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LobYonder t1_j77kikb wrote

Reply to comment by DeusAxeMachina in There Are No Natural Rights (without Natural Law): Addressing what rights are, how we create rights, and where rights come from by contractualist

You can argue the "social contract" is the willing acceptance of a group's rules in order to obtain in-group or social benefits. It is a valid "contract" to the extent that you can leave the group and it's rules and join another (or live as Robinson Crusoe).

There is no a-priori reason to suppose a group's rules would be fair or maximize benefits over restrictions, however as long as there are multiple groups and individuals or families can migrate between them or influence the rules, then there is a selection effect towards the most beneficial, fair and effective rules. The fact that other primates also have strong concepts of "fairness" suggests that this group selection on rights and duties has been affecting our ancestors for millions of years. Thus you can argue that modern societies have reached a near-optimal and thus pretty "moral" set of rules for maximum personal net benefit with minimal restrictions and unfairness. It is therefore probably unreasonable for someone to reject modern social norms. I don't know if this is considered a Lockean view.

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DeusAxeMachina t1_j77lzlp wrote

>You can argue the "social contract" is the willing acceptance of a group's rules in order to obtain in-group or social benefits

You can, that would be implicit (or explicit) consent, which is not the view argued in the article (theoretical consent - the idea that people would consent if they were rational).

You can certainly support a view of rights that is based in implicit or explicit consent to a(n actual) social contract, but then you'd run into the problem of not being able to apply those rules and restrictions to people who explicitly do not consent to the social contract.

As for whether modern social contracts maximize personal wellbeing, and whether the survival of such contracts or the apparent mass consent to them is indication of such is an entire discussion to have, and one that I'll not participate in for now, if you can forgive me for that. However, as for the question of whether that Lockean view, it isn't. I'd say your view (and this depends on how you view "benefit" and "unfairness") is closer to Utilitarianism. I'm not familiar with J.S Mill's theory of rights, but I'd guess his position is somewhat similar.

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LobYonder t1_j77p1p1 wrote

> not being able to apply those rules and restrictions to people who explicitly do not consent to the social contract.

If someone I don't have a "social contract" agreement with attacks me I will certainly defend myself and perhaps kill them if necessary, and that would be morally justified. I don't need their agreement to do that. Similarly if someone who doesn't agree to my town's social contract regarding property rights breaks into my home and steals my stuff why should I need their agreement to apply the law? If you don't agree with the town rules you should not enter the town.

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DeusAxeMachina t1_j77qegd wrote

If you source moral and legal authority from a social contract, then no, you can't apply the law to people who are not part of that contract. That is what "willing agreement" means.

To prevent people who do not agree with the town rules from entering the town, you need a moral law that allows limiting their freedom in that way. And of course, that law can't be the town rules, because they're not part of the town, and because if that were the case you'd fall into infinite regress.

So if you want to justify applying legal codes outside of willing participants, you need something beyond consent to justify that.

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LobYonder t1_j77qw5a wrote

That's why the option to leave is important. If they chose to stay they are subject to the rules. That is their choice.

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DeusAxeMachina t1_j77rid7 wrote

What of people who do not have a reasonable option to leave? Can the law not be applied to them?

And more importantly, what of people who decide to stay but explicitly confirm that they do not want to be a part of the social contract, benefits or otherwise? The option to leave is important because people staying when they could leave is an indication that they accept the town rules, and that indication could be overruled by an even stronger indication (explicit statement) to the contrary.

If you argue that people should be forced between leaving the state or accepting its laws regardless of their personal consent, then you need a moral justification for that, and we run into the same problem from before.

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