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contractualist OP t1_j9i1cym wrote

Reply to comment by XiphosAletheria in What Morality is Not (and why it's not the Repugnant Conclusion, Utilitarianism, or Libertarianism) by contractualist

It’s not about actual consent but what would reasonable people agree to. No way would anyone reasonably agree to be enslaved, sacrificed, or raped. Abortion and eating meat relate to the boundaries of our moral community (not necessarily the agreement, but who is a party) whereas the death penalty (given certain evidence) may be morally excused.

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XiphosAletheria t1_j9id7c3 wrote

> No way would anyone reasonably agree to be enslaved, sacrificed, or raped...whereas the death penalty (given certain evidence) may be morally excused.

You see the contradiction there, right? No way would anyone reasonably agree to be executed. For that matter, if we hadn't been raised in a society where involuntary taxation was the norm, I doubt many reasonable people would agree to it. That is, just because I wouldn't reasonably agree to have X happen to me doesn't mean society might not morally do X to me anyway under certain circumstances.

And I don't see the point of your argument anyway. Let's say there is some set of moral norms that we all agree to be true. That doesn't help us. What we need is a guide for when we have moral disagreements between reasonable people. At best, you'll end up stating something glaringly obvious (since we all apparently agree with it anyway). At worst, and this seems far more likely, you'll have people using your idea as way to simply dismiss anyone who disagrees with them as both unreasonable and immoral, which is the opposite of the mindset any thoughtful person, and especially a philosopher, ought to have.

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contractualist OP t1_j9j91rn wrote

  1. People may agree to execute criminals and will very likely agree to involuntary taxation, given the coordination problem and benefits of collective action.

  2. The article’s goal is only to say what morality is and isn’t. To the extent that issue is in dispute, as it is in meta-ethics, then having at the very least a defined term is useful for settling disagreement. I’ll get into more specifics in later pieces on what “reasonably rejectable” really means.

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