thefuzzylogic t1_it8v00b wrote
Reply to comment by [deleted] in I read The Coming of the Third Reich by Richard J Evans and now I'm terrified by Rymbeld
>In the modern U.S., there is no meaningful level of objection to contraception.
Just because it's not popular doesn't mean it won't happen. Depending on the poll, something like 70-80% of Americans think abortion should be safe and legal, yet a nationwide abortion ban is a serious possibility if the GOP achieves a majority in both houses of Congress next month.
The Dobbs opinion specifically called out a number of other "bedroom privacy" precedents including Obergefell v Hodges (equal marriage), Lawrence v Texas (sodomy laws), and Griswold v Connecticut (contraception for unmarried couples) as being decided using the same reasoning that they overturned in Dobbs. They tried to soften this by stating that the Dobbs decision only applies to abortion cases because abortion involves the rights of "potential life", but that won't stop the Christian Nationalists from teeing up test cases that seek to declare foetal personhood and/or outlaw hormonal contraception and IUDs as "abortifacients", especially if Roberts retires or dies and is replaced by another Federalist Society hack.
But don't just take my word for it. In his concurrence, Justice Thomas says the quiet part out loud, explaining that the "this is only about abortion" claim in the majority opinion actually means that the court should reconsider all the "substantive due process" precedents as I described above:
>The Court’s abortion cases are unique, see ante, at 31–32, 66, 71–72, and no party has asked us to decide “whether our entire Fourteenth Amend- ment jurisprudence must be preserved or revised,” McDon- ald, 561 U. S., at 813 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). Thus, I agree that “[n]othing in [the Court’s] opinion should be under- stood to cast doubt on precedents that do not concern abor- tion.” Ante, at 66. For that reason, in future cases, we should reconsider all of this Court’s substantive due process precedents, includ- ing Griswold, Lawrence, and Obergefell. Because any sub- stantive due process decision is “demonstrably erroneous,” Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 7), we have a duty to “correct the error” established in those precedents, Gamble v. United States, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (THOMAS, J., con- curring) (slip op., at 9). After overruling these demonstra- bly erroneous decisions, the question would remain whether other constitutional provisions guarantee the myr- iad rights that our substantive due process cases have gen- erated. For example, we could consider whether any of the rights announced in this Court’s substantive due process cases are “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
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