Viewing a single comment thread. View all comments

contractualist OP t1_j76sq2w wrote

Reply to comment by DeusAxeMachina in There Are No Natural Rights (without Natural Law): Addressing what rights are, how we create rights, and where rights come from by contractualist

Not all views of an objective morality pre-existing the state are Lockean. There are many different schools of thought in meta-ethics. Mine is metaethical constructivism linked here if you would like to read it. You will find references to Kant, not Locke.

3

DeusAxeMachina t1_j76u798 wrote

>Not all views of an objective morality pre-existing the state are Lockean

This is certainly true, and it is not my intention to discuss all views of objective morality existing before the state, just yours. Which I insist, is Lockean in its conception and justification, as it sees rights as a natural component of reality that is imposed on agents. It is not surprising, considering (as I'm sure you know), Kant's philosophy was largely a response to the Empiricist school Locke belonged to, and he operated from largely the same groundwork as they did. Kant's view is, in the way that matters for this discussion, Lockean, and it is definitely (even more so than your view) not a social contract based view. Thus, my previous argument, that your justifications are not applicable to your view, still stands regardless of whether you personally trace your inspiration to Kant or Locke.

8

contractualist OP t1_j76x6oe wrote

I argue that there are no moral facts outside of a hypothetical contractual procedure, Locke argues that there are. That is how I am not a Lockean.

2

DeusAxeMachina t1_j76yz57 wrote

If your contractual procedure is hypothetical - a thought experiment for the philosopher to discover rights, then your position is simply that moral rights exist in nature, the same as Locke.

5

contractualist OP t1_j7713h7 wrote

Not discover, create. And there would not be rights outside of this procedure. This is discussed in the article: " it’s reason that leads us to develop the universal moral principles which make up the social contract." And these moral principles are the basis of our rights.

3

DeusAxeMachina t1_j772hgc wrote

For a procedure to create something it must be actual, not hypothetical. If what you call a "social contract" is nothing but an expression of reason, then, again, that's just a Lockean view and the term "social contract" is misappropriated.

Like I said before, your position is self-inconsistent as it tries to use social contract based justifications without including an actual social contract, but simply "something else" (rationality) that you use the words "social contract" for.

6

contractualist OP t1_j773kk0 wrote

I've addressed hypothetical consent here. Summary: You can't have moral principles of actual consent without reference to the social contract, which relies on hypothetical consent. Actual consent depends on hypothetical consent.

3

DeusAxeMachina t1_j774byz wrote

This does not answer the problem. Noting that consent is based on underlying principles doesn't do anything to give authority to hypothetical consent, nor is hypothetical consent the only possible value to base actual consent on.

All you've done is to (again) reduce yourself to a Lockean position in more steps, as the law that you base rights on is agent-independent. And so, the social contract based justifications you give in the article still aren't applicable, and the terminology used is still misappropriated.

4

contractualist OP t1_j775718 wrote

I've already addressed why the social contract has moral authority in the above-linked pieces, as well as why I am not a Lockean.

1

DeusAxeMachina t1_j775ott wrote

You've done neither in regards to this specific understanding (or rather, simply changing the meaning of a term) of "social contracts".

Your arguments do not fit the position you're arguing for, as they imply an actual contract and not Lockean rights in a poor disguise.

6

contractualist OP t1_j77h10a wrote

Social contract theory has never referred to an actual, material, morally binding agreement. No social contract theorist has argued this. Rather, it is a very common misconception and mischaracterization of the argument. I'd recommend reading the above posted articles that develop this contractualist view. Keep in mind that you're addressing a strawman.

2

DeusAxeMachina t1_j77j9tw wrote

Of course it has. Implicit consent (and other less popular "consent replacements") has been an argued position since Rousseau's time.

I've skimmed over the articles you posted and haven't seen anything to suggest that the view I ascribed to you is inaccurate.

1

contractualist OP t1_j77l766 wrote

Implicit consent is not actual consent as you refer to above. Only Locke has made a serious argument for implicit consent, which contractualists have not adopted. Social contract theory takes after Kant and Rawls. Again, why this social contract theory is not Lockean but Kantian.

1

DeusAxeMachina t1_j77mwpr wrote

This is outright false. Locke saw rights as God given natural facts, not based on any kind of consent, implicit or otherwise. You are talking nonsense.

3

contractualist OP t1_j77ng5a wrote

See here for Locke on tacit consent. Again, contractualists don't take either an actual or implicit consent view. This is a misunderstanding of the philosophy.

0

DeusAxeMachina t1_j77nwun wrote

This is Locke's argument for Political Authority, not natural rights.

There is no misunderstanding, the view is internally inconsistent

2

contractualist OP t1_j77p45i wrote

Yes, this is the only argument made for implicit consent and its not even applied to moral philosophy (I'm not even sure how implicit consent would apply in that case). Again, contractualists have never used either actual or implicit consent, and their failure to do so isn't Lockean. To attribute this view onto them is a blatant misunderstanding. But if you know of any social contract theorists that rely on those ideas of consent, I'd be curious to know.

0

DeusAxeMachina t1_j77po2j wrote

Try Hobbes.

Contractualists don't rely on either type of consent. They try to make rights do things only an argument from consent could jusify. The conception of rights and justifications don't fit each other. Thus, internally inconsistent.

1

contractualist OP t1_j77qjhw wrote

Hobbes never relied on actual consent either. And yes they do, because you can't declare rights that impose duties onto others without a reasonable justification that others can reasonably accept. And this is not Locke's view of rights.

0

DeusAxeMachina t1_j77r0jo wrote

It's not a Lockean justification for rights, yet contractualists use is to justify a Lockean conception of what natural rights are (moral facts). You are either not properly distinguishing between Lockean arguments and Lockean conclusions, or you really do not see the incoherency between the justification and the idea that it is meant to support. Either way, the inconsistency remains.

1