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EleanorStroustrup t1_j8qys18 wrote

Reply to comment by Devinology in “The principle of protecting our own thinking from eavesdroppers is fundamental to autonomy.” – Daniel Dennett debates the sort of free will it’s worth wanting with neuroscientists Patrick Haggard and philosopher Helen Steward by IAI_Admin

Your argument is built on several unstated assumptions that are not obviously correct.

> That’s the point, we know we do have free will.

No, we don’t know this.

> If we didn’t, we wouldn’t be able to function,

Why would not actually having free will mean we couldn’t function?

> there would be no point to anything,

Yes. And?

> and ethical concepts would be meaningless.

Yes. And?

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Devinology t1_j8qzj7h wrote

We do know, because we know the difference between experiences of agency and lack of agency. This wouldn't be a topic of conversation otherwise. Why would we even be discussing this? Again, this is the point here. Experiencing free will is all free will is. It would be nothing if not experienced. A god-like figure dictating reality without perceiving itself as doing so wouldn't have free will because it wouldn't experience itself as such. It wouldn't care.

Experiencing free will is tantamount to having it. Anything else is some other unrelated concept.

If there was no point to anything then you wouldn't bother doing anything.

If ethical concepts were meaningless than we wouldn't care about them.

A determined reality would dictate that we wouldn't bother pretending to have free will if we didn't have it.

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EleanorStroustrup t1_j8r3lir wrote

> Experiencing free will is all free will is. It would be nothing if not experienced. A god-like figure dictating reality without perceiving itself as doing so wouldn’t have free will because it wouldn’t experience itself as such.

The experience is necessary, but not sufficient. A god-like figure who doesn’t think they have free will wouldn’t meaningfully have free will, but neither would a non-god who thinks they have free will, because they’d still have to actually have free will in order to have free will.

I’m sure you’ve seen a lot of demonstrations that thinking oneself admirable is not sufficient to actually be admirable. Free will isn’t qualitatively different from that.

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liquiddandruff t1_j8uwg7s wrote

A lot of free will proponents seem unable to distinguish between the concepts of a subjective experience of free will and the ontological existence of free will. They think subjective experience is sufficient to automatically prove the latter. They see them both as one concept. So strange.

It's like a mind block. Kind of shocking to see, really.

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liquiddandruff t1_j8uw979 wrote

> A determined reality would dictate that we wouldn't bother pretending to have free will if we didn't have it.

False. You seem to be under the assumption a determined reality cannot give rise to the illusion of free will. This is an grounded, baseless assumption you're standing on.

We are experiencing "free will" but our subjective experience of such does not automatically impart to the universe that then free will as a concept is true. If you don't see this, simply come up with any other subjective experience as example and you should reach the same conclusion.

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