The ratio of military expenditure to national income one year after entry into war was only higher in the Soviet Union (60% in 1942 for SU vs. 40% in 1940 for Germany), Germany expected to defeat them soon, and Germany at that point in time (June 1942) already matched them at 60% in its third year of participation in war. Germany moreover already spent 20% several years before the war started. Not exactly a situation in which Germany was very urgently considering losing a war of attrition.

A major factor is that Germany had occupied countries to exploit, and due to economic blockades had almost full control over availability of raw resources for production. They had those companies by the balls anyway: they could only produce if resources were prioritized for their use. On the output side you can then keep behaving as if business goes as usual.

There are similar input control factors in play for US industry, but more subtly: Dutch colony Suriname was for instance the biggest supplier of aluminium ore to the US, so it was easy for the government in exile to 'prioritize' it for use by US factories that built warplanes. The British government had similar options for regulating industry through its colonial exports to the US. US industry was pushed into war mode before the US government started pulling on it.