It helps to substitute "war economy" with "full mobilization" of the war effort in Germany itself. That includes measures like mandatory employment for German women and the broadening of rationing as Speer directed what had been protected resources to keeping up arms production.

An ongoing, related question is why did the Allied bombing effort end up being so diffused as to targets and tactics? The Air Forces bitterly resisted the tactical use of bomb resources to attack French transportation infrastructure until Eisenhower threatened to quit in the build up to Overlord. Also, the industrial targets used in manufacturing were easy for the Germans to disperse. The one campaign that truly was hurting the Axis was against her oil production. I've read some felt had it been more of an overall priority Germany could not have fielded armies even with synthetic replacements in POL.

The German population was not mobilised like the Brits and Russians, for example. Women did not usually go to work in factories and some luxury goods were still being produced.

Also, they had somewhat warped priorities as they preferred to put a lot of resources into the Holocaust (and other chimerical fantasies) rather than use those resources in the war effort.

Yeah, you are correct to notice those contradictions. The answer is simple: the narrative that "Germany didnt mobilize until it was too late" is arguably largely false. I recommend you read Wages of Destruction by Adam Tooze. It gives a good overview of Germany's economy during the war, and it was quite a bombshell when it first came out because he debunks many repeated myths. He basically argues that Germany even at the beginning of the war was pretty close to being "maxed out" - there wasn't much more they could've done.

Its been years since I read the book, but as I recall, during the prewar years, Germany was mobilizing basically as quickly as it reasonably could. Even in these prewar years, Germany was already running into resource and infrastructure limitations - like the trains were getting bogged down and such.

For example, there is the often repeated claim that Germany refused to mobilize its women fully to get them working in factories. Problem: the workforce participation rate of German women is over 50% in 1939, which is higher than the equivalent figure for British and American women at full mobilization in 1945! (well, technically, America never actually mange to reached its full mobilization potential before war ended). I believe the figure for Britain circa 1939 was less than 33%. In terms of women, the Western allies were arguably less mobilized than Germany throughout the entirety of the war. The reason for this is, most of those German women worked in the farms (whereas the allies were able to put their women in factories - so yes, the allies technically had more women in the factories, but that isnt the full picture). Pull those women out of farms to put them into factories, and the British blockade will starve Germany like it did in WW1. Britain got a large chunk of their food overseas and America had the most efficient agriculture sector in the world, so they didnt have this limitation.

As for the oft repeated claim of Speer pulling a miracle, kinda. He did organize things more efficiently, but many of the "miracles" that are commonly credited to him were years in the making. Getting armament production setup and going is a long term process, and it just so happens that that stuff finally came online at around the same time Speer took charge, so it makes his efforts seem more impressive than it already is.

Could German industry have done things better? Yes, with hindsight, there were a ton of things that could've been improved, you could point to this thing or that thing. But you could also say the exact same things about the allies. Tooze basically argues that in the big picture, in the macroeconomic level, and considering that this is the largest industrial war in human history, Germany did their best right from the beginning, and there wasn't a whole of "slack" left that the Germans could've tapped into.

There’s a pretty good documentary series (two episdoes) that explores the German economy during the Nazi period. “Blood Money” I saw it on curiosity stream but it may be elsewhere.

>The German population was not mobilised like the Brits and Russians, for example. Women did not usually go to work in factories

The German population was actually more mobilized than the Brits and Americans in terms of percentage of women working (>50% Germany versus <33% British/American circa 1939). They did not work in the factories as much as the allies because the vast majority of them were working in (relatively inefficient) farms.

Were they specifically sent to the farms, like the Farm Girls, or were they actually already living in rural communities? Also, the war started in 1939 (1941 for the USA and USSR) so it might not be the best year to use. What was the mob. rate in 1944?

the german economy before the war did not have enough oil to mobilize further. After the war started there was a chronic oil shortage in the axis powers

Not to mention that Germany's total war economy drive in 1943 involved things like 1) stripping underutilized factories in occupied countries that were resource-starved from their machinery and tools, 2) targeted forced labour razzias in industrial areas in occupied countries to obtain capable metal workers etc, and 3) using concentration camp infrastructure to run factories (e.g. Neuengamme had 92 subcamps attached to factories, i.a. assembling military vehicles). That's a part of 'full mobilization potential' not considered for the Allies.

Western Germany and Austria had a lot of small farms. When the men went to war, the women (and the old and the very young) replaced them. They were critical to the supply of food and other materials. From early in the war Germany drafted labour from Occupied Europe for farm work (and much else - they ended with over 11 million slave labourers).

The ratio of military expenditure to national income one year after entry into war was only higher in the Soviet Union (60% in 1942 for SU vs. 40% in 1940 for Germany), Germany expected to defeat them soon, and Germany at that point in time (June 1942) already matched them at 60% in its third year of participation in war. Germany moreover already spent 20% several years before the war started. Not exactly a situation in which Germany was very urgently considering losing a war of attrition.

A major factor is that Germany had occupied countries to exploit, and due to economic blockades had almost full control over availability of raw resources for production. They had those companies by the balls anyway: they could only produce if resources were prioritized for their use. On the output side you can then keep behaving as if business goes as usual.

There are similar input control factors in play for US industry, but more subtly: Dutch colony Suriname was for instance the biggest supplier of aluminium ore to the US, so it was easy for the government in exile to 'prioritize' it for use by US factories that built warplanes. The British government had similar options for regulating industry through its colonial exports to the US. US industry was pushed into war mode before the US government started pulling on it.

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> in peacetime the German economy is already on a heavy war footing.

This is propaganda by the Allies before and after the war.

Recall that the Versailles Treaty crippled and excessively limited the German military in the 1920s. So the Germans did a lot of catching up in the 1930s and eagerly bragged about this in news films. In fact, much of the logistics in the invasion of Poland was via horses though we see the films of mechanized/tanks. Speer explained that there was a reluctance to fully mobilize in part because the German leadership was very sensitive to keeping consumer goods going to the public and in part because they thought they could negotiate from a position of strength after Poland -- not anticipating a full fledged scorched-earth unconditional-surrender war over a country far from the UK and France. While at a train station, Goebbels complained about seeing upper-class German women wearing furs riding in 1st class returning from vacations in Italy as late as 1943 while the soldiers being shipped out wait sitting on the cold concrete. That's when (plus considering the defeat in Stalingrad shocked everyone) he made his "Total War" speech and war production accelerated by Speer. Look at war production output charts comparing 1938 through 1944, and it is clear as night and day supporting my argument.

>The fact that more women were not mobilized for war work is some¬
>
>times taken as one more symptom of the inability of the Nazi regime to
>
>demand sacrifices from the German population. In this respect it has
>
>often been contrasted to Britain, where an increase in female partici¬
>
>pation in the workforce was the key to sustaining the war effort. Such
>
>comparisons, however, are completely misleading, since they ignore the
>
>fact that the labour market participation of German women in 1939
>
>was higher than that reached by Britain and the United States even at
>
>the end of the war. In 1939, a third of all married women in Germany
>
>were economically active and more than half of all women between the
>
>ages of 15 and 60 were in work. As a result, women made up more than
>
>a third of the German workforce before the war started, compared to a
>
>female share of only a quarter in Britain. A year later, the share of
>
>German women in the native workforce stood at 41 per cent, compared
>
>to less than 30 per cent in Britain. Not surprisingly, over the following
>
>years Britain caught up. But even in 1944 the participation rate for
>
>British women between the ages of 15 to 65 was only 41 per cent, as
>
>against a minimum of 51 per cent in Germany already in 1939....As we have seen, the burden of maintaining the small peasant farms thatdominated German agriculture fell disproportionately on women'sshoulders. And as farm men were recruited away for the war, this burdengrew ever more arduous. In areas such as Wuerttemberg and Bavaria,with dense populations of peasant farms, female workforce participationrates already exceeded 60 per cent in 1939. It goes without saying thatby sustaining the food supply, Germany's farm women provided anindispensable service to the Nazi war effort.But, even allowing for this difference in economic structure, the German level of mobilization was greater than that in Britain. In Berlin, a major centre of both industrial and service sector employment, with virtually no farm workers, 53 per cent of women were at work in 1939. The same was true of the eastern industrial hub of Saxony. Even in the port towns of Hamburg and Bremen or the heavy industrial centres of the Ruhr, where the occupational structure was particularly unfavourable to female employment, 40 per cent of women of working age had jobs, matching the national average for Britain at the end of the war.

- Wages of Destruction, page 357 and 358
Edit: apologies for formatting

Well for one thing some of the things mentioned couldn't have been done earlier in the war. Pillaging other countries couldn't happen before those countries were invaded. The heavy use of slave labor pushed by Speer couldn't have happened without that pool of slave labor. And so forth.

And despite all that germany was still being heavily out produced by the allies.

As early as the Spanish Civil War, Germany assisted as an "anti-communist" measure. He also took that opportunity to show off recent developments in Germans weaponry in combat situations.

The results were impressive, and were key to convincing the British to back off after Germany took western Czechoslovakia.

rearmament happened in semi normal ways via giving contracts to companies, allow bidding. Do not check the production processes. This was all still done under the blanket of a normal economy (though the Nazis incurred massive debt that necessitated a war)

Total war footing of WW1 and WW2 implied the military administration / Nazi regime taking over all means of production to gear everything for the war effort e. By 1917/18 that meant intentionally stripping the agrarian sectors of manpower and resources to fuel the army for a last push (which meant requisiting last horses, drafting formerly essential workers and prioritizing the army for food supplies over food for the civilian population). Which in the end caused famine and shortages and a collapse at the home front.

The Nazis were very afraid of such a thing happening if it looked like they would repeat that until late into the war so they tried to maintain a facade of supplying basic goods normally.

So one can say they were already funneling lots of money into the military before WW2, more than the economy could afford, but various levers were left untouched until somewhere after Barbarossa failed.

Case in point for Barbarossa they still ordered tanks and planes normally and did not press for elevated production numbers, thinking it would be over like France anyway.

So sure, Germany had a more militarized economy than the western allies before WW2, but it did not activate all available levers necessary a totalitarian regime has available (see Soviet Union) until after their invasion of the Soviet Union failed.

>In fact, any economic growth and prosperity during the "Golden Years" is usually attributed to this massive rearmament drive.

"Usually"? I would question that assumption. In fact, the German "Golden Years" happened in the 20s, fuelled by western capital & lowering/restructuring/cancelling reparations and more importantly, before the nazis had taken over. And while some rearmament was going on, it was not a key factor in the economic growth of the era.

I meant Nazi Golden years. Or the "Good Years" who many who lived in the Third Reich call the mid 1930s. All associated with the economic prosperity during that period.

The narrative that Germany's war economy started too late, in 1943 with Albert Speer, is based on the idea that the German economy was not fully mobilized for total war until that point. However, as you have pointed out, there are contradictions to this narrative. The Nazi-led economy, as early as 1933, was predominantly focused on rearmament. The German economy invested heavily in synthetic resource production and rationed crucial resources, similar to the Allied war economies. Additionally, the Wehrmacht exploited the economies of occupied countries to sustain the German war effort.

It is true that Hitler did not want a repeat of 1918, when the collapse of the home front contributed to the defeat of Germany. He sought to avoid this by building up his forces before general war broke out and by maintaining a certain level of economic prosperity during the "Golden Years" through rearmament drive. However, it is also true that the German economy was not fully mobilized for total war until 1943, when Albert Speer took over as Minister of Armaments and Munitions and implemented a number of measures to increase the efficiency and output of the German war economy.

One possible explanation for the coexistence of these two narratives is that while the German economy was heavily focused on rearmament and had some war-time characteristics, it was not fully mobilized for total war. This means that the German economy was not fully dedicated to the war effort, and many resources were not being used to their fullest potential. Furthermore, the Nazi regime was not willing to fully implement total war measures that would have required a complete mobilization of the economy and society. Additionally, the exploitation of occupied countries economies was not enough to sustain the German war effort.

Point been made is about Germany doing total mobilization of economy late, not that Germany did not switch economy to military footing. Those are too different things. Or it other words it's not about Germany not mobilizing it's economy, but rather about Germany not mobilizing it to the maximum.

Essentially claim is that Germany did not do maximum it could and did not use all resources it could to maximize military production earlier in the war. And that's evidenced by the fact that later in the war Germany indeed did it.