Submitted by fatsosis t3_11xh9cf in philosophy
scrollbreak t1_jd6840t wrote
Reply to comment by Beepboopbob1 in In-depth interview with Gregg Caruso, free-will skeptic by fatsosis
>We like to think that we are making decisions based on preferences,
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>but in reality what we prefer has been shaped by our genetics and environment/life experiences
Why are you treating those two things as different?
​
>this lack of free will implies none of us have true moral responsibility for our actions
Well, apart from the idea of 'true moral responsibility' being treated as if it exists like some kind of physics, where does such an implication come from?
I'm not sure how things can be 'factors beyond our control' and also there be any 'our'. If as an organism it's all 'factors beyond control' all the way down then there is no 'our' or 'I'. The view seems to keep personal identity as an individual ("I'm me!") but abandon responsibility as an individual ("I didn't do it, the factors did it!").
Pigeonofthesea8 t1_jd6mgre wrote
Yes because personal identity is a subjective reality. We have a sense of ourselves as bounded, relatively continuous & coherent over time and in space in the experiencing, self-aware self. But there’s no doubt that intrinsic and extrinsic factors shape and move us, from your microbiome or thyroid to language and cultural ideologies.
scrollbreak t1_jd6scxo wrote
IMO you're not really saying what you're committed to. Saying 'We have a sense...', doesn't say what you're committed to yourself and any contradiction that might be pointed out with such a commitment.
Pigeonofthesea8 t1_jd806mv wrote
The Cartesian self aware self is self evidently unified in time and place, the experiencing self
tjscobbie t1_jd6z0cz wrote
This seems totally incoherent. What are you trying to say here?
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