BlueSkyAndGoldenLite t1_j98eepq wrote
Took me a few rereads and looking up whatever/whoever he was referencing, but I think I'm getting the gist of what he's arguing? The main points I got from this I think were:
- Definitions of concepts/words matters a lot here
- Compatibilists definition of "free will" can be defined as having the freedom to act on our desires, even if these desires aren't something we were responsible for
- The conflict between our desires and the outside world's doesn't prove that free will exist in a compatibilist context. These desires after all, were just products of past events and causal chains
- Who we are has to be defined somewhere down the causal chain though, the alternative would mean that we would be free of all our desires and thus not really "us". Being free of all desires would mean that we are not really ourselves since our desires are important to our identity
Very interesting read, I think he makes a pretty compelling argument that is a lot more well defined/coherent than my take on free will up to now which kind of just boiled down to "all of who I am up to now has kind of been predetermined but even if free will is an illusion it's better to believe, even if falsely, that I am free so that I can function in society" Would love to hear other takes, especially if I interpreted some of this incorrectly.
keelanstuart t1_j9a522a wrote
What I took from it is that I may be a Compatibilist - I believe the universe is completely deterministic, even though I also think "free will" is the human experience - because I am ignorant and beyond education in any relevant, meaningful sense... unless I somehow missed the point.
Why? Given the state of the universe at any time to be S(T):
- I do not have knowledge of S(0)
- I do not have knowledge of the current T
- I can not extrapolate a future state, S(T + n), with any degree of certainty, even locally
- I feel "free" in my decisions, because even though I cannot control what I desire, it seems like I can choose how to deal with desires
- I can never change any of the above
Acceptance of our inescapable ignorance is the key to never feeling "oppressed" by determinism... which is why I would feel pity for any omniscient beings that exist; god knows they're not free.
In terms of moral responsibility, perhaps it is helpful to view the universe systematically. "Responsibility" allows the system to self-correct and protect itself. If we are not the individuals that we seem to be, but parts of a whole, removing pieces that damage that whole is of benefit.
BlueSkyAndGoldenLite t1_j9bblou wrote
My limited understanding of quantum stuff has led me to believe that there's multiple worlds out there due to the probabilistic nature of things. But then that seems to imply that the world is still deterministic, just now in infinite ways and the current "world" is still determined with factors outside of my control (luck/randomness).
I think that the acceptance definitely plays a part somewhere, I mean at the end of the day we are biologically programmed beings to live and have self-preservation so it makes sense that our minds come up with reasons for us to keep living.
I've pondered the idea of responsibility before as well. If you view the world deterministically then you can't hold people accountable. Even if the majority of society accepts determinism, we can't allow people who commit crimes to stay free for the benefit of the majority. If we want to act morally and put the blame on what caused someone to commit crimes, you kind of just start going down the rabbit hole of who/what to hold accountable? Do you blame someone's parents for their poor upbringing and as a result environment for growing up? Their DNA? For practicality, in society you kind of have to put the "responsibility" somewhere and its easiest to put the responsibility on the individual.
keelanstuart t1_j9bgbct wrote
Many of my beliefs have formed due to my profession as a software engineer. "Random" numbers are not truly random... they are pseudo-random given a seed value to start with. I.e., pull n values from a random number generator that started with the same seed and you will get the same numbers out in the same order each time. I like to think of "god" as that generation function and of each universe having a unique seed value. Maybe all universes have the same rules, but for each "decision point" (whatever that is!), a different number was given and thus a different result.
The little computers between our ears can't extrapolate S(T + n) for more than a couple of variables and we also can't look at the state of other brains... so, we're left to be mostly reactive to whatever we observed in S(T - m). Responsibility is placed most easily with the observed. When a computer malfunctions, we deal with that instance... yeah.
Looking at parents or at DNA is really meta... the machine looks at itself... what does it see?
mixile t1_j99gsq0 wrote
What does “freedom to act” mean? It sounds like a circular definition and nonsensical. If the universe is determined, you would act as you must act due to causality. What does freedom mean? Is it even meaningful outside of an aesthetic context? I think a feeling, what is perhaps referenced by freedom, is being substituted for an axiom without awareness of this choice.
frnzprf t1_j99wrs5 wrote
Let's say there is a human string puppet. It's wants to move a certain way, but the strings (or an exoskelleton) forces it to move another way.
It feels intuitive that a human that isn't tied to strings is freeer than a human that is.
The will may still be determined, so I wouldn't call it free will, but the untied human is free to act according to his will.
A short while ago someone argued that the term "free will" is also used in juristic contexts. I'd say at least they are talking about something, whether you should call it "free will" or not.
I suggest "free to act according to your own will".
People think of string-puppets when they feel uncomfortable with entertaining that they don't have free will.
On the other hand people also would say that a hypnotized person is not acting on free will, although they are free to act according to their will - which happens to be manipulated. Not all types of manipulation are considered as taking away free will. If you ask nicely or buy a service, that is also manipulating will.
What I'm saying is: There might be something what people call "free will" that exists and something different, that other people call "free will", that doesn't exist.
mixile t1_j9aenee wrote
If I psychologically prime a child to make the choice I prefer them to make such as give them two insignificant variants of the same choice (would you like to go to school now or in a few minutes?) they can feel free, no? Are they not compelled?
When the tiger starts running towards me, I feel a surge of adrenaline that allows me to climb a tree to safety. That may not feel free and yet every day I make choices with less urgency that are still ultimately about survival. I am not choosing to survive I am compelled.
Underneath whatever desire we think we have, how do we know there are no strings? Isn’t the point of a determined universe that there must be strings even if our intuition cannot see them? These desires are not an uncaused cause.
My intuition tells me all desire is manifest from the substrate and is not free ever, though I cannot define free so I have to go with some process of elimination to make that statement. My intuition tells me that we are always on strings due to our inability to fly or teleport but that other people feel free despite these constraints due to their acceptance of the constraints. My intuition tells me that constraints long applied get ignored. If I place a human being in the confines of a cell they will eventually stop testing the limits of that cell and perhaps then they will think they have free will again, intuitively, after some time.
If you want to define free will as any time you can make a decision that aligns with your expectations of what is possible without having to reflect on enfetterment you have not accepted as natural… then ok you have free will at times but it’s a rather absurd distinction to make. It does not seem to give rise to the moral premise the author wants.
frnzprf t1_j9b35id wrote
I was talking about literal strings. (When people say they aren't monkeys or machines, they are also thinking about literal monkeys and machines with metal cogs.)
Some constraints are felt as restricting, for example literal strings attached to your limbs and other constraints, like scratching your head, because it's itching or listening to music you like, don't feel restricting. They are both 100% determined, but they make a pragmatic difference in life. (That was phrased weirdly...)
Your home can never be 100% clean, but it still makes sense to say that a home is clean. "Clean" means that you can stop cleaning.
Maybe you could say that "free will" in a juristic sense is defined by it's consequences. Whenever it makes sense to punish someone, you say they acted on "free will". Whenever a condition should be medically treated, you call it a "sickness".
Then you can't say that someone should be punished because they acted on free will, or that a condition should be treated because it is a sickness, because that would be circular reasoning.
I absolutely agree that you could very well define "free" as "not determined" and as it is determined, it's not free. There is just an alternative definition of free will, that makes sense.
InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j9a4o8m wrote
>What does “freedom to act” mean?
Just use the normal definition used in society. I generally like to refer to the legal system.
In a legal contract there might be certain conditions that restrict your freedom to act in certain ways.
It's about the "external" world influences on what we call a "person". So to what extent does the external world influence and control what the person can do.
So treat a "person" as a black box, that includes everything that goes into making up that person, so their DNA and all past environmental inputs that you would consider making a person what they are.
Then since that person is a black box, you can't know how they work. In such a situation would knowing the current environmental inputs be able to predict what that person does.
So lets use a real life situation.
You may offer that person the opportunity to commit to traffic drugs. In the normal case you can't completely know whether the person would traffic drugs, that person has the freedom to choose. (The fact they choose deterministically is irrelevant).
In another situation you threaten the person to kill the person's family if they don't traffic drugs. In this situation the external environment is limiting the freedom to act of the person. That person is going to very likely to traffic drugs. (The fact they choose deterministically is irrelevant).
There is a real difference between being coerced into committing a crime and not. The difference according to most/all court and justice system, most lay people and most professional philosophers is know as "free will". The only group that might not agree are amateur philosophers.
>It is a principle of fundamental justice that only voluntary conduct – behaviour that is the product of a free will and controlled body, unhindered by external constraints – should attract the penalty and stigma of criminal liability.
>
>https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/1861/index.do
In the case of R. v. Ruzic
>The accused had been coerced by an individual in Colombia to smuggle cocaine into the United States. He was told that if he did not comply, his wife and child in Colombia would be harmed.
The Supreme Court found that he didn't smuggle the cocaine of his own free will. He didn't do it in line with his desires free from external coercion. Hence they were found innocent.
mixile t1_j9acihx wrote
By this definition my dresser has freedom to act. I can equally apply this definition to a computer program that controls a thermostat based on tenant law.
Do these objects have free will?
InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j9ajhd1 wrote
>By this definition my dresser has freedom to act.
No it doesn't... How did you come to that conclusion.?
Edit: To clarify I define free will as "the ability to make voluntary actions in line with your desires free from external coercion/influence".
BlueSkyAndGoldenLite t1_j9bf18i wrote
I kind of see it as the ability to act as we desire, but not having the ability to desire what we desire. That definitely just circles back around to not being in control of our actions, but the main takeaway I took was the counterargument that we must come from somewhere as our definition of who we are is the sum of our experiences, environment, genetics, etc. If you take all that away then you are not really you anymore so you should kind of just, accept that I guess? Maybe you are right about the emotional aspect of it as this argument seems to hint that we should take some pride in our past. Kind of like, well we can't really have changed who we are up to now but the alternative is nothingness so let's try to make the most out of it.
Perhaps this is the natural conclusion even if deterministic that we are designed to come to? Giving people the illusion of free will helps encourage them to survive and make the most out of their life?
oeksa t1_j9a7212 wrote
this is kind of an impossible discussion. whether we call it determinism or compatibilism or guided voluntarism or whatever, logic says that no man or woman can think or act beyond the constraints of the laws of nature (which may include some randomness. however, randomness does not make you any more in control, it just means that your actions were not predetermined). freedom to act would require freedom not to act. not acting on a desire only proves that other desires or constraints were stronger. so your previous take is still right and compatible with both determinism, some variants of voluntarism, and compatibilism, depending on definitions of these terms.
BlueSkyAndGoldenLite t1_j9bfhj6 wrote
Yeah, just mentioned it in another comment but my understanding, though limited of quantum mechanics just implies that the world can be probabilistic but that just shifts causality to be the result of luck/randomness.
I think this is definitely an argument that kind of just never ends until we come to a better understanding of neuroscience/physics. At the end of the day though it seems valuable to have arguments, define concepts, etc.
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