Expensive_Winter_864 t1_ja6bd2f wrote on February 27, 2023 at 3:59 AM

Late to the AMA, what effects do you think troop and battle space rotations had on the "winnability" of the Afghan war? What challenges did these rotations present for you as contractors and the continuity brain trusts in your AOs? Do you think the government and/or the military has the ability to internalize the lessons learned from the entirety of the Afghan war? Which INT is the most accurate, timely, and reliable? How would you like to solve the gaps between tactical collectors/analysts, strategic analysts, and decision makers?

theboardwalkpodcast OP t1_ja7de4r wrote on February 27, 2023 at 11:46 AM

Deployment cycles certainly had an effect on the war's winnability. Wesley Morgan's book The Hardest Place directly addresses the difficulties faced in the Pech Valley due to our rotations. We consider theater-level changeover to be a bigger issue. A new ISAF commander would show up and they would have a new plan, which means it's time to scrap the old one. Any progress made over the previous year would be halted to pivot to the new priorities. And an even bigger contributing factor, probably the biggest, to the war being lost was the inability to build a stable government. That responsibility fell on the State Department.