Submitted by greghickey5 t3_113ecst in philosophy
adurango t1_j8psxld wrote
This is pretty interesting and I appreciated the end of it (quick read). But I think the author skipped an important concept. If all our decisions can be traced back to genetics, situational and nurture; aren’t those variables beyond our own control anyway? We may feel that our choices are our own but think about a recent decision. You may have debated it consciously, but if you really think about it, that decision was made as soon as you are aware of the choice. You are really spending the time trying to understand that choice.
I think that was main theme The Matrix part II.
dmk_aus t1_j8qhoqo wrote
At each point in time, all your atoms, electrons bonds etc are in a given state of motion, energy, location, etc. So the next moment must either be determined already and/or varied by what we consider random quantum effects. And so on back to the big bang and forwards into the future.
Unless there is "a soul" or similar which would contain our will and can somehow interact with our body(including the brain) and change its state but also has never been detected by science... it is pretty hard to explain that their is free will.
However, it is clear that drugs/chemicals, brain damage, education, illness, weather, sleep deprivation, time of day, etc can affect what people think, how they think and how they act. Which means that a souls impact is minimal or the soul is impacted by the material world and is therefore starting to look deterministic...
Either quantum actions in the brain are soul/magic/unknown something or we are deterministic (Newtonian) and/or random (quantum) bio-automatons.
Or, of course, we are in a simulation, then a scientific understanding of the "world" doesn't help much as there could be a random "if statement".
pizzageek t1_j8qpj2h wrote
Even the soul or external force argument leads to determinism. Does a being with a soul get to choose that soul? If so, did they get to choose whatever it was that made that particular choice of soul? Any philosophical concept surrounding free will eventually leads back to there being an external determination made first. This original determination then effects all subsequent “choices” and negates any true free will.
[deleted] t1_j8rvd2d wrote
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Dirks_Knee t1_j8rucil wrote
Have you seen Devs? A great entertaining show debating this exact idea.
gashmol t1_j8qmc94 wrote
Trying to explain freewill in terms of a soul is begging the question. Appealing to randomness is replacing one kind of prison with another. Compatibilism, no matter how you define it, is another illusion.
Freewill is nonsensical.
dmk_aus t1_j8qp7op wrote
That is essentially what I said, I just provided reasoning and left the pathway to changing opinion without ridicule.
dbx999 t1_j8rt8bs wrote
Randomness should be considered as deterministic. The flip of a coin over time reveals the deterministic nature of randomness, falling in line with the elegant orderly pattern of 50% heads and 50% tails. Chaos and uncertainty turns into order and predictable over an aggregate.
Your life is one toss of one coin.
So when you land one way, you will feel as if you chose the side to land on. But it is all the forces acting on you from outside of you that determined that outcome. And if you pull back that perspective to a population of 8 billion other humans, the predictable order that humans follow the same rules as flipped coins and viruses becomes evident.
We may be sentient but we may only be witnesses to our own existence. Passenger of my soul, eyewitness of my fate. Not master or captain.
SpoddyCoder t1_j8t4l40 wrote
Another way to view randomness as the same as deterministic was posited by John Conway when developing the free-will theorem…
Imagine rolling all the random numbers you need for the universe’s lifetime in advance. Then simply pull them out in the order of their use… gives the illusion of total random outcomes for events - but they were still determined before the event.
dbx999 t1_j8t6kva wrote
Another simplistic demonstration I found neat is this distribution of balls which despite the random falling behavior of each individual ball, ultimately reveals an orderly outcome of an aggregate population of balls - and consistently behaves this way over and over when the process is repeated.
So if we imagine ourselves as being one single ball, then we will feel as though the paths we “choose” will be either random or even made by our free will to pick between a right or left direction at each collision and crossroads that we encounter - and where we end up may feel as though we chose our adventure. However, the fact we all together as a group behave in such a predictable way as to repeat the bell curved distribution contradicts the idea that individual choice is separate and independent from determinism.
Our choices are not only limited (we cannot for instance choose to violate physical laws of the universe - so we’re constrained to choices bracketed inside parameters) but our choices are ultimately following a grander deterministic set of rules. What you choose and what I choose may seem independent of one another - and independent of the choices of everyone in our population- yet we will fall within a bell curve and the bell curve will be established each time by our so called choices.
We have no more free will than each of those little falling balls. Randomness exists but randomness leads to both order and predictability and consistency. Randomness does not equal complete chaos. It is merely a process to carry one thing from one state to another state and there is nothing chaotic about that process, only that from the perspective of the individual in motion, the future is opaque until it becomes the present.
frnzprf t1_j8w270m wrote
It's like shuffling a deck of cards.
Auctorion t1_j8rwakg wrote
Except that there are aspects of quantum mechanics that, as far as we know, are totally random and non-deterministic, e.g. radioactive decay. Now you might say that these events don't percolate up to our scale, but bypassing discussion of whether they do, we can make them percolate up. If you defer decision making to a quantum random number generator you would have an event on our scale that could not have been predicted. A deterministic event horizon.
dbx999 t1_j8ta8sf wrote
I think we’re trying to shoehorn the concept that true chaos exists and “percolates” to disrupt a clean deterministic system. However I’m not convinced this is the case.
Let’s look at the ratio of pi. Its values consist of unpredictable seemingly random strings of digits. Randomness therefore exists?
Well - that’s in pure mathematics so does this even apply to a physical world? Not sure if these two can bridge the gap between the conceptual math to material reality.
Say some value of some phenomenon seems random. like your radioactive decay. I’m still not sure if that proves anything. What if the observed radioactive decay when aggregated forms a more cohesive pattern akin to the bell curves and distribution of other phenomena? My point was to say that seemingly random events such as the flip of a coin become not random when aggregated. And maybe that is also the case in your example.
Auctorion t1_j8tk86z wrote
>I think we’re trying to shoehorn the concept that true chaos exists and “percolates” to disrupt a clean deterministic system.
It's not shoehorning at all though, is it? Humans exist. Humans can leverage quantum probability. That is all that is needed because we act as a conduit for the micro, medium, and macro scales to interact in ways they may not absent the involvement of intelligence. Left alone, our Sun will become a white dwarf in about 5 billion years. If humans stick around long enough, it's likely we'll find a way to prevent that. If we decided whether to let the Sun burn itself out or to refuel it based on the roll of a quantum RNG, that would be a piece of quantum randomness affecting the lifecycle of stars. Scale it up. Even if you consider it to be shoehorning, it doesn't matter. It's still disruption to the supposedly clean deterministic system.
>Let’s look at the ratio of pi. Its values consist of unpredictable seemingly random strings of digits. Randomness therefore exists?
Pi isn't random. It's irrational. Its numbers don't change, it's properties aren't in flux- they just require discovery. Fun aside: we only need 40 digits of pi to calculate the circumference of the universe to within an error margin smaller than a hydrogen atom, but last summer we knew over 62.8 trillion digits of pi.
>What if the observed radioactive decay when aggregated forms a more cohesive pattern akin to the bell curves and distribution of other phenomena?
Then my beliefs will adjust based on the evidence because these are beliefs founded upon the evidence, not beliefs that cherry pick evidence in support of beliefs I intend to hold regardless.
SnapcasterWizard t1_j8sr3d8 wrote
>totally random and non-deterministic, e.g. radioactive decay
Its not totally random, from the perspective of an individual atom it appears to be. But if you have enough atoms then there is a clear non-randomness to the decay.
Look at it like this, if it were truly random, then different atoms couldn't have different half lives.
Auctorion t1_j8ss3va wrote
Totally random doesn’t mean 100% absolute maximum random, just as free will doesn’t mean the ability to ignore causality. It means that the specific moment of decay cannot, by any known means, be predicted even if you know the window.
frnzprf t1_j8w1zuv wrote
Randomness is a weird concept. I think you can replace it with "unpredictable".
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Predictability depends on an individual perspective. When physicists say that quants are random, they say that noone will ever be able to predict their behaviour.
bakmanthetitan329 t1_j8xm020 wrote
I try to use the term "causal determinism" in discussions of free will. The progression of the state of the universe is strictly caused by the state of the universe (and nothing else), although it may not be a priori determinable from the state.
Xenophon_jr t1_j8rkitj wrote
And you're nonsensical without it.
Aus_with_the_Sauce t1_j9016iy wrote
This is the only viewpoint that has ever made sense to me. Free will is only real in the sense that we “feel” like we’re in control.
DasAllerletzte t1_j8rcs7w wrote
>a random „if statement“
Then our world might be run by an AI
Fast_Philosophy1044 t1_j8wytzt wrote
I wonder why you said scientific understanding isn’t possible if there is a random if statement.
Science already tries to uncover those of statements as causality, isn’t it? If there is an if statement, that would be under the chain of causality since it always applies.
[deleted] t1_j8ym8qw wrote
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InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j8rap2b wrote
>If all our decisions can be traced back to genetics, situational and nurture; aren’t those variables beyond our own control anyway?
You are your genetics and upbringing. There is no need for you to have control over what you are.
So free will is about being able to act in line with your desires. It isn't about having complete control of your desires.
HippyHitman t1_j8rbguv wrote
But what’s free about that? What’s the difference between you acting on your desires and a robot acting on its programming?
threedecisions t1_j8rpkg4 wrote
The belief in Free Will is like an algorythm sent to a robot because it is encourages social order. It puts parameters on the robot's behaviors by telling it nasty things will happen to it if it acts outside of them.
The limitations on the idea is when the robot is unable to comply with prescriptions given to it and is punished rather than assisted.
DasAllerletzte t1_j8rea3z wrote
I’d say, you can adapt.
And also consider non-measurable phenomena like other peoples feelings or reactions.
You can prioritize.
Recently I wanted to get §thing.
Then I started to weigh wether I truly need §thing and if I can afford it too.
Such decisions would require a ton of code engineering to implement.
HippyHitman t1_j8rf9hn wrote
>I’d say, you can adapt.
Sure, but what about a machine that can alter its own programming? If it’s not acting with free will when it adapts, then those adaptations aren’t free will.
>And also consider non-measurable phenomena like other peoples feelings or reactions.
They may not be measurable, but they can be observed and estimated. That’s how you do it, after all.
>You can prioritize.
This one machines are already great at. Probably better than us. The amount of prioritization that happens every microsecond in order to make modern computers run would fry our brains.
>Such decisions would require a ton of code engineering to implement.
Sure, and that’s my argument. We’re just extremely complex machines, so the reasoning is obfuscated to the point that it gives the illusion of free will. But if we could actually analyze our minds and thought mechanisms I don’t see why it would be any different from a computer program, and I don’t see where there’s room for free will.
frnzprf t1_j8w3ow1 wrote
> We’re just extremely complex machines, so the reasoning is obfuscated to the point that it gives the illusion of free will.
That's interesting. You say you have an illusion of free will, but you have seen through it. I don't even have the illusion of free will. I just have a will, which is inherently subjective, so it can't be an illusion.
Maybe historically free will meant something different then how I'd define it today. Maybe "someone is free to act according to their will". (Maybe not that though. I'm not sure.) A judge said "I'm punishing you, because you acted on free will, i.e. you weren't directly coerced by other peoples wills."
Then over time the meaning of free will evolved to something like "will, at least partially independent of everything", but people still claim to believe in it, because they are thinking of the older, pragmatic definition.
dbx999 t1_j8rw2b1 wrote
The more complex and nuanced the situation and decision making becomes the more convincing that the choice is the product of our inner self. We retcon our decisions as being products of free will. We ride a roller coaster of a life and think the whole time we’re steering the thing while it’s on a track.
InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j8rcoqq wrote
>But what’s free about that?
I'm sure there are other definitions, but I use something like free will is about "the ability to make voluntary actions in line with your desires free from external coercion/influence".
Free will is key in morality and justice, so I like to understand how the courts define and use it. Lets use a real life example of how the Supreme Court considers free will.
>It is a principle of fundamental justice that only voluntary conduct – behaviour that is the product of a free will and controlled body, unhindered by external constraints – should attract the penalty and stigma of criminal liability.
>
>https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/1861/index.do
In the case of R. v. Ruzic
>The accused had been coerced by an individual in Colombia to smuggle cocaine into the United States. He was told that if he did not comply, his wife and child in Colombia would be harmed.
The Supreme Court found that he didn't smuggle the cocaine of his own free will. He didn't do it in line with his desires free from external coercion. Hence they were found innocent.
Compare that to the average case of smuggling where someone wants to make some money and isn't coerced into doing it. If they smuggle drugs then they did it of their own "free will" and would likely be found guilty.
So in one example the person had what the courts say is free will and not in the other.
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>What’s the difference between you acting on your desires and a robot acting on its programming?
Well I would say a person is just a really complicated robot, so there isn't anything fundamentally different apart from complexity.
HippyHitman t1_j8rd1xk wrote
Legality doesn’t imply truth.
Let’s compare two scenarios: in one you program a robot to kill someone, in the other you program a robot to cut people’s hair but it has a horrible malfunction and kills someone. In which of those is scenarios is the robot exercising free will?
If you agree that humans are essentially no different from robots, then it follows that we can’t have free will regardless of what any court or law says.
InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j8rf5pd wrote
>Legality doesn’t imply truth.
I just refer to the legal system since they have good high quality analysis of free will which matches up to most people's intuitions around free will. It also lines up with what most philosophers think.
>Let’s compare two scenarios: in one you program a robot to kill someone,
Not sure here, how do you define a robot's desires?
If we switch it out to be a person, and say they have the genetics and upbringing to make them a violent killer. If they had the desire to kill someone and voluntary acted on that then it would be of their own free will.
> in the other you program a robot to cut people’s hair but it has a horrible malfunction and kills someone.
Well that's not in line with their desires and isn't a voluntary action, so wouldn't be of it's free will.
>If you agree that humans are essentially no different from robots, then it follows that we can’t have free will regardless of what any court or law says.
Sounds like you are talking about libertarian free will, and sure people don't have libertarian free will, but that doesn't matter since most people are really talking about compatibilist intuitions, which we do have.
What people really mean by free will is the same thing the courts are talking about. They aren't talking about the libertarian free will you are using.
HippyHitman t1_j8rg9mj wrote
This doesn’t seem like a logical argument to me. It seems like you’re just saying humans tend to believe we have free will, and our society is based upon that assumption.
I’m arguing that the assumption is incorrect.
Where would we draw the line between free will and compulsion? It has to be arbitrary, just like you noted about a robot’s desires. An automaton desires nothing other than following its programming, so anything a robot does successfully would be an exercise of free will. But I don’t think anybody would actually argue that, they’d argue it’s an exercise of the programmer’s free will. Why is it different for us just because our programming isn’t apparent?
InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j8rrx36 wrote
>This doesn’t seem like a logical argument to me. It seems like you’re just saying humans tend to believe we have free will, and our society is based upon that assumption.
I'm saying that humans use the compatibilist definition of free will. Hence it makes sense to talk about compatibilist free will rather than libertarian free will.
I'm saying it's illogical to use the incoherent concept of libertarian free will.
>Where would we draw the line between free will and compulsion?
It would depend on the facts and I like to look at the legal system, which does this all the time.
In cases like R. v. Ruzic, they looked at the facts and determined they were coerced and hence didn't have free will.
In the case of Powell v Texas, where they tried a defence that it wasn't of their own free will since they were an alcoholic. While this argument shows they didn't have libertarian freewill. The courts didn't accept this argument and it was found they did have free will. So they did distinguish between free will and compulsion in this case.
>It has to be arbitrary
Just like pretty much every high level concept. Even the concept of "life" is arbitrary with many blurred lines. But just because the concept of life is arbitrary doesn't mean it isn't useful or that we can't apply in the context of humans.
>, just like you noted about a robot’s desires. An automaton desires nothing other than following its programming, so anything a robot does successfully would be an exercise of free will. But I don’t think anybody would actually argue that, they’d argue it’s an exercise of the programmer’s free will. Why is it different for us just because our programming isn’t apparent?
​
>Why is it different for us just because our programming isn’t apparent?
Maybe that's the main difference. We aren't programmed with a clear simple goal of killing someone, whereas the robot was.
If you change the example of just making the angry and violent, then if the robot following these goals kills someone, I think it is fairly similar to the human case.
CruxCapacitors t1_j8t1c7h wrote
I dislike your focus on the legal use of "free will" because the legal system, particularly in the US (which is where you're citing cases from), has a very poor, punitive prison system that has terrible recidivism rates. I can't help but feel that if more people realized that compatibilism is flawed, we might be able to better rehabilitate people.
InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j8t4336 wrote
>I dislike your focus on the legal use of "free will" because the legal system
If you read the legal judgements around free will you'll see that they have an amazing grasp and understanding of the subject. They are as good if not better than most stuff philosophers write on the subject.
I like looking at the legal approach since is a nice realistic approach and understanding of the world that makes sense rather than an incoherent idea that isn't applicable to the reality we live in.
​
>I can't help but feel that if more people realized that compatibilism is flawed, we might be able to better rehabilitate people.
Having a more rehabilitative justice system has absolutely nothing to do with the fact the justice system is based on compatibilist free will. So that's just a non argument.
Any functioning justice system which focuses on rehabilitation needs to also use compatibilist free will to work.
In fact studies suggest the justice system would likely be even worse without compatibilist free will.
>These three studies suggest that endorsement of the belief in free will can lead to decreased ethnic/racial prejudice compared to denial of the belief in free will. https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0091572#s1>
>
>For example, weakening free will belief led participants to behave less morally and responsibly (Baumeister et al., 2009; Protzko et al., 2016; Vohs & Schooler, 2008) From https://www.ethicalpsychology.com/search?q=free+will
>
>these results provide a potential explanation for the strength and prevalence of belief in free will: It is functional for holding others morally responsible and facilitates justifiably punishing harmful members of society. https://www.academia.edu/15691341/Free_to_punish_A_motivated_account_of_free_will_belief?utm_content=buffercd36e&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer From https://www.ethicalpsychology.com/search?q=free+will
>
>A study suggests that when people are encouraged to believe their behavior is predetermined by genes or by environment they may be more likely to cheat. The report, in the January issue of Psychological Science, describes two studies by Kathleen D. Vohs of the University of Minnesota and Jonathan W. Schooler of the University of British Columbia.
BroadShoulderedBeast t1_j8rks0a wrote
I think in the context of free will discussion, voluntary action isn’t the same as free will. Even a robot can have a goal to do a thing as a matter of its pre-programming, but if another thing interrupts that action and the robot is made to do something different, it is no longer totally voluntary. The robot had a plan of action but had to change that plan because of circumstances outside of its control. Free will is not required for voluntary action.
Someone who kidnaps because they have the goal of making money versus someone who kidnaps because they have the goal of surviving against the person who ordered them at gun point to kidnap have very different degrees of voluntary action. The causes of their doing the kidnapping say something about the person’s propensity for voluntarily engaging in anti-social behavior.
InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j8roxdi wrote
>I think in the context of free will discussion, voluntary action isn’t the same as free will.
I didn't say it was the same.
>Someone who kidnaps because they have the goal of making money versus someone who kidnaps because they have the goal of surviving against the person who ordered them at gun point to kidnap have very different degrees of voluntary action. The causes of their doing the kidnapping say something about the person’s propensity for voluntarily engaging in anti-social behavior.
Even if you don't use the word "free will", you are using the concept to distinguish between these two situations. So I'm not really sure of your point.
You accept that there is a difference between the situations. Do you also accept the legal system and most people would use the term free will in that context?
BroadShoulderedBeast t1_j8uufed wrote
I worded that very poorly. What I should have said was, voluntary action doesn’t require libertarian free will. Then, as I kept trying to explain more, I realized I don’t even think ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ really make sense in a deterministic/random universe.
>So I’m not really sure of your point.
My point was that free will means you could have acted differently given the same exact set of circumstances, genetics, environment, so on, because of some force that can act on the universe without detection. Involuntary means the person wouldn’t normally do that action except for a very small set of circumstances, usually because of threat to safety or life.
>most people would use the term free will in that context?
I’m not sure what the conventional use of the term ‘free will’ has to do with metaphysics. See the conventional use of “begging the question” for why lay use of philosophy jargon is not always helpful.
InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j8x2kpk wrote
>Then, as I kept trying to explain more, I realized I don’t even think ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ really make sense in a deterministic/random universe.
I use the word voluntary since it's also used by incompatibilists like Sam Harris.
So Harris gives the example of deliberately shaking your hand as a voluntary action and your hand shaking as a result of Parkinson's as an involuntary action.
In theory we could do brain scans to differentiate the kinds of actions which are voluntary and involuntary.
So lets just use the words as defined by medical science.
I assume you agree there is a manful different between someone hitting you on purpose vs having an epileptic fit. That difference is what people normally mean by voluntary and involuntary actions.
>My point was that free will means you could have acted differently given the same exact set of circumstances, genetics, environment, so on,
Libertarian free will would mean that, but I'm talking about compatibilist free which doesn't doesn't.
>I’m not sure what the conventional use of the term ‘free will’ has to do with metaphysics. See the conventional use of “begging the question” for why lay use of philosophy jargon is not always helpful.
My point is that most lay people have compatibilist intuitions, most professional philosophers are outright compatibilists, pretty much all moral, court and justice systems are based on compatibilist free will.
>Most professional philosophers are compatibilists https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/all
Why on the earth would someone use some metaphysical definition of free will, "libertarian free will", which is only really used by some amateur philosophers? It has zero relevance to what most people actually mean by the term, and has zero relevance or impact on the world in which we live.
I want to talk about the definition of free will which most people really mean, the term used by most professional philosophers, the the definition used by moral systems, court and justice systems around the world. I want to use the definition which is relevant to the world in which we live.
So if you want to talk about metaphysics which has zero relevance to the world in which we live, then you should make it clear. Because when people say that free will doesn't exist it confuses lay people. When you confuse people then it leads to people being more racist, immoral, etc.
​
>These three studies suggest that endorsement of the belief in free will can lead to decreased ethnic/racial prejudice compared to denial of the belief in free will. https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0091572#s1>
>
>For example, weakening free will belief led participants to behave less morally and responsibly (Baumeister et al., 2009; Protzko et al., 2016; Vohs & Schooler, 2008)
>
>From https://www.ethicalpsychology.com/search?q=free+will
>
>these results provide a potential explanation for the strength and prevalence of belief in free will: It is functional for holding others morally responsible and facilitates justifiably punishing harmful members of society. https://www.academia.edu/15691341/Free_to_punish_A_motivated_account_of_free_will_belief?utm_content=buffercd36e&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer
>
>From https://www.ethicalpsychology.com/search?q=free+will
>
>A study suggests that when people are encouraged to believe their behavior is predetermined by genes or by environment they may be more likely to cheat. The report, in the January issue of Psychological Science, describes two studies by Kathleen D. Vohs of the University of Minnesota and Jonathan W. Schooler of the University of British Columbia.
>
>From https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/19/health/19beha.html?scp=5&sq=psychology%20jonathan%20schooler&st=cse
frnzprf t1_j8w5oy6 wrote
I agree that we should use words how they are used in daily life and not redefine them.
I think the judges shouldn't call that "free will" based on the usages of "free" and "will". Basically, I personally like the definition of libertarian free will better, because it's about a will that is free.
I'd call what the judge called "acting on free will", "acting based on your own will". If the judges definition is more common, it becomes the correct definition.
When it's hot in a room, then you don't have to fix the air-conditioning system, when there is a power failiure. The air-conditioniner wasn't "responsible". I think punishing criminals is like fixing or calibrating machines.
InTheEndEntropyWins t1_j8x6vq0 wrote
>I agree that we should use words how they are used in daily life and not redefine them.
That's my main argument. Most people have compatibilist intuitions in respect to free will. Most professional philosophers are outright compatibilists. Moral, court and justice systems are all based on compatibilist free will.
So yes, we should use the definition of what most people/society really mean by the word free will.
>[https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/all)
The only people redefining free will are the ones using libertarian free will, and incompatibilists.
Latera t1_j8zzhzd wrote
The ability to act based on reasons. No robot that has ever been produced has been able to act based on reasons and if, one day, we have AI that CAN reason, then it WILL be free.
LittleFoot_Path t1_j8q2cpk wrote
Only if you can pinpoint a certain spot at which you consider “life starting”
I’ve asked this question to many and most just become uncomfortable about it, but I still hold it,
“when do you consider your life starting, at which point did you say “I’m alive” and consider the other parts not alive”
I’m not sure this highlights the topic but it’s still in line with the underpinnings. Why do we look to science to deliver us when most can’t even simply awnser that for ourselves?
Quarter13 t1_j8qlgya wrote
I had this conversation with my lady one night. My question was a bit different, it was "when does consciousness start, and do we have 'soul' before that?" Was trying to recall my first memory and it really terrified me that I was alive, breathing, eating, walking etc. all before I had any recollection. Made me wonder if consciousness requires a certain amount of information be taken in by the brain first.
LittleFoot_Path t1_j8r5gqu wrote
Agreed that it’s kind of a mind fuck, and yes I’m using life and consciousness interchangeably here. reminds me of a song “death is only the end if you assume the story is about you”
Quarter13 t1_j8r9vs1 wrote
I like that quote a lot. Ima use that
DasAllerletzte t1_j8rd4rb wrote
Wasn’t there a saying along the lines of „we’re but the sum of our memories“?
[deleted] t1_j8ton8r wrote
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TheReal8symbols t1_j8sdm85 wrote
This is what has always bothered me about the multiverse idea that every choice you could have made is made in another dimension/universe. I made the decision for reasons and there's no reason I would have ever made a different decision under the same circumstances.
JeanVicquemare t1_j8tvibo wrote
>If all our decisions can be traced back to genetics, situational and nurture; aren’t those variables beyond our own control anyway?
This is in fact the thrust of Galen Strawson's major argument, which I find to be pretty compelling.
The article basically allows that we don't have freedom to do otherwise but says that free will is still a useful psychological concept, which is true. But it doesn't help proponents of libertarian free will.
VitriolicViolet t1_j8t1epz wrote
All of that is you though, that's the whole point.
If those things (your genes, neurons, environment, culture, memories etc) are not 'you' then 'you' don't exist
Johannes--Climacus t1_j8u1bez wrote
Are there events that occur which require me as an agent to affect them? If yes, then there is free will, if not, there is neither free will nor me
Jaltcoh t1_j8v04ra wrote
I don’t know what you mean by “that decision was made as soon as you are aware of the choice.” It’s not clear to me that that’s true, or that it would disprove free will if it were true.
Also, you seem to be assuming that “all our decisions can be traced back to genetics” and other things outside our control. Well, those things clearly contribute a lot to our actions, but that isn’t the issue. That just means we don’t have total freedom, which should be obvious even to believers in free will. When people argue against free will, it often seems like they’re setting up two extremes: either no freedom ever, or a magical, supernatural “ghost” roaming around our bodies. Framing it like that makes the second option sound so ridiculous as to suggest that the only serious answer for any educated person in the modern world is to deny free will in absolute terms. But I like the article’s suggestion to reconsider how we think about free will. We might not have all the relevant knowledge yet, and the debate doesn’t need to be constantly boiled down to two cartoonish extremes.
The article does a good job of subtly refuting the Libet experiment, after it was more bluntly debunked by John Searle in his book Rationality in Action over 20 years ago.
Fast_Philosophy1044 t1_j8wygyn wrote
This is exactly Schopenhauer’s position on free will.
Voidtoform t1_j8y3dd0 wrote
You are still your subconscious…. I don’t see how subconsciousness has anything at all to do with free will.
Insanity_Pills t1_j991m3q wrote
I would say that yes, those variables are beyond are control. I would personally go a bit past that and say that everything that happens is simply the inevitable result of what happened before it, a single line of events tracing back to the beginning of things.
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=WagdzxAH8EQ
this video really made me start thinking about this topic, I highly recommend anyone with an interest in free will watch this
SaltyShawarma t1_j8qoh8j wrote
I really appreciate this take and will exercise my free will to continue to assume the title actually read, "Free Willy is Only an Illusion if You are, too."
Willy and I are not illusions and I would challenge you to hypothesize some logical origin of this declared decision based on nuances contained within this rambling.
bumharmony t1_j8qy6jz wrote
If you keep your Willy free in the public, your will will not be free in the near future.
Nameless1995 t1_j8px505 wrote
> You may have debated it consciously, but if you really think about it, that decision was made as soon as you are aware of the choice. You are really spending the time trying to understand that choice.
I don't see why. That sounds like saying an artificial reinforcement learning agent is only evaluating a pre-made decision when it is computing the weight for each action in the action space and selecting (deciding) the maximum weighed action. That would be a very weird and confusing thing to say, even if the agent is completely determined by its inital seed, program, environment, history and etc. You can always create off-brand language games, and say such things as "because the decision is logically entailed by so and so, it's all pre-made" but I am not sure everyone would subscribe to that language game. Being logically entailed is different from actually causally executing a decision.
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