Viewing a single comment thread. View all comments

SvetlanaButosky t1_j8ehuvi wrote

Reply to comment by IAI_Admin in “The principle of protecting our own thinking from eavesdroppers is fundamental to autonomy.” – Daniel Dennett debates the sort of free will it’s worth wanting with neuroscientists Patrick Haggard and philosopher Helen Steward by IAI_Admin

Nice summary but Dennett is still using the same unconvincing argument with a different spin.

As Sam Harris put it, compatibilism is just arguing that free will exists as long as the puppet ignores its strings.

Non of our thoughts are free from external causations that we dont control, even our attempts to control our thoughts are just an illusion of will that our brain created from other external stimuli, its just a function of evolution to give us agency and survive better, but agency is not free.

43

Devinology t1_j8ers16 wrote

The main point from compatibilists is that the determinist conception of free will is simply inaccurate. Free will isn't about imposing control of any sort. That simply has nothing to do with agency. Agency is constituted by the experience of not being at odds with reality. Only the agent's experience matters. The causal interaction of atomic particles isn't part of the phenomenology. If you experience yourself as having agency, then you do, by definition, since that's all agency is.

21

HumbleFlea t1_j8f17zq wrote

We have agency but it isn’t free from causality. What is a choice if you couldn’t have made a different one?

15

Devinology t1_j8f7e05 wrote

Phenomenologically, you could have acted otherwise. In other words, as far as you're concerned, you could have. It's not inconceivable or impossible for that to have happened (as in there is definitely a possible world in which you did act differently, virtually infinitely many in fact), which is why it appears as a "choice" to you. As long as there is some possible world in which you acted differently, then you experience the event as contingent. And since the experience of it is all that matters to you (the only person who could perceive their own agency), you have agency.

More technically though, agency is not an event to be observed objectively. You can't point to something and say, "that's agency". Agency is a phenomenological property, something that can only be experienced. Nobody else can determine whether you have agency or not, only you can. For example, if you tell me to do something, and point a gun at my head, and then I do it, you'll probably assume I don't have agency in that situation. But if I felt like I wanted to do it, then I do have agency, despite the fact that I ultimately had to do it (or die I suppose, but you can change the gun to a magic wand that literally forces me, to strengthen the example). This is all still the case, regardless of whether everything happening was determined in some grander sense. Just think of every higher order system of determination as another magic wand.

Going back to your initial question though, I think the simple answer is that our layman's notion of what constitutes a choice is just wrong. We don't enact reality when we make choices; that's not what a choice is. But it doesn't mean choices don't exist. We know they do because we experience them. We act them out.

8

HumbleFlea t1_j8fh3y8 wrote

No, phenomenologically you felt like you could have acted otherwise. That’s an important distinction. And while an individual’s experience is very important, so too is the truth of the inevitability of all behaviour. Laypeople understanding that no matter what a person has done they could not have chosen differently is of much greater importance than clinging to the notion of experiencing options and calling it free will

25

JZweibel t1_j8gl5ly wrote

What do you want from a "free" choice besides the opportunity to apply your criteria to a circumstance and subsequently act in a manner to best satisfy that criteria? The inevitability of the outcome of our choices arises from the fact that we can only have one over-arching set of criteria (including criteria about what subsets of criteria to use) and we can only have awareness of one over-arching set of circumstances. So, the only thing "free will" would enable you to do is to act against the interests of the criteria you applied to the circumstance, but what good is that?

Saying that someone only "felt" like they could have acted otherwise doesn't invalidate their application of their criteria to their circumstance. If I COULD order anything off of the menu (at least in the sense that if I said the right words to the waiter then any of the food items would be prepared for me), then fact that I will inevitably get my favorite dish on my birthday, or the healthy dish when I'm on a diet, or the expensive dish when I'm trying to impress a client, shouldn't matter to how we conceptualize my order. If it's MY criteria being applied, that's MY agency, and what comes about is surely at least partially MY fault; inevitable or not.

If anything, trying to get a layperson to "understand that no matter what a person has done they could not have chosen differently" is doing them a huge disservice in terms of encouraging accountability and mindfulness.

So what's the point of denying the existence of free will? To be technically correct about the relationship of cause and effect but in doing so wholly misrepresent the fundamental way that we actually experience reality as subjective participants within it? Fine then, I don't have "free will," but I absolutely have the only kind of "will" that matters as long as I get to apply my criteria my circumstances.

5

Capt_Vofaul t1_j8hlgkm wrote

Dennett's idea of "free will worth wanting" kinda falls short for me, when I know that I didn't choose to be attracted to some weird bipedal creatures with certain visual & other attributes, and know that these features don't have absolute value (positive or negative)--yet I am unable to escape the mechanism that makes me feel certain way towards "good looking" or "ugly" people, and that my emotions, thoughts, and behavior are affected by whether the person in front of me has just the right distance between eyes... how ridiculous and demeaning is it, that the way I feel towards a person is affected by something like that? Or some other factors like familiarity and such like... And I have the "freedom" to choose how I act based on such ridiculous factors? Gimme a break!

Or, the fact that I have the uncontrollable drive to continue this stupid existence, which I have no 'good' rational reason to want to continue--for I know that things I feel attached to, I am attached to not because of some free, rational decisions I've made, but rather, because things "I" (the part of "my" brain writing this) had no way of choosing such as my genes, environment, experience, etc. (existence which frail people try to believe is meaningful, for they'll become unable to get out of bed if they don't believe in it, which results in them becoming unable to satisfy other desires that, if left unfulfilled, 'punish' them, whether it takes the form of loneliness, hunger, thirst, boredom, physical pain, immense fear or worry)

Not to say I want to entirely discard the idea of "praise/blame" or "personal responsibility" as a means of encouraging good behavior and discouraging bad behavior--but to believe I have some "autonomy"... that just doesn't work on me. I wish it did.

2

JZweibel t1_j8icvlv wrote

You’re describing consciousness as something akin to being strapped into a rollercoaster and then pushed and pulled along the track that was built for “you” by your genetics, as if you’re somehow external to them. You seem to suggest that “autonomy” would require the ability to act without a physical body, because you presuppose that deterministic physical laws make physical action impossible to undertake without being wholly controlled by them.

I think you’re insisting on the wrong definition of the self. You aren’t bound by your instincts, they are part of you. Anything internal to you that influences your criteria is simply more you, and not something that gets in your way of making your own choice.

I’m not asking you to pretend any more than is necessary to defeat solipsism. If you can accept that you just have to believe that other minds exists, then it shouldn’t be hard to accept that they (and you) have criteria that are meaningfully applied to their circumstances in what has to be called a choice.

What IS free will if not that? Can you describe what a being with free will would be like?

6

Capt_Vofaul t1_j8j8o3a wrote

Autonomy, or "true autonomy" for me would require there to be conscious intentions behind (intentions behind) actions. And not doing so as a way to avoid punishment. Which of course is impossible (probably). Not "doing something part of me-as-a-whole tells me to do, because if I don't do it, I experience suffering of some form." When someone's pointing a gun at your head and suggests that your might get blown off if you do what they don't want you to do, and you do the thing they want you to do, is that an exercise in autonomy? We may distinguish the two when it comes to ethics, and you get less accountability from people for doing something in the latter case, but when talking about what's going on inside one's mind, I don't think there's as much meaningful difference between the two.

Suppose you get brain-washed by someone, and you now feel the urge to act like a pig, while still having your prior human preferences. Do you consider the pig part, which is now a part of "you" as a whole, you? Do you call it your "decision based on free will" when the pig instinct somehow wins, and you roll around in a pool of mud--even though the part of you who consciously thinks, writes and talks HATES doing that? Is that decision to roll around in the mud your exercise of agency? If you somehow think the pig instincts you acquired through brain-washing is an external imposition or something (what isn't), what if you were born like this to begin with, rather than acquiring these attributes later in life? It's always been a part of you, and "you" (the conscious you) always hated it, cause its goals doesn't align with "your" preferences. But conscious part of you-as-a-whole still cannot control it.

To me, "my" biological nature/instincts are like those pig instincts. I've examined my needs, drives, and reaction towards things (like the pretty/ugly face example for instance), and deemed they were primarily there due to my nature as a machine that's 'made' (not implying intention of someone/something) to live and reproduce. Both functions I see as something utterly stupid and pointless, lacking any utility in itself--this mechanism happened due to happenstance, and all it does is to do the same thing so it can continue to do the thing til the end of fucking time (why the hell should I continue my existence so I can continue to try to fulfill needs that constantly arise, which lack utility of its own (other than to serve the said stupid mechanism), despite my desire for them to stop bothering me)? It's not a result of conscious and rational thought process, let alone mine.

I see a human baby, and I feel the urge to protect them. Why's that? Because they are small and 'cute' (which causes me a certain kind of emotional and behavioral response)? Or helpless? Why do I want to protect that bipedal organism if it's small and cute? Because that's in the interest of this mechanism as a biological copy machine. "My" emotional response towards the cuteness and whatnot are not much more than a triggering mechanism. (Whether that response is also caused when I see a cute and small quad-pedal organism or non-organism is irrelevant to this. I also want to protect them so they won't experience suffering, but the same applies to this motivation as well)

When you think hard about those 'responses', get to the root cause of such things, and figure out that they are there to serve/to help achieve something ultimately (or that you deem, even if you are wrong) pointless, and if your conscious/rational preferences don't align with it, it no longer feels like a part of you. And it's like this way all the way down, what's "my choice", what's "my decision", when the sky's all clear and you can see where they come from--and that where isn't you.

1

JZweibel t1_j8jev7m wrote

Where’s this “you” with the gun to its head? Your argument implies that there’s something like a soul that is unfortunately tethered to a physical body and thus imprisoned by causality. It’s all just you. The body, the tethers, and the thing that feels like a soul.

1

Capt_Vofaul t1_j8lo321 wrote

This "gun" is referring to the aforementioned mechanism which makes us do useless stuff. 'Threat' (otherwise likely possibility) of hunger, thirst, loneliness, boredom, fear, so on. (Unless you were a machine that works on a different mechanism,) Would you be doing anything if it wasn't for that mechanism, of the threat of suffering?

I'm suggesting that if you look into your mind closely, this mechanism is not much different from the kind of "external coercion" that, when talking about ethics, usually makes us consider that the person 'wasn't acting voluntarily.'

Think of something you enjoy doing. Why do you do it-Why does that thing has any use to you? Is it because you feel good when doing it? Does it remove the tingly sense of "I wanna do this"? (which can turn into more of an irritating sense if you are unable to do it for long) Does it provide you some temporary distraction from suffering, whether it's on-going or imminent? Why do you need to satisfy the desire which doing the thing satisfies. Cause it makes you happy? Why do you need to be happy, what drives you to achieve that emotional state?

Essential component of any 'needs' or 'wants' is that they cause suffering of some kind if left unsatisfied. Otherwise, they'd be completely optional. Water is useful to us so long as we get thirsty (or it helps us satisfy our other needs). The fact that drinking it prevents us from experiencing thirst (further), the fact that it prevents (further) suffering makes it valuable to us. It doesn't have any value, utility, any "goodness" in itself.

Again, why do you do stuff you enjoy? What makes you do it/want to do it? And what kind of experience do you get if you can't do it?

1

JZweibel t1_j8lu63h wrote

I'm just not buying the assertion that the gun you're describing isn't just part of you. You're not a ghost in a shell, you are the ghost and the shell. I didn't even ask what the gun was, I asked what "you" were, but the answer is the same so I agree with you there.

"Voluntary" is also a much higher bar than "chosen" so I don't just go ahead draw the same line from A to B there at all.

You could stand to dial down the smugness by like 40% at least.

I do stuff because I choose to.

2

Capt_Vofaul t1_j8m4ipw wrote

Sorry if I'm sounding smug, it's just how I came to write these stuff. You can think of it as some kinda condition. And yeah, I responded weirdly (failed to address that question).

Voluntarily may not have been the best choice of word there, but I stand by the idea that in both cases you are doing something in order to avoid suffering.

And.. we do stuff because (usually) we choose to do that, sure. But why do you choose to do the stuff you choose to do, what motivates you to do that? And what function is there behind it?

3

JZweibel t1_j8n6eu7 wrote

Even if we only do stuff to avoid bad brain chemicals, which I don’t think is true, those bad brain chemicals are just as much a part of us as the part that will subjectively experience the negative affect brought on by them, so it can’t be coercive. You can’t coerce yourself, that’s just you being you.

As for the chemicals themselves, take the example of people who break drug addiction habits and stop using. They definitely aren’t getting more pleasurable brain chemicals as a result, at least not for a loooong time.

1

Capt_Vofaul t1_j8ojnng wrote

Why do you think it's not a coercion, if the cause of potential suffering is inside the organism which creates the conscious thoughts and experience of "it"? Sure, the distinction may be useful when discussing ethics in a court and we wanna decide the appropriate response to someone's action. But Dennett's not just talking about that. If it's inside you, does it not matter how ridiculous the needs/drives/etc. it causes are when contrasted to your conscious/rational personality/preferences? Even if you, the conscious, experience great disconnect between your preferences and the condition imposed by the rest of "you"? If someone was born in such a way that their conscious part has normal sensibilities, but the particulars of their brain makes it so they feel immense suffering if they don't eat human feces, would you still not call it a coercion, from the perspective of the conscious part/conscious experience (of thoughts and feelings) of the person?

If you, one day, suddenly develop a condition so that you experience unbearable suffering unless you do something you absolutely hate to do, (I don't know what your preferences are, but suppose it's the urge to hurt people and you don't like hurting people) would it not feel like you are 'being forced' to do something you (the-conscious, thinking and feeling part of you) have no good reason to be doing? Forget about how you'd see someone like that, as a thirdperson. How would it feel to be in that state?

1

JZweibel t1_j8p57sc wrote

It really just sounds like you’re subscribing to dualism, so we’re not having the argument we think we are.

0

Capt_Vofaul t1_j8qgtsv wrote

I don't subscribe to dualism, but you can call it anything. Meat of my argument is whether or not the kind of state of existence/experience I'm describing, where a person has the awareness of the absurdity of their own nature of existence & the lack of ability of their rational/conscious preferences to defy their own primary programmings, is something one should be happy that they have, or want to have. Sure, the experience may still be less awful than enslavement by other humans or some kinda aliens, but does this state sound anything close to the characteristics/images we associate with the idea of 'freedom.'

Is your idea of freedom being a robot and not having your execution of tasks obstructed by the environment? I mean, we are basically robots, but you seem to be saying that being a robot is free as long as no one's stopping you from carrying the box from point A to B, and your own computer is doing the calculation to decide the optimal route to get there.

2

JZweibel t1_j8qk1jx wrote

You say you don’t, but your previous comments constantly differentiate between “a person” and concepts like “their programming” and so I ask you: where’s that line? If you’re not drawing it on a mental physical divide then why are you constantly referring to situations as if an immaterial mind is being made unfree by its connection to a physical body? You have refused to address this any time I’ve pointed it out and just double down on this “we are trapped” narrative as if I’m supposed to have some existential epiphany and realize I’ve actually been deluding myself this whole time.

An unintelligent robot like you’re describing doesn’t have consciousness or a sense of self, or even the capability to recursively alter its own criteria on a meta-level via self-reflection and imagined circumstance, so now we are not “basically robots”The robot’s programming isn’t part of its identity because it doesn’t have one. It doesn’t even have will, so forget about free will.

I’m out.

0

Capt_Vofaul t1_j8r4x6x wrote

What's the point in distinguishing what you call "unintelligent" robot and us? Difference is in its complexity and how exactly each of them work, and that's minutia. Neither of them can defy what it is or the laws of the universe, and exist only as the process of the larger mechanism. What you are gonna choose is already decided by things before and outside of you. And I think I've gave my answer to that question, even if it wasn't perfect. The line I draw is between the conscious thinking part/its experience, preferences, etc. and the rest, because that's the part that thinks, feels and talks in response to the universe/its subjective experiences. It doesn't have to be immaterial for it to know whether it experiences ridiculous drives as a result of the body it's a part of.

And you haven't given an answer to the simple question of "how would it feel to be the person in that state" and if you'd call that experience "freedom worth wanting" or whatever. Is it that hard to imagine?

What are you but a machine made to do pointless tasks until you are no more? Eat, sleep, think, talk, entertain, all so we can continue to maintain the existence of this silly process. And we can't even get out of bed unless we delude ourselves into thinking there's some value or point to this farce. We have the capability to examine our own nature of existence, and know if it's stupid or not.

If you decide to respond one last time, just answer the question. How would it feel to be in that state, and would you call that "exercise of freedom" or "freedom worth wanting."

For people who might (somehow) read this back and fourth, or in case you revisit this thread, I have a thought experiment for you. Suppose I knew how you would react to certain inputs, and said just the right things, so you would respond the way I want you to. You are still deciding what you write using your own knowledge, criteria, etc. And you aren't making the choice based on some imminent possibility of harm. I only chose words so you'd pick certain choices. Would you call this a free choice?

2

ElegantAd2607 t1_j955n1t wrote

Well that was sad. So you don't have free will cause you have the will to live?

1

HumbleFlea t1_j8jbjki wrote

But again, that “criteria” isn’t causa sui. If your “criteria“ determines your choice to become violent when the waiter flirts with your wife it’s the “criteria” that needs to change. If you can’t use your agency to change the “criteria” that causes what you choose, what good is it?

1

spiralbatross t1_j8jbjkv wrote

I don’t understand why it can’t be a spectrum. Can’t we have agency in certain scenarios but not in others? Vaguely like electromagnetism, electricity and magnetism seem like different things but they’re really not.

1

EleanorStroustrup t1_j8hhjhy wrote

> What do you want from a “free” choice besides the opportunity to apply your criteria to a circumstance and subsequently act in a manner to best satisfy that criteria?

To have actually made the choice, obviously.

> So what’s the point of denying the existence of free will? To be technically correct about the relationship of cause and effect but in doing so wholly misrepresent the fundamental way that we actually experience reality as subjective participants within it?

Our experience of reality is not reality.

It seems to me your argument boils down to “everyone is indistinguishable from a P-zombie, but we should pretend that the fact that we each experience consciousness means that the fact that we each experience consciousness makes a difference, or is meaningful”.

0

marginalboy t1_j8hjzey wrote

What’s the difference between “actually making the choice” and what’s being described: evaluating the options and selecting the one that best fits your criteria?

It sounds like you’re arguing that “free will” is something that’s only discernible externally, regardless of the perception of the agent making the choice.

3

EleanorStroustrup t1_j8hlwy5 wrote

> What’s the difference between “actually making the choice” and what’s being described: evaluating the options and selecting the one that best fits your criteria?

That’s not what’s being described. What’s being described is having the perception that “you” (whatever that means, since it’s all just particles) are an agent who is evaluating options and selection the one that best fits “your” criteria. Your perception of reality is not reality.

> It sounds like you’re arguing that “free will” is something that’s only discernible externally, regardless of the perception of the agent making the choice.

I’m arguing that the concept of free will does not make sense, and cannot exist. I suppose one could prove a being has free will by observing particles in its nervous system that don’t obey physical laws while it makes choices, but if we’re entertaining that idea then we have a lot of other philosophical and scientific problems.

0

marginalboy t1_j8hwjzd wrote

Ah, then it seems the disagreement is more fundamental, indeed. If you’re arguing from a context in which “you” isn’t defined, then the notion of “will” — free or otherwise — is irrelevant.

But even then, I’m not sure “particles not obeying physical laws” is the most sensible benchmark. Of course they obey physical laws; the distinction is the series of reactions that could occur but don’t.

For example, I’m imagining expanding the previous paragraph. I’ve composed several sentences in my head that would illuminate the point further, but I’m choosing not to do so. I think that may be an example of what we’re calling “free will” here: the ability to chart multiple courses of viable action and selecting one. Your argument seems to be that the chemical composition of my brain prevents me from doing anything but imagining those sentences, but my perception is that I could go on at length if I chose to do so (a tendency many on Reddit would testify to) ;-)

2

EleanorStroustrup t1_j8lsykw wrote

> If you’re arguing from a context in which “you” isn’t defined, then the notion of “will” — free or otherwise — is irrelevant.

If someone is arguing that we do have free will, surely “there is no will” is a valid way to counter.

> Of course they obey physical laws; the distinction is the series of reactions that could occur but don’t.

What do you mean “could have occurred”? If reality proceeds according to physical laws, only the things that did happen could have happened. If other things could have happened, they would have happened instead.

You could have acted differently to the way you did yesterday, sure. And the moon could be made of cheese.

> the ability to chart multiple courses of viable action and selecting one

But you’re not. You just have the perception that you are.

> Your argument seems to be that the chemical composition of my brain prevents me from doing anything but imagining those sentences,

Yes. The current composition as a result of all the interactions your constituent particles have had during your life.

> but my perception is that I could go on at length if I chose to do so

Our perception is not relevant to the issue.

1

Devinology t1_j8fzixt wrote

I disagree, respectfully. The idea of moving the world in a god-like fashion is a human delusion, and one that causes us a great deal of problems in terms of interpreting the world around us and ourselves. Arguably, many psychological issues are either caused by, or contributed to, by the delusion that we can control things that we can't (by having a false worldview regarding free will). It has literally no importance for human functioning, because it doesn't make any difference to us in any pragmatic way whether we are truly choosing (in that delusional way) or not.

All that matters is that we think we are acting with agency (that it genuinely seems like we are) in some sense. Whether we are or not, on the grandest level, has zero relevance for us outside of philosophical pondering. All that matters is that we think we have agency, and that we conduct and judge ourselves as if we do, since ultimately this is all agency is anyway. We don't need any god-like world influencing power for this to work.

I'll also add that under some possible worlds based metaphysical theories, having choice just means that there is at least one possible world in which you've chosen otherwise than you did in the actual world. This allows for compatibilism because it allows for each possible world to be deterministic while also allowing for a genuine sense of agency since for all we know we could be in any of the possible worlds, and which one we're in isn't determined until it plays out, from our perspective at least.

0

tough_truth t1_j8g4v0z wrote

I agree that the sense of voluntariness is significant for individuals. My critique of compatibilism is only that compatibilists seem unclear on the limits of their domain. It seems that this pro-free will argument applies to the feelings of an individual or perhaps for the convenience of everyday conversation, but falls apart when we consider communities or societies. The feeling that “Jon could have acted differently” is different than saying “Germany could have acted differently”. The more people that are involved, the more they can be modelled as statistically determined rather than agents.

This is because ultimately, we are beings without libertarian free will, or “delusional” free will as you call it. And the farther away we move from our individual frame of reference, the more clear that becomes. I feel like I can choose whether or not to commit a crime, but I know for certain that some percentage of the population will “choose” to commit crimes today. It would be a mistake to assume a whole society could shift based on collective spontaneous individual choice, it is statistically impossible. This does have implications for the way we ought to correctly talk about nations or about widespread social issues (e.g. why do the poor choose to be lazy?).

I disagree with S. Harris about many things but one thing I’ll agree is incompatiblism forces you to take judicial reform seriously. I feel compatibilists skirt around confronting the full implications of having no libertarian free will.

4

zossima t1_j8ggw9b wrote

“Voluntariness”… the ethical implications of the assumption free will is nonexistent are devastating to the concept of holding individuals responsible for their actions. If an individual does not have real control/agency over their actions, how are those actions truly their fault? Culpability is out the window. And how can an individual be treated as an end-in-itself if we approach them as nothing but a proverbial wind vane fluttering in the wind of reality? I’m into analogies…

Consider the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. We cannot predict with full accuracy the physical qualities of a particle, like position, from initial conditions. That is, considering all factors at a given time, the “reality” giving context to and influencing a particle, we still can never know what is really going on with the particle until it is directly observed and measured. Sure, we know the shapes of electron shells and other aspects in a broader context, but we can never predict the exact nature of an individual particle until we measure it. I think human agency/free will might be similar in nature. Just like a particle, it is influenced by context, but there is always space there for uncertainty and the spark of spontaneity, a sort of freedom. Particles and minds are different in scale and category, it’s the idea of some undeniable mystery that creates space for very important, ethically foundational concepts to remain relevant. We should work to avoid sophomoric assumptions in any case. And I will point out the idea of free will as outlined above is still very compatible with physical reality in the same way it is for, say, electrons.

5

DwayneWashington t1_j8gq1br wrote

But the fact that we don't know what's going on with the particle doesn't mean its path isn't determined.

2

zossima t1_j8hankn wrote

I am not denying any sort of determinism. What I am getting at is, like with a particle, there is no way to fully access and completely explain individual agency. Consider recent discoveries in quantum mechanics. Experiments have proven that quantum particles can exist in multiple exclusive states at once (https://www.science.org/content/article/reality-doesn-t-exist-until-you-measure-it-quantum-parlor-trick-confirms). The particle does not collapse into a definitive state until observed. Consider what if the mind is a quantum computer of sorts, with myriad conceptual states coexisting at once in our brains. Surely the concepts are tied to physical states, however they all exist as potentialities in our brains.

There is a certain freedom there at a fundamental level shrouded in that we do not fully understand all of the aspects of consciousness and volition. As with anything you can manipulate a person (impose your will), treating an other as an object, as in a Buberian I-It relationship. Or context can influence a person. However, in many circumstances we are not being overly influenced by context, be it social media, drugs, the full moon, illness, and so on. In circumstances lacking an overwhelming burden of influence on our volitive capacities, I would argue we do have free will, as fragile and at times fleeting as it may be. It’s why Buber raises up the I-You relationship as a preferable way of encountering other beings. Maybe we would all be more free if we could only just stop trying to impose our own will on others. Here’s to hoping Nietzsche wasn’t right that everything is will to power. And maybe all of the above are possible and it’s our choice at any given moment which is real to us?

2

DwayneWashington t1_j8hcph3 wrote

I don't think I'm smart enough to comprehend a lot of this... But "there is no way to fully access and completely explain individual agency" sounds like it doesn't exist or maybe we just don't have the mental capacity to understand it yet.

I don't really understand the "if we feel like we have agency, then we have it" idea ...where does that logic end, if I feel like I'm God am I God?

I don't know a lot about this topic so i apologize, I'm sure a lot of my questions have been talked about already.

1

Bowldoza t1_j8hr9jw wrote

Claiming agency or perspective is not akin to claiming godhood. Be reasonable. Comprehending agency as a concept in light of a deterministic chain of events is about as good as you can get in regards to "free will".

Kinda off topic, but in this context I would believe that someone claiming Godhood in a similar comparison would be doing so from an solipsistic and egotistical perspective precisely because they perceive their own agency but can't or refuses to extend that potential to other people.

2

DwayneWashington t1_j8hsscx wrote

Ok...so if I feel like I don't have agency then I don't, right? So that means that humans have agency and don't have agency at the same time?

1

zossima t1_j8iqqpv wrote

I think "it depends" is probably an apt thing to posit here.

1

zossima t1_j8irtby wrote

I would agree we just don't understand it yet. I think it is a real jump to conclusion with implications that outpace the assumption to assert everything is determined. You might as well become a practicing Calvinist. No need to apologize. The core of what I am getting at is we really do not know enough, or at least that agency is too complex and nuanced a concept with wide-ranging ethical bearing to settle on the stance there is no free will because all is pre-determined. Frankly, I feel the belief is not just pessimistic and ethically problematic, but a bit lazy.

1

Foxsayy t1_j8grjfb wrote

>Consider the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. We cannot predict with full accuracy the physical qualities of a particle like position from initial conditions. [...] I think human agency and free will might be similar in nature. Just like a particle, it is influenced by context, but there is always space there for uncertainty and the spark of spontaneity and for a sort of freedom.

Currently, we have to assign probabilities for where electrons might be, as far as I understand. So essentially, it's up to chance, randomness. Let's say that they're truly is Randomness in the universe, and could you make the same choice at the same point in time again, you might choose differently.

However, if the only reason that actions are not entirely predictable is because your decisions are being made partially by some Quantum dice roll, how can you call that free will any more than you can choose the outcome of a dice roll at the casino?

2

zossima t1_j8h1xuo wrote

My point is the randomness might not be so random when it comes to human agency, perhaps there is room there for decision-making, even if flawed, influenced and at times ineffectual.

2

tough_truth t1_j8h5iv8 wrote

>randomness might not be so random when it comes to human agency

This is where the “delusion” comes in, imo. Ultimately, it seems many believers of free will also disbelieve in the laws of physics. You seem to think humans can defy randomness through sheer willpower.

1

Foxsayy t1_j8j98yi wrote

>My point is the randomness might not be so random when it comes to human agency

I'm trying to think of a good metaphor for this, unsuccessfully, and I think that might be because there aren't really things that work this way.

Something is either random, or it is not. Although you can bound the domain, they're really isn't an in between. So if you have the set of all things random, and human agency does not fall in that set, then human agency must fall within that set's compliment (the compliment of all random things), which is by definition, things that are not random–that is, systematic, predictable, causal, etc.

Therefore, if human agency and decision making is not entirely random, then it must be nonrandom. So you're either accepting randomness as a given (to some degree) in the universe, in which case it still doesn't allow for free will in the traditional philosophical sense, or you're rejecting that the process is up to randomness, in which case you fall back into determinism. ,

1

EleanorStroustrup t1_j8hihq2 wrote

> If an individual does not have real control/agency over their actions, how are those actions truly their fault?

Exactly. They’re not. We recognise this in the justice system in many ways already. Many jurisdictions give sentence reductions to people whose childhoods were shaped by traumas, or who have mental health difficulties, for example.

> Culpability is out the window.

Whether the person is culpable for the action (or whether the idea of a person is even physically meaningful), and whether we should apply a judicial consequence for it, are not the same question.

Why are you asking these questions in a way that implies they disprove the idea that we lack free will?

1

Foxsayy t1_j8gqxzv wrote

>I disagree, respectfully.

Did you explain to me what exactly you were disagreeing with? It didn't seem like you're ideas conflicted with the other comment.

1

wolfgeist t1_j8h1aqi wrote

>All that matters is that we think we are acting with agency (that it genuinely seems like we are) in some sense

You know, I felt like I had no agency before reading this. After reading this, I'm going to make some changes in my life.

1

EleanorStroustrup t1_j8hhpu9 wrote

> All that matters is that we think we have agency, and that we conduct and judge ourselves as if we do,

But this is circular. If we don’t have agency, then we don’t conduct ourselves. We are conducted as if we have agency.

1

Devinology t1_j8qr6ja wrote

No, you're just using a false conception of agency. Agency isn't deciding how to conduct yourself, that's the point. You're reading my description of agency with a preconception that isn't compatible with it.

0

EleanorStroustrup t1_j8qtaqh wrote

Any other conception of agency is useless to consider.

1

Devinology t1_j8qwhhw wrote

The whole reason this debate is important is because on the one hand we have the science demonstrating for us that everything that happens is determined in some sense, and on the other we have human intuition, experience, ethics, and practical reason telling us (or necessitating) that we exercise agency of some kind. The challenge is in reconciling the two. This is the starting point of nearly all philosophical problems.

It's not helpful to just repeat ad nauseum "but everything is determined cuz the science so free will is an illusion". This is the starting point of the conversation, not the end. We already know that, Harris hasn't said anything that wasn't said 100 years prior. He's just adding more updated science examples. In fact, he's really not contributing anything to the conversation that wasn't already considered 3000 years ago. He's basically just ignoring thousands of years of philosophical discourse, and going "but causality". He doesn't get it.

1

EleanorStroustrup t1_j8qxowm wrote

> on the one hand we have the science demonstrating for us that everything that happens is determined in some sense, and on the other we have human intuition, experience, ethics, and practical reason telling us (or necessitating) that we exercise agency of some kind. The challenge is in reconciling the two

But they can’t be reconciled. If reason tells us it’s necessary for us to exercise agency, that’s too bad, because we can’t. We are going to act like we can, but we can’t.

The existence of the field of ethics is one thing among many that both arose out of the past physical state of the universe, and will influence its future state, but not from any external cause - it’s all in the closed system. We’re pulled towards the earth because there is gravity, and someone might “decide” something in a certain way because they are aware of some ethical principle, and that contributed to what the particles in their brain do in the current moment. That doesn’t mean the principal itself has intrinsic value.

0

Devinology t1_j8qyptd wrote

If they can't be reconciled then there is no point to anything and no such thing as responsibility. Why wouldn't you just kill someone for $5? You aren't responsible anyway.

But you know that you are. How do you reconcile this? You realize that free will is not constituted by going against laws of nature.

1

EleanorStroustrup t1_j8qzakg wrote

> Why wouldn’t you just kill someone for $5? You aren’t responsible anyway.

Lacking moral responsibility is not the same thing as believing or acting like you lack moral responsibility, nor is it the same thing as lack of practical consequences for things that happen.

> But you know that you are. How do you reconcile this?

I know that I feel like I am responsible for my actions and that we have to act for all intents and purposes like we are. That doesn’t mean that we are.

> You realize that free will is not constituted by going against laws of nature.

Why does feeling like you have free will require you to conclude that there is free will?

1

Devinology t1_j8r06bs wrote

Because that's all that free will IS. I don't think we're going to get anywhere further here, it's too large of a conversion.

I'm not saying that because I feel like a can genuinely alter the state of affairs of the world that I must therefore have it. I'm saying that I can't do that, and I know I can't do that, but I experiemce free will, so I can conclude that free will isn't altering the state of affairs of the world. It's not that kind of phenomenon.

You're morally responsible because you have agency, not because you can genuinely choose what happens.

1

EleanorStroustrup t1_j8r37h8 wrote

> I’m not saying that because I feel like a can genuinely alter the state of affairs of the world that I must therefore have it. I’m saying that I can’t do that, and I know I can’t do that, but I experiemce free will, so I can conclude that free will isn’t altering the state of affairs of the world.

It seems like you’re still not really addressing my central point. You don’t experience free will, so you cannot conclude that.

A stereotypical schizophrenia patient doesn’t actually experience voices. They experience the illusion of voices.

“I have a certain perception, and I have named that concept, and therefore the thing I just named is actually equivalent to a different thing with that name” is not logically valid.

> You’re morally responsible because you have agency, not because you can genuinely choose what happens.

We are caused to act for all intents and purposes like people are morally responsible for things, because we have to, practically. But that doesn’t imply actual responsibility.

1

ElegantAd2607 t1_j955b9g wrote

You could have made a different one; what are you saying?

1

HumbleFlea t1_j97mzkh wrote

Really? What’s the cause of that different choice?

1

ElegantAd2607 t1_j97v0n8 wrote

The fact that we are humans with certain wants and needs. We're propelled along by are brains and bodies but that doesn't mean we cannot choose.

1

HumbleFlea t1_j991qxd wrote

If my wants and needs, propelled by my brain and body, cause me to choose X, they can’t also make me choose Y unless those wants and needs, body and brain change somehow. If everything stays the same so does the choice

1

ReaperX24 t1_j8ibxln wrote

That's a circular definition, isn't it? There has to be an objective definition, else the word simply does not mean anything. You can't just say that an agent is someone who identifies as an agent.

Also, it's not particularly difficult to directly experience your lack of free will with simple thought experiments. Practices such as meditation break the spell even further. How do you reconcile that?

1

Devinology t1_j8qrxup wrote

I didn't say "identifies". You're still thinking of it as a decision in the traditional sense. No such thing is happening. People are just being, and if they believe that what they are doing is in line with what they'd like to do, then they have agency. It's not circular at all. Nobody is deciding they have agency, they just have it.

You'll have to explain what you mean by the second paragraph as it's not clear what you're asking exactly.

2

ReaperX24 t1_j8qum3s wrote

> I didn't say "identifies". You're still thinking of it as a decision in the traditional sense. No such thing is happening. People are just being, and if they believe that what they are doing is in line with what they'd like to do, then they have agency. It's not circular at all. Nobody is deciding they have agency, they just have it.

I believe that I misinterpreted your comment. I see that you are drawing a distinction between what people want and what they actually do. I think you are agreeing that this distinction is an illusion, because you can't possibly do anything other than what you want. Since we are unable to choose what we want, it's ultimately a distinction without a difference, but your point still stands. That's a valid definition.

> You'll have to explain what you mean by the second paragraph as it's not clear what you're asking exactly.

I figured you were defending libertarian free will, but since you appear to be a compatibilist, I guess there is nothing to reconcile. There's no distinction between compatibilism and no free will, as far as our first person experience is concerned. I think our disagreement lies solely in the semantics and the practical implications of said semantics, not in the physical mechanics of 'free will'.

2

Devinology t1_j8qxvo6 wrote

I'm defending a compatibilism closest to Harry Frankfurt's conception of free will.

Under this view, you can very much do things you didn't want to do, because you have different levels of preferences/desires. The laws of realty dictate what you do, and whether your will is free or not is more about how you perceive what happens. If what happens is what you'd want to happen if you were able to control it, then your will is free. If the opposite, then it's not. This is super simplified of course. The idea is that we don't really choose what we do, but we have some higher order preferences, and we feel free if they are fulfilled over lower order ones.

So if you have a drug addiction, we can say that you both want and also don't want the drug. Your higher order reasoning and desire is that you don't keep using the drug, assuming you'd genuinely prefer a life without it. This doesn't always win though, you often succumb to the drug, to lower order desires. If you ultimately desire not to use the drug and succeed in this, you will perceive your will as free, which is all free will really is. If you don't succeed, you'll perceive your will as not free. Meanwhile, all of what actually happens is determined, there are no classically conceived "decisions" happening here. You experience the agency, you don't enact it.

2

ReaperX24 t1_j8r23ou wrote

I see where you are coming from and find your premise to be mostly agreeable. I just don't see how calling it free will is helpful, when there is nothing free about it.

To follow up on your example, if I'm truly convinced that the decision to use the drug was the less desirable option, and I still used it anyway, that would imply that I felt forced by an outside source. I would not even view that as a choice that I made. What is more likely, though, is that using the drug was always my real desire, regardless of the stories that I tell myself to feel better about my own depravity. In this latter case, it's just a slightly trickier version of the free will illusion. This storyline, more often than not, comes off as textbook self-deception.

But let's say it's not self-deception, instead sticking with your original proposition. From my viewpoint - as the drug abuser - the illusion of free will was never present to begin with. I never felt like I had a choice to make, I just acted on pure impulse as a result of my addiction. I may still experience regret and feel responsibile for my inability to resist the urges, but it's not unheard of for people to take responsibility of an act that they never had any agency over to begin with. One morbid example of this is how rape victims often blame themselves for not acting otherwise, even though they fully know that their agency was severely diminished by uncontrollable circumstances.

In either case, there is no genuine free will to experience, but the latter case features the illusion of it, when as with the former, one just immediately admits that it was never there to begin with. So, why call it free will at all? If we must make a distinction between the two scenarios, we could use words like "will" or "desire" without pretending that freedom plays any part in it. My main problem with compatibilism has always been its potentiality to reinforce the layman concept of free will. I think it's more conducive to abolish the term entirely, and instead use new terminology when nuance is required. "Free will" carries far too much baggage.

Edit: I said I wouldn't get into this rabbit hole in the other comment chain, and yet here I am irresistibly at it again. That's fairly amusing, considering the subject at hand haha. Certainly hope my comment makes at least a bit of sense to you, after all that.

2

Devinology t1_j8t5x07 wrote

We can have competing desires, but only one side can "win" in any given situation. In fact, we rarely wholeheartedly do anything. This doesn't mean that we didn't genuinely want to do multiple conflicting things. You're right, if you didn't want to do the drug but did it anyway, you didn't have free will, you felt forced. That's exactly what I'm saying. If you did the thing your higher order desires want, then you feel free, like you really wanted that. That's the experience of free will. You can also say that when you do what you wholeheartedly wanted to, that's free will.

The reason it makes sense to call this free will and not an illusion is because that's what freedom is to a will. Why refer to something that's impossible (going against the laws of reality) as freedom? That seems silly, that's not something we can do and doesn't represent anything in our experience. The way I'm using it is a useful distinction, between when we feel free and when we don't. That's all freedom to a person's will is. Using terms like 'desire' or 'will' aren't helpful here. It's your will and your desires in every case. But only in some cases is your will free.

3

bestest_name_ever t1_j8elmoy wrote

> As Sam Harris put it, compatibilism is just arguing that free will exists as long as the puppet ignores its strings.

Lol. There's a reason why other philosophers take Dennet seriously and Harris ... not. His incapability to understand basics such as the actual claims of compatibilism is a major part of it.

10

mixile t1_j8fzjfs wrote

This feels like an ad hominem.

19

Foxsayy t1_j8gqici wrote

First, that's attacking the person not the arguement. Second:

>Dennett argues there is often a mistaken conflation of cause and control, and that while every decision might be part of a causal chain, that does not mean our decisions and choices are necessarily controlled. Protecting against manipulation and control on the part of another agent means protecting the only sort of free will that really matters, he claims.

Based on this summary, either Dennis is arguing that our decisions and choices are part of a causal chain, but somehow, they are neither entirely due to that causal chain or perhaps that causal chain and randomness, if randomness truly exists in the universe, OR he's arguing that the type of "free will" that matters is the ability to make our decisions without being manipulated.

The former is extremely unconvincing, and the latter is a different definition of free will, which still fits within a clockwork universe.

5

Devinology t1_j8eslj3 wrote

Yup, Harris is just a scientist who doesn't understand the point; he has a layman's (naive) conception of free will. He can't grock the philosophy of science and mind involved in the current debate. He thinks anything outside of imposing god-like powers of control over the world is not free will. He doesn't understand that his conception of free will is a layman's conception, and that philosophers have long ditched that.

−11

EleanorStroustrup t1_j8hiz26 wrote

> He thinks anything outside of imposing god-like powers of control over the world is not free will.

Your perception is so warped that you think the desire to be able to make a simple choice is born of god-like arrogance. If you are representative of philosophy as a field, then Harris is right to disregard its self-indulgent and contrived definitions here.

4

Devinology t1_j8qrq2k wrote

You've horribly misunderstood what I said. We're not talking about arrogance. Harris holds a very naive conception of agency; be thinks that having agency means having control over reality in some way, making decisions that change the course of the world. This is what I mean by god-like. He thinks that since physical laws dictate that we have no such ability, we must not have free will. He's not wrong about the science, he's wrong about what constitutes free will. Free will is not the power to be a "first mover".

2

EleanorStroustrup t1_j8qto68 wrote

> be thinks that having agency means having control over reality in some way, making decisions that change the course of the world.

Taking something mundane like “I choose to have a glass of water now” and framing it as wanting to “change the course of the world” is a choice you’ve made to imply arrogance on the part of the speaker. Now anyone who argues that having free will is ideal looks like they’re saying they should have omnipotence.

> This is what I mean by god-like.

Why do you believe that only gods should have this power?

1

Devinology t1_j8qwypn wrote

Nope, you're not getting it. If the state of the world at the present moment is completely determined by the preceding moment, then you can't choose to have a glass of water, because that would mean defying the laws of realty and exerting a god like power. You're drinking the glass of water because at the start of all existence something was set in motion that dictated you would drink that water. This is the conception of reality that Harris and other determinists have. This is not what I'm saying, this is what determinism is. This is why Harris concludes that free will is an illusion.

The reason he's wrong is that this god-like ability to break the laws of reality simply doesn't have anything to do with having a free will.

2

EleanorStroustrup t1_j8qx9g7 wrote

> If the state of the world at the present moment is completely determined by the preceding moment, then you can’t choose to have a glass of water, because that would mean defying the laws of realty and exerting a god like power.

I know. But nobody is saying “I wish I had the power to ignore physical laws”. They’re saying “if only things weren’t deterministic, because it would be kinda nice to actually have agency and be able to make choices”.

1

Devinology t1_j8qyf6x wrote

That's the same thing. And I don't think anybody is saying either of those things. That's the point, we know we do have free will. If we didn't, we wouldn't be able to function, there would be no point to anything, and ethical concepts would be meaningless. That's why it's a genuine philosophical problem. We know we have free will, but we also know the science appears to dictate causal determinism. How do we reconcile the 2? Harris wants to give a non-answer and just conclude that we don't have free will. He gives no explanation for how this makes sense or why this is a useful conception of free will. He's ignoring the heart of the problem.

1

EleanorStroustrup t1_j8qys18 wrote

Your argument is built on several unstated assumptions that are not obviously correct.

> That’s the point, we know we do have free will.

No, we don’t know this.

> If we didn’t, we wouldn’t be able to function,

Why would not actually having free will mean we couldn’t function?

> there would be no point to anything,

Yes. And?

> and ethical concepts would be meaningless.

Yes. And?

1

Devinology t1_j8qzj7h wrote

We do know, because we know the difference between experiences of agency and lack of agency. This wouldn't be a topic of conversation otherwise. Why would we even be discussing this? Again, this is the point here. Experiencing free will is all free will is. It would be nothing if not experienced. A god-like figure dictating reality without perceiving itself as doing so wouldn't have free will because it wouldn't experience itself as such. It wouldn't care.

Experiencing free will is tantamount to having it. Anything else is some other unrelated concept.

If there was no point to anything then you wouldn't bother doing anything.

If ethical concepts were meaningless than we wouldn't care about them.

A determined reality would dictate that we wouldn't bother pretending to have free will if we didn't have it.

1

EleanorStroustrup t1_j8r3lir wrote

> Experiencing free will is all free will is. It would be nothing if not experienced. A god-like figure dictating reality without perceiving itself as doing so wouldn’t have free will because it wouldn’t experience itself as such.

The experience is necessary, but not sufficient. A god-like figure who doesn’t think they have free will wouldn’t meaningfully have free will, but neither would a non-god who thinks they have free will, because they’d still have to actually have free will in order to have free will.

I’m sure you’ve seen a lot of demonstrations that thinking oneself admirable is not sufficient to actually be admirable. Free will isn’t qualitatively different from that.

2

liquiddandruff t1_j8uwg7s wrote

A lot of free will proponents seem unable to distinguish between the concepts of a subjective experience of free will and the ontological existence of free will. They think subjective experience is sufficient to automatically prove the latter. They see them both as one concept. So strange.

It's like a mind block. Kind of shocking to see, really.

1

liquiddandruff t1_j8uw979 wrote

> A determined reality would dictate that we wouldn't bother pretending to have free will if we didn't have it.

False. You seem to be under the assumption a determined reality cannot give rise to the illusion of free will. This is an grounded, baseless assumption you're standing on.

We are experiencing "free will" but our subjective experience of such does not automatically impart to the universe that then free will as a concept is true. If you don't see this, simply come up with any other subjective experience as example and you should reach the same conclusion.

1

ReaperX24 t1_j8id42h wrote

> He doesn't understand that his conception of free will is a layman's conception, and that philosophers have long ditched that.

Hate to say it, but you need to actually look into his stuff before spewing such nonsense. One of his main complaints is that compatibilists arbitrarily redefine free will. He feels that this counterproductive.

Philosophers don't [always] philosophise just for the sake of philosophising. In the case of free will, the practical outcome of the conversation is of paramount importance.

2

Devinology t1_j8qshsr wrote

I've read a bunch of his material, including one of his books on this very topic. I'm well versed in the topic.

Your description is just a different way of saying what I've said. Harris is assuming a particular definition of free will that is simply false. It's a very naive conception that doesn't have anything to do with free will. I don't mean that in a rude way, it's a definition that most people who haven't studied and contemplated this stuff much at all might have. The difference with Harris is that he actually thinks he knows better when in fact he doesn't understand the philosophy involved at all. Nobody is redefining it, they're just better understanding what it actually is. What Harris is doing is counterproductive because he's just effectively repeating that "free will means having control over reality" over and over without making any good arguments for why that's a good way to conceive of free will. He's not reconciling the phenomenology and intuition with the science.

2

ReaperX24 t1_j8qv8zr wrote

I could attempt to marshal a reply, but I know that we'll just continue to talk over each other, when we are in fact 99.98% in agreement. Neither of us will concede that last 0.02%, so we might as well save our energy and move on.

However, I do owe you an apology for my less than polite tone, so might as well attach it here. That was unnecessary.

1

grooverocker t1_j8gbjqe wrote

Dennett and compatibilists at large are not arguing for the existence of libertarian freewill, which is the kind of freewill Sam Harris is good at debunking.

The idea of libertarian freewill (that the will is a law unto itself, free from external causation) either belongs in the category of magical thinking or debunked hypotheses à la phlogiston theory and the luminiferous aether.

Dennett agrees with all of that. Compatibilists agree that the universe is deterministic, that's why they're compatibilists.

Dennett brings a far more subtle and important point to the table which he has coined "the freewill worth wanting." This stance is what (among other things) differentiates responsibility from inculpability. There are reasons why, in a brute deterministic world, some people are held responsible for their actions while others are not.

It seems to me that there are two misunderstandings incompatibilists often make,

  1. They operate under the old rubric of libertarian freewill in their discourse, in which case they're talking past the compatibilist.

  2. They haven't done their due diligence with the "and then what happens?" component of the two philosophies. This is where the major differences between the two schools show themselves! This is where- I'd argue- you'd find the reasons why compatibilism is the superior philosophy compared to incompatibilism.

7

EleanorStroustrup t1_j8hl78m wrote

> Dennett agrees with all of that… Dennett brings a far more subtle and important point to the table which he has coined “the freewill worth wanting.”

“I am a hard determinist, but I’m going to take this other thing that isn’t free will and call it free will, and argue that we have that instead (while not always making it clear that I’m not talking about actual “free will” despite using that phrase), as if that’s a meaningful thing to do”.

Going back to basics:

> Some "modern compatibilists", such as Harry Frankfurt and Daniel Dennett, argue free will is simply freely choosing to do what constraints allow one to do. In other words, a coerced agent's choices can still be free if such coercion coincides with the agent's personal intentions and desires.

If everything is determined, the concept of an agent loses all meaning. There is no agent who can make choices. There are just indistinguishable particles. Debating the nuances of what it means to “freely choose to do what constraints allow” is also internally inconsistent if you accept determinism, because we don’t make choices. What we’re left with is “free will is simply having the perception that you are an agent who is capable of choosing to do something that you think is an available choice”, which is just worthless as a position. It means nothing.

2

JohannesdeStrepitu t1_j8gtx7b wrote

Could you say what you think Sam Harris' argument is? Asserting that we are puppets or that our attempts to control our thoughts are just illusions are both just ways of re-asserting the conclusion he is trying to defend or ways of asserting implications of that conclusion (in other words, it's just begging the question). What do you take his argument to be for the conclusion that we are not free or that determinism makes us not free?

I'm specifically wondering if he has any more than just an intuition that being caused to do something is being unfree, more than an uncritical, uninterrogated sense that this is just obvious.

1

subzero112001 t1_j8hvvtu wrote

Your explanation sounds quite similar to the reasoning a mentally unstable person uses after they've stabbed a victim and then they blame that victim and say "Why did you make me do this?!".

1