internetzdude t1_j9g8j2u wrote
Reply to comment by contractualist in What Morality is Not (and why it's not the Repugnant Conclusion, Utilitarianism, or Libertarianism) by contractualist
Francesco Orsi makes similar distinctions as I do. Orsi (2015): Value Theory. Bloomsbury Academic. It gives some taxonomy, otherwise I don't think it's very interesting. Here is my take, but whether you think these are examples of the types of values really depends on your metaethical stances:
+ subjective and agent-relative:
John: Becoming a lawyer is better for me than becoming a clarinetist. I appreciate the better job prospects and payment in the long run and I'm not really sure I would continue to like music if I became a professional musician.
John: Bungee jumping is great, it's better than going on a hike.
+ objective and agent-relative:
It is better for John not to become a lawyer and pursue a career as a clarinetist. John would probably not even pass the bar exams and the profession would invariably burn him out. He doesn't have the personality for it.
Bungee jumping is horrible for John. Because of some traumatic experience as a child, he's afraid of heights. However, he isn't aware of that yet.
+ subjective and agent independent:
John: Basic democracy is better than representational democracy. At least, I'd much prefer to live in a direct basic democracy.
+ objective and agent independent:
For various reasons <long list of reasons>, basic democracy is vulnerable to disruption and representational democracy is much better.
contractualist OP t1_j9hh3n4 wrote
>+ objective and agent-relative:
It is better for John not to become a lawyer and pursue a career as a clarinetist. John would probably not even pass the bar exams and the profession would invariably burn him out. He doesn't have the personality for it.
Woah, this definitely sneaks in valuing well-being. If we replaced it with "challenge seeking" or "self-development", we'd have a different ruling. And how do you decide between which values are truly objective, well-being or challenge? I actually discuss this issue in my last section here (although my thoughts need some more fleshing out)
internetzdude t1_j9l0351 wrote
My view so far is roughly speaking naturalist/pragmatic in the sense that we figure out which values are truly objective in the same way as we would figure this out about any other issue. Maybe it's more about the stance towards a specific value. We sometimes speak of specific values in strongly realist ways. Whether we're right or wrong about this is a matter of nature, and, if you want to put it in these terms, concerns value epistemology. Although I'm sympathetic with error theory as a critique, I find it overall not very credible as a statement about all value.
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