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contractualist OP t1_j9c97mb wrote

Reply to comment by internetzdude in What Morality is Not (and why it's not the Repugnant Conclusion, Utilitarianism, or Libertarianism) by contractualist

I wouldn't say morality is divorced from ethics either. To have normative reasons, you need values that create those reasons, which I argue are freedom and reason. However, there are objective reasons to act given those values, which belong in the reason core (along with logic and mathematics). Value themselves, since they are agent-relative, would be in the freedom-residual.

In this case, what I am distinguishing are concepts that are either agent-independent or agent-relative, since we might be getting lost on objective/subjective.

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internetzdude t1_j9cfzh3 wrote

I understand the motivation and what you say but can't agree. IMHO the object/subjective distinction is indispensable, without it you cannot understand metaethical positions that talk about agent-relative, objective values. For example, if someone is an extrovert and likes meeting people, then it can be objectively good for them to have the opportunity to do so (notwithstanding conflicts with other values or reasons against it). But the value is clearly agent-relative, since there are also introverts with other needs. Many human needs are like that.

The attribute "subjective" is a bit special in my opinion, however, since it is better to speak of personal preferences instead of subjective values. These reflect what people like and what they prefer at a time. We do not generally talk about these as values, although sometimes we'd call some of them "personal values."

Orthogonal to these distinctions is in my opinion the agent-relative vs. agent-independent axis. Basically any kind of value that concerns a human is agent-relative.

To cut a long story short, agent-relative vs. agent-independent is one axis, subjective vs. object another axis, and absolute vs. relative yet another axis. I accept all distinctions, it's just is part of my personal view that talking about subjective values is a bit of a misnomer.

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contractualist OP t1_j9d05zg wrote

I get absolute vs. relative, but I treat agent-relative and agent independent the same as objective and subjective. If you have time, could you explain what I'm missing or point me in the right direction? If there is a distinction, I'll have to re-work my writing.

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internetzdude t1_j9g8j2u wrote

Francesco Orsi makes similar distinctions as I do. Orsi (2015): Value Theory. Bloomsbury Academic. It gives some taxonomy, otherwise I don't think it's very interesting. Here is my take, but whether you think these are examples of the types of values really depends on your metaethical stances:

+ subjective and agent-relative:

John: Becoming a lawyer is better for me than becoming a clarinetist. I appreciate the better job prospects and payment in the long run and I'm not really sure I would continue to like music if I became a professional musician.

John: Bungee jumping is great, it's better than going on a hike.

+ objective and agent-relative:

It is better for John not to become a lawyer and pursue a career as a clarinetist. John would probably not even pass the bar exams and the profession would invariably burn him out. He doesn't have the personality for it.

Bungee jumping is horrible for John. Because of some traumatic experience as a child, he's afraid of heights. However, he isn't aware of that yet.

+ subjective and agent independent:

John: Basic democracy is better than representational democracy. At least, I'd much prefer to live in a direct basic democracy.

+ objective and agent independent:

For various reasons <long list of reasons>, basic democracy is vulnerable to disruption and representational democracy is much better.

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contractualist OP t1_j9hh3n4 wrote

>+ objective and agent-relative:

It is better for John not to become a lawyer and pursue a career as a clarinetist. John would probably not even pass the bar exams and the profession would invariably burn him out. He doesn't have the personality for it.

Woah, this definitely sneaks in valuing well-being. If we replaced it with "challenge seeking" or "self-development", we'd have a different ruling. And how do you decide between which values are truly objective, well-being or challenge? I actually discuss this issue in my last section here (although my thoughts need some more fleshing out)

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internetzdude t1_j9l0351 wrote

My view so far is roughly speaking naturalist/pragmatic in the sense that we figure out which values are truly objective in the same way as we would figure this out about any other issue. Maybe it's more about the stance towards a specific value. We sometimes speak of specific values in strongly realist ways. Whether we're right or wrong about this is a matter of nature, and, if you want to put it in these terms, concerns value epistemology. Although I'm sympathetic with error theory as a critique, I find it overall not very credible as a statement about all value.

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