Submitted by Maxwellsdemon17 t3_xsrx5g in philosophy
I always think it's clever to point out that subjective truths can be treated objectively--it can be a fact that Person A thinks Bansky art is ugly even if it's not generalizable to say that the art is objectively ugly. Just fun to think about--subjective isn't lesser it's just different and harder to work with because it doesn't generalize.
My perspective is that it isn't even different. Everything that is "subjective" objectively occurs, as neurological impulses in our brains that are in every (other) way equivalent to the objective (but non-subjective) things which also cause such impulses. The things (like "ugly") that we consider subjective aren't any less objective, they are simply more complex. Every thought and feeling you have objectively occurs: it isn't whether it corresponds (usefully, logically, or accurately) to some state of affairs outside of your brain that make it "objective".
Your explanation says the same, of course, but is just a "clever" trick based on a bit of misdirection involving the words "fact" and "thinks". I believe it is problematic in that regard, and insufficient. It utilizes a fallacy to suggest that anyone would claim it is not a fact that someone has an opinion about whether something is ugly, and ignores the important question of whether any opinion could possibly have more validity than any other. In that way your 'cleverness' uses postmodern reasoning to promote more postmodern reasoning rather than provide any useful reasoning or understanding.
A tremendous amount of philosophical contention these days occurs because some people want to focus on the fact that everything which is objective is always subjective: we know of it only through our (supposedly not objective) perceptions, while others want to focus on the idea that anything which is subjective is supposedly not objective: our description of something is not true if it is not accurate. And still others (Hoffman, Kastrup, et al) wish to insist that being subjective is a necessary prerequisite for being objective. But this distinction between subjective and objective is a false dichotomy and an assumed conclusion: they are not the mutually exclusive categories modern and postmodern philosophy assumes they are to begin with.
True, I am tragically aware that my so-called clever idea is not anything that will revolutionize philosophy. However, I am glad that it does contest (however trivially or non-usefully) the view that anything subjective is not objective. While trite, pointing out that the thought behind the opinion and the fact that the opinion exists is worth mentioning in my opinion.
I think generalizability is an important aspect when defining objective. We have a collection of facts about how atoms work and thus have significant amounts of statements that we can generalize beyond an individual's point of view.
>it isn't whether it corresponds (usefully, logically, or accurately) to some state of affairs outside of your brain that make it "objective".
But I would argue that the content of the opinion, if aligned with that outside state of affairs, is more likely to align with generalizable truths. In that way, it is what makes it objective. It is a generalizable truth that anyone can say that you have such and such opinion (the opinion objectively occurs), but whether the content of the opinion is objective depends on how much it is true beyond a certain point of view.
And indeed, that does not make for a dichotomy of subjective and objective, since many different aspects of any "fact" can be some gradient of more generalizable or less generalizable.
>pointing out that the thought behind the opinion and the fact that the opinion exists is worth mentioning in my opinion
In many cases, you may be right, but the principle is more argumentative than generalizable. Saying "it is a fact that it is an opinion" might confound people who over-simplify the idea of subjectivity (generally folks who want to use 'subjective' as a dismissive characterization and 'objective' as an insinuation of omniscience) but as I said before, this technique actually amplifies the intellectual basis of the conflict while misrepresenting its cogency.
>But I would argue that the content of the opinion, if aligned with that outside state of affairs, is more likely to align with generalizable truths. In that way, it is what makes it objective.
I feel like you are working hard to declare that the content of an opinion (which is to say, the opinion) is either what determines, or can be determined by, whether it can be considered "objective". I believe this is motivated by a desire to use the term "objective" as a synonym for "right" (not an untoward substitution in all cases, but not an appropriate one in every case.) You're shifting around the dichotomy from 'objective/subjective' to 'fact/opinion' (or "more/less generalizable") in the same "clever" way, and end up being simply a contrarian, chasing your tail and encouraging others to do the same.
>whether the content of the opinion is objective depends on how much it is true beyond a certain point of view.
Not really, no. This approach conflates objective with popular, or risks doing so, and misrepresents what (if anything) distinguishes facts from opinions. In general (not to put too fine a point on it) your perspective (opinion) is a useful enough approximation of the truth for being argumentative in conversation, but not factually accurate enough for a philosophical consideration.
>many different aspects of any "fact" can be some gradient of more generalizable or less generalizable.
The same can be said of any opinion, though.
I apologize if my replies seem like hectoring. I intend no insult. These issues have more significance than just the matter of off-handed comments, and I like to explore them as a test of my philosophical perspective.
>>But I would argue that the content of the opinion, if aligned with that outside state of affairs, is more likely to align with generalizable truths. In that way, it is what makes it objective.
>I feel like you are working hard to declare that the content of an opinion (which is to say, the opinion) is either what determines, or can be determined by, whether it can be considered "objective".
This seems like the opposite of my interpretation of the text.
Since you probably have the same (problematic) notion of what makes something "objective" (confounded by an assumption that whether it is objective is the same as whether it can be known to be objective) that is not surprising. Can I ask whether you believe that the content of an opinion determines or can be determined by whether it is considered (presumably by either you or whoever holds that opinion) to be objective? My concern about the original text was not whether what is objective is more likely to align with generalizable truth (that much is simply a timid tautology) but whether "In that way, it is what makes it objective" is a supportable contention.
>Since you probably...
Of course.
>Can I ask whether you believe that the content of an opinion determines or can be determined by whether it is considered (presumably by either you or whoever holds that opinion) to be objective?
I believe so.
>I believe so.
So that would explain both why you interpreted the text as agreeing with your opinion, and why you didn't follow my conjecture about its import.
Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.
>So that would explain
I think you mean could.
Also, you are incorrect.
Your uncertainty and posturing proves my point, though. So now I can replace "would" with "does", since you weren't able to provide any coherent refutation besides an unsupported and not very believable denial.
Your thinking style is fascinating.
Your flailing is still pointless.
This is a prediction/perception about reality, including the future, aka clairvoyance.
It is a reasonable presumption, which you've been kind enough to confirm was accurate.
There is an important distinction between "is" and "equals".
What?
What do you mean please?
You should explain the distinction, what makes it important rather than irrelevant in this context, and its relevance to my comment, along with what implications it supposedly has to the issue.
"Your flailing is still pointless."
You are speaking from a ~relative perspective ("is"), not an absolute perspective ("equals").
All speaking is always done from an unavoidably relative perspective; that is a factual certainty, given the nature of speech, consciousness, and metaphysics. Since I never used the word "equals" and it has nothing to do with the conversation, and it is rarely used except by tossers pretending to have absolute perspectives or someone pronouncing "=" out loud, your initial comment on the matter, and all your follow up comments, consititue flailing.
Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.
> All speaking is always done from an unavoidably relative perspective....
False.
Also: requires omniscience.
> that is a factual certainty, given the nature of speech, consciousness, and metaphysics.
Actually, it is a belief.
> Since I never used the word "equals"
My complaint is that you seem to be using another word, but with that meaning.
> ...and it has nothing to do with the conversation...
This is a belief.
> ...and it is rarely used except by tossers pretending to have absolute perspectives or someone pronouncing "=" out loud, your initial comment on the matter, and all your follow up comments, consititue flailing.
This is rhetoric. Also consciousness in action.
> > > > Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.
It does! And thank you for your time, as always.
>>All speaking is always done from an unavoidably relative perspective....
>False.
>Also: requires omniscience.
Unsubstantiated balderdash. Also: malarkey. How would speaking require omniscience, and how could it avoid a relative perspective?
>Actually, it is a belief.
As I've patiently explained to you several times, in different ways and across several conversations, and you have failed to address let alone refute in every instance, there isn't any absolute distinction between facts and beliefs you assume and wish there were. So yes, it is actually a belief that all speech is a relative perspective, and it is unavoidable fact, as well. Since it is unavoidable, the more you try to evade it, the more you appear to be flailing desperately.
>My complaint is that you seem to be using another word, but with that meaning.
Would the term "synonym" be applicable, perhaps? Yes, in this context, as in almost every other, 'is' and 'equals' can be considered synonyms, despite the fact they are not exactly the same. Either meaning or word would be sufficient, for my purposes, as they probably would be to any reasonable person reading my thoughts. Your flailing is both the cause and the effect of your inability to be a reasonable person, in that way.
>This is a belief.
It is your belief that it is a belief. But all truths are merely the belief that they are truth. This causes no problems to my position or in my philosophy, but it must to yours, or why else would you keep bringing up whether something is a belief as if were relevant, like that is a prima facie indication it isn't true or not also a fact?
>This is rhetoric. Also consciousness in action.
All text is rhetoric. Also consciousness in action. Yes. Once again, your observation does not provide a counter-argument to the statement.
Keep flailing!
Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.
> >>All speaking is always done from an unavoidably relative perspective.... > > >False. > > >Also: requires omniscience. > > Unsubstantiated balderdash.
Please present your proof then...or at least some sort of evidence.
> As I've patiently explained to you several times, in different ways and across several conversations, and you have failed to address let alone refute in every instance, there isn't any absolute distinction between facts and beliefs you assume and wish there were.
Ok then, would you be comfortable with acknowledging that everything you say is merely your opinion then?
Also: would it be too much to ask for you to STOP READING MY MIND?
>Please present your proof then...or at least some sort of evidence.
I did.
>Ok then, would you be comfortable with acknowledging that everything you say is merely your opinion then?
Of course not. Most of my opinions here are based on facts and solid reasoning, very thoroughly considered and carefully constructed to be taken seriously in the context of philosophical discussions and presenting that reasoning honestly and at some length, despite the restrictions of the format. They are far more than "merely" opinions.
Your responses have been either parroting other people's opinions or flailing, in contrast.
>Also: would it be too much to ask for you to STOP READING MY MIND?
All I can do is read your words, and make honest and reasonable conjectures based on them. Crying about it without actually demonstrating (by something more than mere denials, while repeating the very behavior that led to those apparently well-justified conjectures) that my suppositions are inaccurate won't suffice to stop me from reading your words, and knowing that those words came from your mind.
If you don't believe identifying something a belief calls into question whether or is a fact, why do you keep blankly asserting, as if it were an informative observation, that my assertions are beliefs? Something about your argumentation is severely deficient in explaining the reason for your argumentation. I suspect I know exactly what it is. Does that bother you?
Fear not, we are in r/philosophy so it is quite appropriate!
I think we must define our terms then. What do you define "subjective", "objective", "fact", and "opinion" as?
For me:
Something subjective is the experience a subject has. It is inherent related to the subject's point of view. Something objective is what is true about the object itself, outside of the experience. A green object reflects a certain wavelength of light (an objective fact), and that gives a viewer the subjective experience of what color it is. The subjective fact is the experience of green, through many physical processes we would call objective.
The word Fact I am using as a particular case/item/detail that is true (this can be at different levels of truth, either a scientific fact that we have good evidence to treat as true or speaking abstractly about a Fact which we want to know is part of any "Truth"). But i admit that usage could be cleaned up. I'm mainly just using it as a detail we want to know or are experiencing (for example, the light reflects off the green object).
It's also worth noting that I would not say I'm conflating "subjective" and "opinion" but rather that an opinion is a straightforward example of a subjective truth. Other subjective truths could include experiences.
Naturally, there's always interplay between the two and value to understanding/discussing both. I share your urge to not use subjective pejorativly.
>This approach [how much something is true beyond a certain point of view] conflates objective with popular, or risks doing so, and misrepresents what (if anything) distinguishes facts from opinions.
Not for nothing, how else do we approach identifing what is objective? Peer review is all about identifying what holds up across multiple perspectives. It dies indeed risk "popular" theories being passed as objective until such time as we disprove that iteration, but that is a mighty effective strategy.
>The same can be said of any opinion, though
This, to some extent, is my point I suppose.
In the end you're definitely right; I was too caught up in the (erronous, lay, and/or postmodern) debate between subjective and objective that sees an opinion as subjective rather than the use of the term to merely describe whether we are talking about the object or the experience of the object. So I appreciate the discussion.
>I think we must define our terms then
All of your "definitions" seem mundane and conventional, so I don't see any need to quibble with them. All of my definitions are implicit and otherwise correspond to the ineffable meaning the words have in any arbitrary context.
>It's also worth noting that I would not say I'm conflating "subjective" and "opinion" but rather that an opinion is a straightforward example of a subjective truth
This is an example of the conflation I was observing. I don't believe "truth" comes in objective or subjective varieties. Your note reiterates the "clever" approach you started with, and is subject to the criticisms I've already expressed about that technique. Being an honest opinion is not the same, either colloquially or philosophically, as it being true. Rhetorically, of course, people are used to making their conjectures unfalsifiable by resorting to the ambiguity of whether a "true opinion" is merely honest or "is likely to align with generalizable truths". That makes it a practice I would guard against rather than encourage.
> Other subjective truths could include experiences. [...] I share your urge to not use subjective pejorativly.
I believe such usage is intrinsic in your perspective. I mention using it dismissively as an example of the results (and the cause as well) of using it ambiguously, and from my perspective, you continue to use it ambiguously. To be honest, outside of philosophical discussions about the term itself, I make it a practice to simply never use the word at all. It cannot be divorced from its pejorative connotations in postmodern (contemporary) language.
>Not for nothing, how else do we approach identifing what is objective?
Well, when we avoid using "subjective" at all, we rarely need to identify what is objective, per se.
>Peer review is all about identifying what holds up across multiple perspectives.
I would dispute this notion, but we may have different processes in mind when using that term. "Peer review" is about identifying what cannot hold up under any reasonable perspective. It is a process that precedes publication of a scholarly paper. I believe you may be referring to public scrutiny, the process which follows publication, when other experts with different perspectives can consider and criticize the thesis.
>So I appreciate the discussion
I'm glad to hear it. I too, as well.
I wrote about this idea, of the false dichotomy between subjectivity and objectivity, as a topic in formal logic Avatar Modal Subjectivity. The basic principle is that one can talk about "uniform subjectivity" as when a proposition holds necessarily, but not mentioning whether this is "true" or "false". Hence, there are languages that can't talk about objectivity in that sense, e.g. music, where the digital signal 0000... and 1111... in the raw audio channel both means silence.
It is my understanding (possible naive, inadequate, or downright incorrect) that in formal logic, there is no "true" or "false", there is only 'necessary'. What in vernacular we would call "true" is something that is both necessarily true from the perspective of having to be true as the result of being based on true premises and necessary that it be true as a consequence of being relied on as a premise of true conjectures. In logic, as in math (I don't accept that there is a distinction between them) there is no true or false, just correct or incorrect computation.
It was my first inkling of a break with the perspective of Richard Dawkins when, after prevaricating a bit about the nature of truth (re: mathematics) he declared he was only a "90% atheist", that on a scale if 1 to 10, his certainty that God doesn't exist was only a 9. Once I accepted his uncertainty on that matter, I eventually was able to recognize the flaws in his theory of "adaptive altruism", and that set me on a course to reconstructing philosophy from the ground up, while trying to comprehend the implications of Benjamin Libet's work on cognition.
As for the bit about audio channels and Avatar, just to clarify, when I use the term "language", I mean only natural organic human language, not formal systems of logic or mathematics or computer programming methods or conventions, or metaphoric analogues of language like music or bee dances or whale song.
What you refer to as "necessary" comes from Modal Logic, which is interpreted by many as "true for all possible worlds". In formal Type Theory, this correspond to something provable from an empty context. However, ordinary Propositional Logic has "true" and "false".
You are correct in the way that Propositional Logic requires an interpretation, which usually covers the entire language when given. This means that there is not a unique way to interpret Propositional Logic, hence no unique way of interpreting "true" and "false". However, you can also not exclude the possibility of interpreting these values as literally true and false respectively.
I am not familiar with Benjamin Libet's work, so thanks for mentioning him.
What is language? That is an interesting question. I do not know the answer. However, I know that many people underestimate e.g. Propositional Logic because their brains can't comprehend what an exponential semantics is like. You have to learn it yourself to understand (in my opinion).
I don't think there is anything special about natural language, or any special property, which can not be used as an interpretation of some formal language. Now, the problem might be that what you consider some kind of "intrinsic quality" of natural language is hard to make precise, since you only have natural language to appeal to (I guess?). What do you think?
>However, I know that many people underestimate e.g. Propositional Logic because their brain's can't comprehend what an exponential semantics is like.
An intriguing claim. I am of the mind that language, being something that everyone uses every day, must be rooted in mechanisms that don't require extensive study. But I can appreciate the perspective that our brains are doing a lot more computational processing than our minds are aware of. It just seems most probable to me that if Propositional Logic or similar formal systems were relevant, the last two and a half thousand years of philosophy (and civilization) would have been quite different.
>I don't think there is anything special about natural language, or any special property, which can not be used as an interpretation of some formal language. Now, the problem might be that what you consider some kind of "intrinsic quality" of natural language is hard to make precise, since you only have natural language to appeal to (I guess?). What do you think?
I think the truth is that everything about natural language is "special", that language itself is a special property; in general it is identical to and coincident with consciousness, an apparently unique emergent property of human brains. It is this very speciality, the ability to "interpret" things, which enables us to invent formal systems of logic and call them (mistakenly, in my opinion) languages. Without the intrinsic quality of natural language, which is about accuracy rather than precision, how are we to create, develop, and communicate computational code systems, or appeal about anything with anything to anyone? Every beast with a brain performs logic as an inherent capacity of having a neural network, why would natural language even exist if formal logic could provide any useful information without the foundation of arbitrary reasoning to communicate emotions and experiences well enough to develop civilizations complex enough to allow mathematicians and analytic philosophers to survive.
So what's the difference between Objective truth and scientifically proven?
Science has requirements that are basically cultural. Yes the scientific method is powerful, because it handles humans beings irrational belief in their own subjective truth.
So we invent a functional system that says, prove it in a lab, let someone else try to disprove you. If they can't it's a theory.
That's a good system, but it's still based on arbitrary rules.
>So what's the difference between Objective truth and scientifically proven?
I think the real question is what are the similarities. The issue becomes fraught with both epistemic and metaphysical uncertainty, to varying degrees based on whether you are asking about a specific instance of fact or demanding a categorical declaration. Science is about searching for objective truth, and finding provisional truth instead. So I think the real issue depends on if we are considering whether something is scientifically certain versus whether the implications of it are as equally certain.
>Science has requirements that are basically cultural.
Scientists have requirements that are essentially cultural. "Science" as an abstraction does not, and cannot, or at least should not.
>Yes the scientific method is powerful, because it handles humans beings irrational belief in their own subjective truth.
This goes to the underlying inconsistency in both the postmodern materialist (scientification) and postmodern idealist (anti-realist) perspectives. Both adopt the postmodern premise concerning the term "rational" (or irrational). According to IPTM (the Information Processing Theory of Mind, the standard explanation of cognition all postmodernists share) good reasoning must be logical, and therefore rational, but bad reasoning is not logical, and therefor irrational. So "rational", when applied to human cognition, reduces to simply whether someone else's reasoning (or conjecture, or behavior) is the same as yours: when it is, it reinforces the IPTM model and is deemed "logic", when it doesn't, it reinforces the IPTM model and is deemed "irrational belief". A consistent theory of cognition would recognize that either all beliefs are rational (the term 'belief' simply equating to whether the speaker, or for that matter the believer, is aware of the reasoning for the conjecture) or that all knowledge (which I presume you will accept as a complementary contrast to 'belief') is irrational (indistinguishable from "beliefs" and merely conjecture, with the singular exception of cogito ergo sum).
>prove it in a lab, let someone else try to disprove [it] >That's a good system, but it's still based on arbitrary rules.
I don't see those rules as arbitrary in any way. They are both functional and necessary.
>Scientists have requirements that are essentially cultural. "Science" as an abstraction does not, and cannot, or at least should not.
There is a very real difference between abstract ~intentions and object level behavior.
There might be a hypothetical difference, but as far as I can tell (making allowances for the brevity and syntax of your contention) whether there can be a "very real" distinction between those two things is quite uncertain, to say the least. Could you explain your point, and your reason for interjecting it, further?
>There might be a hypothetical difference, but as far as I can tell...
This satisfies me.
You're easily satisfied. I can (and do) presume it is because you're content with self-satisfaction, and prefer to not have your ideas challenged.
You are satisfied with presumption, I am satisfied when you acknowledge it. Win win!
> I don't see those rules as arbitrary in any way. They are both functional and necessary.
They are, but also arbitrary.
>My perspective is that it isn't even different. Everything that is "subjective" objectively occurs, as neurological impulses in our brains that are in every (other) way equivalent to the objective (but non-subjective) things which also cause such impulses.
And yet, even in your comment you've couched your language in that of perspective. The objective reality that we assume exists, and which we claim to experience, we can only access through our subjective experience.
Therefore, everything that is "objective" occurs within subjective experience, where objectivity is assumed based on some metaphysical theory about the reliability of such subjective experiences.
We can't prove the accuracy of our subjective experiences because any standard upon which we might base this proof likewise derives from subjective experiences. There is no archimedean solid point from which to leverage objectivity.
> Every thought and feeling you have objectively occurs
Quite the contrary. Every thought and feeling we have occurs subjectively, as does any notion of objectivity.
The confusion of Descartes's cogito ergo sum is his assumption of the thinker as an objective entity based on a subjective doubt; whereas only the thought itself is beyond doubt--not the doubter--and this thought can only be experienced subjectively.
That is, cogito ergo sum is a subjective experience, not an object.
>And yet, even in your comment you've couched your language in that of perspective.
"Couched"? I think not. I don't know of any way to discuss subjectivity without discussing subjectivity. And I think we can all appreciate how badly it would go if I presented my perspective as objective rather than subjective.
>The objective reality that we assume exists, and which we claim to experience, we can only access through our subjective experience.
When I can do so without confusing people who assume otherwise, I reject the notion that perceptions which are "subjective" aren't experiences. We remember experiencing dreams, but we never experience them, we only experience "remembering" them. In the moments we are regaining consciousness (mind) after being unconscious, we construct dreams to account for the change from our previously experienced 'brain state' before we lost consciousness, and since our mental apparatus is geared towards recognizing perceptions as experiences, we get the impression (a notoriously impressionistic one) that we are experiencing those events which never happened. This explains both why the 'reality' of dreams is so convincing while waking but becomes a confused jumble while recalling them afterwards, and why dreaming strongly correlates with the occurence of REM sleep (being a more profound re-ordering of brain states than simple unconsciousness but the dreams don't actually occur during that period, as evidenced by the occassions when the 'events' concluding a dream are triggered by environmental stimuli at the time of waking.
Hallucinations, likewise, are illusions of experiences rather than experiences, if they are concurrent and intermingled with real perceptions (hearing voices or seeing figmentary creatures or objects which seem to exist along with more concrete perceptions) or delusions, if they entirely replace sense perceptions (complete psychedelic "trips" or waking dreams).
So all experiences objectively occur, somehow, even if they are not of the physical character that "objective experiences" are. Referencing "subjective experiences", as you have, is confusion or misdirection.
> objectivity is assumed based on some metaphysical theory about the reliability of such subjective experiences.
No such theorizing is either necessary or useful. The metaphysical theory that 'subjective perceptions' are experiences is flawed epistemically, since all perceptions are equally "subjective", as you presume. Objectivity (not our perspective of accurate knowledge, but the physical nature of objects independent of our knowledge of them) is not an assumption, it is a conjecture. And an extremely valid and typically sound conjectures, for that matter (no pun intended). So much so that some metaphysical theory that "subjective" is a coherent distinction from objective can be relied upon for most, but not all, reasoning.
>We can't prove the accuracy of our subjective experiences because any standard upon which we might base this proof likewise derives from subjective experiences. There is no archimedean solid point from which to leverage objectivity.
Quite the contrary. We need not "prove" the accuracy of our perceptions ("subjective experiences") to other people, which is considered the defining feature of the idea something is proved. The "brain in a jar conundrum" which vexes you will never be defeated, no matter how long your lever or solid your fulcrum.
>Every thought and feeling we have occurs subjectively, as does any notion of objectivity.
Since your assumption is a subjective one, it cannot be proven. My contrary presumption that all subjective perceptions objectively occur (differing in character only in that some are the result of external physical stimuli and others the result of internal mental causes, but in every other way objectively identical in that they correspond to neurological phenomenon of an as-yet ill-defined nature) has the advantage of being scientifically falsifiable but empirically unfalsified.
>The confusion of Descartes's cogito ergo sum is his assumption of the thinker as an objective entity based on a subjective doubt;
Your confusion about cogito ergo sum is caused by your mistaken belief that it relies on any assumptions, or results in any necessarily "objective" entity. This is a widespread error these days. It is the Cartesian Circle, not "dubito, cogito..." by which Descartes introduces the dualistic dichotomy between objective and subjective.
>That is, cogito ergo sum is a subjective experience, not an object.
I say again, the phrase "subjective experience" is so profoundly redundant it becomes meaningless. It seeks to jump over the hard problem of consciousness with semantics, occluding the very nature of "experience" in much the same way the Cartesian Circle skips the formulation of a rational universe in which to "be" with a self-referential invocation of a benevolent deity. Neopostmodernists simply replace God with faith in the transcendence of mathematics, often unaware they are ignoring the need for the Cartesian Circle entirely, and believing their perspective rests directly on dubito of any ideas they disagree with prima facei.
If the term "objective" has any referent or meaning at all, then subjective perceptions, while inaccessible to naive empirical demonstration, objectively occur as neurological occurences. To believe otherwise goes so far beyond idealistic dualism that it becomes solipsism.
>And I think we can all appreciate how badly it would go if I presented my perspective as objective rather than subjective.
Exactly!
>When I can do so without confusing people who assume otherwise, I reject the notion that perceptions which are "subjective" aren't experiences. We remember experiencing dreams, but we never experience them, we only experience "remembering" them.
Do you reject subjective perception as experience, or not? Did you mean: "I reject the notion that perceptions which are 'subjective' are (necessarily) experiences"?
The wording is confusing.
If so, then how do we explain lucid dreaming, where the dreamer has the experience of influencing their dreams as they happen?
Regardless, the framework through which we might categorize phenomena as objective or subjective is always derived from some metaphysical theory or assumption about our subjective experiences--such as those in your analysis of dreaming.
We distinguish hallucination from reality only by comparing various subjective experiences, from multiple perspectives, and then we use our theories and assumptions about such experiences (explicitly or implicitly) to reconstruct our own version of what we "objectively" experienced.
I see a person in the woods, but upon closer inspection, I recognize that the person is a tree. I could conclude that the person turned into a tree. Or, I could conclude that my previous perception was confused, but based on other subjective perspectives, I am now confident that I was always looking at a tree--whereby the possibility remains that further inspection might reveal that I was actually looking at a person in a rather convincing tree costume, and so on, without ever reaching definitive objective reality.
Objectivity, then, can only ever be surreal in that it provides a functional but ultimately tentative concept for how we process the subjective perspectives that are the only real experiences that we can have.
Descartes's mistake, likewise, is attributing to his subjective doubt an objective subject, "I", upon which he builds his positive arguments; whereas, he is only entitled to the doubt itself, NOT the doubter.
All experience is of consciousness. The hard problem of consciousness is not explaining how consciousness emerges from what lacks consciousness. The hard problem of consciousness is explaining why anything ever lacks consciousness.
One need not be vexed by brains in jars when we understand that everything is mind.
>Do you reject subjective perception as experience, or not?
Categorically? Of course not. Most subjective perceptions are based on objective stimuli, and are actually experiences. But this does not mean that everything someone imagines or falsely believes happened to them is something they actually experienced:
>>I reject the notion that perceptions which are "subjective" aren't experiences.
Those are scare quotes, identifying a particularly facetious use of the term "subjective" to suggest that experiences flagged with it are just as valid as experiences which are not, and simply referred to as "experiences" or the even more dangerous phrase "objective experiences".
>The wording is confusing.
The issue is confusing. The wording can be adequately understood by looking at the entire context rather than seizing on a single instance of syntax. But given the nature of the subject, there will always be instances of confusing wording.
>If so, then how do we explain lucid dreaming, where the dreamer has the experience of influencing their dreams as they happen?
They have the perception, the belief that they experienced that, just as everyone does regardless of the content of the dream. They do not qualify as "experiences" any more than a false memory does. They are, in fact, that very thing, except they arise from different neurocognitive mechanisms and therefor have differing characteristics. I have had lucid dreams, and in a conversation in a general context I have no trouble saying "I experience lucid dreaming", but the current context demands more exacting terminology, so I would insist that dreams are not experiences, and would say that experiencing dreaming isn't quite the same as experiencing a dream.
>the framework through which we might categorize phenomena as objective or subjective is always derived from some metaphysical theory
Your metaphysical theory may run aground in this area, but mine does not, that's all I'm saying. Your assumption of "or" is physically inaccurate, so I have no trouble accepting that it is metaphysically inaccurate as well.
>We distinguish hallucination from reality
Your proclamations about such things become careless and ambiguous when you are not careful to identify just who this "we" is. From the remainder of the paragraph, I can only surmise you mean a single person somehow subjectively determining whether their personal sense perceptions are hallucinatory. This is a practical and theoretical impossibility, a misrepresentation of what the word "hallucination" refers to. One can suspect that one's perceptions are true or false, but one cannot determine whether it is so.
>Objectivity, then, can only ever be surreal
When one is standing alone in the woods, it can easily feel that way. You're basically ignoring all the evidence of objectivity outside of such personal experiences. Yet, the feeling of "surrealness" is objectively occurring as a brain state of undefined (and perhaps undefined, even ineffable) character.
>Descartes's mistake, likewise, is attributing to his subjective doubt an objective subject, "I",
A necessity cannot be a mistake, however inconvenient it is to your reasoning. The doubt is as objective and subjective as the "I", in the case of Descartes' very accurate (indeed, unassailable) reasoning. As I've already explained, the existence (and therefor the distinction) of "objective' or 'subjective' character doesn't enter into it until one gets passed the dubito and attempt to reason further, which is the process defined as the Cartesian Circle. In order to proceed with his reasoning, Descartes relied on the otherwise inexplicable (and presumably prior) existence of a rational (objective rather than reasoning) universe, which he could explain with no other terms than a benevolent deity's gift. Neopostmodernists silently substitute metaphysical transcendence of mathematics (rationality, or logic, in this context) for God and then backtrack to proclaim Descartes' to have erred, while preserving their own "I" free of the necessary metaphysical doubt (either transfering it to everything outside their consciousness, or pretending to deny the existence of their own agency as proven by their ability to reason at all.) I prefer a more cognizant and comprehensive approach, of using the intrinsic reasoning of language already demonstrated by cogito ergo sum, and foregoing the purposeful yet meaningless ignorance of the empirical evidence that there is an objective world, regardless of why or how it came to be. Descartes had faith in God, you have faith in Logic, and I have faith in reasoning and language.
>All experience is of consciousness
All experience is of perceptions by consciousness. The perceptions must still be explained in order to understand what the consciousness is, and accurately interpret the perceptions, including determining, as best we are able, which are experiences and which are dreams, delusions, or hallucinations.
>The hard problem of consciousness is explaining why anything ever lacks consciousness.
This is an erroneous perspective on what is meant by the hard problem of consciousness. It is not an engineering challenge or a scientific puzzle which can be overcome with explanations or theories. It is simply the ineffable distinction between an experience, and the experience of experiencing that experience.
>One need not be vexed by brains in jars when we understand that everything is mind.
You cannot overcome the metaphysical uncertainty of the brain in a jar conundrum by relying on epistemic uncertainty about what "mind" is. To say that "everything is mind" is simply declaring that the word is meaningless by invoking a false tautology.
Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.
> Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.
Thank you for your time as well. It always helps to share our perspectives in good faith.
> The issue is confusing. The wording can be adequately understood by looking at the entire context rather than seizing on a single instance of syntax. But given the nature of the subject, there will always be instances of confusing wording.
I agree completely. You noted concern about confusion, so I assumed you meant the non-categorical version, but sought clarification to be sure.
Likewise, we often use redundant phrases to clarify nuances or potentially confused concepts.
> Most subjective perceptions are based on objective stimuli, and are actually experiences. But this does not mean that everything someone imagines or falsely believes happened to them is something they actually experienced
We differ on the meaning of experience:
Your position is that experiences are only those subjective perspectives that are validated based on your conjecture of objectivity.
My position is that any conjecture of objectivity only ever tentatively postulates a network of subjective perspectives within a metaphysical framework.
If objectivity does not necessarily follow from the collection and comparison of various subjective perspectives, then we should not reject any perspective as experience based on that which we only tentatively hold.
> Your proclamations about such things become careless and ambiguous when you are not careful to identify just who this "we" is. From the remainder of the paragraph, I can only surmise you mean a single person somehow subjectively determining whether their personal sense perceptions are hallucinatory. This is a practical and theoretical impossibility, a misrepresentation of what the word "hallucination" refers to. One can suspect that one's perceptions are true or false, but one cannot determine whether it is so.
The ambiguity is careful. As you say, the single person cannot determine whether one's perceptions are objectively valid. Rather, WE rely on "other minds" to collect and compare various perspectives. Since we only ever perceive these "other minds" from within our own subjective perspective, however, we rely on our own metaphysical theories/assumptions about other minds to verify their "objectivity".
Confused and mistaken perspectives are still experienced--thankfully, because that's all we ever experience. To reject any such experiences based on a tentatively held conjecture nested within our own metaphysical theories about other minds, which themselves defy objective analysis, is to ignore experience in favour of conjecture.
We likely agree on the fuzzy nature of distinguishing between subjective and objective in various contexts, but we each emphasize one to dismiss (in some sense) the other.
You maintain that having purported to achieve objective validation through a collaborative process, we can go back and dismiss subjective perspectives that conflict with our agreed "objective" reality--something like Descartes's returning from perceiving God's perfection, and thereby rejecting the Evil Genius doubt.
But your conjecture of objectivity is, by definition, tentative.
I might conclude that the tree is really a person. And I might query if this person perceives another object as a tree or a person. But I can never be sure the first object is a person, so I cannot be sure about the new tree/person simply because the person I thought was a tree agrees with me.
Eventually, we might conclude that our concept of tree and person are themselves confused metaphors. Maybe a tree is a person--in some sense. Maybe it's all the same substance. Then we don't have to explain the emergence of consciousness--not to avoid a problem that requires solution, but--because there is no experience of an absence of consciousness.
> All experience is of perceptions by consciousness.
If consciousness is the experience of experiencing, then how is experience by consciousness not experience of consciousness?
Are we not experiencing the experience of experiencing experience?
Doubt exists necessarily, self-evidently--I have faith in nothing else.
Our language and our specific perspective, however, present confused notions that fragment our experience in ways (like subject/object) that are (in a given context) useful to us--and some which are less useful--but which always represent a different mode of the same substance--the unity of which, explains how we are able to agree on a conjecture of "objectivity" without "objective experience"--the latter you rightly reject.
I can make sense of querying your queries, not because we've exchanged perspectives through some objective intermediary--facilitated by some epistemic hand-shake of objectivity--but because your mind and my mind are different perspectives within the same mind. Our disagreements are similar to those with our previous selves: useful in their differences, but only possible by certain continuity.
Introducing new substances and discreet minds insulted from each other by mindless matter only compounds the confusion.
Postulating the existence of anything that lacks consciousness is extraneous; whereas perspective per se, confused as it must be, cannot be denied. Therefore, the burden of proof remains with those who would introduce such substances and discreet minds--of which, I am quite literally unaware.
>Likewise, we often use redundant phrases to clarify nuances or potentially confused concepts.
My point was that this is not such an instance. I had hoped that was obvious, both from context and the fact I explained this issue previously. The phrase "subjective experience" (or, alternately, "subjective perceptions") does not "clarify nuance" or reduce confusion, it breeds confusion or hides assumptions, possibly on purpose.
>Your position is that experiences are only those subjective perspectives that are validated based on your conjecture of objectivity.
You are incorrect. My position is that only perceptions which are caused by the same external objective occurences as the internal perceptions of those occurances are actually "experiences". To clarify the nuance: only things that actually happened are experienced. This analysis is not based on whether it can be proved the experience actually happened to anyone else's satisfaction, but it is independent of how certain the person who believes they are/were accurately perceiving events is that they experience those events. It leaves all experiences (indeed, all perceptions) metaphysically uncertain, but such is life. Mankind invents philosophy to explore such quandaries, philosophy did not invent mankind to prove a point.
A solipsistic view might rely on only a "conjecture of objectivity", but a sane perspective cannot, not even in the guise of a philosophical premise. To reduce confusion: dreams, false memories, hallucinations, and (most controversially, given the nature of the subject) NDE are not "experiences", they are perceptions of occurances which didn't factually occur: false experiences. Again, I understand why this is an unsatisfactory conjecture for idealists, but that their demands for absolute certainty or metaphysically transcendent logic are unreasonable and impossible to satisfy is not something that I can control.
>My position is that any conjecture of objectivity only ever tentatively postulates a network of subjective perspectives within a metaphysical framework.
If you were the only consciousness in the universe, that would be your only option. To cling to it as a necessary assumption when you are just one person among billions, many of which existed long before you did, is solipsism, though.
>If objectivity does not necessarily follow from the collection and comparison of various subjective perspectives, then we should not reject any perspective as experience based on that which we only tentatively hold.
Objectivity definitely cannot follow from only one person's collection and mental comparison of their own subjective perspectives. And, indeed, we cannot prima facie reject any perception as experience, at all. But to say that the existence of objective perceptions and experiences and also their distinction from private delusions of having experienced things which never happened is 'tentative' leaves only two comprehensible positions: solipsism or insanity.
>But your conjecture of objectivity is, by definition, tentative.
All conjectures are by definition tentative (presumptuous), this can be (logically) assumed. Based on that, logic (computational cognition) becomes, from that point on, useless, as it relies on further assumptions which are also tentative since they are conjectures which follow from more fundamental assumptions, each becoming more tentative from the previous. Reason (non-computational cognition, relying on presumptions rather than assumptions, and utilizing comparison of qualia rather than calculation of quantities) remains more than adequate, however; each conjecture becomes more reliable rather than more tentative, because the process is a pile of comparisons rather than a chain of logic. But that is a slight digression from your point.
To address what I must surmise is your point in mentioning the tentative character of (all, or just this one you imagine, inaccurately, I have made about objectivity) conjectures: just because all conjectures are tentative does not mean that they are all equally tentative. So simply observing my conjecture is tentative neither requires it be unreliable nor suggests that it is untrue.
>And I might query if this person perceives another object as a tree or a person. But I can never be sure the first object is a person, so I cannot be sure about the new tree/person simply because the person I thought was a tree agrees with me.
As far as I can tell, you have reiterated my point, but rejected what I presumed was your position. You can never be sure if the "new tree" is even a tree, if you are already hallucinating that a tree is speaking to you. Did you actually experience the tree/person speaking? Of course you didn't, if it is a tree, or perhaps even if it is a person. Can you, alone and by yourself, through any mental effort of either reasoning or logic, know with more than tentative certainty that anyone is speaking, that you are not simply imagining that other people, indeed your own body, or time and space, even exist? No, you cannot. Solipsism (indistinguishable except by abstract declaration from 'the brain in a jar conundrum') is undefeatable because it is unfalsifiable. But from a practical perspective, it is also indistinguishable (by the solipsist) from insanity. Luckily enough, other people don't have such a difficult time telling the difference between a philosophical premise and a mental disorder. Usually.
>postulating the existence of anything that lacks consciousness is extraneous;
Only if you first postulate, not just without evidence but contrary to all available evidence (and there is, despite denials by solipsists/idealists/panpsychists, a LOT of evidence) that your consciousness is independent of the body from which it emerges. Otherwise, postulating the existence of things which lack consciousness isn't necessary, one can directly observe an unlimited number of them.
>whereas perspective per se, confused as it must be, cannot be denied.
Perspectives cannot be denied. Their accuracy can be. Disappointing as it must be, your philosophical perspective is only coherent if it is solipsistic. Otherwise, it is simply an incoherent hypothesis which fails to be rigorously philosophical. Or perhaps it is merely insanity. Do you actually believe paperclips are conscious? Are the pixels on the screen you are looking at conscious? Are the letters those pixels form conscious? Are the photons emitted by those pixels to present those letters to your eyes conscious? Are your eyes conscious independently of your own consciousness? (You may recognize this as the "combination problem", perhaps in inverse form, which everyone but panpsychists recognizes wrecks panpsychism.)
Solipsism, incoherence, or insanity. Those are your only choices, if you believe your philosophy is a serious perspective. Please forgive me for being so blunt.
Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.
>To clarify the nuance: only things that actually happened are experienced.
Then how do we explain the double slit experiment, where we experience observing the interference pattern as if what might have occurred--but we understand not to have occurred--causes the observed experience as if it had happened?
Further, when we observe which slit the particle does travel through, then the interference pattern disappears--hence, the measurement problem of quantum mechanics.
The implication being, observation causes change in the observed.
It's something like General Relativity, where mass bends space-time: observation shapes the observed because they are linked across some (meta)physical substrate--call it The Universe, The Quantum Potential, The Collective Soul, God... whatever metaphor works for you, it is mind itself.
Except, on the quantum level we abandon many of our physical and metaphysical presumptions and assumptions about causation itself.
We can no longer maintain that our experiences are limited to what actually happened, even within the rigorously empirical realm of science, never mind the less abstract realm of metaphysics upon which science must build.
>Objectivity definitely cannot follow from only one person's collection and mental comparison of their own subjective perspectives. And, indeed, we cannot prima facie reject any perception as experience, at all. But to say that the existence of objective perceptions and experiences and also their distinction from private delusions of having experienced things which never happened is 'tentative' leaves only two comprehensible positions: solipsism or insanity.
If we rely on other minds to establish objectivity, but we cannot ourselves establish the objectivity of our own experience of other minds, then objectivity is tentative.
My own sanity is not something I'm prepared to argue--nor is anyone. Sanity is a subjective designation of (limited use, but great misuse) made, as with that of objectivity, tentatively within a collection of perspectives.
>All conjectures are by definition tentative (presumptuous), this can be (logically) assumed. Based on that, logic (computational cognition) becomes, from that point on, useless, as it relies on further assumptions which are also tentative since they are conjectures which follow from more fundamental assumptions, each becoming more tentative from the previous.
But here we contemplate objectivity itself, not just any conjecture.
If objectivity merely exists as conjecture within the collection of perspectives we attribute to other minds, which we must experience from within our own subjective perspective, that is not reason to deny the status of experience to those perspectives which might disagree with such conjecture, because the perspective happened regardless of purportedly external stimulus.
The external stimulus is the unnecessary bit--unless we presupposed it.
>just because all conjectures are tentative does not mean that they are all equally tentative. So simply observing my conjecture is tentative neither requires it be unreliable nor suggests that it is untrue.
Hallucinations are experiences, even if they are not shared. Our task is to place those experiences along with our other experiences within our metaphysical framework to constantly puzzle out how they ALL fit together, with some given more weight than others depending on the context considered.
But if we reject as experiences the perspectives that fail to conform to our tentative notions of objectivity, then we will fail to recognize experiences that falsify our existing paradigm.
>Solipsism (indistinguishable except by abstract declaration from 'the brain in a jar conundrum') is undefeatable because it is unfalsifiable.
Metaphysics, however, is not bound by falsifiability--we should not abstract from questions just because we cannot test them with this specific method, which defines and therefore limits science, not metaphysics.
That's what "meta" means: left-over. Here, we examine what science cannot, so we can ground our science and other understanding on pillars of well-examined doubt, beyond other limited methods.
>Only if you first postulate, not just without evidence but contrary to all available evidence (and there is, despite denials by solipsists/idealists/panpsychists, a LOT of evidence) that your consciousness is independent of the body from which it emerges. Otherwise, postulating the existence of things which lack consciousness isn't necessary, one can directly observe an unlimited number of them.
We only have the experience of consciously experiencing something else "losing" consciousness, as we experience ourselves gaining and losing consciousness.
Just because our own consciousness and that we recognize in others ebbs and flows and changes mode, does not suppose that consciousness itself is absent anywhere.
Again, we cannot have an experience of lacking consciousness. That is beyond falsifiable. It is inconceivable.
>Disappointing as it must be, your philosophical perspective is only coherent if it is solipsistic. Otherwise, it is simply an incoherent hypothesis which fails to be rigorously philosophical. Or perhaps it is merely insanity. Do you actually believe paperclips are conscious? Are the pixels on the screen you are looking at conscious? Are the letters those pixels form conscious? Are the photons emitted by those pixels to present those letters to your eyes conscious? Are your eyes conscious independently of your own consciousness? (You may recognize this as the "combination problem", perhaps in inverse form, which everyone but panpsychists recognizes wrecks panpsychism.)
The combination problem, insofar as it is a problem, is largely a problem of combination itself, not just within interpretations of panpsychism. William James originally suggested there are no composite objects whatsoever. Is that the position that you take?
The problem arises from the illusion of fragmentation itself.
Where do the foothills end and the mountain begin? Nowhere. Mountains and foothills are metaphors we use to represent topographical relationships by postulating objects that are a function of our own perspective rather than some objective demarcation.
We choose ontological metaphors that fit our own perspective and the functional context at hand, much as we might choose to distinguish our current self from past selves, even though there is no clear demarcation of one self from the next, and in other ways we understand all our selves to be one person.
When we further remove the subject itself--because we can doubt the doubter but not the doubt--then we no longer have the subject-summing problem.
Much like the horizon is an artifact of our perspective--there is no such demarcation of the ground and sky, except as a function of our metaphors for the same--the subject is an artifact of our perspective.
Therefore, cosmopanpsychism does not suffer the combination problem.
When we choose to look for particles, then we see particles. When we choose to look for waves, then we see waves.
From our mundane perspective, we are discreet indivisible individuals, but when we look closer we see ourselves as constituted of many parts, and even particles, which observed in certain contexts display behaviour that we can recognize as consciousness--hence why we say electrons want to remain in stable orbits, even if the electron itself might otherwise be described as a probability matrix rather than a single object in space-time.
We fail to understand a certain mode of consciousness as consciousness the way we fail to see beyond the horizon. But if we travel beyond this horizon, we will not fall out of existence or discover a lack of consciousness--rather, we will discover new territory, new consciousness.
When I first learned about panpsychism, it was but a tiny paragraph in the textbook--barely a footnote. We were encouraged to discard the theory as nonsense, just as you have.
Over time, however, our tentative models of objectivity have given way, reluctantly, to this increasingly powerful paradigm.
The orthodoxy called Copernicus and Galileo insane, because they could not make sense of their paradigm shifting models.
Likewise, even Einstein rejected quantum mechanics, because, "God does not play dice with the universe." Rather, Einstein said, "I believe in Spinoza's God."
Turns out, based on our current understanding of quantum mechanics, that Spinoza's God plays dice with the universe.
Calling me insane is an ad hominem attack, which only betrays a lack of argument on your part.
As yet, we cannot decidedly doubt panpsychism--perhaps because it is an accurate model of the cosmos--and so mindless matter is not necessary. Your failure to take seriously this possibility only renders your metaphysics less serious for being unduly limited.
The hard problem of consciousness only arises when we try to explain the existence of mindless matter, which we can never experience.
Panpsychism avoids this problem by not postulating this unnecessary mindless matter.
If the strongest argument against panpsychism is that we cannot disprove it, then this seems like a good reason to at least include this metaphysical paradigm as one lens (of many) through which to examine our cosmos.
>Then how do we explain the double slit experiment,
Question: why do panpsychists always want to flip from a philosophical consideration of consciousness that admits no existence of anything objective except their own mind to the conundrum of wave-partice duality which necessarily presupposes the existence of all of the objective apparatus that demonstrations of quantum physics requires, as soon as their philosophical hypothesis is shown to be incoherent? Answer: because their philosophical hypothesis is incoherent.
>as if what might have occurred--but we understand not to have occurred-
Because the reliance of your description on "as if" and the limits of our understanding reinforces rather than refutes my position, that's why. If you took your own position seriously, there would be no need to refer to the double slit experiment, it would simply be a mundane an unsurprising result that whatever we wish to be is what happens, even when it needs to reverse chronology and change what happened, in order to make what is match our desires. But your position cannot be taken seriously in that way, instead it is incoherent, because this phenomena can only be demonstrated by the double slit experiment, and panpsychism has no cogent explanation for why that is the only circumstance that conforms to this expectation of yours that objectivity is subjective.
Realists don't need to explain quantum weirdness, we need merely annotate it as weird, and not currently explained. But fantasists can't explain why everything else except carefully and rigorously defined demonstrations like the double slit experiment doesn't exhibit the same kind of weirdness. That alone is not an insurmountable task: if an idealist worldview could coherently describe how, when, and why quantum decoherence results reliably (very reliably) in the deterministic objective behavior of non-quantum systems, that would be interesting and informative. But that doesn't seem likely, since idealist philosophies such as panpsychism reject the notion any such description is necessary, and are incompatible with scientific results because science is realist rather than anti-realist.
>The implication being, observation causes change in the observed.
Your implication is simple-minded and mistaken. For the purposes of physical experiments (including quantum mechanics) "observation" is interaction with any other system, not limited in any way to conscious perception. The double slit demonstration carefully excludes all other interactions in order to make the effect obvious, but all it proves is that quantum weirdness (including the measurement problem, heisenberg's uncertainty principle, wave-particle duality, and other related but not necessarily identical artifacts) is an objective phenonemon, independent of any subjective "belief system" of the scientist performing the empirical experiment or philosopher proclaiming its implications, despite being surprising based on intuitions honed by classical objective phenomena.
Since the basic premise of panpsychism is that mind is more fundamental than matter, quantum physics doesn't actually support your premise any more than classical physics does. It just opens the door to epistemic and metaphysical confusion, which fantasists can then take advantage of to pretend their hypothesis is coherent.
>Except, on the quantum level we abandon many of our physical and metaphysical presumptions and assumptions about causation itself.
LOL. Nobody abandoned any assumptions, we are simply forced to do without certain familiar prevarication and posturing. Since the quantum world still conforms to an extreme degree with mathematical predictability (it simply does so probabalistically rather than deterministically) causation itself still favors the realist side rather than the fantasist side, despite the adjustment that must be made in understanding what causation is. I've developed a philosophy which does so adequately, without the need to resort to anti-realism.
>Again, we cannot have an experience of lacking consciousness. > Hallucinations are experiences, even if they are not shared. >But here we contemplate objectivity itself, not just any conjecture.
Your declarations lead to confused rhetoric and pointless insistences, so I reject your semantics and instead attempt to clarify discussions of very difficult topics by using better ideas about the proper usage of these words. "Experience" excludes false perceptions such as dreams and hallucinations. "Objectivity" does not exclude subjectivity. These aren't perfect allowances; the nature of epistemology and ontology ensure that no terminology can be perfect. But mine is more practical than yours, more consistent and productive. Yours simply revels in being mired in ignorance so that you can maintain a fantasist's outlook.
>We were encouraged to discard the theory as nonsense, just as you have.
I have read extensively on it. My dismissal is not based on a mere paragraph, but grows ever more certain with every paragraph I read about it. My philosophy actually explains the underlying problem (related to the connection, necessarily but generally inconsequentially ignored by scientific realism, between self-determination, consciousness, and the nature of teleologies, causation) that fantasists believe justifies panpsychism, but without all the fantasizing panpsychism requires. And the fact that even after all that anti-realist effort, panpsychism still doesn't provide a coherent explanation seems, to me, to bring the matter to a conclusion. No, I cannot disprove idealism, but that's okay, because I don't need to, I only need to recognize why it can't be disproven.
Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.
Good shout.
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