics.
I think it is fair to say this is true in principle, but in real terms you are overstating the case, and expressing a profession of faith rather than fact. In general I definitely support your side of the argument, but at this point you seem to be missing the nature of the counter-argument in order to "be right". We know that classic physics relates to, for instance, the collapse of superpositions and entanglement through decoherence into classically deterministic states, yes, but not really how or why. That's just putting words to mathematically described aspects of quantum systems. It doesn't really mean we actually can derive classic physics from QM, explicitly, just that we assume it must be possible theoretically. Your profession of faith in physical realism is scientifically appropriate, but philosophically it is akin to a declaration of omniscience.
sticklebat t1_irn0p1k wrote
> I think it is fair to say this is true in principle, but in real terms you are overstating the case
No, not really. What do you think condensed matter physics is, if not the application of quantum mechanics to macroscopic systems? What I said is both true in principle and proven in reality, even if it’s often too difficult to do.
> We know that classic physics relates to, for instance, the collapse of superpositions and entanglement through decoherence into classically deterministic states, yes, but not really how or why.
That’s fine. Scientific models aren’t concerned with how or why. It’s pretty easy to prove that the mathematical model that we call quantum mechanics reduces to classical mechanics in the appropriate limits of energy and scale based solely on the fundamental principles of quantum mechanics. In fact, mathematically the only distinction between the two arises entirely from the fact that in classical mechanics [x,p] = 0 and in quantum mechanics [x,p] = ihbar.
You’re right that we don’t fully understand the mechanisms by which macroscopic systems lose coherence. But that doesn’t mean we don’t know that, regardless of those details, quantum mechanical behavior necessarily reduces to classical mechanics in appropriate macroscopic limits. We also know that macroscopic systems are represented in our models of quantum mechanics by the same sorts of density matrices as everything else is. Of course, this is all predicated on the assumption that quantum mechanics is an accurate model, which there’s some small chance it isn’t, but this conversation is meaningless outside of that assumption.
> It doesn't really mean we actually can derive classic physics from QM, explicitly, just that we assume it must be possible theoretically.
No, you’re wrong. We cannot derive the stress tensor for a chair when I’m sat on it using quantum mechanics (which we could do using classical mechanics) because it’s simply much too complex a feat. But the neat thing about physics and math is that we can often prove things to be true in general more easily that we can actually do something for a specific, complicated case, but that first proof nonetheless implies that a determined and resourceful enough entity could do the latter, too. This is one such case, where mathematical proofs of the correspondence principle between quantum mechanics and classical mechanics exist. See, for example, the Ehrenfest Theorem. A different alternative is to take the limit as the ratio of hbar to a relevant scale factor (multiple choices could be made here) approaches zero, and then quantum mechanics and classical mechanics become mathematically identical models.
> Your profession of faith in physical realism is scientifically appropriate, but philosophically it is akin to a declaration of omniscience.
My comment has nothing to do with physical realism. My comment is entirely based purely on the mathematical properties of quantum and classical mechanics.
TMax01 t1_irnihwe wrote
>What do you think condensed matter physics is, if not the application of quantum mechanics to macroscopic systems?
The term "systems" seems a bit of over-reach, in line with your original premise. It may be common for people to assume that quantum mechanics is intrinsically limited to sub-atomic systems, but that isn't important. What is important, for the purposes of this discussion, is that condensed matter physics is a specific sub-domain of physics, rather than all of physics itself, which exemplifies the fact that QM doesn't literally explain how or why classic physics ("Newtonian physics" was the iconic representative) arises from the principles of QM. In theory we "know" it must, but as it has not yet been convincingly demonstrated in general cases, insisting that conjecture is fact is problematic. At least as far as philosophy goes, which is not restricted to even presuming that classic physics accurately describes "the macroscopic world".
>Scientific models aren’t concerned with how or why.
I would dispute half of that. Scientific models are entirely about how, and necessarily unconcerned with why. But the nature of language (capable of absurdity as functional, which logic and mathematical systems are not) makes the distinction itself less certain than scientists and scientificists are capable of addressing.
>In fact, mathematically the only distinction between the two arises entirely from the fact that in classical mechanics [x,p] = 0 and in quantum mechanics [x,p] = ihbar.
I would say that the notation arises from the distinction rather than the other way around. But the direction of the teleology itself is a philosophical matter, not a scientific consideration, because as I said, science is all about how, not about why.
>You’re right that we don’t fully understand the mechanisms by which macroscopic systems lose coherence
Bingo.
>But that doesn’t mean we don’t know that, regardless of those details, quantum mechanical behavior necessarily reduces to classical mechanics in appropriate macroscopic limits
Actually, it genuinely does mean exactly that. While it is not a possibility that science needs to deal with at the moment (though I might wonder why 0 is not the same as ihbar) it is one that must be considered philosophically, lest we assume that science is omniscient by definition.
But of course, and I may be mistaken about this and please enlighten me about your reasoning if I am, I presume you meant classic physics reduce to QM, rather than the other way around, which is what you actually typed. I think the idea that quantum behavior necessarily reduces to Newtonian mechanics is absurd, isn't it?
>We cannot derive the stress tensor for a chair when I’m sat on it using quantum mechanics (which we could do using classical mechanics) because it’s simply much too complex a feat.
I don't mean to sound flippant, but that is an awfully convenient excuse. Which is to say that since you cannot demonstrate that you can perform such a feat, it remains conjecture rather than knowledge, faith rather than fact, a valid supposition but not a foregone conclusion, that it actually can be done.
> But the neat thing about physics and math is that we can often prove things to be true in general more easily that we can actually do something for a specific, complicated case,
And the unfortunate reality about logic (physics and math) is that we can often make presumptuous assumptions without demonstrating their validity in practical cases. "Often", after all, does not mean 'always', and whether the instant case is such an example requires empirical demonstration or else it is simply not convincing, all the more so because of the specifically confounding results that differentiates QM from classic physics.
>This is one such case, where mathematical proofs of the correspondence principle between quantum mechanics and classical mechanics exist.
As I've said all along, your conjecture is true in principle and theoretically. And also as I pointed out, it remains an act of faith to suppose that means it is true in reality.
>My comment has nothing to do with physical realism
Then it, quite arguably, has nothing to do with the discussion, in a way very analogous (or perhaps entirely identical) to whether QM "has nothing to do with" actual reality, but only mathematically models particular systems in scientific laboratories. I don't fault or question your principles, and I realize that discoveries founded on quantum mechanics have provided real results in terms of useful engineering results. But I still insist you are overstating the case of their applicability, since functional utility in restricted examples does not actually prove general accuracy in all instances, even with further theoretical bases to support the belief that QM fully explains why Newtonian physics arises from quantum interactions.
Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.
sticklebat t1_iroq2uv wrote
Your entire post uses ignorance of physics as a bludgeon.
> The term "systems" seems a bit of over-reach, in line with your original premise.
No, it is precisely the right word. Which you’d know if you knew enough about physics to have this conversation.
> What is important, for the purposes of this discussion, is that condensed matter physics is a specific sub-domain of physics, rather than all of physics itself,
None of this makes sense. Condensed matter physics is an application of quantum mechanics used to model properties of macroscopic systems. I used it as an example of how macroscopic things absolutely do demonstrate quantum mechanical properties, and gave examples of macroscopic phenomena that we can only explain in terms of quantum mechanics. I never said that it is “all of physics,” but that’s a nice strawman.
> which exemplifies the fact that QM doesn't literally explain how or why classic physics ("Newtonian physics" was the iconic representative) arises from the principles of QM. In theory we "know" it must, but as it has not yet been convincingly demonstrated in general cases, insisting that conjecture is fact is problematic.
I even gave you a link to a general proof of the correspondence principle and described an approach for an alternative proof, and it’s telling that you didn’t even respond to that at all, and instead built a strawman to argue against instead. Neither of those are conjecture, they are proofs. Your ignorance of them doesn’t mean they don’t exist. You should stop arguing about things you don’t know. You may be the best philosopher in the universe, but you can’t do philosophy about topics you don’t understand, let alone those that you aren’t even aware of.
> I would dispute half of that. Scientific models are entirely about how, and necessarily unconcerned with why.
Semantics. Science is about constructing models that reflect reality insofar as we can measure it. A scientific model is good if it is consistent with existing data and accurately predicts the results of future experiments. For example, quantum mechanics doesn’t address how things happen, only what will happen. GR does the same, although in both cases we use words that ascribe some sense of “how,” but it’s more to help us talk about and understand the math, than intrinsic to the model. For example, we often say that mass curves spacetime, and that’s what gravity is, but it’s possible to reframe GR in terms that have nothing to do with spacetime curvature. e.g. it can equivalently be thought of as arising from torsion instead of curvature, or even as a field on a standard spacetime background; all of these are probably mathematically equivalent and no experiment can ever, even in principle, distinguish between them. This nearly identical to the issue of interpretations in QM, it just gets less attention for a variety of reasons.
> I would say that the notation arises from the distinction rather than the other way around.
I’m not talking about notation, I’m talking about the meaning behind the notation (which I suspect you probably don’t know). Either way, you’re missing the point. The point is that in circumstances when hbar is small compared to the relevant scale factors of a system, quantum mechanics turns into classical mechanics. In that sense, classical mechanics is embedded in quantum mechanics.
> But of course, and I may be mistaken about this and please enlighten me about your reasoning if I am, I presume you meant classic physics reduce to QM, rather than the other way around, which is what you actually typed. I think the idea that quantum behavior necessarily reduces to Newtonian mechanics is absurd, isn't it?
No, I meant what I said. In the macroscopic limit, quantum mechanics reduces to classical mechanics. Just like GR reduces to classical mechanics in the limit of low masses and small scales. This is an important aspect of the development of scientific models, it is what the word “reduce” means in this context. It means that quantum mechanics is a more encompassing model, and by taking the appropriate limit you can reduce it to recover classical mechanics.
> I don't mean to sound flippant, but that is an awfully convenient excuse. Which is to say that since you cannot demonstrate that you can perform such a feat, it remains conjecture rather than knowledge, faith rather than fact, a valid supposition but not a foregone conclusion, that it actually can be done.
It’s not an excuse. In a Newtonian world, Newtonian mechanics could be used to deterministically predict the precise time evolution of a gaseous system given accurate and precise initial conditions, regardless of the number of gas particles. It is wildly impractical to do that for anything above a small number of particles, but that doesn’t make it conjecture. And again, I’ve already proved your second sentence wrong. You just chose not to even acknowledge it.
> "Often", after all, does not mean 'always', and whether the instant case is such an example requires empirical demonstration or else it is simply not convincing, all the more so because of the specifically confounding results that differentiates QM from classic physics.
Again, I literally gave you the proof. You’re not even just using ignorance as a weapon here, you’re using willful ignorance. QM has been unambiguously and explicitly proven to reduce to classical mechanics in the macroscopic limit. Hard stop.
> And also as I pointed out, it remains an act of faith to suppose that means it is true in reality.
And again, it’s been proven true in reality. The model of QM reduces to the model CM in the macroscopic limit. You can argue all you want against that, but you’d be wrong. The only place “faith” shows up is in the assumption that QM accurately models reality, but I’m not arguing whether it’s correct or not (and also that is always the case for every scientific model that ever has and ever will be constructed, making it a pedantic argument in the first place). The fact that QM reduces to CM is mathematical fact, regardless of the applicability of either model to the real world.
> Then it, quite arguably, has nothing to do with the discussion, in a way very analogous (or perhaps entirely identical) to whether QM "has nothing to do with" actual reality, but only mathematically models particular systems in scientific laboratories.
No, the other person made false claims about the limits of applicability of quantum mechanical systems. They weren’t arguing that we can’t know whether QM is actually, truly correct. They were clearly under the wrong impression that QM, even if true, doesn’t apply at macroscopic scales. That is what I argued against. You are merely creating strawmen.
> But I still insist you are overstating the case of their applicability, since functional utility in restricted examples does not actually prove general accuracy in all instances, even with further theoretical bases to support the belief that QM fully explains why Newtonian physics arises from quantum interactions.
Except I’ve given explicit examples of ways that QM empirically is relevant in macroscopic systems. But as usual, you simply don’t engage with the parts of my arguments that you don’t know how to address and pretend they never happened.
TMax01 t1_irouiml wrote
>Your entire post uses ignorance of physics as a bludgeon.
Nah. It is an effort to explain to people who understand physics but little else why other peope, who don't understand physics, understand more than they do.
>No, it is precisely the right word. Which you’d know if you knew enough about physics to have this conversation.
You're mistaking what is conventional within physics for what is meaningful in real life. "System" is the wrong word for a single substance, even one so profoundly important to physicists as Bose-Einstein condensates.
>Condensed matter physics is an application of quantum mechanics used to model properties of macroscopic systems.
It is used to model one very specific and particular (pun intended) kind of quantum system, which is really important because that specific "condensed matter" is a macroscopic substance, unlike most quantum systems, which are sub-atomic, so small that even using the contrast macro/microscopic is actually weird.
>I used it as an example of how macroscopic things absolutely do demonstrate quantum mechanical properties,
Nobody disputes that deterministic objects "demonstrate quantum mechanical properties"; as far as I know, they do so simply by existing. The issue being address here is how, and whether that is known with enough detail and accuracy in a wide enough variety of instances to be considered important outside of the singular domain of physics. Most directly observable ("macroscopic") systems don't demonstrate quantum mechanical properties over and above classical mechanical properties. So the use of one example of a "macroscopic thing" demonstrating quantum properties (which, as far as I know, aren't observable as distinct from conventional properties in BEC without special equipment and in highly restricted circumstances) really doesn't have the weight you think it would, in this discussion.
> I never said that it is “all of physics,” but that’s a nice strawman.
Not a strawman, just an example of what it would take to justify saying that QM effects "the macro world" of everyday objects.
>Semantics
AKA language. AKA discussion. AKA the real world.
>I’m not talking about notation,
Semantics.
>The point is that in circumstances when hbar is small compared to the relevant scale factors of a system, quantum mechanics turns into classical mechanics.
A very important issue, in theory. Why is it that you have trouble excepting that proving something in principle to other scientists isn't the same as having an effect on the rest of the world?
>Except I’ve given explicit examples of ways that QM empirically is relevant in macroscopic systems
"Relevant". What a pleasantly useful dragging of the goalposts halfway down the field that is.
I never disputed that QM is relevant in those examples. But despite that, the relevance of those examples is less than you are insisting. At least to the person who made the comment, which we both disagreed with. I just did a better job of it, and I thought I'd be helpful and explain what it is you were doing wrong in that regard.
>But as usual, you simply don’t engage with the parts of my arguments that you don’t know how to address and pretend they never happened.
You have it backwards. The parts I don't engage are either trivial or accurate. The sections of your comments I directly address are mostly just the more illustrative mistakes in your reasoning.
sticklebat t1_irpaayk wrote
> Nah. It is an effort to explain to people who understand physics but little else why other peope, who don't understand physics, understand more than they do.
Except you can’t do that effectively if you don’t understand physics in the first place.
> You're mistaking what is conventional within physics for what is meaningful in real life. "System" is the wrong word for a single substance, even one so profoundly important to physicists as Bose-Einstein condensates.
What? No. A system is any portion of the universe chosen to be analyzed. Anything outside the system is considered an environment, and it is ignored except for its effects on the system. System is a perfectly valid word to mean what I intended to mean, and it absolutely can refer to a “single substance.” What even does that mean? If I want to know why a metal is lustrous I can’t treat it as a single thing. Its luster arises from quantum mechanical effects arising from its atomic scale structure and properties.
> It is used to model one very specific and particular (pun intended) kind of quantum system, which is really important because that specific "condensed matter" is a macroscopic substance, unlike most quantum systems, which are sub-atomic, so small that even using the contrast macro/microscopic is actually weird.
Condensed matter doesn’t apply only to one specific kind of system. It applies to a huge range of systems. It is in fact so broad that it’s the single largest sub field within physics, and has significant overlap with other disciplines. Things as mundane as metallic surfaces, salt crystals and as exotic as superconductivity, BECs, and liquid helium fall under the umbrella of condensed matter, as do most phase transitions.
And again, you’re missing the point. I gave it as an example. I also gave other examples, too. Over the years, quantum coherence has been observed in bigger and bigger systems, from large particles all the way to the 40 kg mirrors used in the LIGO experiment, each of which was placed near its quantum mechanical ground state.
> Nobody disputes that deterministic objects "demonstrate quantum mechanical properties"
Are you really that dense? Nobody except for the person I was talking to before you jumped into the conversation. I literally made my arguments to a person disputing what you’re saying no one disputes. It seems like you’re just being contrarian at this point.
> So the use of one example of a "macroscopic thing" demonstrating quantum properties (which, as far as I know, aren't observable as distinct from conventional properties in BEC without special equipment and in highly restricted circumstances) really doesn't have the weight you think it would, in this discussion.
That might be the case if it’s what I did. But it’s not. And you’d know that if you weren’t basing your responses to me based on brief skims of relevant Wikipedia articles about condensed matter, for example. Once again you’re outing yourself here. You not only don’t understand the physics, you don’t even know what entire fields within physics refer to. There’s a reason why I said “condensed matter” and not “BECs.” That’s like confusing “Newtonian mechanics” for “the mechanics governing how balls roll.”
> Not a strawman, just an example of what it would take to justify saying that QM effects "the macro world" of everyday objects.
No, very much a strawman. We haven’t proved that Newtonian mechanics works for every conceivable macroscopic system, either. Nor can we do ever prove such a thing: science relies on induction, and while we can’t prove the validity of inductive logic in science, if that’s the point you’re making then it applies to every iota of scientific understanding ever, not just to QM.
> AKA language. AKA discussion. AKA the real world.
And here you’re using language to deliberately misrepresenting my meaning. My point was, whether it’s about “how” or not is a matter of semantics, it just depends on what we each meant by “how,” which can be interpreted different ways. But it’s telling that instead of engaging with my lengthy argument after that word, you’ve latched onto this one word to make a pithy point with little bearing on the argument at hand, instead.
> A very important issue, in theory. Why is it that you have trouble excepting that proving something in principle to other scientists isn't the same as having an effect on the rest of the world?
How many times must we complete this circle? I show you that it’s been proven in principle, and you say “okay but prove that it has an effect on the world.” So I give you countless examples of ways that it has an effect on the world. And then you ignore all but one and say “but prove that it’s always true.” Do you truly think you’re being reasonable here?
> "Relevant". What a pleasantly useful dragging of the goalposts halfway down the field that is.
Please explain how that word shifted any goalposts.
> I never disputed that QM is relevant in those examples.
So wtf are you on about? The other person did and they’re who I was talking to. You jumped into a conversation between two people to have your own side argument with the wind?
> I just did a better job of it, and I thought I'd be helpful and explain what it is you were doing wrong in that regard.
Of course you think you’ve done a better job. You also think you’re more qualified to talk about quantum mechanics than Bohr and Einstein were, and that your personal philosophy makes you immune to falling for misconceptions. You have a very high opinion of yourself; of that much I’m sure we can agree.
> You have it backwards. The parts I don't engage are either trivial or accurate. The sections of your comments I directly address are mostly just the more illustrative mistak
No, you consistently ignore important points that derail your entire argument. If they’re accurate, you’d have gone away already. If you view them as trivial, then you clearly don’t understand them.
TL;DR Stick to arguing about things you understand. You don’t understand quantum mechanics.
TMax01 t1_irkcf38 wrote
Well, I think you're overstating the case. Exactly what QM has to do with the deterministic objective universe most people believe is identified by the word "reality" is an open debate, but it seems definite that it isn't "nothing".
DBeumont t1_irkdimq wrote
No. Things on that small of a scale behave differently, that's why they had to come up with quantum physics to describe it.
TMax01 t1_irkgqy5 wrote
Yes, of course, certainly. Now all you have to do is explain why, and how the size of the scale causes this profound difference in behavior, and your initial conjecture that quantum physics "has nothing to do" with the universe that arises from those quantum physics will be something more than stomping your foot and crying "no"!
Smooth_Notice8504 t1_irmv5de wrote
This is a common misunderstanding. Quantum physics isn't strictly about small things. It's about systems with a low number of degrees of freedom. Experiments have been done with "macroscopic" (thousands of particles) systems; in controlled conditions the system can be made to exhibit quantum behaviour despite not being what one would traditionally call quantum.
Devout--Atheist t1_irkgoss wrote
This is absolutely not true, case in point, quantum computers. They use qubits that exist in superpositional states, instead of binary 0 or 1 bits.
TMax01 t1_irms8wy wrote
I'm uncertain if I am more delighted or bemused by the need to try to reign in both sides of this debate that has followed from my comment. The existence of quantum computers would be a lot more coherent (pun intended) of an argument for the idea that extracting the deterministic world of physical objects conforming to classic physics from the principles of quantum mechanics is a 'done deal' if quantum computers were mundane appliances. But the truth is that real-world quantum computers are effectively gigantic super-expensive science experiments, not consumer goods, so the difficulty of wrestling practical power from superpositions, even in the abstract case of computational calculations, seems to support the "QM doesn't describe reality" side of the discussion more than the "QM does describe reality" side, if I can be forgiven for trying to simplify the conflict in that way.
Devout--Atheist t1_irntsus wrote
> support the "QM doesn't describe reality" side of the discussion more than the "QM does describe reality" side, if I can be forgiven for trying to simplify the conflict in that way.
Sure, if you describe "reality" as what humans are capable of perceiving, then it's hard to argue QM applies. If you hold the position that reality isn't simply what we can perceive but what we can empirically measure, then of course QM applies.
My quibble with the parent comment was their assertion that
>It has nothing to do with the complex macro structures we know as "reality."
Emphasis added.
A computer is undeniably a macro structure. A computer manipulating the rules of quantum mechanics must have something to do with our macro "reality", even if it is rather inconsequential at this time.
TMax01 t1_iro0c7c wrote
>Sure, if you describe "reality" as what humans are capable of perceiving,
I describe "reality" as what humans do percieve, and consider only humans to be capable of perceiving. But I don't limit perception by excluding what we can empirically measure from it. To believe that QM is different from classic physics because it requires more precise measurements to identify it's principles is just like believing that QM is a matter of size rather than scope.
>A computer is undeniably a macro structure.
I accept that challenge. A computing appliance (a generally programmable calculating device) is a macro structure. But the computer which it enmatters is not. It is a system, but it would be the same system if it were implemented with any other structure, regardless of the size. In a very real way, all computers are "quantum devices", because a binary digit is a quantum of information/data, and also because somehow (we know not how!) the electrical mechanisms we use to execute the computer are themselves quantum effects, more so than the physical object is. But of course, the current craze concerning 'equipment which utilizes superpositions for computation' makes that identification of a data processing appliance as "a quantum computer" confusing.
>A computer manipulating the rules of quantum mechanics must have something to do with our macro "reality", even if it is rather inconsequential at this time
It really doesn't, although admittedly the mind boggles at trying to imagine a computing mechanism which does not require deterministic ("macro") components. But your analogy furthers my position, because neither the mathematical manipulations (translations, in mathematical terms) nor the rules of quantum mechanics are bounded by "our" reality, although they are objective so there is a parallel.
In case you didn't notice, I quibbled with the same comment (a reply to my previous comment) that you did. I am not opposed to your conjecture about the necessary relationship between QM theory and the more directly observable universe of objects. I was just picking at a particularly troublesome part of the reasoning you apparently based that conjecture on.
Sorry to have bothered you. Carry on. 😉
Devout--Atheist t1_iro4qhe wrote
Well now you just seem to want to redefine "computer" as a piece of an emergent "computing system", but you've failed to clearly do so. At what part does this distinction occur? Can we include the motherboard? Is your arbitrary definition confined to only the computer's processor? Can we include the processor's BIOS, or are we also excluding any assembly code that is essential to the processor's function? Do we need to go to individual logic gates of the processor to reach your definition of "computer"?
Until you clearly define the physical parts of the commonly held definition of computer that fit your esoteric definition, forgive me for dismissing yours as nonsense.
TMax01 t1_iropdyr wrote
>Well now you just seem to want to redefine "computer" as a piece of an emergent "computing system",
Not a piece, a purpose. The computer is the logic behind the hardware, not the hardware.
> At what part does this distinction occur?
Distinctions occur when they are made. You can refuse to make the distinction; obviously enough, it was mentioned only to illustrate a point. But regardless of whether it is a common usage of the term, it is easy to grasp (metaphorically, though as impossible to physically grasp as any metaphor) if you try even a little bit to understand the point. It isn't even all that novel. There was a time when "computer" was a career choice, not equipment. The computer is not the appliance, but the function. It may require a process, but it is holistic; the (abstract) computer missing any "part" of the process is no longer a computer at all. In contrast, the appliance without a given chip or a hard drive is still a "computer" in the conventional sense, just not a functioning one.
>Until you clearly define the physical parts of the commonly held definition of compute
LOL. Until you come to grips with the point I was making, that the hardware (or even software) isn't the issue, the computation is, you'll continue to be mystified by the fact that anything that computes is a computer, and it is not necessary for it to be the "macro" device you are thinking of when you use the term, and you'll be unable to recognize the significance of your error when it comes to the relationship between QM and deterministic objects. It is easy to assume and believe that our current QM models are sufficient for explaining how and why deterministic objects we directly interact with emerge from the quantum mechanics we've already discovered, and nothing more, just as it is easy to assume the word "computer" only refers to the electronic appliances you are familiar with. But until you do explain how and why the "macro world" emerges from quantum interactions, in each and every detail and every possible instance, you're just testifying to your faith, not reporting a fact. I can't dismiss your assumption that Newtonian (and relativistic) mechanics would certainly emerge from what we already know about quantum interactions as nonsense, because it is not nonsense. It's just arrogance and ignorance. It might not even be an inaccurate belief, but it is still wrong simply because it is a belief rather than actual knowledge.
Let me close by summarizing the distinction between my reasoning and yours, in terms of the quibbles we have with the original comment we've both separately addressed by disagreeing with it:
>>It has nothing to do with the complex macro structures we know as "reality."
Here's your quibble, as you've attested, indicated by emphasis:
>It has nothing to do with the complex macro structures we know as "reality."
I said you overstated your case in your quibbling, and I hope you'll take the trouble to review the thread to see why I said it, and how it was a reasonable criticism. I think it is more important than you realize. In contrast, here's my quibble, again indicated by emphasis, which I also hope will be self-explanatory in making a less overblown and thus stronger case against the original comment:
>It has nothing to do with the complex macro structures we know as "reality."
Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.
DBeumont t1_irkhgqh wrote
They use sub-atomic particles that exist in superpositions and quantum computing operates on the probability they will arrive in certain states.
Devout--Atheist t1_irkhvpf wrote
And how do these physical, very real, computers have
>nothing to do with the complex macro structures we know as "reality."
?
DBeumont t1_irkpt6t wrote
The effects that quantum physics describes only occur at an atomic and sub-atomic scale. Superpositions, entanglement, these things only happen at a quantum scale. Your body does not hold a superposition. Nor does a rock.
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