The narrative that Germany's war economy started too late, in 1943 with Albert Speer, is based on the idea that the German economy was not fully mobilized for total war until that point. However, as you have pointed out, there are contradictions to this narrative. The Nazi-led economy, as early as 1933, was predominantly focused on rearmament. The German economy invested heavily in synthetic resource production and rationed crucial resources, similar to the Allied war economies. Additionally, the Wehrmacht exploited the economies of occupied countries to sustain the German war effort.

It is true that Hitler did not want a repeat of 1918, when the collapse of the home front contributed to the defeat of Germany. He sought to avoid this by building up his forces before general war broke out and by maintaining a certain level of economic prosperity during the "Golden Years" through rearmament drive. However, it is also true that the German economy was not fully mobilized for total war until 1943, when Albert Speer took over as Minister of Armaments and Munitions and implemented a number of measures to increase the efficiency and output of the German war economy.

One possible explanation for the coexistence of these two narratives is that while the German economy was heavily focused on rearmament and had some war-time characteristics, it was not fully mobilized for total war. This means that the German economy was not fully dedicated to the war effort, and many resources were not being used to their fullest potential. Furthermore, the Nazi regime was not willing to fully implement total war measures that would have required a complete mobilization of the economy and society. Additionally, the exploitation of occupied countries economies was not enough to sustain the German war effort.